


A HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Douglas A. Howard




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A HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Douglas A. Howard



A History of the Ottoman Empire

Covering the full history of the Ottoman Empire, from its genesis in post-Mongol Eurasia to its dissolution after the Great War in Europe, this book takes a holistic approach, considering the Ottoman worldview – what it was, how it came together, and how it fell apart. Douglas A. Howard stresses the crucial role of the Ottoman sultans and their extended household; discusses the evolution of the empire's fiscal model; and analyzes favorite works of Ottoman literature; emphasizing spirituality, the awareness of space and time, and emotions, migration, violence, disease, and disaster. Following how people spent their time, their attitudes towards authority, how they made their money, and their sense of humor and sense of beauty, this illustrated textbook is an essential resource for graduate, and advanced undergraduate, courses on the history of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East, Islamic history, and the history of early modern Europe. The book includes over eighty illustrations, maps and textboxes.

Douglas A. Howard is Professor of History at Calvin College, where he has taught since 1988. He is the author of *The History of Turkey* (2nd ed., 2016), and has published articles on Ottoman military and literary history in journals such as *Acta Orientalia*, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, *Fides et Historia*, *Journal of Asian History*, and *Journal of Turkish Studies*. He is also a former editor of *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*.

Advanced Praise

“At last – a survey of Ottoman history that covers the entire 600-plus years of the empire’s history, written by a true expert with command of both primary and secondary sources, yet designed as an accessible textbook. In lucid, often lively, prose, Douglas Howard treats not only the Ottoman Empire’s political history but social, economic, religious, and intellectual developments, as well, incorporating imperial capital and provinces, elites and commoners, dispassionate analysis and telling anecdotes. The maps, illustrations, lists of rulers, and “box” features make this book particularly user-friendly. This is the Ottoman history textbook many of us have been waiting for.”

Jane Hathaway, Professor of History, Ohio State University

“Using “ruins” as a metaphor, Doug Howard takes us on a fascinating journey through the political, spiritual and literary world of the Ottomans, heirs to ancient civilizations and steeped in the sense of the divine. Amply illustrated with maps and photographs, many taken by the author, this compelling narrative should become a classroom standard.”

Virginia Aksan, Chair of History, McMaster University

“Douglas Howard’s scholarly and engaging history presents the sprawling Ottoman Empire in all its complexity. Of particular value is his use of the voices of Ottoman poets and chroniclers to detail the religious rhetorics and spiritual sensibilities that animated the Ottoman imperial imagination.”

Palmira Brummett, Professor Emeritus, Brown University

“Howard’s *The History of the Ottoman Empire* offers an innovative approach that should appeal to general as well as academic audiences. Its unique organization, with each chapter taking up one century by

the Islamic calendar, places emphasis on the shifting temperament of the times. Intertwined with the usual politics, economy, and war are spiritual concerns, poetic sensibilities, and off-beat stories of individuals.”

Leslie P. Peirce, *Professor of History, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University*

“This is a beautiful book, not just a history of the Ottoman Empire from beginning to end, but a history of the Ottomans themselves. Without omitting political chronology, institutional evolution, or socio-economic developments, Howard humanizes the Ottomans by foregrounding issues of culture, religion, and identity. He makes them accessible to students and general readers, providing generous translations from Ottoman texts, illustrations, maps, and references. Based on Ottoman sources and a wide selection of recent scholarly research, the book counters stereotypes about terrible Turks, harems, forced conversion, and decline, and introduces a cast of famous and lesser-known characters, their deeds and motivations. It doesn’t do everything--military buffs and gender historians, for instance, will be disappointed--but what it does, it does superbly well. At last we have a history of the Ottoman Empire than can be assigned in the classroom without apology or regret.”

Linda Darling, *Professor of History, University of Arizona*

“Professor Howard has produced most profound study of the development and dismemberment of the Ottoman enterprise. His book combines great learning with remarkable insight. Unlike so much academic prose, it is well and clearly written, and the work also displays a rare humility. The book is as much new research as it is a synthesis of what scholars have retrieved. I shall require this book of students: it is a great book from a great scholar.”

Rudi Lindner, *Professor of History, University of Michigan*

“Douglas Howard’s book provides a fluent narrative of Ottoman history imbued with often-neglected cultural, social, intellectual,

spatial, and architectural references. It is a long-awaited textbook on Ottoman history from the genesis of the empire to its demise with abundant primary sources and updated scholarly input of the last three decades. Uniquely crafted by one of the most erudite voices of modern Ottoman history, Howard's book will be a great toolbox for undergraduate and graduate students and for those of us who teach Ottoman history for years to come."

Vefa Erginbas, Assistant Professor, Providence College

A History of the Ottoman Empire

Douglas A. Howard



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS



University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia

4843/24, 2nd Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, Delhi – 110002, India

79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521898676

doi: 10.1017/9781139026062

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First published 2017

Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-89867-6 Hardback

ISBN 978-0-521-72730-3 Paperback

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To my father, Frank Alton Howard, and to the memory of my mother,
Theodora A. Christacopulos Howard.

Many a book I borrowed from your shelves.

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Acknowledgments

It gives me pleasure to express my thanks to the numerous colleagues and friends whose support and encouragement I enjoyed during the several years of my work on this book.

Calvin College, my professional and intellectual home, provided strong institutional support throughout the project. A book written by me about worldview is a book that comes out of many years of teaching and research with my colleagues at Calvin College, where worldview is a central focus of ongoing discussion and debate. The college provided ample support for research and scholarship, and a friendly work environment. A sabbatical leave was indispensable near the beginning of the project, and in subsequent years I benefited from reduced teaching loads by the Calvin Research Fellowships program. The Office of the Provost at Calvin College supported a study trip to Cairo and Jerusalem in 2007. The faculty travel budget paid for attendance at several conferences, notably the second international Conference on the Cultural History of Emotions in Pre-Modernity, in Istanbul in 2011. My colleagues in the Calvin History Department, friends each one, read chapters and gave critical feedback, put up with my complaining, and refused to let me take myself too seriously. Bruce Berglund empathized at a low point. Bert de Vries shared his great wisdom. My department chairs, William Van Vugt and Will Katerberg, found ways to arrange my teaching schedule so as to maximize my energies. Will Katerberg suggested I read William Reddy's *The Navigation of Feeling*. My deans, Cheryl Brandsen, then Dean of Contextual Disciplines, and Matthew Walhout, Dean of Research and Scholarship, listened to my needs and backed my work.

The maps that appear in the book were all created by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda of Calvin's geography department. Victoria Seaburg of Calvin's office of instructional graphics carefully edited many of the images for publication. And since, while Calvin College has an excellent library it does not have very many books in Turkish, the unflappable professionalism of interlibrary loan librarian Kathy Struck was vital. A grant from the Calvin College Alumni Association paid for fees to republish several photographs and textual excerpts.

Six months before Marigold Acland suggested the project to me and promised the unstinting support of Cambridge University Press, the main idea for such a book was brought to mind by experiences in Turkey in spring 2006, on a trip with President Gaylen Byker and a group of loyal Calvin College supporters. In Turkey I began a wonderful collaboration with two superb guides, Ender Tan and Orhan Sezener, whose friendship and ideas I have appreciated, besides their work with Calvin College students.

The first two chapters were written during a sabbatical spent as a fellow of Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study. I received beautiful lodgings in the Buda Castle district, computer access, and the amiable company of other scholars engaged in a wide variety of research projects in the sciences and the humanities. Géza Dávid graciously put the library and other resources of the Turkish Chair at Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest at my disposal, and Pál Fodor and Marcus Köhbach gave crucial support to my proposal. From Budapest I was able to consult with new colleagues at a meeting of the Comité International des Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes in Zaghreb, and to make research visits to Sarajevo and Sofia, as well as to Turkey. A National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend in 2012 enabled research in Turkey and the writing of [chapter 5](#). The Istanbul branch of the American Research Institute in Turkey, and its staff and director Tony Greenwood, provided an amiable setting for research. Megan Berglund of the Development Office of Calvin College

shepherded the grant proposal to success and patiently prodded me to write more clearly. The research for [chapter 7](#) was done at the Library of Congress in spring 2012 while I served as Director of the Calvin College Semester in Washington, DC. I was helped by the staff of the manuscript reading room, and by the staff of the photographs and prints division reading room.

I would like to thank my colleagues in the field of Turkish and Ottoman studies for their love of their work and their deep concern over how Ottoman history should be understood. We are a comparatively small group of scholars and friends who mostly know each other, and we stand on the shoulders of earlier generations. My position in the ongoing debates in our field should be immediately apparent to specialists, and traceable in the footnotes. The work of four giants in the field set the conceptual foundation without which the book could not have been written. Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj's independent thinking, exemplified in a seminal 1974 article "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households" and his book *Formation of the Modern State* (1992) cleared a path to reimagine Ottoman history outside of narratives of rise and fall. Victoria Holbrook's *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance* (1994), and Walter Andrews's work, in *Poetry's Voice, Society's Song* (1985), and in his conference papers and collaborative translations since then, convincingly put poetry at the center of any discussion of Ottoman culture. Ariel Salzmann's reinterpretation of the Ottoman fiscal model in her doctoral dissertation, and in her article "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire" (1993), broke down the oversimplified centralization vs. decentralization dichotomy.

Several people shared their thoughts and gave their time generously to conversations about this project as it developed. Through numerous discussions, sometimes spirited, often informal and seemingly unimportant, and disagreements and friendships, in subtle and intangible ways, their insights have informed this book. Virginia

Aksan read the entire manuscript and offered valuable and challenging comments. Géza Dávid read several chapters, corrected many mistakes, and offered consistently good counsel. I also remember Gábor Ágoston, Virginia Aksan, Walter Andrews, Palmira Brummett, John Curry, Linda Darling, Suraiya Faroqhi, Cornell Fleischer, Pál Fodor, Jane Hathaway, David Holt, Paul Kaldjian, Reşat Kasaba, Hasan Kayalı, Rudi Lindner, Nenad Moačanin, Victor Ostapchuk, Leslie Peirce, Amy Singer, Bill Wood, Madeline Zilfi, and the late Donald Quataert. Where I have failed to understand you properly, I apologize. And all the mistakes that still made it into print despite all these filters, those are my own fault.

Several colleagues kindly shared materials to which otherwise I would have had no access, including their unpublished research. I owe special thanks to Virginia Aksan, Snježana Buzov, Bert de Vries, Pál Fodor, Gottfried Hagen, Tijana Krstić, Vjeran Kursar, Rudi Lindner, Nenad Moačanin, Victor Ostapchuk, and Tahir Nakıp. I also benefited from the unpublished senior theses of several undergraduate students at Calvin College, including Will Clark, Spencer Cone, Lauren DeVos, Melanie Janssens, Ryan Jensen, Abby Nielsen, Emma Slager, and Josh Speyers. Thanks also for the insightful observations of Nathan Hunt in answer to a final exam question.

Thank you, Elisabeth and Gottfried Hagen, Carolyn and Dan Goffman, Ágota and Géza Dávid, for your friendship and hospitality over many years. Thank you also to Telle and Gustav Bayerle for many lessons.

Thank you, Sandy, for everything.

Introduction

The famous Turkish Armenian photojournalist Ara Güler has told the story of how he was sent to cover the opening of a big new dam on the Meander River, in Turkey, in 1958. He came down from Istanbul, and the provincial governor put a car and driver at his disposal for the three-hour drive to the event. The photoshoot ran late. On the return trip, his driver claimed to know a shortcut through the hills, but they got lost, the sun went down, and they could not find their way in the dark. Seeing a light ahead, they pulled up to a village coffeehouse to ask if there might be a place to spend the night. As his eyes adjusted to the dim light inside Güler saw, not tables in the coffeehouse, but instead that the men were drinking and playing cards on the tops of ancient pillars.¹

Next morning Güler walked around taking photographs. The village, called Geyre, was entirely built amid the ruins of an ancient Roman city. “I’ve never seen a stranger thing in all my life,” he recalled. “People say ‘ruins are ruins,’ but this was something else altogether – the past and the present living on top of one another.”² Güler’s photos caused quite a stir when he took them back to Istanbul and showed his editors. An American magazine wanted the pictures and commissioned a story. Güler suggested it be written by the eminent archaeologist Kenan Erim, of New York University. Over the course of the next three decades, Professor Erim went on to raise funding and excavate the site – but only after relocating the entire village to a new site, a little over a mile away. To visit Aphrodisias today is to be astounded at the extent of the ruins, the rich remains preserved amongst a site with extraordinary natural beauty, and the attractive museum nearby that displays many of the excavated artefacts. Yet with the village gone and the excavations turned into a major tourist attraction, the “Aphrodisias of life,” as Güler described it, where people put the ruins to use in their daily lives, was gone. The site, he noticed, was now history.³

Güler's 1950s photographs identified elements of an approach to life, a worldview, that is the subject of this book. His photographs did not give nostalgic snapshots of rural life for an urban audience, or patronizing juxtapositions of a supposed village timelessness with a supposed modern historical consciousness. Rather, the images identified the villagers' familiarity with ancient remains, their easy acceptance of the naturalness of living amid the ruins of the past that occupied their everyday landscape. The attitude contrasts with an impulse to collect and display ruins, to cordon off and institutionalize them for purposes of preservation or pedagogy.

Aphrodisias, the ancient city, was a major focus for the Aphrodite cult in Roman times and a center of the arts. Christianized, in late antiquity it was made a bishopric. Beginning around AD 1000, migrating Turkmen tribes subjected Aphrodisias to violent raids, and the town slowly emptied and was abandoned.⁴ Yet in the cadastral records of the Ottoman Empire, the village is there, called Gerye. Not in the first survey records of the region, from the 1460s,⁵ but in the survey done in 1530 the village is there, with a market.⁶ Sometime in the intervening decades between the two Ottoman cadastral surveys, the ruin was resettled. In being set amid the ruins Gerye was exemplary but probably not unique. Ottoman history, the subject of this book, was staged in ancient lands with long pasts, bordering major waterways, the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. Ruins lay everywhere across this landscape.



Figure I.1 Villagers in the fields at Aphrodisias, 1958.

Photograph by Ara Güler. Used by permission of Magnum Photos.

Ruins as Metaphor

To writers of the Ottoman era, ruins symbolized loss, but something greater than lost civilizations or the passage of time. Ottoman writers did memorialize the past. In one memorable section of *Book of Supplications*, written about 1500 and a spiritual classic for generations of Ottoman readers, a long line of heroes walks through in a lyrical litany of lost time. The Prophets are there, beginning with Jesus and Moses, and the saints, from the Rightly Guided caliphs to Sufi masters like Rumi. King Darius is there, and Nebuchadnezzar, and the Pharaohs of Egypt. The masters of Hellenistic and Indian science are there, including Plato, Aristotle, and Galen, and the whole crowd of heroes from the Persian *Shahnama* (*Book of Kings*), “All dwelling in the foundation of Truth, some joyful, some sorrowful.” It concludes with a lament,

Where are the Caesars who ruled Rome? Where the Khosroes
who commanded the world?

Where are the Caliphs of Islam? Where the Amirs of the
Universe?

Where are the Abbasids and their might? Where the Marwanids
and their authority?

Where are Chinggis and those sons of his? Where those dynasts
and descendants?

Where are the House of Seljuk and its Khans? Where the House
of Osman and its Khakans?

Where are Sultan Mehmed and his power? Where that glory
and awe? Where that strength and might? Where that leap to
the attack? Where the vengeance, the toughness? Where the
majesty, the valor?⁷

Ruins, however, for Ottoman writers, were more than this. Ruins stood for the loss that lay at the heart of everything. When Ottoman

poets wrote of ruins they usually meant the heart, or else a tavern – they were one and the same, and both were sites of ruin. Figani (d. 1532) wrote, “Since that hard hearted one destroyed the province of my heart it appears a ruined city, no stone left upon a stone.” Or Esrar Dede (d. 1796):

In the ruins, in the tavern – what is built endures
Outside – monuments, civilizations, lie collapsed, destroyed.

For Yahya (d. 1644) the ruins lying around in the countryside matched the deserted, bereft state of his heart.

Destroy the dwelling of my heart, don't leave a single stone
standing on a stone.

Do this, and let the travelers call it a ruin.

But to be in ruins was not a bad thing for the poets. As painful as the experience might be, they welcomed it, because it alone offered the possibility of insight into the true nature of things. To be ruined, in a state of total loss – only in such a condition was inner transformation possible, and inner transformation was what life was about. Dissolution was no tragedy, it was the whole point. The dark interior of a tavern, enveloped by the pain of longing and lost love, illuminated the interior of the heart. Slowly getting drunk was like descending into a sleep, but a sleep from which a spiritual awakening was possible. Fuzuli (d. 1556), for instance:

In the corner of this tavern Fuzuli found a treasure of delight
Oh God, this is a holy place, may it never be brought to ruin.⁸

And Revani (d. 1524):

Like the wine bubbles the dervish surrenders his crown to the
drink
and wanders the world, tavern to tavern.⁹

Elements of an Ottoman Worldview

In this book the story of Ottoman history is told as the story of this worldview. In the pages that follow, this book tries to explain what this Ottoman worldview was, how it came together, and how it fell apart. It did not go unchallenged, and dissent was not absent. Yet the fundamental elements of this worldview were shared by all Ottoman communities, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, even though each, and groups within each, might articulate its elements in different fashion in accordance with community traditions. The book describes the Ottoman worldview in three overlapping layers.

The first layer is the Ottoman dynasty, the family of the Ottoman sultans, without which there was no Ottoman Empire and there is no Ottoman history. The residents of the empire shared the perception that there was something special about the Ottoman dynasty, and it was not merely that the Ottoman family enjoyed the longest span of uninterrupted dynastic sovereignty in world history. According to Ottoman writers the sultans possessed *Din ü Devlet*. *Din* was spiritual energy, the capacity to direct and set the conditions for the encounter between the human soul and the Divine. *Devlet* meant charismatic authority, the magical ability to lead, to bring victory and prosperity. The purpose for which these powers were bestowed was to enable the material and spiritual prosperity of the peoples under the dynasty's care. In large part Ottoman "politics" amounts to a description of the relations of the Ottoman peoples to the Ottoman sultans and their extended household. How this worked out in practice did change over time, as the Ottoman family's public persona evolved, and with it definitions of identity, loyalty, and belonging.

A second layer of the Ottoman worldview described below is its understanding of prosperity and success, and appropriate strategies for achieving these. An empire's fiscal model is important, as we have all learned in the last two decades. In building it, however, the Ottoman

dynasty did not consider the “economy” to be an impersonal or independent category, but rather an expression of material success flowing from both dynastic power and spiritual commitments. The Ottoman instinct was usually to leave people alone to make decisions about their well-being. The circumstances of the late agrarian age in which the Ottoman Empire flourished, its existing capacities of transportation and communications technology, made this necessary, but it was also sensible. Imperial rhetoric aside, “absolutism” was not something agrarian age empires could easily enact. The Ottoman government did generate big ideas, and sometimes made intrusive demands under threat of punishment. For sultans and statesmen flush with victory, it was tempting to overreach. The more distant the province, the more likely it was that patience and a willingness to negotiate would have their reward. These were ancient lands, where people knew how to run things.

The third layer of the Ottoman worldview laid out in these pages is the set of spiritual convictions described above. The book gives ample space to Ottoman literature as one means of locating these convictions. As in viewing Ara Güler’s ethereal photographs, it does not take long in reading Ottoman literature to feel the pervasive melancholia that accompanies loss, but also an acceptance of its naturalness in wonder and good humor. The human experience here on this orb, beneath the luminaries and planets rotating in the dome of the seven heavens above, was the experience of change and the pain that comes with it. Some of this pain was the result of ruthless acts of God – earthquakes, epidemics, drought and famine, storms, and fires. Some came, as will be seen, from self-inflicted wounds like war and slavery. Some came from insoluble existential challenges, among which certainly the most enigmatic was the experience of time. And yet for Ottoman writers and readers transitory reality, in all its apparent randomness, ultimately divulged a full description of the Divine. Objects and experiences and events and, especially, each love and loss finally overwhelmed the exterior senses and drove a person

into the darkness, into the tavern of ruins, there to consider his or her unsurprising circumstances and see that others have been there before. People feel comforted in their pain when their lives are seen to conform to archetypal patterns.

Arrangement of the Book

A society's sense of time seems a suitable point at which to enter its worldview. Therefore the story is divided into seven chronological chapters, according to the centuries of the Islamic calendar, the era that began with the hegira of the Prophet Muhammad (AD 622). While there were other calendars also in use in its lands and among its communities, the Ottoman dynasty observed this Islamic calendar and used it as a standard throughout the empire. [Chapter 1](#) begins with the appearance of Osman at the beginning of the eighth Islamic century, and [chapter 7](#) ends with the Ottoman dynasty's demise midway through the fourteenth Islamic century. In this way the book makes two arguments. One is that the drama of history lies precisely in its chronology. People never know what is about to happen; they only know what just happened and that but faintly. Since it is the historian who ultimately tells the tale, in the doing history is inherently anachronistic. The paradox is part of the fun. The other argument made by the book's chronological arrangement is that the experience of time is itself a dimension of the story. No era is more or less important than any other. One human cultural construct that orients people cosmologically and offers them a structure in which to grasp the meaning of their lives is the calendar.

The book's structure engages the Ottoman worldview in two other ways, by using local place names and by using personal names. Place names name the ground that the Ottoman peoples were constantly crossing. They provide the setting of the story and some of the context of events. Even more, they indicate the shape of the Ottoman mental universe; that the Ottomans assumed regional diversity cannot be overstated. They reveled in it. They avoided making master judgments based on generalizations such as "the Ottoman Balkans" – there was no such thing – or "Anatolia," whose current definition also arose quite recently, after the empire's demise. Ottoman writers spoke of

“these well-protected domains” in specific local detail. As for personal names, many of them are perhaps unfamiliar, yet they are nonetheless essential. The book is about people and the decisions they made, the things they wrote and said, how they coped with suffering, the surprises they encountered, and what gave them happiness. The Ottomans liked to document everything, and so the records on which the book is based do indeed name names. Many in the comparatively small Ottoman ruling class of course knew one another, especially those raised together in the palace, but this is not much of an explanation because it is not just the ruling class whose names show up in the records. Common people appear by name too, men and women alike, Christians, Jews, Muslims, and foreigners, in complaints and petitions, court cases, contracts, journals, histories, and the like. These names may try the patience of the uninitiated, but to the properly prepared, Ottoman names often made important information transparent – gender, communal identity, place of origin – besides being sometimes colorful and entertaining. In preserving so many of these names the book attempts to replicate what the Ottoman historical records make abundantly clear, that the plainest expression of the Ottoman worldview was a respect for individuals and both the great and the mundane details of their lives.

Notes

1 The story from *Skylife*, the magazine of Turkish Airlines (October 2009), is reprinted on the Aphrodisias Museum website, <http://www.ozgurguker.com/Turkey/Aphrodisias-Archeology-Museum-Turkey.html>.

2 Quoted at <http://arkeofili.com/?p=2600>, story by Erman Ertuğrul, 16 March 2015. My translation.

3 Quoted at the Freer-Sackler Gallery's online report of a 2014 exhibition of Güler's photographs, "Ara Güler and the Lost City of Aphrodisias," <http://bento.si.edu/from-the-archives/ara-guler-and-the-lost-city-of-aphrodisias/>.

4 Akurgal, *Ancient Civilizations and Ruins*, 171–75.

5 Erdoğan and Bıyık, eds., *T.T. 001/1 M. Numaralı*.

6 166 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri, 459, 464.

7 Sinan Paşa, *Tazarru'nâme*, 117–18, alluding in turn to a passage in Attar's Sufi classic, *Conference of the Birds*, 186. My translation.

8 Examples taken from Andrews, Black, and Kalpaklı, eds., *Ottoman Lyric Poetry*: Figani, no. 19, Yahya, no. 41, Esrar Dede, no. 66, Fuzuli, no. 25. On the tavern imagery, pp. 177–78.

9 Şentürk, *Osmanlı Şiiri Antolojisi*, 151, my translation.

Ottoman Genesis, 1300–1397

The rains were heavy that spring and the Sangarius River overflowed its banks, seeking out its former bed under a long-abandoned bridge. A torrent of mud, silt, and debris spilled along the route, and there the Ottoman Empire began, in the western borderlands of the Mongol world at the dawn of the little ice age, in the month of March at the turn of the eighth Islamic century. Turkish herdsmen, fleeing the rain-ravaged heights with their flocks, were able to bypass the broken Byzantine defenses on the ruined riverbank.¹ Their advance guard surprised a Byzantine force. The emboldened Turks attacked and pillaged. More raids came, and more: a veritable flood. The regular army marched out from Constantinople under orders from the emperor to meet the Turkish threat, but at the plain of Bapheus outside Nikomedia the Turks won a great victory.

Box 1.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Eighth Islamic Century

Osman, d. 1324?

Orhan, 1324–61?

Murad I, 1361?–89

Bayezid I, 1389–1402

Not so fast. One single battle does not an empire make. The earliest surviving Turkish descriptions date only from a hundred years later, by which time memories of how the empire began were closely tied up with opinions about the way things had turned out. And so, loosened from firm historical moorings, the Ottoman founding generation went adrift in eddies of poetry and epic. Even the date is not quite certain. For Ottoman writers this was just as well. They liked

to put it in the year 699 of the hegira of the Prophet Muhammad, as if the Ottoman house fulfilled the hope of the “Renewer of the Age” that was to appear at the dawn of each new century. And what an extraordinary dawn this was – the Islamic year 700 corresponded almost exactly to the Christian year 1300, a remarkable overlapping of eras.

Raids and rushing waters flow from the same verbal source in Turkish, and tears too, from the root *ak-*, and many later writers both Turkish and Greek knew of the pun. “Religion’s reinforcements *rushed* over the infidel,” quipped the Turkish poet Ahmedi,² and the Greek historian Ducas wrote, “If they hear the herald’s voice summoning them to the attack – which in their language is called *akin* – they descend like a *flooding river*, uninvited.”³


The Turkish Flood

Almost nothing is now known of Osman, founder of the House of Osman, the man remembered as the first of the Ottoman sultans. “Osman Bey appeared,” stated a laconic chronograph, later. No one knows when or where he was born, and for a long time not a single artefact existed that could be confidently dated to his lifetime. Now two coins have come to light, one in a private collection in London and the other in the Istanbul Archaeological Museum, inscribed *Osman ibn Ertugrul*.⁴ Even his name is the subject of some controversy. The Greek historian Pachymeres,⁵ who gave us the description of the Sangarius flood and is the one contemporary writer to mention Osman’s name, did not call him Osman at all but rather Ataman. The surprising notion that Osman had another name finds support in two later sources, one an armchair geography written around 1350 in Arabic and the other a biography of the Muslim saint Haji Bektash, circa 1500. Ataman is a Turkish name or maybe Mongol, while Osman is impeccably Muslim, the Turkish form of the Arabic ‘*Uthman* – as in the companion of the Prophet Muhammad, the third Caliph of Islam. This has led to some suspicion that our Osman, or Ataman, the Ottoman, might have been born a pagan, that he may have taken his new name Osman later when he became a Muslim. But if this were true, if Osman were indeed a convert to Islam who changed his name, why would his sons have kept their genuinely Turkish names, who were Muslims beyond any doubt?⁶

From what Pachymeres wrote, about the only thing we can surmise of the Turk he called Ataman is that he was a warrior. With the Sangarius (Sakarya) River raids and the victory at Bapheus, Turkish warriors came from far and wide to join him.⁷ Ataman laid siege to Nicaea and, though he was not able to take the city, subjected the surrounding area to raids, killing many, taking some captive, and scattering the rest. He did take several other fortresses and fortified

Orhan

It is far easier to find contemporary evidence about Orhan, the son, than about Osman, the father. Two of Orhan's inscriptions survive, and copies of three of his trust deeds;¹⁰ he appears by name in Mongol accounting records;¹¹ and he is mentioned in Persian and Arabic sources. Ibn Battuta claimed to have met Orhan, "the greatest of the Turkmens and the richest in wealth, lands and military forces." Orhan "fought with the infidels continually," and moved regularly between his more than one hundred castles, checking that they were in good repair, never staying more than a month in any one place.¹² Ibn Battuta's impression of Orhan as engaged in incessant combat is emphatically supported by Greek writers who left accounts. He and his men took Brusa (Bursa) in 1326 after a long siege, and by the next year he was minting coins there, as a surviving silver piece shows. Nicaea (İznik) fell to Orhan's forces in 1331 and Nicomedia (İznikmid, İzmit) in 1337. Conquest of these three major Greek cities, Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia, made Orhan the master of the whole region of Bithynia.



Map 1.1: Around the Marmara Sea.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

Orhan was only one of many Turkish rulers Ibn Battuta met in his tour of Asia Minor. Turkmen clans fleeing the Mongol invasions supplied the manpower for many an ambitious lord who plundered the river valleys and coasts of the Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean, beginning in the 1290s. Several of them besides Orhan used their armed bands to create rudimentary administrative structures. By 1340 they controlled most of the overland routes and caravan towns of the river valleys and, on the coasts, joined the contest for the ports and shipping lanes between Byzantium and the Italian maritime states. The Turkish lords of these borderlands and their followers seemed coarse and unruly not just to the Greeks but also to the urbane Muslim writers of “Rum,” or Rome, the name given to the upland plateau because it used to be within the Roman Empire. Islamic culture had prevailed there for more than two hundred years under the rule of the Seljuk dynasty,¹³ which had governed a cultured, Persian-influenced kingdom centered at Konya. The newcomers were semi-nomads who proudly spoke southwestern (i.e. Oghuz; see figure 1.3) Turkic languages. Their lifestyle was based on raiding as well as stock breeding and marketing the products of their herds.¹⁴ Their holy men and dervishes were eager to carry Islam into new lands. Vassals of the Mongol rulers of Iran (the Ilkhanids), their appearance was linked to events of the previous century, beyond the horizons of their own memories, when commercial and political relations throughout Southwestern Eurasia had been dramatically disrupted by the Mongol advance.


Violence, Disease, and Calamity

The Mongol destruction of Khwarezm in 1219 had set in motion a forced migration of central Eurasian peoples that affected all the societies west of the Caspian Sea. Among the refugees and migrants were thousands of Turkmens with their families and herds. Their tribal societies were highly mobile and their inherent military potential renowned. The biographies of two great saints, Rumi (a.k.a. Mevlana Jalal al-Din), and Haji Bektash, are both connected with the Mongol violence – the climate change and human misery that lay behind it, and the irruption of millenarian spiritual fervor that ran ahead of it.

By 1260 political fallout from the Mongol incursions had produced three powerful kingdoms in Southwestern Eurasia. Two were Mongol – the Golden Horde in the lower Volga valley and the steppe north of the Black Sea; and the Ilkhanids in Iran, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus, with a capital at Tabriz. The third was the Mamluk Sultanate, founded not by Mongols but by Kipchak Turkish slave officers who overthrew their Ayyubid masters and seized power in Cairo in 1250. The Mamluks ruled Egypt, Arabia, and coastal Syria. Between and around and among these three major kingdoms, from the Danube River to the upper Euphrates and Tigris, dozens of Slavic, Latin, Greek, Armenian, and Turkish nobles and lords, their names long forgotten, engaged in intense and often violent competition for control of the endpoints of the great Eurasian trade routes. These lords were called “emirs” in Turkish, whence the term “emirates” for their petty kingdoms. Among the many Turkish emirs were Osman and Orhan, but the strongest position was held by the Greek noble dynasty of Michael VIII Palaeologus, regent of the Greek Kingdom of Nicaea, who recaptured Constantinople from the Latin crusaders in 1261.

The Byzantine Civil War

The local circumstances in which the small Turkish emirate of Orhan first became a significant factor in this larger world took the form of a dynastic crisis in Byzantium. This crisis cloaked larger issues both within the Orthodox faith tradition and international politics. In the years after the restoration of Greek rule in Constantinople Michael VIII pursued long-term Byzantine security, both through a structure of alliances, with the Kingdom of Hungary, and with the Turks and Mongols of the northern Black Sea steppe, and through union of the Orthodox Church with Rome. To large numbers of the Orthodox, clergy and laity alike, marital union with neighboring dynasties was just so much politics, whether it was with the daughter of the King of Hungary or the daughter of the Tatar Khan. Ecclesiastical union with Rome, however – finalized at the Council of Lyons in 1274 – was repulsive, and Michael's successor Andronicus II (1282–1328) ignored it. Politics did not save Byzantium in the end, but pointed the Church towards the route of its trials and ultimate transfiguration. Andronicus II presided over the paradoxical loss of Byzantine sovereignty and spread of Orthodox revival in the Slavic lands. The Orthodox revival was visible especially in the mystical Hesychast movement, bubbling up from monastic communities. The home of Hesychasm was Mount Athos, where numerous monasteries were located on a peninsula in the Aegean.



Map 1.2: The Aegean rim.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

The conflict broke into open civil war when the reigning emperor died in 1341, leaving 9-year-old John V as heir. The court divided into two factions. On one side, in support of the boy, were his mother the widowed Empress Anne of Savoy, the Greek patriarch, and the grand admiral. They advocated for unification with Rome as a means of strengthening the empire with military assistance, envisioning a Byzantium reconstructed on the model of the Latin maritime merchant states. In this they had the support of many Greek townsmen.¹⁵ On the other side, opposition to the empress and her party was led by the Grand Domestic John Cantacuzenus, a powerful general and military advisor at court. Cantacuzenus had the backing of most of his fellow landed aristocrats in Thrace, as well as Orthodox Christians from all walks of life who opposed union with Rome. Crucially, Cantacuzenus also had the endorsement of the monk Gregory Palamas, leader of the Hesychasts.

Sympathy to Hesychasm formed the spiritual dimension of the dynastic conflict. As a movement of personal renewal, Hesychasm

focused on inward prayer, using the “prayer of the heart” as a meditative exercise. This simple prayer, *Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me*, aroused great controversy. Although Hesychasm had ancient roots in Greek spirituality, its introduction at Mount Athos in the early fourteenth century AD birthed a spiritual revival. When Turkish raids forced a temporary relocation to Salonika in the 1320s, Hesychasm came out of its monkish closet and became a mass movement. Critics attacked it as anti-intellectual, and ridiculed its discipline of yogic-like breath control, but the preaching and writing of Gregory Palamas gave the movement firm theological grounding. Palamas analyzed the experience of the believer in contemplative prayer as an encounter with the energies of God in the form of light, the same light that shone around Christ on the Mount of Transfiguration. Theological sparring grew sharp over Palamas’s distinction between the *energies* of God and the *essence* of God, which was inaccessible and unknowable. For Palamas, the point was that theology by itself is inadequate to produce true knowledge of God – the mysteries of God are beyond rational description. The only hope for salvation was to have a mind transformed by the true light of God’s grace. To many Greek aristocrats bothered by the growing influence of commercialized Italian values, Hesychast spirituality expressed an authentic Greek Christian identity.¹⁶ Although there were exceptions, Hesychasts like Palamas tended to be strong supporters of Cantacuzenus and viscerally opposed to union with Rome.¹⁷

While Cantacuzenus was absent in Thrace in the fall of 1341, the patriarch and the empress staged a coup. They seized Cantacuzenus’s property and imprisoned his allies, including Gregory Palamas. Cantacuzenus countered, declaring himself and the boy John V co-emperors, and appointing Palamas Archbishop of Salonika. But a regime of “Zealots” favorable to the empress took over Salonika and prevented Palamas from assuming his post, and Hesychasm was for the moment officially condemned. Palamas went to prison, and

Cantacuzenus fled to Prishtina, where he spent nearly a year under the cynical protection of the Slavic King Stefan Dushan. As soon as Cantacuzenus departed Dushan switched sides, betrothed his son to the boy emperor's sister,¹⁸ and plundered all of Macedonia except for Salonika.

Both Byzantine factions sought allies among nobles and neighbors, not just Slavs but also the Italian city states, their Aegean colonies, and the numerous Turkish emirs of the Aegean and Black Sea coasts. The empress approached Orhan, but after getting a cool response, negotiated the backing of Orhan's neighbor to the south instead. Cantacuzenus was rebuffed by the Turkish Emir of the Troad,¹⁹ but won the support of the Emir of Aydın, the most powerful of the Aegean Turkish emirates. Aydın sent both a fleet and troops to Thrace, and ravaged the Italian commercial bases in the Aegean islands. In October 1344, however, the combined forces of the Pope, Venice, the King of Cyprus, and the Knights Hospitaller captured the port and citadel at Smyrna, a defeat from which Aydın never fully recovered.

Cantacuzenus then turned to Orhan. They sealed what became a lasting alliance by Orhan's marriage to Cantacuzenus's second daughter, Theodora.²⁰ Two thousand Turkish troops led by Orhan's sons joined Cantacuzenus's son Matthew in a joint campaign to evict Stefan Dushan and plunder Thrace. The palace group around the empress asked for a truce, and Cantacuzenus entered Constantinople victorious in 1347. He had himself crowned by the patriarch and gave his third daughter Helena in marriage to the young John V, who became his co-regent as planned. In a show of support Orhan feasted and hunted with Cantacuzenus across the Bosphorus from Constantinople.²¹ After his coronation Cantacuzenus presided at a Church council where Hesychasm was duly declared to be orthodox. A Hesychast patriarch was appointed, and Gregory Palamas finally took up residence as Archbishop of Salonika.

The Black Death and the Marmara Earthquake

Less than six months after the feast on the Bosphorus the Black Death reached Constantinople. The pestilence struck the Aegean basin in two separate waves within a single generation, first in 1348 and again in 1361. Crossing Eurasia by way of the overland trade routes, it devastated the Golden Horde, then spread from the Black Sea ports on the Crimean Peninsula to the Aegean and Mediterranean and across the Caucasus to Mongol Tabriz. From Tabriz the epidemic hit Mosul and Baghdad in 1348. An Armenian source described it in the upper Euphrates region. The following year it raged up and down the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts and on Cyprus.

Ibn Battuta lost his mother to the disease. He witnessed the prayers, fasting, and processions undertaken in response to the epidemic in Damascus in the summer of 1348. "The entire population of the city joined in," he wrote.

The Jews went out with their book of the Law and the Christians with their Gospel, their women and children with them; the whole concourse of them in tears and humble supplications, imploring the favour of God through His Books and His Prophets. They made their way to the Mosque of the Footprints and remained there in supplication and invocation until near midday, then returned to the city and held the Friday service.²²

In Constantinople, "The despair was most frightful," wrote Cantacuzenus. He and his wife saw their youngest son carried away, and "the great weight of depression was added to disease." For Cantacuzenus the epidemic was a trial from God that drove people to acts of virtue. "Many distributed their belongings to the poor even before the disease had fallen upon them. If they saw people afflicted at any time, not one of them was so unfeeling that he did not show regret for sins he had committed ..."²³

When Cantacuzenus had his surviving son Matthew crowned

emperor in 1352, the civil war in Constantinople broke out anew. Stefan Dushan made himself “Emperor of the Serbs and Romans” at Skopje on Easter Sunday and prepared for war. Once again Cantacuzenus reached out to the Turks. As part of the agreement, troops commanded by Orhan’s son Süleyman occupied the fortress of Tzympe, on the Gallipoli peninsula. Conditions worsened as runaway inflation swept Constantinople. A desperate palace sought the mediation of Gregory Palamas.

Sailing for Constantinople, Palamas and his suite of monks entered the Dardanelles in March 1354 during a late winter storm. Their boat barely made landing at Gallipoli. There they entered a scene of utter misery. The previous Saturday evening, on the eve of the Feast of Orthodoxy (the first Sunday of Lent), an earthquake had leveled the entire area. The earthquake was strongly felt in Constantinople, a hundred miles to the east.²⁴ Gallipoli was completely destroyed, including the walls, and filled with refugees from the surrounding towns and villages. The earthquake made “not only buildings and possessions but also body and souls ... a spoil for dogs and all manners of vultures ... both human and non-human.”²⁵ Cantacuzenus added that many died in the freezing cold, the snow, and the rain, “especially women and newborn babies.” Immediately after the earthquake, Palamas learned, Orhan’s son Süleyman had sailed across the Dardanelles to occupy Gallipoli. Turkish troops now boarded Palamas’s boat, seizing the archbishop and his traveling companions.



Figure 1.2: Saint Gregory Palamas, from an icon at Mount Athos.

Image courtesy of Saint Isaac of Syria Skete.

By the time Palamas was released from captivity nearly a year later everything had changed. Süleyman had rebuilt Gallipoli, stronger than it was before. Turkish knights had defeated Stefan Dushan, as Cantacuzenus had hoped, but they also raided throughout Thrace and laid siege to Constantinople. His political situation unraveling, Cantacuzenus was forced from the throne.

Box 1.2: The Turks and Europe

Observers medieval and modern have seen the Ottoman capture of Gallipoli in 1354 as a symbolic beginning point for the Turkish expansion into Europe. The Byzantine Greek writer Critobulus, for example, put the crossing of the Hellespont (Dardanelles) in terms that evoked Herodotus's famous description of Xerxes's invasion of Greece, and even called Orhan's troops "the Persians."^a

But the Ottomans were not the first Turks to cross the Straits, and anyway they lost Gallipoli in 1366 (and regained it again in 1373). For at least three centuries people of the central Eurasian steppe had migrated into the whole region. Turks probably first entered Asia Minor from Europe, rather than the other way around.^b Even the geographic terminology is impermanent – in classical antiquity it was a different "Bosphorus" strait, the one separating the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which was said to be the dividing line between Europe and Asia, not the one at Byzantium.^c The migrations of semi-nomadic Turks and Indo-Europeans were by no means limited to Byzantine Asia Minor.^d By 1200 Turks were a permanent feature of society in the Slavic kingdoms and Hungary too. In none of this were the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean much of a dividing line.

Contemporary observers saw the importance of the Ottoman occupation of Tzympe and Gallipoli differently. It gave Ottoman armies a forward base on the other side of the Straits from Bithynia, both to plunder Thrace and to threaten Constantinople from the landward side – no small matter for the Ottomans, who at the time had only a meager navy.

^a Kritovoulos, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, 21–27.

^b Sinor, "Réflexions sur la presence Turco-Mongolian," repr. in

Sinor, *Studies in Medieval Inner Asia*.

^c O. Pritsak, “The Role of the Bosporus Kingdom,” in Ascher, Halasi-Kun, and Király, eds., *Mutual Effects*, 3–21.

^d Zachariadou, “The Oğuz Tribes.”

Murad Hüdavendigâr and the Conquest of Thrace

Though the civil war in Byzantium ended, peace did not soon return because Stefan Dushan's fragile Slavic kingdom dissolved at his death amid conflicts among his heirs and vassals. While Turkish raiding parties no doubt played some role in and took advantage of the resulting lawlessness in Thrace, it was also the Turkish conquest that brought the return of stability and public security after decades of destructive violence.

The Ottoman conquest of Thrace was completed not by Süleyman, who died in a hunting accident, but by another of Orhan's sons, Murad. Murad succeeded Orhan after a struggle with his youngest brother Halil, whose mother was Theodora, Cantacuzenus's daughter. Greek pirates kidnapped Halil and held him at Constantinople. A marriage was arranged between Halil and the daughter of Emperor John V as a way of strengthening Byzantine bonds with the potential Ottoman heir,²⁶ but the plans came to nothing when Murad defeated Halil. The war between the two Ottoman brothers merged into a general conquest of the Turkish emirates throughout coastal Asia Minor and on the western rim of the plateau. Many Turkish emirs capitulated, as did the Christian city state of Philadelphia.

West of the straits, Murad's conquest of Edrene (Adrianople, or Edirne), at the confluence of the Tunca and Maritsa Rivers, doomed many Slavic lords. The final blow was a Turkish victory at the Maritsa in September 1371. This left no serious obstacle to Ottoman control in Thrace and Macedonia, as far as the southern slopes of the Balkan Mountains. These conquests, carried out sometimes by Murad himself and sometimes by Murad's vassals, powerful Turkish commanders in their own right,²⁷ spread Turkish influence westward towards the Adriatic.

Murad widened Ottoman authority both by conquest and diplomacy. He was allied by marriage to the Slavic lord of Tarnovo and to the Turkish emirs of Kastamonu and Sinop. He deftly used his

son Bayezid's wedding to display his power to his invited Turkish vassals.²⁸ And from his one-fifth share of campaign plunder Murad created a small army of elite slaves, a highly trained infantry loyal to him personally. Although Orhan had had a small infantry, Murad's permanent, salaried "new troop" (*yeni çeri*, whence janissary) must have been created as a counter to his Turkish vassals, and to the troublesome Turkmen raiders, the very ones who had brought Osman and Orhan their initial success.²⁹ Documents of the next century reflect the Ottoman ruler's elevated status. Murad, and his son and successor Bayezid, were no longer called emir but *Sultan* and *Hüdavendigâr*, "Great Lord."

A second series of campaigns in the 1380s brought Turkish rule to western Thrace. Several Macedonian fortified towns fell, and in 1387 Salonika fell after a four-year siege. Murad's armies raided into the southern Slavic lands and near the Adriatic coast. There were some Slavic successes. Lazar, the lord of Krushevac, briefly regained Nish and the passes guarding the route to Sofia at the end of 1387. The next year the Turks and their Albanian allies were beaten near Dubrovnik, and Tarnovo too defied Murad. Murad crossed the Balkan Mountains, forced the submission of Tarnovo, Silistre, and Varna on the Black Sea, all the forts up to the Danube, and raided into Wallachia. Finally, Murad met combined Slavic forces under Lazar on 1 August 1389 on the plain of Kosovo.

Kosovo

The outcome of the Battle of Kosovo was somewhat ambiguous. Both King Lazar and Sultan Murad died, and Ottoman dominance of all the south Slavic lands had already been assured at the more definitive battle on the Maritsa eighteen years earlier. Yet among the South Slavs the legend of the Kosovo defeat grew into a medieval folkloric cycle and later fed the modern myth of the resurrected Serbian nation.³⁰ In Turkish accounts, on the other hand, the climax of the story was the treacherous murder of Murad. A Christian knight stabbed Murad to death with a dagger tucked inside his cloak after the battle. He had either hid among the corpses or, in some versions, was brought to the sultan's tent as a captive.

Both Turkish and Slavic writers knew each others' stories. Later Slavic chroniclers decided that the assassin was pretending to desert to the Turks, a story they picked up from the Turkish historians, while the Turkish historian Neşri incorporated both the assassin's name and his vow to kill the sultan, made at Lazar's last supper, from the Slavic sources.³¹ Another sinister detail, the assassin's feigned conversion to Islam, appears a century after Neşri in the *Anthology of the Sultans' Correspondence*.³² This work was authored by Ahmed Feridun, an Ottoman statesman whose origins are unknown, but since he rose to prominence as the secretary of the famed Slavic Ottoman Grand Vezir Mehmed Sokollu, it would not be surprising if he too were a South Slav convert. Many of the "official documents" Feridun collected in his *Anthology* were actually fakes, including the Kosovo story. It appears in a letter purporting to be from Bayezid, Murad's son and successor, describing how he came to the throne.³³

In any event, Murad was carried back from Kosovo where he had fallen and buried in a new mosque in the Bursa citadel, the Martyr's Mosque. Bayezid succeeded his father Murad unchallenged, probably because he ordered the execution of his one brother on the battlefield at Kosovo.³⁴

A New Society

Out of the wars, disasters, disease, and migrations of this remarkable century there began to emerge in these borderlands a new society. Its several communities living side-by-side – Greeks and Turks, Slavs and Latins – did not always understand or like one another. Yet, as in the legends of Kosovo, their ignorance of one another and their sometimes shocking malice towards one another could not prevent an inevitable sharing of ways and means, an interlocking of identities, if often unacknowledged and even unconscious, created from calamity within a generation.

It is not inaccurate to describe the communities as Christian and Muslim, but at the blurred boundaries between the two a borderland opened in which both Christian and Muslim knights were among the plundering armies, both Christians and Muslims faced the danger of enslavement, Christians and Muslims alike fell victim to disease, and Christians and Muslims fell in love with each other, shared intimacy, and were intermarried. Cantacuzenus chided his Greek rivals in Constantinople for their armies full of “half-breeds,” *mixobarbaroi*, and at the end of the century Tamerlane said the very same thing about the Ottomans.³⁵ The two most famous contemporary observers of these linked societies, Ibn Battuta and Palamas, one a Muslim and the other Christian, each felt himself an outsider in coastal Asia Minor. Ibn Battuta spent the greater part of a lifetime travelling from end to end of the Islamic world, enjoying the company of like-minded Muslim scholars, but he faced surprising barriers in coastal Asia Minor because he did not know Turkish. And when Archbishop Palamas came among Greek Christians in Asia Minor, who might be considered his own people, he observed with some wistfulness – but also some admiration – “the Christians and the Turks mixing with each other, going about their lives, leading and being led by each other ...”³⁶

It is not easy to draw a full demographic picture of this emerging

society. It is not possible to know, for example, the total numbers of the population of the region at the time of the Turkish conquest or the size of the various ethnic and religious groups making up the whole. It is not possible to know the numbers of invaders and immigrants; how many residents fled the calamities, temporarily or permanently, to the islands of the Aegean, to Constantinople, or to the Slavic lands; how many died; how many were sold into slavery; how many remained in their homes; or how many returned to them once the violence receded.

Most of the population in the lands ruled by the Ottoman emirs in the beginning was Orthodox Christian. It is no simple matter to assess the condition of these “large numbers of Christians living under Muslim rule,” as Ibn Battuta wrote. The Orthodox Church, its ecclesiastical structure decimated first by the Slavic invasions and then by the Turkish invasions, faced enormous difficulties.³⁷ The Church organization experienced significant material losses and impoverishment because of the attacks of the Turks, the flight of congregations and their leaders, the capture and enslavement of at least some of the population, the abandonment and confiscation of properties, and the toll of epidemic disease. Discipline, morality, and doctrinal purity all suffered.³⁸ Yet excavations at Sardis, a town on the well-worn Hermus (Gediz) river route between the coast of Asia Minor and the interior, show little disruption in settlement patterns, but rather strong evidence of continuity, between the Byzantine and early Turkish periods, for instance in production and use of glazed ceramic ware.³⁹ Although Archbishop Palamas found Nicaea largely deserted during his enforced residence there, its commerce being diverted to Bursa, congregational life continued in spite of hardships. In Biga too, “They took us to the church of Christ, which even now exists through his power, praising him freely.” And Palamas met Christians in high places, including Orhan’s personal doctor, a Greek physician named Taronites.⁴⁰

Another problem for the Church was conversion to Islam. Two

patriarchal letters addressed to the Christians of Nicaea in 1338–40 invited converts to return with forgiveness. Allowing that some might have become Muslims under duress, the letters promised that once the pressure was removed, those who wanted to return to the Church would find acceptance. Yet the letters repeatedly condemned converts for failing to maintain their Christian faith. They treated it as a sin, requiring repentance and forgiveness – implicitly conceding that the conversions were not, in fact, coerced.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, among the factors contributing to conversion was intermarriage. Royal models of Christian–Muslim intermarriage, done for dynastic political reasons, were ready at hand should they be desired, but it was not merely a practice of the nobility. It was the children of these probably hundreds of unions who were the *mixobarbaroi* spoken of by Cantacuzenus.⁴² All of Sultan Orhan’s wives were Greek women – besides Theodora (Cantacuzenus’s daughter), Orhan had already married Nilüfer, the daughter of the Byzantine governor of Yarhisar.⁴³ Theodora remained Christian, Nilüfer became a Muslim.⁴⁴ But this was nothing new. The Byzantine emperors had been intermarried with the Seljuk Turks for two hundred years.⁴⁵ Dozens of princesses from the royal families of Christian Constantinople, Trebizond, and Serbia were married to Mongol and Turkish rulers.⁴⁶ Orhan’s successors, Murad and Bayezid, married both Muslim and Christian women. Murad was married to daughters of the Christian lord of Tarnovo and the Muslim lords of Kastamonu and Sinop. Murad’s son Bayezid married the daughter of the Duchess of Salona who was a Roman Catholic, the sister of Serbian lord Stefan Lazarevic who was Orthodox, and the daughter of the Prince of Germiyan who was a Muslim.

Interdependence

The Turkish conquest drew the coastal lands on either side of the Straits more tightly into the embrace of the Afro-Eurasian world.⁴⁷ In situations where security had broken down, the initially predatory relationship between raiders and victims evolved into interdependence, once the Turkish emirs re-established order. Ibn Battuta sometimes felt himself to be at the edge of the civilized world – these people did not speak Arabic! Yet speedy cultural maturation occurred through close contact with the Seljuk civilization of the plateau. Ibn Battuta was impressed by the ambience of the inns, which doubled as markets. There he met pilgrims and other professional travelers like himself, a Muslim from Egypt, a Jew from Spain, and others.⁴⁸ He wrote extensively of the men who staffed the inns and saw to the needs of travelers and merchants. They were members of religious brotherhoods, practicing an ethic of pietistic service. Ibn Battuta's report also lends a sense of the active competition among the Turkish emirs to attract Muslim scholars, Koran chanters, and other artists and entertainers from abroad to their courts. This competition in philanthropy and patronage of the religious sciences and the arts extended to major building projects such as mosques, medreses, and baths, besides the inns. The architects of the early mosque complexes and other monuments built by the Turkish conquerors were often from Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere, but workshop techniques show that the decorative craftsmanship and the laborers were local and Christian.⁴⁹ The cosmopolitan Turkish attitude of appreciation for work and commerce clearly arose from and was compatible with their Islamic religious values.

Box 1.3: The Turkic Language Family

The Turkic languages make up a family of several dozen dialects, spoken across Eurasia in the Middle Ages. They were

first analyzed linguistically in *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects* (*Diwan Lugat al-Turk*), written in Arabic in 1082. The author, a Karakhanid Turk named Mahmud al-Kashgari, introduced his work as follows:

When I saw that God Most High had caused the Sun of Fortune to rise in the Zodiac of the Turks ... [I saw that] every man of reason must attach himself to them, or else expose himself to their falling arrows. And there is no better way to approach them than by speaking their own tongue, thereby bending their ear, and inclining their heart ...

I heard from one of the trustworthy informants from among the Imams of Bukhara, and from another Imam of the people of Nishapur: both of them reported the following tradition, and both had a chain of transmission going back to the Apostle of God, may God bless him and grant him peace. When he was speaking about the signs of the Hour and the trials of the end of Time, and he mentioned the emergence of the Oghuz Turks, he said: "Learn the tongue of the Turks, for their reign will be long." Now, if this hadith is sound, and the burden of proof lies on those two! – Then learning it is a religious duty; and if it is not sound, still Wisdom demands it.

I have traveled throughout their cities and steppes, and have learned their dialects and their rhymes; those of the Turks, the Turkman-Oghuz, the Čigil, the Yaghma, and the Qirqiz. Also, I am one of the most elegant among them in language, and the most eloquent in speech; one of the most educated, the most deep-rooted in lineage, and the most penetrating in throwing the lance. Thus have I acquired perfectly the dialect of each one of their groups; and I have set it down in an encompassing book, in a well-ordered system.^a

newly developed mines in the southern Slavic lands, made into coinage in Ilkhanid mints.⁵¹ The Ilkhanids operated more than two hundred mints producing silver coins called dirhems or aspers, enabling monetization and investment in expanded local trade networks.⁵² Although sole minting rights belonged to the Ilkhanid rulers (this was an important emblem of sovereignty) the Turkish emirs of Asia Minor were permitted to distribute anonymous, single-issue silver coins, perhaps part of an effort to keep the loyalty of these vassals by allowing them to profit from a mutually beneficial financial commonwealth.⁵³ The fall of the Ilkhanids around mid-century coincided with a scarcity of silver linked to European monarchs' inability to maintain an adequate balance of trade. The Turkish emirs called up a variety of coping tactics. One was a switch to gold, especially the standard Venetian ducat, or homemade imitations thereof.⁵⁴ Additionally, they began minting their own coins, some from local sources of silver. Several Turkish emirs issued coins, similar in make and appearance, small silver coins modeled on the Byzantine hyperperon that remained in limited local circulation.⁵⁵ The Ottoman version of this coin was called the *akçe*.

Among the products sold were corn, fruits, cotton, and wine, all consumed locally, as well as commodities of importance in the wider trans-Eurasian commercial economy such as alum and silk. But more significant than any of these were slaves, spoils of war who were held for ransom or else destined for market.⁵⁶ The range and complexity of the various categories of human captives in this world defy the single English word "slave."⁵⁷ Greek sources frequently lamented that the fate of Christian captives was to be sold into slavery by the Turks, but slaving was by no means an exclusively Turkish business. A great medieval slave trade already existed throughout the whole region, in which Tatar Turkish slaves from the region north of the Black Sea, bound for use in Western Europe and Egypt, were sold in markets on Crete, Naxos, Rhodes, and Chios.⁵⁸ In the wars the Venetians, Hungarians, and Slavs continued to enslave the Turkish soldiers they

took and to sell the population of captured towns into slavery.⁵⁹

What the Turkish raids did was open up a subsidiary trade in local Greek slaves from coastal Asia Minor and the Aegean, both at these markets and at new ones. Ibn Battuta bought slave girls at two places in Asia Minor, was given a slave – a Greek dwarf – as a gift from the Emir of Aydın, and had two of his slaves run away in Magnesia. He noticed the link between slavery and prostitution.⁶⁰ Nor did ransom necessarily bring freedom. Palamas freed a former slave, a Christian who, though ransomed, was indentured to the Christian merchant who had ransomed him.⁶¹ The Greek Orthodox legates involved in negotiating an anti-Turkish alliance made release of Greek slaves belonging to Latin Christians, and a moratorium on the trade, a precondition of any Byzantine–Roman union.⁶² So frequent are the references to the sale of enslaved captives, it would not be hard to conclude that the major motivation in all these wars, on all sides, was the acquisition of slaves for ransom.

The Spiritual Vocabulary of Cataclysm

In a century when Bulgarians, Byzantines, Franks, Normans, Alans, Pechenegs, Serbs, Genoese, and Venetians all threatened each other with virtually identical methods and outcomes, the Turks were hardly unique. The Turks were not the only warriors interested in raiding and plunder and slaving, and they were not the only ones who justified the outcome as ordained by God. Yet this common outlook was expressed in culturally specific ways. In Latin Europe, for example, the crusader ideal was still very much alive. John Cantacuzenus recalled negotiating an alliance against the Turks with Pope Clement VI, who “considered that it brought the greatest gain to die while fighting for such causes.”⁶³ And while the Turkish version of the general sentiment did indeed employ certain elements of the Koranic notion of jihad, it bore a closer resemblance to the sacred warfare of the central Eurasian steppe tradition, which emphasized the dynasty predestined to world conquest by the special favor of God.

This was why, among the Mongols and Turks, privileging one religious tradition was not incompatible with the reality of religious difference. Conquest did not bring expectations of mass conversion.⁶⁴ The Mongol Great Khan Güyük confronted Pope Innocent IV in a letter of 1246, “How could anybody seize or kill by his own power contrary to the command of God? ... From the rising of the sun to its setting, all the lands have been made subject to me. Who could do this contrary to the command of God?”⁶⁵ Yet it would be difficult to surpass the Mongol Empire in religious diversity and tolerance. Güyük’s successor Möngke told William of Rubruck, “We Mongols ... believe that there is but one God, by Whom we live and by Whom we die and towards Him we have an upright heart ... But just as God gave different fingers to the hand so has He given different ways to men.”⁶⁶ In the same way, Gregory Palamas observed of Orhan that, “while the duty of the servant or of any common individual is to know about one

faith and this only barely, it is necessary for him who has many races under his rule to know of all faiths and in an accurate way.”⁶⁷

In Asia Minor, the term *gaza* articulated this aspect of the common Turkish and Mongol worldview in a naturalized Islamic idiom.⁶⁸ *Gaza* meant warfare for expansion of the worldly realm of Muslim rulers. One who did *gaza* was a *gazi*. By participating in *gaza*, the Turks played a leading role in the great drama of sacred history, the expansion of Islamic sovereignty. It was the *gazis* who waged the war that affirmed the rule of God over all the earth. This concept was popular among the Turks for a long time, including Turkic societies as different from one another as Mamluk Egypt and Mughal India.⁶⁹ Jihad, by contrast, was a Koranic term meaning “struggle.” In the Koran it occurs almost always in the phrase *jihad fi’s-sabil Allah*, “struggle in the way of God.” Jihad was spiritual warfare, a multifaceted struggle against enemies of the rule of God both within the human soul and out in the world. A person who engaged in jihad was called a *mujahid*.

Since their meanings overlapped to a degree the two terms, *gaza* and *jihad*, were in practice often paired poetically. Sultan Orhan, the second Ottoman sultan, referred to himself as “Sultan of the *gazis*, *gazi* son of *gazi*,” and *Mujahid fi sabil Allah*, “Fighter in the way of God,” in a famous inscription in Bursa. The tombstone epitaph of Evrenos, a Turkish vassal of Orhan and then Murad, eulogized him as “King of the *Gazis* and *Mujahidin*.”⁷⁰ Islamic catechisms, popular at the Turkish courts of Asia Minor both in translations from Arabic and in Turkish originals, contained sections explaining the difference between *gaza* and *jihad* that laid out acceptable conditions for fighting and spelled out rules of engagement.⁷¹ Thus *gaza* became one potential means of bridging the Turkic and Mongol steppe tradition to the Islamic tradition, whose claims to universal sovereignty were effectively laid to rest with the last of the Abbasid caliphs in the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258.⁷²

While warfare was a central concern for the Turkish conquerors

of coastal Asia Minor, concepts like gaza and jihad did not completely exhaust their spiritual lexicon. Turkish Muslims had far wider interests than this. Ibn Battuta found a distinctively Turkish Islam conveyed through charitable public works, which laid the foundation for regional recovery.⁷³ Besides this, reports survive of a remarkable series of Muslim–Christian dialogues involving Gregory Palamas, the fruit of his nearly one year in Turkish captivity. Additionally, the religious architecture of the conquering Turkish rulers also shows their broadly inclusive vision.

Gregory Palamas and Interfaith Dialogue

Palamas's interfaith encounter began when, en route to Constantinople to mediate a settlement to the Byzantine civil war, his ship was boarded by Ottoman troops shortly after the Marmara earthquake of March 1354. His little group of monks was brought to Sultan Orhan in Bithynia. Palamas described his experiences among the Turks in *Letter to the Thessalonians*.⁷⁴ The title recalled the letter of Saint Paul of the same name that is in the New Testament. Palamas's first interfaith conversation began when Ismail, the grandson of Sultan Orhan, asked the archbishop why he did not eat meat. As they talked they were interrupted by a messenger telling Ismail that Orhan had finished the weekly distribution of alms to the poor. Ismail used this as a segue to ask Palamas whether Christians too practiced charity. From almsgiving the discussion went on to cover the Prophethood of Muhammad, the virgin birth of Jesus, and the Holy Trinity. The conversation ended when a thundershower struck and everyone ran for cover.

Sometime later Orhan himself arranged a theological debate, which was transcribed by the sultan's Greek Christian physician. Palamas was put up against a group of Muslim scholars, probably former Ilkhanid scribes now in Orhan's service.⁷⁵ Palamas gave a lengthy explanation of the Trinity, and the subsequent debate revolved therefore around the divinity of Christ and the refusal of Christians to recognize Muhammad as a prophet of God. Circumcision, icons, and other subjects also came up. One of the Muslims lost his temper at the end of the debate and punched Palamas in the nose! He was hurriedly packed off to the sultan for punishment.

Finally, Palamas got into a discussion with an imam after witnessing a Muslim burial. As before Palamas began with the Trinity and the imam responded with a question: since Muslims accept all the prophets of the Christians, why did Christians not accept Muhammad? Palamas's line of argument – that the Old and New Testaments did not

foretell Muhammad but instead warned against false prophets, and that Muhammad rose to success by “war and the sword, pillage, enslavement, and executions” – dragged him into deep water with his audience. He extricated himself by his own saintly charm and his opponents’ good will. “After all,” he said, “if we were in one accord, we would be of one and the same faith, too.” When one of the Turks graciously offered, “There will come a time when we will agree with one another,” Palamas responded warmly with the wish “that such a time may come quickly.”

Besides not liking each other very much, Turks and Greeks, Muslims and Christians, did not know much about each other. Palamas’s captors did not even know who he was at first – did not know that he was a powerful ecclesiastical figure destined for sainthood, or even that he had supported Cantacuzenus, Orhan’s ally and father-in-law. It was Orhan’s Greek Christian physician who informed the sultan who it was that they held in their hands and his importance. Muslims repeatedly asked Palamas why Christians did not accept Muhammad, since Muslims accepted Christian prophets. Ismail cited the Koranic understanding of the Incarnation that seems like crude literalism to Christians. Palamas did little better. He had only a rudimentary understanding of Islam, and repeated old Christian bigotries about Muhammad’s violence and licentiousness.

Yet intercommunal peace and reconciliation does not rest on such things but rather on courage and political will, and sultan and saint had both in equal measure. Each was conscious of his public role. In personally sponsoring interreligious dialogue Orhan enacted a central Eurasian topos of royal sovereignty, numerous examples of which are known from the Mongols to the Mughals. For his part, in *Letter to the Thessalonians* Palamas related his experience among the Turks as an allegory of the suffering of his Church, itself in captivity, and of human life under the mysterious grace of God. Orhan did not waver as champion of the faith, and for all Palamas’s irenic grace he had no interest in religious compromise or syncretism.⁷⁶ Rather both Greeks

and Turks were grappling with inscrutable Providence, whose workings presented a kind of ontological double entendre. Palamas experienced Providence as “abysmal,” manifested in the environmental and demographic calamities that made the Turkish conquest both inevitable and irreversible – in his words, in “those things from above (I do not know whether I should call them chastisement or abandonment) which our nation suffered, and especially the earthquake ...”⁷⁷ Some Turks, meanwhile, saw conquest as a simile of superiority. For them Palamas’s captivity was “proof of the ineffectiveness” of Christianity.⁷⁸

Sacred Space

In the aftermath of their encounter, Palamas and the Turkish conquerors established close relations. While obviously politically expedient, they also grew from mutual respect and from a not incompatible spiritual experience. The Mount Athos monastic community, home of Hesychasm, continued to be a focus of Christian contemplation and a destination of Christian alms, under Turkish protection.⁷⁹ Even if the mosques of the Turks were similes of conquest to superficial triumphalists, they were also visual metaphors of the mixed communities they served, reflecting a common history lived out under Providence. The famous Bursa inscription where Sultan Orhan called himself both mujahid and gazi, actually starts with the Oneness Sura (Sura 112) of the Koran, quoted in its entirety – a more succinct synopsis of Islamic theology would be hard to find – and ends with a blessing that is a wordplay on the dual usage of the Arabic root *sajd*, meaning “prostration.” A mosque (*masjid*) is a place of prostration, and prostration negates pride.

Box 1.4: Orhan's Inscription in Bursa

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Say: He is God, the One. God, the Eternal, the Absolute; He neither begets nor is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him. Dated the year 738 [AD 1337–38]. May God pardon the founder of this place of prostration. He is the Great Emir, the Exalted, the Mujahid in the Way of God, Sultan of the Gazis, Gazi, the son of the Gazi, dauntless in sovereignty and spirituality, warden of the borderlands, hero of the age, Orhan son of Osman, may God prolong his life. He commanded the blessed prostration for the pleasure of the Most High. May God raise up in heaven the one who prostrates.^a



Figure 1.4: The Bursa inscription. As established by Colin Heywood, the inscription originally adorned the first mosque of Orhan, in the Bursa citadel. This was destroyed in a siege in 1413 and the present mosque erected a few years later, with the old inscription.^b

^a My translation. The text, difficult to decipher, was first published by Mantran, “Les Inscriptions arabes,” no. 1. On the current location, Heywood, “The 1337 Bursa Inscription.”

^b Heywood, “The 1337 Bursa Inscription.”

Other mosques newly built by the Turkish conquerors, not only

the Ottomans, show the same kinds of multiple symbolic resonances. One is the mosque of Isa Bey of the Aydın dynasty, a large stone mosque in Ayasoluk (medieval Ephesus), dedicated in 1375.⁸⁰ It stands on what used to be the shoreline, between the ancient Temple of Artemis and the Christian church that contained the relics of Saint John the Apostle, above it on the hill of the town.⁸¹ Turkish raiders captured and plundered the town and the church in 1304. After this the Aydın dynasty built a powerful state along the Aegean coast, from the Gulf of Edremit in the north to the Meander River valley in the south, which lasted for almost a century. When Ibn Battuta visited Ayasoluk in 1332 he was impressed by the Church of Saint John, noting that it had become the Friday mosque of the Turkish conquerors.⁸² According to recent archaeological excavations, the complex also contained shops and stables – probably dedicated in trust (*vakıf*) for the support of the mosque. The Christian Wilhelm von Boldensele, who visited about the same time, reported that Christian pilgrims still venerated the relics in the decades after the conquest, paying a duty to the Turkish rulers as they had done to the Christian rulers before them.⁸³



Figure 1.5: The Isa Bey mosque, viewed from the atrium of the Church of Saint John.

Earthquake destroyed the building sometime after 1350, necessitating a new mosque.⁸⁴ Its location must have been chosen for its symbolic value. Materials from the Temple of Artemis were reused in the mosque construction (not at all unusual in itself), including twelve columns that were enclosed within the courtyard garden of the mosque as an arcade, and a composite Roman capital in the interior worship hall. The mosque was engineered in a specific relationship both to the Temple of Artemis and the Church of Saint John. The qibla wall of the mosque with its windows is not oriented toward Mecca, but faces the temple. Of the two original minarets only one is now standing, and it is missing its upper portion, above the balcony level. Its twin stood on the other corner of the courtyard but evidently collapsed in an earthquake in the 1650s. Today the balcony of the surviving minaret of the mosque appears double-framed in the narthex doorways of the church, just at the position partway down the nave of the church where the relics of Saint John the Apostle lay buried in a crypt under the altar. (See [Figure 1.7.](#))

In these ways the mosque of Isa Bey, as the most recent of the three buildings at the ancient site, reiterated the chronological relationship between Greek paganism, Christianity, and Islam. Incorporating aspects of the temple and the church, the mosque superseded both just as Islam was built over Christianity and over the ruins of paganism. But the architect also borrowed from and reinforced the sacred aura of Artemis and of the Apostle, manipulating the irresistible aesthetic attributes of the site,⁸⁵ creating a visual symmetry in which prayer is aligned with the forces of nature and of time. Making the call to prayer, the muezzin would have found himself looking straight up the nave of the broken-down church to the relics of Saint John, and prostrating worshipers would have faced the submerged Temple of Artemis beyond the mihrab.



Figure 1.6: The temple-mosque-church site at Ayasoluk, viewed from the Temple of Artemis.



Figure 1.7: The minaret of Isa Bey Mosque, framed in the atrium doorway of the Church of Saint John.

A more modest example is the Ottoman mosque at Assos, on the

southern coast of the Troad. The Turkish name of the town, Behram, comes from the medieval Greek name Machramion. The town remained overwhelmingly Greek and Christian right down to the forced migrations of 1919–23. The classical ruins at Assos occupy a cliff top and give a spectacular view of the blue waters of the Aegean two hundred meters below. They were the subject of the first archaeological excavations carried out by the Archaeological Institute of America, in 1881–83.⁸⁶



Figure 1.8: The Assos mosque.

The mosque, on the northeast corner of the acropolis, stands like a sentinel from the landward side, where it can be seen for miles. It is also visible from the sea, depending on one's vantage point. Up close it is surprisingly humble and unpretentious. The building including the porch measures only 17 meters long and 14 wide, and consists of a single square room covered by a dome.⁸⁷ It does not even have a minaret. It has no founding inscription, but Ottoman records of the next century confirm that it was commissioned by Sultan Murad,⁸⁸ probably about the same time as Isa Bey's mosque at Ayasoluk. The

Assos mosque was built from the brick and stone ruins of a church that had once stood on the same spot, and of the adjacent Athena temple.⁸⁹

As at Ayasoluk, reuse of the materials was more than just functional and environmentally conscious. Even the marble doorframe of the former church, the Church of Saint Cornelius, was recycled in the mosque, complete with its original Greek inscription on the lintel. The Greek inscription honors a provincial governor, unnamed, whose patronage had financed the repair of the church at some unknown date in the past.⁹⁰ So the doorframe became a double entendre – here at the acropolis of Assos, standing amid the ruins of the ages, Sultan Murad put the building back together. He too left his name unmentioned, like the forgotten Greek governor who had repaired the church long before him.



Figure 1.9: The doorframe inscription of the Assos mosque.

Notes

- 1 This is Rudi Paul Lindner's reconstruction, used with permission, including stressing the flood and its consequences: *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, 102–16.
- 2 Silay, ed., *History of the Kings of the Ottoman Lineage*, 61, couplet 60. On the passage, see Lowry, "Some Thoughts on the Meaning of Gaza and Akın," in Kermeli and Özel, eds., *Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and "Black Holes,"* 47–50.
- 3 Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 133–34.
- 4 Artuk, "Osmanlı beyliğinin kurucusu"; and Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, 18.
- 5 For the Greek sources on the early Ottomans, see Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*; and Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, 466–77.
- 6 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 124 and notes 11–13.
- 7 Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, 102–16.
- 8 In a late fifteenth-century ad copy, published by Uzunçarşılı, "Gazi Orhan Bey Vakfiyesi." On this document, Emecen, "Orhan Bey'in 1348 Tarihli Mülknamesi hakkında," in Emecen, *İlk Osmanlılar*, 187–207.
- 9 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2, 451–52.
- 10 These and most of the other Ottoman documents discussed here have been published: Lowry, *Nature of the Early Ottoman State*.
- 11 Hinz, ed., *Resālā-ye Falakiyyā*, 162.
- 12 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2, 451–52.
- 13 Emecen, *İlk Osmanlılar*, 82, 89.

- 14 İnalcık, “Yürüks,” in İnalcık, *Middle East and the Balkans*, 97–136.
- 15 Liaou, “Byzantine Empire in the Fourteenth Century.”
- 16 Krausmüller, “Rise of Hesychasm.”
- 17 Meyendorff, *Gregory Palamas*, 104.
- 18 Miller, “History of John Cantacuzenus,” 167–69.
- 19 Zachariadou, “Emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans,” in Zachariadou, ed., *Ottoman Emirate*, 225–36.
- 20 Bryer, “Greek Historians on the Turks.”
- 21 Miller, “History of John Cantecuzenus,” 165–66.
- 22 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 1, 143–44; Dols, *Black Death*, 65.
- 23 Miller, “History of John Cantacuzenus,” 187–88.
- 24 Ambraseys, *Earthquakes*, 372–75.
- 25 Arnakis, “Gregory Palamas among the Turks,” 105.
- 26 Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins*, 121–23.
- 27 Lowry, *Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans*.
- 28 Wittek, *Menteşe Beyliği*, 76.
- 29 Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. IX (2001), 323–31, s.v. “Yeñi Čeri” (Rhoads Murphey).
- 30 Redep, “Legend of Kosovo.” See also Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity*, 176–202; and Vucinich and Emmert, eds., *Kosovo*.
- 31 Neşri, *Kitâb-ı Cihan-Nümâ*, vol. 1, 304–7.
- 32 Feridun, *Mecmu’a-ı Münşe’atü’s-Selatin*, vol. 1, 115–16.

- 33 This account was published by Kreutel, *Osmanisch-türkische Chrestomathie*, no. 39, 36–37.
- 34 Reinert, “A Byzantine Source,” in Heywood and Imber, eds., *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, 249–72.
- 35 Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 74, 92, and 272 n. 51.
- 36 Sahas, “Captivity and Dialogue,” 412.
- 37 Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*.
- 38 Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 288–350.
- 39 Crane, “Some Archaeological Notes.”
- 40 Sahas, “Gergory Palamas (1296–1360) on Islam.”
- 41 Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 339–43.
- 42 Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 176 and 228–29.
- 43 On Ottoman royal marriages, Peirce, *Imperial Harem*.
- 44 Bryer, “Greek Historians on the Turks,” 488.
- 45 Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 227–28.
- 46 Bryer, “Greek Historians on the Turks,” 481, n. 1.
- 47 Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*.
- 48 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2, 451, 481.
- 49 Ousterhout, “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation.”
- 50 Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, published and analyzed the texts of several treaties.
- 51 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 7–30

- 52 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 7–8.
- 53 Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, 81–101; Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 7.
- 54 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 25–27; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, 140–43.
- 55 Zhukov, “Ottoman, Karasid, and Sarukhanid Coinages,” in Zachariadou, ed., *Ottoman Emirate*, 237–42.
- 56 For the slave trade, Csokovits, “Miraculous Escapes from Ottoman Captivity,” in Dávid and Fodor, eds., *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders*, 1–18; and Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, 160–63. On the historiography, Pál Fodor, “Introduction,” in Dávid and Fodor, eds., *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders*, xi–xx.
- 57 Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition*.
- 58 Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery*.
- 59 Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, 67.
- 60 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2, 445, 447, 449.
- 61 Arnakis, “Gregory Palamas among the Turks,” 109.
- 62 Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, 160–61.
- 63 Miller, “History of John Cantacuzenus,” 192.
- 64 On Mongol religious tolerance, Jackson, “Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered,” in Amitai and Biran, eds., *Mongols, Turks, and Others*, 245–90.
- 65 Text published in Dawson, ed., *Mongol Mission*, 85–86. See also Turan, “Ideal of World Domination.” Similar language appeared in a letter of Hülegü to the Mamluk Sultan al-Muzaffer Kutuz; Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 28–29.
- 66 Dawson, ed., *Mongol Mission*, 195. On the exchange, Young, “*Deus Unus or Dei Plures Sunt?*”

67 Sahas, “Captivity and Dialogue,” p. 419.

68 The term has been the subject of a very long debate in Ottoman historiography. For a summary, Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*.

69 Emecen, “Gaza’ya Dair,” repr. in Emecen, *İlk Osmanlılar*, 75–85; for this formulation in Mamluk Egypt, see Haarman, “Rather the Injustice,” 70. On the Mughals, see Thackston, trans, *The Baburnama*, 394. In general, Darling, “Contested Territory,” and Kafadar’s discussion in *Between Two Worlds*, 79–80.

70 Demetriades, “Tomb of Ghazi Evrenos Bey at Yenitsa.”

71 One text was published by Tekin, “XIV. Yüzyılda Yazılmış Gazilik Tarikası.”

72 Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 273–92.

73 Lowry, ““Soup Muslims’ of the Ottoman Balkans.”

74 Texts published by Philippidas-Braat, “La Captivité de Palamas;” translated and studied by Sahas, “Captivity and Dialogue;” and Sahas, “Gregory Palamas (1296–1360) on Islam.” See also Arnakis, “Gregory Palamas among the Turks.”

75 Miller, “Religious v. Ethnic Identity.”

76 Sahas, “Art and Non-Art of Byzantine Polemics.”

77 Sahas, “Captivity and Dialogue,” 412–13.

78 Sahas, “Captivity and Dialogue,” 414.

79 Zachariadou, “Mt. Athos and the Ottomans,” in Angold, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, 154–68.

80 This mosque has been the subject of several studies. The first excavation reports were published in *Forschungen in Ephesos*, vol. 1. See also Otto-Dorn, “Die İsa Bey Moschee in Ephesus.”

81 Foss, *Ephesus after Antiquity*.

- 82 Gibb, ed., *Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2, 444–45.
- 83 Büyükkolancı, *Life and the Monument of St. John*, 40.
- 84 Wittek, *Menteşe Beyliği*, 37 n. 120; Büyükkolancı, *Life and the Monument of St John*, 43.
- 85 I owe the point to Jon Stewart, in a personal conversation.
- 86 Bacon and Koldewey, eds., *Investigations at Assos*. See also several essays on Assos in Holod and Ousterhout, eds., *Osman Hamdi Bey ve Amerikalılar*.
- 87 Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mi'mârîsinin İlk Devri*, vol. 1, 224–29.
- 88 See the Hudâvendigâr survey of 1530, *166 Numeralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri*, text, 137.
- 89 Ousterhout, “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation,” 54–55.
- 90 Ousterhout published a photo of the doorframe, “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation,” 53. The inscription, from *Anthologiae Graecae Appendix, Epigrammata demonstrative*, is no. 7052.003 in the online *Thesaurus Lingua Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature* (the TLG Canon), stephanus.tlg.uci.edu.

A Blessed Dynasty, 1397–1494

The earliest written description of the Ottoman dynasty in Turkish comes as the rather brief concluding chapter to a long, versified Alexander epic by the poet Ahmedi. It celebrated the victorious wars of Sultan Bayezid and his forefathers.¹ Today it bears the reek of panegyric, but for audiences of the ninth Islamic century, the century that began with Tamerlane and ended with Shah Ismail, it probably came across differently. The memory of Sultan Bayezid as *Yıldırım*, the Thunderbolt, evoked not just his lightning-like strikes but also the melancholia of Turkish court life in Asia Minor in the aftermath of his catastrophic defeat.² Loss and violence were the legacy of this tragic hero who, the chroniclers wrote, brought himself to ruin by his reckless ambition. Proper blame ought to be spread equally among all the other Turkish feudal lords, whose battlefield defection at Ankara in 1402 was a factor in Bayezid's demise. Few of them mourned the passing of Bayezid's brand of royal authority. Yet the work of rebuilding was mixed with a sense of loss, on whose ambiguous meanings Turkish timekeepers ruminated as if over tablets of destiny.

Box 2.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Ninth Islamic Century

Bayezid I 1389–1402

Mehmed I 1413–21

Murad II 1421–51

Mehmed II, “The Conqueror” 1451–81

Bayezid II 1481–1512

Violence, Succession, and Memory

Bayezid's reign began with victories of his father Murad, at the Maritsa (1371) and at Kosovo (1389), still reverberating both to the west and to the east. The Slavic kingdom of Stefan Dushan fragmented when his son died childless a few months after the Maritsa battle. Among the Slavic lords King Sigismund of Hungary had his advocates, but others accepted Ottoman service. Bayezid honored their loyalty by marrying Olivera, the daughter of King Lazar, who lost his life at Kosovo. The Turkish emirs of Asia Minor, Galatia, and Cappadocia found themselves caught between Bayezid in the west, the Mamluk sultans to the south, and Tamerlane in the east. Under the circumstances many saw their best hope for independence in backing Kadi Burhaneddin, the philosopher-sultan of Sivas. He ruled a sophisticated sultanate, a worthy successor of the Persianate culture of the Seljuk centuries.³

For Bayezid, insulation against dangers both western and eastern lay in capturing Constantinople. It would be a virtually impregnable fortress, were it to become once again the capital of an empire straddling both sides of the Straits. With Constantinople conquered he might lose everything else, but he would not lose that city.⁴ Such was one lesson of late Byzantium, whose longevity far exceeded anything its dysfunctional politics gave reason to expect. Bayezid weighed in on the Byzantine succession struggle; he took Christian Philadelphia (Alaşehir), and he forced the Turkish knights of the Aegean to recertify their fiefs from his own hand. He gained the grudging submission of Kastamonu and other emirates. But in the summer of 1391, Bayezid was defeated in battle by Burhaneddin. Shortly thereafter, Tamerlane advanced from the east. Seeing the urgency, Bayezid tried to secure his own eastern bona fides, appealing to the Mamluks for support.⁵ Then he put Constantinople under siege.

It was a strategy with huge potential benefits and no obvious

downside. Bayezid built a fortress 5 miles up the Bosphorus from Constantinople on the Asian side of the Straits, and put the city under continuous blockade. It had an effect. As the price of grain imported from Venice soared, the Greek aristocracy in the city was forced to sell out to profiteers. Many left.⁶ Yet the city held out despite deprivations. With his siege ongoing, Bayezid campaigned far to the west and north, even to Temesvár and Belgrade. He took Nicopolis, forced the submission of Wallachia, and defeated an alliance of Christian kings led by Sigismund of Hungary in the Nicopolis Crusade of 1396. This led to the conquest of Vidin, on the Black Sea, and Ottoman control of the lower Danube. The still powerful Evrenos, one of the conquerors of Thrace under Murad, campaigned for him in Epirus, Greece, and the Morea. From their base at Gallipoli Bayezid's galleys patrolled the Aegean. But all this was not enough. The last bulwarks against Tamerlane fell when the Mamluk sultan died and Kadi Burhaneddin was killed in battle. Bayezid would march out to face Tamerlane without the imperial city in his grasp.

Tamerlane's Invasion

If indeed Tamerlane had a plan beyond plunder and the epic life of the endless campaign, he seems to have imagined re-enacting the career and the tributary empire of Chinggis Khan. Bayezid's demands upon his vassals gave Tamerlane a pretext to attack in the summer of 1400.⁷ Bayezid took a calculated risk, dispatching one of his sons to Sivas where Tamerlane had lain siege, and remaining himself for the moment beneath the walls of Constantinople. The Ottoman armies arrived too late at Sivas, whose city fathers were buried alive. That winter Aleppo, Diyarbekir, Hams, Hama, and Baalbek all fell to Tamerlane. For resisting, Damascus was sacked and massacred. Given unenviable options, Tamerlane's cruelty on the one hand or Bayezid's intrusive authority and tactical recklessness on the other, many Turkish emirs submitted to Tamerlane in the hopes that he would weaken the Ottomans and they would be spared the fate of Sivas. Their desertion was decisive in the staggering Ottoman defeat at Ankara on 28 July 1402. Bayezid was taken prisoner and died in captivity. Tamerlane's armies ravaged Asia Minor all the way to the Aegean.⁸

Any real hopes for independence entertained by the Turkish emirs who had joined Tamerlane's side were dashed, first by his exorbitant demands for tribute and wanton destruction of their assets, and then by the survival of Bayezid's sons. No serious challenge to the Ottomans arose west of the Straits either, so the fact that Bayezid's heirs lived meant that the Turkish emirs were doomed. None had the savvy to unite Asia Minor after Tamerlane's death in 1405. Emperor Manuel II of Constantinople played an enhanced role, but in the end he accomplished little more than to prolong the inevitable conflict between the Ottoman princes.

The Succession War

The drama of war between Bayezid's sons, which raged intermittently for twenty years,⁹ paradoxically served to reaffirm Ottoman unity.¹⁰ The question was whether the Ottoman dynasty still had *devlet*, that magical quality of inner authority that was always a gift of the Divine.¹¹

Two of the brothers, Musa and Mustafa, had been taken captive by Tamerlane with their father. Musa was released and brought Bayezid's body back, but Mustafa was kept back in Samarkand. After two years of confusing fighting Isa, the oldest brother, was dead. Mehmed was headquartered at Tokat and controlled the Galatian plateau. Musa was in his custody, with the body of their father. Süleyman held the strongest position, with both Ottoman capitals, Bursa and Edirne. He reached an agreement with Genoa and Constantinople, and made peace with Venice. Mustafa was apparently in Samarkand, out of contact.

Mehmed took the offensive in 1409. He had several allies among the Turkish emirs and also the Christian lord of Wallachia, all sealed by marriage. He sent Musa against Süleyman in Edirne and attacked Bursa himself. Forced to fight on two fronts, Süleyman could defend neither and lost both – Musa took Edirne, Mehmed took Bursa, and Süleyman died on the run.¹² It did not go well for Musa in Edirne, however. His short reign there was a picture of incompetence. He put Constantinople to the siege, yet his intrusive bureaucracy and his personal vindictiveness alienated the very Turkish raiders whom he needed. Allies and subordinates alike defected to Mehmed, who turned on Musa and defeated and killed him in July 1413.¹³


Just when it seemed Mehmed's victory was assured, he had to deal with the last brother, Mustafa, who suddenly reappeared, released from Samarkand in 1415. Mehmed defeated him, Mustafa fled to Constantinople, and Emperor Manuel promised not to release him while Mehmed was alive. The Ottoman dynastic war finally ended

in 1421 – it was Mehmed's son Murad who caught and executed Mustafa, and defeated and blinded his own two brothers.¹⁴

The Revolt of the Dervishes

In the midst of the Ottoman dynastic conflict, a populist revolt brought into question the very concept of Ottoman dominion. Even if there was no realistic alternative, the Ottoman recovery had not necessarily inspired full confidence. The measure of public disillusionment with the Ottoman restoration was the revolt, led by two epic characters, Börklüce (“Felt Crowned”) Mustafa and Sheikh Bedreddin. It broke out in 1416, at just the point where Mehmed defeated Mustafa and consigned him to captivity in Constantinople. The several surviving accounts vividly illustrate how potent a challenge might still arise from someone who could bring a credible political vessel to the deep well of Turkish spirituality.¹⁵

One account comes embedded in a history of the Ottomans written by a Greek aristocrat named Ducas. His ancestors had sat on the Byzantine throne.¹⁶ He himself grew up in Aydın, where his grandfather had taken refuge during the Byzantine civil war of the 1340s. To Ducas, the fates of the Byzantine and Ottoman dynasties were totally intertwined, and the fall of Constantinople (1453) – which he lived to see – foretold the extinction of both.¹⁷ Ducas portrayed his hero, Börklüce Mustafa, as the prophet of an ironic new dispensation, in which Islam and Christianity were united, private property abolished, and oppression ended. Ducas heard from an anchorite monk in Crete that dervishes, “wearing only simple tunics, their uncovered heads shaved bald, and their feet without sandals,” walked barefoot over the sea to commune with him nightly.¹⁸ “The story goes,” added a nearby Muslim writer, “that they had four thousand Sufis with them. They all said *‘There is no God but God’* – but *‘Muhammad is the Prophet of God’* they did not say.”¹⁹



Map 2.1: Tamerlane's invasion and the Ottoman civil war.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

Ducas constructed his account as a strange reversal of Christ's Parable of the Tenants. In the Gospel, after the rebels kill the slaves the Lord decides to send his own Son, and the rebels kill him too. Ducas instead had the son slaughter the rebels. Sultan Mehmed sent an army against Börklüce Mustafa's base in the Karaburun Peninsula, the remote, mountainous western rim of the Gulf of Izmir. Approaching by the narrow coastal pass that affords the only access from the mainland, the Ottoman troops were turned back by the rebels on the heights. A second Ottoman force met the same fate. The sultan sent an army commanded by the leading vezir and his own young son (the future Sultan Murad II). They forced the pass and, according to Ducas, "mercilessly struck down everyone in sight, the old as well as infants, men, and women; in a word, they massacred everyone, regardless of age ..." ²⁰ Börklüce Mustafa was brought to Ayasoluk in chains, interrogated, and crucified. His corpse was paraded through the streets on the back of a camel, an apparent parody of Christ's Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem on a donkey. ²¹ The

Ottoman army went after Börklüce Mustafa's supporters, rounding up anyone dressed as a barefoot beggar. "Welcoming death gladly," Ducas wrote, the dervishes "were heard to murmur: *Dede sultan eriş*, that is, 'O Lord Father, hasten to us.'" Ducas's translation made the prayer into a Turkish gloss of Psalm 38, the opening lines of the Daily Office.

A second account of the dervish revolt is a sacred biography, or *Menakibname*, starring the other of the two rebels, Sheikh Bedreddin, and written by his grandson.²² It portrays the rebellion as a huge misunderstanding. Sheikh Bedreddin's mother was a Greek Christian convert to Islam. His grandfather on his father's side was a nephew of the last Seljuk sultan.²³ The account makes little of this implied dynastic claim, and reads more like an apologia, telling the sheikh's story as the record of his saintly wanderings "there and back again," from his home in Edirne on a pilgrimage to all the great cities of the western Islamic world. The details of this political resumé all imply that Sheikh Bedreddin was loyal to the Ottomans, that he was an outstanding scholar and jurist, and that he had no political ambitions. In the same way, the book summarizes Sheikh Bedreddin's teachings as a form of philosophical Sufism that was quite unremarkable within the context of Ottoman Islam. According to this account, when Mehmed took Edirne during the war between the Ottoman brothers, Sheikh Bedreddin was exiled to Iznik. Then, while on a diplomatic mission to the Crimea on behalf of the Emir of Sinop, his ship was unfortunately seized by Christian pirates in the Black Sea, and Sheikh Bedreddin found himself washed up on Wallachian shores. He set out for Edirne, innocently hoping to present a copy of his most recent book as a gift to Sultan Mehmed, but the sultan mistook his approach for an insurrection.

The third account of the revolt said that there was nothing at all innocent about either one of the rebels. This author, Aşık Paşazade, did not personally witness the events because it all happened while he was separated from the Ottoman army, recuperating from illness in

the home of an old dervish, “the son of Sultan Orhan’s imam.” His book, *Deeds and Dates of the Ottoman House*,²⁴ is one of several related early Ottoman prose chronicles. Aşık Paşazade introduced Sheikh Bedreddin as the kazasker in Musa’s ill-fated Edirne regime – the most powerful civil position in the empire below the sultan – and Börklüce Mustafa was mentor to Sheikh Bedreddin’s son. In this version Sultan Mehmed graciously permitted Sheikh Bedreddin to go to Iznik with his daughter and a small stipend, but Sheikh Bedreddin escaped to the western Black Sea forests instead and declared himself caliph. Börklüce Mustafa, his deputy, fled to the Karaburun, “where there were many hypocrites.” Many joined them who had received fiefs from Sheikh Bedreddin during his tenure in Edirne. In this version Börklüce Mustafa was dismembered and Sheikh Bedreddin was hung in front of the market in Serres. Aşık Paşazade wrote, “Those Sufis claimed, ‘We’re just dervishes,’ but in truth they were not dervishes, they said ‘Our sheikh is the King, and we are his Princes.’”²⁵

The author of this third account, Aşık Paşazade, was a figure of no small cultural significance. Aşık Paşazade came from a long line of Sufi sheikhs and poets and was the sixth-generation descendant of Baba Ilyas, the mystic who had led the anti-Mongol uprising two centuries earlier.²⁶ Aşık Paşazade himself lived to be nearly a hundred years old. The revolt of the dervishes occurred in his youth, but he wrote *Deeds and Dates* decades later, as an old man, after the conquest of Constantinople, at a time when conflict with the Safavids clouded the Ottoman horizon. Two threads run through his book, one the nature of true piety, and the other the Ottoman dynasty’s intimate connection to the holy men of his own heritage.²⁷ He carefully distinguished between spiritual authority and political authority. The Safavids, once a legitimate Sufi order, had turned into the “infidel Ardebil sect,” as he called it, with their belief in the messianic mission of Shah Ismail. And the Safavid movement was prefigured in the revolt of the dervishes. Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa were nothing but politically ambitious frauds and charlatans, just like the

Safavids.²⁸ Among the early followers of the Safavid order, Aşık Paşazade wrote ominously, were twenty-five former disciples of Sheikh Bedreddin.²⁹ They “coveted not wisdom but demolishing the sacred law and winning the sultanate.”

Turkish Mystical Spirituality

Unlike the Safavid Shahs, the Ottoman sultans were never confused with the Divine. According to Aşık Paşazade the Ottoman sultans grounded themselves first in noble descent from the legendary central Eurasian Turkish warrior kings of the Kayı clan, and second in having been deputized by the Seljuks, designated sultans of the Abbasid caliphs. With the Abbasids overthrown by the Mongols and the Seljuks gone too, the line of legitimacy ran through the Ottoman sultans. They now bore the mantle of conquerors and sponsors of the Islamic tradition. The Ottoman sultans might occasionally be model believers, but they were also modest believers. Saints were saints, sultans were sultans.

Sultans and Saints

The relationship of saints and sultans was complicated. The epicenters of Turkish spirituality were not at first in the Ottoman lands, which were coastal Asia Minor and Thrace, and Christian until very recently. The spots most revered by Ottoman Muslims were in Galatia and Cappadocia and tended, if anything, to benefit rival dynasties, the Akkoyunlus and the Karamanids. Konya, the intellectual center of Turkish Islam with both the lodge of Sadreddin Konavi and Rumi's mausoleum, was under Karamanid control. The janissaries, the "new troop (*yeni çeri*)" of Sultan Murad's slave soldiers, was strongly Bektashi by spiritual commitment.³⁰ Sultan Murad I had endowed the lodge of the Bektashis, the sanctuary at the tomb of the sect's founder, Haji Bektash, but it was in a Cappadocian village, west of Kayseri.

That there was therefore some competition among the Muslim holy orders to define a close dynastic relationship between their own saints and the Ottoman sultans can be seen in a prophetic dream that appears in some form in all the earliest Ottoman chronicles. As the story goes, the Ottoman sultan was a good Muslim who said his prayers and carried the name of God on his lips. One night he dreamed he saw the moon rise in his sheikh's bosom and set in his own, where a great tree took root. After the dream he sought its interpretation from his sheikh. In the chronicles there was disagreement about the players – who had the dream? Which sheikh divulged its meaning?³¹ A group of anonymous chroniclers all wrote that Osman's father had the dream, but differed on the interpreter.³² Aşık Paşazade, however, gave the dream to Osman himself, and had it interpreted by a certain Sheikh Edebali. The sheikh said, "Osman my son. It is a favorable sign. God, may he be exalted, has bestowed sovereignty on you and on your descendents. May you indeed be blessed."³³ Thus was the success of the Ottoman dynasty owed to Sheikh Edebali, and no other holy man. In point of fact Edebali's daughter was not the mother of Orhan – Orhan's mother was a

different woman.³⁴ Aşık Paşazade, who himself belonged to Sheikh Edebali's order, avoided this detail.



Figure 2.1: The lodge of Haji Bektash, in a village in Cappadocia.

Note that the different sides in the debate all took it for granted that dreams were a communication from the Beyond, whose message needs to be deciphered with the help of an experienced seer. They all took for granted, that is, that the mystical spirituality of dervishes was plain Islamic piety.

Mosque and Medrese, and Lodge

Muslim mystics (commonly called Sufis today) found reality in God, through authentic personal experience. They knew God through a direct encounter with God's loving presence. Sufis spoke of the divine encounter as intoxicating. As lovemaking. God's love can be overwhelming – it tends to unhinge a person. In such an encounter there was only grace and mercy, and nothing else mattered. Disciples came to grips with the experience through a process of spiritual maturation, under the supervision of a sheikh, a master working within a specific disciplinary tradition.

Not everyone saw it this way. Sober Muslims were more impressed by God's awe-inducing purity. They felt the need to mark off God's sacred power from profane worldliness and to protect it with well-enforced boundaries. Sufis found such boundaries dubious and frustrating. All agreed for now that God revealed himself through "Two Books," one a sacred book with words, the other the book of creation, and that the life of humanity was ordered by attention to these two books. But for mystics, the experience of God was primary, and the human person was a microcosm. The two books, creation and Koran, each possessed an inner structure that pointed to this experience and explained it.

While often projecting a strong Sufi sensibility, the Ottoman sultans also patronized academic Islam and ensured the continuity of the high Islamic civilization. The Ottoman integration of Sufism with academic Islam can be seen from Aşık Paşazade's account of their support of medreses, institutions of higher learning.³⁵ Many early Ottoman scholars were mystics. Davud of Kayseri, the very first professor in the very first Ottoman medrese at Bursa, was a third-generation disciple of Sadreddin Konavi and authored a commentary on Ibn Arabi's *Bezels of Wisdom*.³⁶ Davud's successor at the Bursa medrese, Molla Fenari, the greatest scholar of Bayezid's era, was the son of another Konavi disciple and wrote an Ibn Arabi commentary,

besides an influential textbook on logic. All of this Aşık Paşazade reported as unremarkable.

As an institution medreses were closely affiliated with the authority and wealth of the conquering dynasty and with the vakıf, the powerful financial instrument that developed first as a means of endowing and funding the medrese. The standardized medrese curriculum consisted of reading and mastering classic texts under close faculty supervision. It included Koranic exegesis (*tafsir*), jurisprudence (*fıkıh*), hadith studies, philosophical theology (*kalam*), and Arabic grammar; but also medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and mysticism (*tasavvuf*). The educated alumni of the medreses staffed the sultans' administrative bureaus and court system. The sharia – that is, the summation of the Koran and the lived practice of the Prophet Muhammad (the sunna), interpreted within one of the four accepted schools of Islamic legal thought – lay at the foundation of Islamic society. Like Turkish rulers throughout the Afro-Eurasian world, the Ottoman sultans favored the Hanafi legal interpretation, which tended to strongly endorse God's providential appointment of worldly rulers. Sharia alone, however, has never been sufficient to govern any Islamic society, then or now. It always stood alongside dynastic law, the worldly decrees of sultans.

The medrese was not the sole location of higher learning in the Ottoman lands. Leading Sufi lodges also functioned as academies for training in the arts and sciences. Here, study of creation and the Koran was expanded through sources and methods meant to lay bare the linkages between them, including the esoteric sciences. The hierarchical organization and master-disciple pedagogy of the lodge gave education there a different complexion than that of the medrese. In the lodge, higher learning involved not just increased knowledge but also spiritual maturation, intentionally directed through a course of supervised training in the spiritual disciplines as well as in fundamental texts.

The mosque oriented believers towards the fulfillment of life's

aims, through belonging in the covenant community of God's people. Mosque worship organized the human response to God. It culminated in that liturgical moment in the Friday afternoon service when the imam mounted the pulpit to deliver the *hutbe*, and congregants actualized the human response to God in ritual *secd*, prostration, surrender to the Oneness of God. This was preceded by exhortations and explanations of the Holy Scriptures. The *hutbe*, as a concluding pronouncement, acknowledged the monarch whose earthly protection, legitimized by the caliph, enabled this gathering. For Muslims, daily prayers inculcated a timely response to God; weekly sermons developed a steady community discipline accompanied by constant recitation of the holy book; and the annual cycle of fasting and feasting, pilgrimage and return was the human *hegira* lived out – as the Koran puts it (2:156) “When beset by misfortune,” our only comfort in life and in death is “to God we belong, and to him we return.”

For Aşık Paşazade and the mystics, however, worship occurred not just in the mosque, but in the company of sheikhs and dervishes in the lodge. There were different kinds of lodges, including some that resembled monasteries, with resident dervishes. All had a worship hall. Meetings began with listening to the sheikh, who was descended from the founder and his regents by spiritual genealogy, and culminated in the ritual chanting of the name of God, known as *zîkr* (remembrance). Just as the chanting encouraged a person to trace the Name back to the Named, so the lodge liturgy (*sema*) was an approximation of the real encounter with God, an encounter which might occur perhaps only once in a lifetime. In a social setting in which this encounter was respected, the lodge might become the place to await it, seek it, and expect it potentially in each mundane encounter. It was not merely the verses of the Koran that were signs (*ayet*) of God for Sufis, but every part of creation manifested God's qualities. The sheikh directed disciples in the dissolution of the ego, the death of self that accompanied and was the outcome of any

authentic experience of God. If *secd* in the mosque was the prostrate response of creatures to the Wholly Other, *sema* in the lodge was the Lovers' embrace. Music and dance characterized worship in the lodge, and the entree into its intellectual tradition was lyric poetry. Classic poetry collections (*divans*) became a theology by other means, and literary history doubled as the history of religion.

The landscape of masters and sects was diverse, the lines of influence between them multilayered and fluid.³⁷ Some mainstream figures, including Rumi and Haji Bektash, had roots in Khurasan and central Eurasia; but origins mattered less than the emotional context of Turkish life. In this sense Ottoman Muslims were the truest heirs of Ibn Arabi. The Andalusian master had spent two decades in the Seljuk lands after his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1203. Sadreddin Konavi, whose lodge in Konya was a leading intellectual center, was Ibn Arabi's adopted stepson and most influential interpreter.³⁸ Besides the Koran and Hadith, Ibn Arabi's *Fusûs al-Hikam (Bezels of Wisdom)*,³⁹ usually studied through Konavi's commentary, was one of two additional essential texts in Ottoman Islam. The other was Rumi's *Mesnevi*, a spiritual classic and an almost indescribable verse encyclopedia of cultural referents. The human longing for transcendence, expressed in Ibn Arabi's conceptual vocabulary and Rumi's poetry, connected all Ottoman Sufis. Every lodge member knew and studied these texts, copied and translated them. Their impact was pervasive throughout Ottoman cultural life.

Box 2.2: The Reed Flute's Lament

The opening eighteen couplets of Rumi's *Mesnevi*, the reed flute's lament for the reed bed from which it had been uprooted, were lines instantly recognizable to all Ottomans.

Now listen to this reed-flute's deep lament
About the heartache being apart has meant:
"Since my song's expressed each human's agony,

A breast which separation's split in two
Is what I seek, to share this pain with you:
When kept from their true origin, all yearn
For union on the day they can return.
Amongst the crowd, alone I mourn my fate,
With good and bad I've learnt to integrate,
That we were friends each one was satisfied
But none sought out my secrets from inside;
My deepest secret's in this song I wail
But eyes and ears can't penetrate the veil:
Body and soul are joined to form one whole
But no one is allowed to see the soul.”
It's fire not just hot air the reed-flute's cry,
If you don't have this fire then you should die!
Love's fire is what makes every reed-flute pine,
Love's fervor thus lends potency to wine;
The reed consoles those forced to be apart,
Its notes will lift the veil upon your heart,
Where's antidote or poison like its song,
Or confidant, or one who's pined so long?
This reed relates a tortuous path ahead,
Recalls the love with which Majnun's heart bled:
The few who hear the truths the reed has sung
Have lost their wits so they can speak this tongue.
The day is wasted if it's spent in grief,
Consumed by burning aches without relief –
Good times have long passed, but we couldn't care
When you're with us, our friend beyond compare!
While ordinary men on drops can thrive
A fish needs oceans daily to survive:
The way the ripe must feel the raw can't tell,
My speech must be concise, and so farewell!^a

^a Rumi, *The Masnavi*, trans. Jawid Mojaddedi, 1:4–5. Used by permission of Oxford University Press.

There certainly was tension at times between medrese and lodge. Yunus Emre, the Turkish mystic poet of the previous century, lampooned the spiritual poverty of the ulema, and Rumi has a line, “An intellectual doesn’t know what the drunk is feeling.” And mysticism had its critics among the Ottoman ulema. Yet while Ottoman Islam did not lack for controversy, the mutual antagonism was for now contained. The Arabic invectives of Ibn Taymiyya of Damascus and his disciples had as yet no impact whatever in the Ottoman lands. Ottoman mysticism did not mean anti-intellectualism, and Ottoman academic Islam tried not to discount the validity of mystical seeking and taught mysticism (*tasavvuf*) as an academic subject in the medrese curriculum.

Box 2.3: Yunus Emre on the Ulema

God’s truth is lost on the men of orthodoxy,
Mystics refuse to turn life into forgery.
God’s truth is an ocean and the dogma a ship,
Most people don’t leave the ship to plunge in that sea.
At the threshold of truth, the dogma held them back:
At the door, all came in sight, but they could not see.
Those who comment on the four books are heretics:
They read the text, but miss the deep reality.^a

^a Trans. Halman, in *Yunus Emre*, 181. Used by permission of Indiana University Turkish Studies.

Time and Destiny

The expansive breadth of this holistic spiritual and intellectual life is visible through the deeper themes of Aşık Paşazade's *Deeds and Dates*, beneath its surface chronicling of events.

The book reaches back to two antecedent genres, the “deeds” (*menakıb*) and the “dates” (*tevarih*), respectively, of its title.⁴⁰ The first of the antecedent genres, the “book of deeds,” was a *gest*, a collection of anecdotes about the wonder-working virtue of a hero, usually in verse.⁴¹ Like a popular romance cycle, the content of a *gest* was drawn from tales circulating in folk memory. The stories were often plausible, even if the historicity of the hero himself (they were always male) is not so easy to pin down. The tone of the episodes ranged from hagiography, as with Sheikh Bedreddin, to the fantastic. Battles with infidels and demons, contests between dervishes and Christian priests, all were sites for signs and wonders.

While *Deeds and Dates* got its gaza motif, its militarism and violence, from the *gest*, it took its chronology and many of its episodes from the other antecedent genre, the chronograph. Chronographs – the term used was literally “dates” (*tevarih*, plural of *tarih*, “date”) – were chronological lists of events. They were unembellished and pre-literary, with no overt analysis. Chronographs of the Ottomans appear alongside chronographs of other dynasties, in manuscripts called *takvim*.⁴² *Takvim* was an astronomical term meaning an annual table of ephemerides showing the position of sun, moon, and planets for each day of the year.⁴³ *Takvims* were used by astrologers to cast personal horoscopes and interpret the outcome of events. Using this term, *takvim*, for lists of dates suggests that chronographs were supposed to provide data for the study of patterns and conjunctions in historical events. Though the meaning of events was sometimes unclear to those living through them, nevertheless the premise of astrology was that human life was part of an integral ecology of creation, whose fundamental principles and destiny should ultimately

be discernable through reason.⁴⁴ Just as the movements of the heavenly bodies pointed to individual fates, so the patterns of history, with all their surprises and oddities, were a tableau of society's hidden destiny.

There is no underestimating the intellectual depth of chronographs. They were, after all, concerned with time and its meaning. Chronographs presupposed the same advanced philosophical astronomy that underlay scientific work all over Southwest Eurasia. It was the astronomy Copernicus used,⁴⁵ and the astronomy that was taught in Ottoman medreses and lodges where, for instance, a new Turkish translation of Nasir al-Din Tusi's basic text on calendars was available.⁴⁶ The earliest Ottoman chronographs so far uncovered, which date from the reign of Sultan Murad II (1421–51), are themselves copies and continuations of still older texts. The practice must have gone back to nearly the beginning of the dynasty.⁴⁷ The entries give a simple recitation of events using the formulaic phrase, "It has been so many years since ..." For example, one begins, "It has been two hundred and five years since Osman Bey appeared."⁴⁸ The first entries are brief and vague, and repeated copying has made the actual dates hopelessly garbled. But they become gradually more detailed, including not only military campaigns but births, circumcisions, and marriages of the sultans' sons; deaths of important figures; comets and solar eclipses and the panic they caused; and disasters such as earthquakes and epidemics. Keeping a chronograph at court was, in other words, a way of setting current events in a context where political history, natural history, and sacred history came together.

In combining elements of gests and chronographs, Aşık Paşazade and chronicle writers like him created something quite different from either antecedent genre. The gest's use of gothic terror and the grotesque were dropped, and a sharp moralism replaced the chronographs' moral neutrality. Where chronographs left the meaning of the passage of time to mystery, Aşık Paşazade and the chronicles

spelled it out – the hidden destiny of society was the providential expansion of Islamic sovereignty, by means of the gazas of the Ottoman sultans. Aşık Paşazade downplayed Ottoman conquests of other Muslims; he did not notice the Christian armies that actually fought alongside them as feudal vassals; he showed no interest whatever in the kinds of spontaneous interfaith dialogue that did occur on occasion, as when for example the Christian Emperor Manuel campaigned with Sultan Bayezid in the war against the Muslim Burhaneddin of Sivas in 1391.⁴⁹ The political meaning of the chronicle was inherent in the new genre: dynastic genealogy was a metaphor of history, whose end was the expansion of Islamic sovereignty over the earth.

The poetry that filled the chronicles channeled the author's personal contribution, and carried much of their emotional, as contrasted with their political, interpretation.⁵⁰ Several standard poetic forms were used, the narrative *mesnevi*, a poem of varying length in rhymed couplets, being somewhat favored over the others for its formal and emotional flexibility. By alternating poetry with prose anecdotes, the chronicles shed the exultant violence of the geste and took on an elegiac tone. Drawing out the meaning of the past through correspondences between numerology and memory, Aşık Paşazade's chronicle especially became an extended meditation on providence and time that, like any good book of history, was as much about the present as about the past.

Dates, Aşık Paşazade concluded, were related to destinies somehow.⁵¹ The span of human history was fixed, like the days allotted to each person. Theologians and men of learning agreed, he wrote, that four eras had passed since the Flood of the Prophet Noah.⁵² He proceeded through a discussion of the calendar of the Hebrews and corrections to it, concluding that 6,038 years had passed from the creation of Adam to the hegira of the Prophet Muhammad, the beginning of the Islamic era. Abbasid scholars had worked out from the Torah that the world would last exactly seven thousand

years. The end of the world must be near. Not too near, as it turned out – this final era of human history was blessed by the appearance of the Ottomans. Aşık Paşazade studied past dates to know their inner truths, to relate even his own dates and to understand his own destiny. Writing was like prayer – a mysterious, verbal means of ensuring the auspicious conjunction of events. To write dates – the very act itself – was to transpose eternal signs.⁵³

Piety, Plenty, and Public Works

Thanks to the chronographs, we can surmise that about half of the twenty-nine years that Murad II ruled (1421–51) involved no major campaign led by the sultan. During the period between the recapture of Salonika (1430) and the invasion of Transylvania and Serbia (1438) he seems to have stayed in Edirne. Sometimes he summered in the higher elevations in Anatolia – in one year due to an epidemic that hit the city.⁵⁴ In this period of comparative peace Murad set about rebuilding the Ottoman lands after the long years of war and disaster.

Revenues and expenses were considered as belonging to two treasuries, the public treasury and the personal treasury of the sultan. The sultan's personal treasury included his one-fifth share of booty and slaves, tribute paid by foreign kingdoms, gifts to the ruler and his family, and income from family trusts. It was used to fund family expenditures. In funding reconstruction the sultans did not think they were contributing to something so impersonal as economic development.⁵⁵ They rather modeled works of philanthropy and charity. The public treasury (*Beytü'l-mal*) held funds raised through taxation. Members of the sultan's extended household received their salaries from the public treasury and did not pay taxes. In practice there was not an airtight barrier between the two; the sultan's treasury functioned at times as a savings account.⁵⁶ The public good benefited from the personal resources of the ruler.

Box 2.4: A Chronograph Entry

Chronograph keepers noted not only military campaigns and details of Ottoman territorial expansion and contraction, but also the environmental conditions of human life and their consequences:

It has been twenty-nine years since the Danube was

crossed and the Vlachs engaged in battle and war and most of the lands of the Vlachs destroyed, sacked, and enslaved; since Sultan Mehmed's fall [from a horse]; since in the city of Bursa as well as everywhere throughout the whole the region of Rum the ground shook in an immense earthquake; since in Bursa, in Erzincan and in many places a great number of buildings were destroyed; since there came to Rum a boundless and unprecedented swarm of locusts; since the crops of many places were consumed and destroyed; and since Rum was emptied and all the grain lost.^a

^a My translation. Text in Turan, *İstanbul'un Fethinden Önce*, 56–57

The task of reconstruction was formidable. It began with a new silver coinage and with a focus on the royal cities of Edirne and Bursa.⁵⁷ Both cities had suffered through several regime changes during the civil war, and Bursa had been damaged in the earthquake.

Bursa was the silk city. Most silk reaching Bursa originated in the southern Caspian region of Iran; the staging point for the western caravans since Mongol times was Tabriz. The route followed the Aras River valley to Erzurum, crossed the steppes by way of Erzincan on the Euphrates, Sivas on the Kızıl Irmak, and Tokat on the Yeşil Irmak, and reached Bursa through Amasya and Ankara. The success of this route put great pressure on routes sponsored by the Ottomans' rivals, both the overland route to Aleppo and the sea route to Constantinople via Trebizond. Five Ottoman sultans, going back to Sultan Orhan, endowed trust complexes in Bursa, each including a mosque, a medrese, a soup kitchen, and mausoleums, and nearly all a bath. Among their institutions could also be found a primary school established by Orhan and thermal baths built by Murad II. These were just the sultans' complexes. Women of the dynasty, and leading

statesmen and women, established several more. Nor were slaves inconspicuous. Members of the military class particularly employed large numbers of slave retainers, whose roles prepared them to join the ruling class themselves through manumission.⁵⁸ Probate records of a generation later reveal that in Bursa 15 percent of recorded estates – i.e., the wealthiest class – were those of former slaves.⁵⁹

Edirne, at the juncture of the Tunca and Maritsa Rivers in eastern Thrace, was the sentry node on the route to Buda and Prague, by way of Plovdiv, Sofia, Nish, and Belgrade at the confluence of the Danube and Sava. At least half a dozen major trust complexes in Edirne were endowed by leading statesmen during the reign of Murad II. The stone mosque begun during the civil war was finished afterward by Mehmed I, and was soon joined by another. The old one had revenues from a covered market, or *bedestan*, dedicated in trust to finance it. Among other shops the market included “the principal place and warehouse of the Genoese, where there were about a hundred merchants with a vast quantity of goods.”⁶⁰ The new mosque, its final stone set by Murad in 1437–38, broke with previous architectural models – a single, central dome topped the sanctuary, and one of its minarets had three balconies.




Figure 2.2: General view of Bursa, by Abdullah Frères, ca. 1880–93. The photograph was included in one of the albums sent by the Ottoman government to the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893, a copy of which was given to the Library of Congress.

Prints and Photographs Division, Abdülhamid II Collection, LC
USZ62-81540.

Ottoman control of the Straits enabled a connection between the two royal cities via Gallipoli. Aşık Paşazade described the very public scrutiny given to the route. Sultan Murad financed a mile-long stone bridge over the Ergene River about 50 miles south of Edirne. The heavily forested area was infested with robbers. The sultan ordered the trees cut down and the place cleaned out, and put settlements on both sides of the river at the bridgeheads, with a mosque, bath, and markets. Settlers willing to move there were promised a tax exemption. The sultan attended the opening ceremonies of the complex in the company of ulema and dervishes, distributing money, bestowing robes of honor on the architects, and spreading a public

table for a great feast.⁶¹



Map 2.2: The major overland trade routes.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

By this means the central European markets were linked to the rest of Southwestern Eurasia, even without Constantinople. Thus was Constantinople threatened not by conquest but by irrelevance. When Bertrandon de la Brocquière met Murad in 1432 through an Italian commercial attaché, Constantinople was being bypassed by this Bursa–Edirne route. Returning overland from the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem in a caravan of Muslim pilgrims, de la Brocquière reported that Genoese wholesalers from Pera, the commercial suburb of Constantinople, were buying silk for export directly from Ottoman suppliers in Bursa.⁶² The conquest of Constantinople was unnecessary, as Aşık Paşazade and others did not fail to point out.⁶³ Turkish merchants entered Constantinople regularly, trading in wax, dried fruits, hides, textiles, and war booty, including slaves, at a weekly market. The Ottoman silver akçe was acceptable currency. There was even a mosque and a Muslim judge for their convenience.⁶⁴ The city was becoming their own anyway, by a kind of vicarious visual

familiarity, with its skyline, its buildings, its walls, and its urban cityscapes, familiar like a neighbor's house.

The Trust

The core of the urban centers along these routes consisted of the complex of public institutions whose financial and legal basis was the charitable trust, or vakıf.⁶⁵ Hanafi sharia jurisprudence guarded the monarch's sole prerogative in distributing the empire's land, considering it divinely gifted to the sultanate by virtue of conquest. On agrarian lands, villagers retained usufruct, as divine justice required. The tax revenues owed from these lands, calculated as a cash equivalent of feudal services,⁶⁶ were distributed in parcels (*hass*). The sultan's own *hass* revenues were collected for his private treasury by his agents, and the remainder was bestowed on cavalry soldiers in the feudal bargain of livelihood (*dirlik*) in exchange for service. Private ownership (*mülk*) of land was had only by transfer from the sultan's own possession. As for vakıf, trusts could only be endowed from lands in private ownership.⁶⁷

The vakıf was established by a legal charter, duly registered with the civil magistrate's office. The charter spelled out the financial assets used to create the trust and the specific religious or charitable purpose,⁶⁸ and named a supervisor and staff who oversaw its operations. All kinds of commercial and residential property, including real estate both urban and rural, and movable property, could be set aside in a vakıf and rented to create capital for the beneficiaries. Both women and men, commoners and aristocrats, funded trusts. Urban complexes funded by vakıf typically included a mosque, a public kitchen, a market, an inn, often the tomb of the donor, a bath, and the lodge or monastery of the group of dervishes that organized the settlement.⁶⁹ The market buildings, called *han* or *bedestan*, housed the shops that generated the revenues to finance the other public works. The market building was typically a vaulted hall lined on either side by domed stalls, some with two storeys doubling as inns (caravansaries) for merchants and other travelers. It expressed the architectural and institutional interdependence of communion,

commerce, and cleanliness, and the moral responsibility of wealth to welfare. The magistrate's office appointed a public inspector to guard the interests of civil authorities.

Although the vakıf was not quite a new institution in the Islamic world, its great flexibility as a financial instrument had become apparent during the Seljuk and Mamluk eras, particularly in funding the medrese and hence public higher education.⁷⁰ Evrenos, the powerful subordinate of Murad I, had pioneered the trust as a means of establishing Turkish settlements in Thrace and Macedonia, where many towns abandoned by their Christian populations were resettled by Muslim Turks from Anatolia.⁷¹ Trusts became the most secure means of capital accumulation and the most important creator of new employment in the Ottoman lands. In the Ottoman period their financial potential was exploited as at no other time in Islamic history.

The Sancak and Security

Chronographs contain allusions to administrative structures that can be fleshed out by surviving registers of the courthouse of Bursa going back to the 1450s, and provincial records from the reign of Murad II, after the dynastic civil war. A dual civil and military structure ensured regional security. Civil administration was in the hands of the magistrate, called a *kadı*, an official with legal and religious training who presided at a courthouse in the principal urban center of the province. The military administrative unit was the *sancak*.

The term sancak meant literally “standard,” the banner that was a lord’s emblem of vassalage and was carried by his troops into battle.⁷² Lord in Turkish is *Bey*, hence the title of these vassal lords was *sancakbeyi*. Each sancak was divided into several *vilayets* under an officer called a *subaşı*. The cavalry soldiers under their command were called *sipahis*. These armed men were responsible both for local policing and for mustering for the sultan’s campaigns. Cadastral survey registers survive, the earliest from a sancak called Arvanid (northern Epirus, today in Albania) from 1431–32,⁷³ that recorded revenues to be collected from fields and villages and assigned as pay to the sipahis, in grants called *timars* and *ziamets*. The survey covers only a fairly limited area and was probably drawn up when Arvanid was colonized – a significant enough event to bear mentioning in a surviving chronograph.⁷⁴ But this was not the first such survey of lands under Ottoman control. It and slightly later registers from Thessaly, Bithynia, Ankara, and Aydın frequently cited older records. The 1451 survey of Aydın, for example, referred by name to sipahis who had previously held the same village revenues for four generations, going back to the time of Murad I.⁷⁵ The precision and regularity of these notices leave no doubt that their source was written documentation.

Many of the sipahis in these records were descended from ancestors who had served independent princes before the Ottoman

conquest, nor were the Christian knights disenfranchised when sancaks were created from formerly Christian feudal kingdoms west of the Straits. They were given timars alongside the Turkish newcomers, some of whom had transferred from Anatolia province and others of whom were slave soldiers in the armies of the conquering Turkish commanders such as Evrenos and Turahan.⁷⁶ In the Arvanid register of 1431–32, sixty of the 335 sipahis (17.9 percent) were Christians, including a metropolitan and three bishops. These figures are typical. Even some of the scribes who conducted the survey were Christians. In the area around Vulchitrin and Prishtina about 16 percent of the timars registered in 1454–55 were held by Christians; in the same year in Kircheva and Pirlipe it was 29 percent; in Vidin on the Black Sea it was just under 10 percent; in Thessaly the figure was 47 percent. In the first survey of Bosnia (1469) one-third of the timars were given to Christians, and seven were shared by Muslims and Christians.⁷⁷ In one instance when a Muslim sipahi did not show up for campaign his timar was given to a Christian sipahi. In the Thessaly register of about 1470 there was even an example of a Frankish deserter named Gilbertus Cancelarius receiving a timar. He later converted to Islam and took the name Ahmed.⁷⁸ It does seem that Christian officers may have faced a glass ceiling – though there was a Christian subaşı in Arvanid, there were no current Christians among the sancakbeyis and several converts to Islam. Across the Straits in coastal Asia Minor, which had by this time experienced stable Muslim rule for well over a century, Christian timariots were not completely unheard of, but the military class was overwhelmingly Muslim.

Thus the fundamental social distinction in the Ottoman cadastral registers was not between Muslims and non-Muslims, but rather between the subject class, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who paid taxes, and members of the ruling class, who were exempt from taxation. The Ottomans had no interest in overthrowing universally held notions of social class. The provincially based Ottoman army incorporated the hereditary knightly elites of the Ottomans'

predecessors, called as a class askeri (military), whether Christian or Muslim. Members of the subject class, called reaya, included both Christian villagers and Muslim villagers.

The Ottoman Administrative Service

If one revolutionary trait distinguished the Ottoman order, it was an obsession with written records. Besides revealing a deep structure of control and revenue tracking, the sancak order with its surveys and documentation suggests a drive to preserve and memorialize. Perhaps the ruling group, which included a core of permanent officials but also a fair degree of fluidity at the margins, wanted to avoid being counted in the subject group. The registers contain many careful notes about this, along the lines of “he is not reaya, he is in the askeri service.” But the impulse seems to go deeper. The literary and bureaucratic maturity of the Arvanid register of 1431–32, and the virtually identical Aydın and other registers decades later, point to composition by a small and experienced staff, with common training and probably under close personal supervision, and possessed of a strong class consciousness. Comparison of some Persian terms and phrases with surviving Ilkhanid bureaucratic manuals and documents suggests that the civil service of Iran (under the Mongol Ilkhanids and, later, Tamerlane’s dynasty) was their former employer and the continual source of inspiration of Ottoman literary arts.⁷⁹

Although he did not need to completely reinvent it, Sultan Murad II had to rebuild the institutions of the Ottoman palace service after the disorder and violence of Tamerlane’s invasion and the civil war. The formal structures of governance that were in place by the time of Murad’s death in 1451 were extensions of the sultan’s own developing household on the one hand and aspects of his service relations with subordinates on the other. Clues to the process can be seen in the changing titles of officials that occasionally appear in the chronographs, the Ottoman chronicles, contemporary Greek chronicles such as that of Ducas, and a few official documents. By mid-century if not earlier Murad was referred to by the title *Padishah* rather than Sultan Murad Khan, and his sons, called simply bey (lord) before, were now termed *Şehzade*, son of the ruler. In their youth they were

appointed to provincial commands in Anatolia, accompanied by their mothers and a senior advisor or mentor (*Lala*).

The Breaking Point

Ottoman writers sometimes treated military campaigns as if they were mobile enactments of this administrative and organizational structure. Yet close reading of the chronographs and chronicles reveals an acute awareness of the human dimension of campaigning, its rituals and suffering. An anonymous Ottoman history of the Crusade of Varna (1443–44), *The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Khan*, is one case in point.⁸⁰

The war began when Ibrahim of Karaman, who had reached an alliance with several Christian lords north of the Danube, raided all the way to the Straits. Sultan Murad called a meeting of the ulema of Edirne to get a declaration of jihad against him. Their fetva declared, “If a man makes common cause with the non-Believers and causes harm and oppression to the community of Muhammad ... he himself is a non-Believer.”⁸¹ Armed with this, the Ottoman army set out from Edirne with a band playing. A Tatar advance guard plundered and took many slaves, until Murad put a stop to it, “out of pity for the population.”⁸² Murad returned to Edirne without engaging Ibrahim, but Murad’s oldest son Alaeddin, who had marched from his provincial command at Amasya, did face Ibrahim and lost his life in the battle.

King Ladislás of Hungary, the Serbian King George Branković, and the great Hungarian lord of Transylvania János Hunyadi made a coordinated attack across the Danube in October.⁸³ A small Ottoman force marched into battle with the booming of kettle drums and shouts of *Allah, Allah*.⁸⁴ It was promptly put to flight. Notice of a full mobilization went out from Edirne to the Ottoman kadis, the civil magistrates who were charged with overseeing the muster of troops.⁸⁵ Their orders were to conscript the general population, stating that “this holy war is an obligation on all who live in Rumelia, great or small, whether on foot or on horse.” Irregulars were promised a timar,

a post in the janissaries or in the sultan's personal household corps, or, if they were nomads, release from rotational conscription, "Whatever it is they wish." Murad's two vezirs were charged to inspect the troops when they had gathered at Edirne. A chronograph recorded that the janissaries numbered three thousand men, probably the whole of the force.⁸⁶ The *Holy Wars* also refers to other Ottoman infantry corps as well, called *azebs* and *yayas*. The greater part of the Ottoman army, the regular troops, were organized by province into two bodies, the "army of Rumeli" and the "army of Anatolia." The chronograph noted the evidently remarkable presence of sixteen sancakbeyis.⁸⁷ Together they made up the "combined armies of Osman," or the "army of Islam,"⁸⁸ under a commander-in-chief called the beylerbeyi, "Bey of the Beys."

The campaign went badly. It was plagued by mistakes, mismanagement, and indiscipline of the army of Rumeli. While the army was still mobilizing Murad met his commanders in Sofia, in the middle of a scorched-earth retreat. He burned Sofia to the ground and blocked the passes toward Filibe (Plovdiv). These tactics were more or less successful, causing Hunyadi's army hardship in supplying itself, but they also brought great misery, and Murad was "extremely low-spirited and regretted what he had done." When the Bishop of Sofia said mass for Hunyadi's forces, Murad responded ferociously. Drums thundering, cymbals clashing, trumpets and pipes wailing, the Ottoman troops met Hunyadi's advancing army in a two-day battle in December 1443 in the Zlatitsa pass east of Sofia and fought to a bloody victory. In the botched and indecisive pursuit, however, the Ottoman army was decimated and one of the commanders was captured. Murad had his incompetent officers beaten and shaved and confiscated their fiefs.⁸⁹ Hunyadi's forces fared little better in their difficult retreat north, and in June of the following year Slavic envoys met with Ottoman statesmen at Edirne to conclude a ten-year truce.

Murad, however, had come to the breaking point. He suddenly gave up the throne to his son Mehmed. The chronographs, close to

him and knowing his grief, drew a straight line back from his abdication to the death of his son Alaeddin, and Ducas, the Greek historian, concurred.⁹⁰ Choosing for himself the downward mobility of the saints, Murad fled to refuge in a dervish lodge in Manisa.⁹¹

The opportunity was not to be missed. Hoping to incite a rebellion against Murad's 12-year-old son Mehmed II, the emperor in Constantinople released an obscure Ottoman dynast whom he had been holding in captivity.⁹² In September 1444 the Latin kings broke the truce and launched a massive crusade. Hunyadi marched down the Danube to besiege Varna, but gave up that and made for Edirne itself.

The Ottoman palace entered emergency mode. Experienced men took the helm in Edirne. A moat was dug around the town, the inhabitants were ordered into the citadel, and trees were felled to block the passes through the mountains. Wealth and valuables were evacuated for safekeeping. A second order of general mobilization went out under the signature of Prince Mehmed. Finally Mahmud Pasha was chosen as the person to talk Sultan Murad into returning. Murad did not want to come, but Mahmud Pasha pressed him, and feeling the gravity of the situation, he relented. When messengers arrived by the post roads with the news that the sultan was on his way, Edirne broke into rejoicing. The eager Mehmed wanted to lead the charge against the unbelievers himself! But it was his father who led the troops out "at an auspicious hour,"⁹³ while the young prince stayed to defend the capital. The decisive battle took place outside Varna in November 1444.⁹⁴ The army of Rumeli, on the left wing, was beaten. The army of Anatolia, fighting on the right wing, was routed and its commander fell. The outcome hung on the center, where Murad himself stood, defended by a few hundred janissaries and azebs, his personal guard, and pages of the inner palace. In the extremity of battle they were joined by two other companies of infantry, and the victory was won.

Once again Murad left for the lodge in Manisa, and once again his contemplation was interrupted by an urgent call from his old life, this

time due to financial consequences of the previous decade's activities. There were the wars, the two full mobilizations, and also significant public expenditure on infrastructural rebuilding. A September 1445 fire destroyed the Edirne market, the great mosque, and seven thousand homes.⁹⁵ A Venetian observer reported that the burned out areas were "left as if dead." Ottoman fiscal practice left a discrepancy between revenue collection, semi-annual on a seasonal (solar) calendar, and expenditures, allocated quarterly according to the Islamic (lunar) calendar. Since the lunar year is eleven days shorter than the solar year, roughly thirty-three lunar years occur for every thirty-two solar years. On paper, this extra fiscal year was skipped; in reality, the treasury was forced to find some means to fill the inevitable deficit.⁹⁶ After the fire two pay periods were missed, and when the janissaries were finally paid it was in debased currency.⁹⁷ In late spring 1446 they rebelled. The janissary memoir of Konstantin Mihailović quoted the exchange rate of the Ottoman silver akçe with the Venetian gold ducat. The silver content and weight of the new akçe was reduced by 11 percent, and the coins were visibly smaller.⁹⁸ The rebels voiced the ominous view that they might prefer the Ottoman pretender living in captivity in Constantinople to the young Sultan Mehmed II. Sent for a second time, Murad returned under conditions of joint regency with his son Mehmed II for the remaining years of his life.⁹⁹

Towards the end of his reign Murad began building a new palace in Edirne, at a beautiful setting on the banks of the Tunca, opposite a heavily wooded island in the river. There he finally found repose.

Box 2.5: Aşık Paşazade on the Last Days of Sultan Murad II

One day Sultan Murad went walking on the island. As he returned there was a dervish standing at the bridgehead. "O Padishah!" he said. "Your time is near. Repent!" The ruler turned to Saruca Pasha and said, "You are my witness, I have confessed all my sins." Turning to Ishak

Pasha, he said the same thing.

And he said to Ishak Pasha, “Who was that dervish, do you know?”

Ishak Pasha answered, “He is one of the disciples of Emir Sultan of Bursa.”

As soon as he came to the palace, the sultan said, “I have a headache.” He drew up his last will and testament and entrusted it to the safekeeping of Halil Pasha. He made his son Sultan Mehmed his heir. He lay in bed for three days, and on the fourth day they sent for his son.^a

^a Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 139–40.

The Goodly City

Within a short time the sultans found resources sufficient for a renewed assault on Constantinople. The currency devaluation worked as intended, once the blow to its unfortunate victims – the salaried army and palace servants – was absorbed. The determined push to Constantinople began in Murad’s last years. Murad subdued first the Morea, then the ambitious Albanian Skanderbeg, and crushed the Hungarian and south Slav armies at the second Battle of Kosovo in 1448. Treaties assured that Mehmed II would have no interference from these directions after his accession. Even Ibrahim of Karaman came to terms.¹⁰⁰

Sultan Mehmed built a new fortress on the Bosphorus north of Constantinople, directly across from the fort built by his great-grandfather Bayezid some sixty years earlier and for the same purpose. Construction completed, the blockade of Constantinople began in the fall of 1452, and the siege of the land walls of the city, which stretched from the Golden Horn to the Marmara Sea, the next April. The Ottoman guns breached the walls on 29 May 1453. The anonymous chronicle reported the date in a chronogram, matching the letters in the phrase “Goodly City” (*Belde-i Tayyibe*) to the correct year in the Hegira calendar, “As inscribed of old, the *Goodly City* is fallen; now this sign has reached its fulfillment, and this is the image: 857.”¹⁰¹

Box 2.6: Chronograms

In the chronographs the “years since” formula was sometimes written with numerals. This allowed the writer to insert puzzles called *chronograms*. A chronogram was a style of wordplay that relied on a given numerical value for each letter of the alphabet. Writers could disguise the date of an event in the

wording of a poetic couplet. Thus at a deeper level, chronograms made a graphic association between poetry and mathematics, art and science.^a

For example, an Ottoman chronograph reported that in a single year Sultan Murad II campaigned across the Danube and dedicated a new mosque and a bridge. Then it inserted a poem with a chronogram:^b

The new mosque and the bridge on the Ergene, they
were auspiciously built, those two
He crossed into Hungary, the Sultan of Hope, set up that
date, let THRONG be the name

The numerical value of the Arabic-script letters in “throng,” *humâm*, add up to 841, the year 1437–38.

^a Windfuhr, “Spelling the Mystery of Time.”

^b Ménage, “The ‘Annals of Murād II’,” 577.

Mehmed stood mesmerized amid the ruins of the ancient city. He commissioned a history from the city’s Christian scholars and dignitaries. Weaving classical history together with popular Islamic mythology, it helped reconcile reluctant Muslims to the city’s Christian past. Hoping to protect the urban fabric, the sultan had sent an envoy with the canonical invitation to surrender, which if accepted would have prevented plunder. This option was unfortunately wasted,¹⁰² and Ottoman troops pillaged the city. Other Muslims opposed a negotiated peace, preferring to see the city razed.¹⁰³ Mehmed halted the looting the day after the walls were breached and claimed the sultan’s lawful one-fifth as “the stones of the city, its property, and appurtenances.”

The great Haghia Sophia cathedral was not destroyed. The anonymous chronicle reported that when Mehmed entered the church

he was amazed. Ducas wrote that the sultan himself drew his sword against a soldier who dared damage the floor of the church.¹⁰⁴ The icons were taken away and the lower level figural mosaics covered. The other frescoes and mosaics, including icons of the apostles and prophets, the Virgin Mary and the patriarchs, scenes from the life of Christ, and the icon of Christ Pantokrator in the center of the dome, remained intact and in full view for more than 150 years after the conquest.¹⁰⁵ Other converted churches were treated with similar respect – the Chora Church in Constantinople gained a mihrab, but its mosaics of the Virgin Mary's life were left alone. (The same was true a few years later of the Parthenon cathedral, converted when Mehmed conquered Athens.¹⁰⁶) A brick minaret added, Haghia Sophia continued to grace the city skyline. Constantinople's ancient cathedral, having already challenged the Ottoman architects of Edirne's Three-Balconied Mosque, became the explicit inspiration not only for the Mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror but other future Ottoman royal mosques as well.¹⁰⁷

Rebuilding

Mehmed II pushed urban reconstruction and repopulation in Istanbul. The city walls were repaired and a fortress was erected. Construction of a palace began. A cluster of institutions including a major new covered bazaar, caravansaries, and a bath formed the nucleus of a renovated Ottoman urban center, funded by trusts.¹⁰⁸ Revenues of the covered bazaar were earmarked for support of the renovated Hagia Sophia, which became the royal mosque. Immediately one of the most important centers of commerce in Western Eurasia, the covered bazaar at its completion contained 122 shops. By 1472 the number of shops in and around the bazaar had reached 265.¹⁰⁹ There was no lack of space – the woodcut of Constantinople in Hartmann Schedel's *Nuremberg Chronicle* (1493) shows wide fields with windmills within the city walls. Mehmed granted vacant real estate to new settlers, with tax exemptions. Some mansions and some churches, vacant and unused, were given as gifts to Mehmed's officers. Former residents were invited to return to the city; those in hiding were promised freedom and those in captivity who could pay their own ransoms were allowed to stay. Throughout his reign Mehmed supported a right of return for people who had fled or had been carried off from Constantinople. Additionally, some were forcibly settled there from other places, including Jews, Christian Greeks, and Armenians, and not a few Muslim Turks,¹¹⁰ perhaps out of a desire for cosmopolitan diversity, as in the Mongol world empire, in addition to commercial reasons.¹¹¹

The royal family used its own property as an example. Mehmed settled his one-fifth share of the Greek slaves from Constantinople in homes along the harbor shore, employed them in his building projects, and paid wages that they could use to ransom themselves and settle in the city. The Conqueror's Mosque was the centerpiece of a new neighborhood in the middle of the city with a bath, library, large inn, and primary school. Inauguration of the Eight Medreses at this

complex in 1471 catapulted Istanbul to a position of intellectual and cultural leadership in the Islamic world.¹¹² Its faculty, who received the highest salaries of professors anywhere in the empire, strongly contributed to the emergence of an Ottoman ulema hierarchy.¹¹³



Figure 2.3: Constantinople in the *Nuremberg Chronicle*.

Used by permission of Art Resource, New York.

A new city prefect took charge of the renewal and resettlement program, yet progress was slow.¹¹⁴ There was disease. An intense plague epidemic in 1467 brought, in the words of the Greek eyewitness Critobulus, “great hopelessness and unbearable grief, wailing and lamentations everywhere.” It spread from Thessaly to Thrace and crossed the Straits to ravage Bursa. In Constantinople

“there were not enough presbyters, or acolytes, or priests, for the funerals and burials, or the funeral chants and prayers.” People were buried two or three or more in a single coffin, “the only one that could be found. And the one who today buried another, would himself be buried the next day by someone else.”¹¹⁵

Besides plague, another problem was that few Ottoman Muslims were attracted by the prospect of leaving their established lives to join the project of building a new imperial center in a run-down, formerly Christian city. Although earlier sultans had routinely worked with non-Muslim advisors at court, Mehmed being no different with an Italian Jewish personal physician who for a time served as treasurer of the empire,¹¹⁶ after the fall of Constantinople resentment of the Greek Christian influence at court became hysterical. It brought down a favored candidate for city prefect, the former Byzantine Grand Duke, and Halil Pasha too, the vezir who had opposed the siege and was said to have Greek sympathies. Even after these executions two of Mehmed’s closest advisors were Greek converts to Islam, Rum Mehmed Pasha and Mahmud Pasha. When the sultan ordered a survey of the Greek buildings of the city there was vigorous protest. Muslims who had been lured to the city by financial incentives from the government, and others who had been deported by force, began to move out. Aşık Paşazade juxtaposed the triumphal first Islamic service in Haghia Sophia with the outraged Muslim settlers asked to pay rent for their forced occupation of Christian homes.¹¹⁷ Mehmed had to backtrack.

By the time of the cadastral survey of 1478, a decade after the plague and a quarter century after the conquest, Istanbul had become majority Muslim. Sixty percent of the walled city’s 14,803 surveyed households were Muslim, 20 percent were Greek, and 11 percent Jewish. The remainder included two separate groups of Armenians, deported from Karaman and from Kefe in the Crimea, and thirty-one Gypsy households. Across the Golden Horn in mostly Christian Galata, about 40 percent of the households were Greek and something more

than 20 percent Latin, besides several dozen Armenian households. But even Galata was about one-third Muslim.

Topkapı Palace

Mehmed had a palace built near the city center and moved his permanent residence there from Edirne. Soon sensing that this hastily built palace was inadequate to his maturing vision of empire, the sultan built another. Called Topkapı Sarayı, it stood on the acropolis of ancient Constantinople, a low promontory on the peninsula overlooking the confluence of the Bosphorus, the Marmara Sea, and the Golden Horn. In this geographical marvel Mehmed saw a metaphor not of the “bridge between east and west,” as modern orientalism and Turkish nationalism would have it, but rather of imperial consolidation and world transcendence.¹¹⁸ Topkapı Palace was simultaneously the residence of the sultan, a stage for rituals of royal sovereignty, and the headquarters of public administration. Rather than large, ornate audience rooms and banquet halls, the layout emphasized spacious gardens surrounded by airy corridors, with small, somewhat secluded rooms. Its outer courtyard and garden was open to the public. The council chambers and offices of the secretariat surrounded the middle courtyard. The sultan held public audience under the Babu’s-Saade, the Gate of Felicity, which separated the second and third courtyards. Private audiences with the sultan took place in the chamber of petitions, a little square pavilion inside the third courtyard, separated from the Gate of Felicity by a breezeway. The private third courtyard contained the sultan’s personal apartments.

Along the seashore the palace walls doubled as the city walls, while on the landward side the walls formed a stone line of towers and gates. The foundation inscription speaks of the site as a link between two continents, two seas, two worlds, two horizons.¹¹⁹

The Conquest and History

The Turks like the Greeks knew that the name of the Byzantine capital was Constantinople, or *Kostantiniye*. The city was not “renamed” Istanbul by the Ottomans at all, but rather by the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. The Ottomans used the name Constantinople without prejudice and without controversy, on coins and in publications and official correspondence, right down to the twentieth century. At the same time, throughout the Ottoman centuries, both Greeks and Turks also called it colloquially Istanbul, or Stambul. This word derives from the Greek phrase meaning simply to, or in, *the City*.

The fall of Constantinople naturally held quite different meanings for the Greek Ducas and the Turk Aşık Paşazade. Besides having distinctive personalities and biases, both Ducas and Aşık Paşazade were absorbed, each in his own way, with the story of his own community. Neither wrote the kind of thorough account of the conquest that, for instance, the Venetian merchant Niccolo Barbaro gives, who was inside the city and kept a diary.¹²⁰ When it came to the fall of Constantinople, each had reasons to downplay the essentially conservative Ottoman approach to the city after the conquest.¹²¹

Ducas gave an entertaining account to be sure, relating the story of the great cannon that was cast in Edirne and pulled to Istanbul, and of the Ottoman forces dragging ships overland to bypass the giant iron chain that blocked the harbor. With the Turkish victory, however, Ducas had to bitterly watch the ascendancy of the anti-unionist group among the Orthodox clergy. He had supported the union with Rome, declared by the Council of Florence and consummated in the mass held in Haghia Sophia in December 1452. Since the civil war of the 1340s the sultans had consistently sided with Orthodox foes of union. Ducas awaited the renewal of God’s sovereignty during the Ottoman “tyranny,” which he experienced as a kind of occlusion of the rightful

Palaeologus emperors. Now, Sultan Mehmed's appointment of a new patriarch proved that not only would time go on, so too the Church would have new life, in the imperial city, through the Ottoman tyrant's patronage of an anti-unionist patriarchate.¹²² Ducas's description of the city's fall concluded with an emotional eulogy that quoted the Prophet Jeremiah's lamentation over Jerusalem.¹²³

The conquest was not quite the catastrophe for Aşık Paşazade that it was for Ducas, but neither was it the consummation of history, as some other Ottoman chronicles had it. Aşık Paşazade's account reflects the ambivalence felt by an important segment of Ottoman Muslim society. The siege, the conquest, and the looting of Istanbul he described in a single chapter, one of 166 in his book and not a very long one. He even ignored the discovery of the burial place of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, the companion of the Prophet Muhammad who had died in the Arab siege of Constantinople in AD 668. After the conquest Sultan Mehmed II celebrated this tomb, found near the headwaters of the Golden Horn through the miraculous intervention of a venerable holy man who had prophesied the conquest of the city.¹²⁴ Aşık Paşazade had no interest in such a concocted royal cult.

Tursun Bey and the Conqueror

From among the Turks at the walls, the better account of the conquest comes from the Ottoman civil servant Tursun Bey. Tursun Bey described the siege, the entrance of Sultan Mehmed II into the city, and the sultan's first visit to the cathedral of Haghia Sophia, in his *History of the Conqueror*.¹²⁵ Part memoir, part chronicle, part mirror for princes, the work contrasts markedly in both style and themes from that of Aşık Paşazade. The difference of discursive styles between Tursun Bey and Aşık Paşazade indexed a whole pattern of theoretical and philosophical divergences in the post-1453 Ottoman Empire. They were rooted ultimately in different conceptions of the Divine, yet they did have some interests in common.

Tursun Bey presented the Ottoman Empire as the greatest empire in world history. He wrote in “composition (*inşa*) style,” an elegant language being created spontaneously in literary circles at the Ottoman court. Composition style put Arabic and Persian vocabulary and grammatical constructions onto a Turkish syntactic scaffolding, filling it in with dense alliteration, assonance, internal rhyme, and complicated noun-verb pairings, besides poetry. The new language suggested an analogy between the Ottoman Empire and the cumulative cultural heritage of the Islamic era. But Tursun Bey's book was not a world history, unlike several others written in the century or so after the conquest. Within just a few years came Şükrullah's *Shining Visage of Dates*, in thirteen parts, and Enveri's *Book of Principles*, even more ambitious at twenty-two books, both culminating in the Ottoman dynasty. For Tursun Bey the conquest of Constantinople rather invited comparison between Sultan Mehmed II and great world conquerors of the classical past, Alexander of Macedon, the Sassanian Ardashir, and Chinggis Khan. Drawing heavily on the Islamized Persian genre of advice for kings, Tursun Bey went on to lay out a theory of royal authority in which the legitimate Muslim sovereign acted as the earthly instrument of God's inclusive

justice, and a royal ethics in which the sovereign's deeds were an offering of gratitude to God.

These themes were indicative of Tursun Bey's medrese education and his career of forty years as a scribal official and member of the ulema. He was from an old Bursa Muslim family – his father had been a beylerbeyi, his grandfather had been a sancakbeyi, and his uncle, a governor of Bursa, had directed the survey commission of Byzantine homes in Istanbul after the conquest. Tursun Bey himself had worked with his uncle on this commission, then acted as a provincial surveyor, received a post in the council secretariat in Istanbul, and from there was appointed to important financial positions in the province of Anatolia. He retired in Bursa, where he managed his uncle's trusts and devoted himself to writing.¹²⁶

For Tursun Bey, God's chosen ruler would manifest obvious gifts and was obligated to use them obediently as an essential aspect of God's daily work in the world, in wise judgment, vigilant defense of the realm, and shepherding of the flock under his care. The obedience of the subjects – a common, grateful, humanity, undifferentiated by language, ethnicity, or religious community – expressed their own submission to God's authority. Tursun Bey called them *kul*, the Ottoman word for the sultan's palace slaves. For Tursun Bey the models of kingship were coming not from Rome or Byzantium but from Sassanian Ctesiphon, Hellenized Islamic Baghdad, and Mongol Tabriz.

Ulema and Dervish

By comparison, Aşık Paşazade's strongly colloquial Turkish (*Turkî*) prose, his folkloric, anecdotal narrative style, and his original verse rooted his chronicle in the intellectual tradition of the dervish lodge. As we have seen, he began with the spiritual genealogy of his Sufi order. For him sultanic authority derived from bonds between warrior lords and holy men, and the authority of the Ottoman sultans specifically grew from the blood ties of the Ottoman dynasty with Sheikh Edebali. The Ottoman sultans were gazis, commanders of armies of righteous warriors fighting the powers of Unbelief. Their victories played a role in the coming end of the age by bringing the rule of Islam in history.

Like other dervishes, Aşık Paşazade feared that conquest of the city might enable an alliance of sultanate and ulema to create structures of royal and religious control, aimed against them.¹²⁷ He resented the continuities with Istanbul's Christian past embodied by prominent Ottoman statesmen who were Christian converts, some quite recently. Among these recent converts were three men who dominated the office of grand vezir for three-quarters of a century. One of them, Mahmud Pasha Angelović, was Tursun Bey's patron. Grand vezir from 1456–68 and again in 1472–74, Mahmud Pasha had come into Ottoman service when he was taken prisoner as a child. He was educated in the palace school in Edirne and probably participated in the siege of Constantinople. He married one of Sultan Mehmed's daughters, but throughout his career he also maintained close ties with his own south Slavic noble family.¹²⁸ He planned many of Mehmed's conquests, including Greek Trebizond, where his cousin George Amirutzes was treasurer. A second such man was Mahmud Pasha's successor as grand vezir in 1468, Rum Mehmed Pasha. He was from a Greek noble family and may have been captured in the siege of Constantinople. A third was Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha, son of a Slavic lord from around Mostar. His brother seized their father's inheritance,

so he left for Istanbul, converted to Islam and took the name Ahmed Hersekzade, literally “Son of the Prince.” He reached the highest levels of Ottoman service, married Sultan Bayezid’s daughter Hundi, and served five terms of office as grand vezir under Bayezid II and Selim I.¹²⁹

Despite their differences, dervishes like Aşık Paşazade and ulema like Tursun Bey found common ground in the decades after the conquest of Istanbul. They were each opposed to two trends. Both fought the aggressive fiscal policies of Mehmed II, which they saw as a threat to the financial vitality of Ottoman religious life. And a generation later they made common cause against the Safavid movement.

One agent of this reconciliation was Sultan Bayezid II, son and successor of Mehmed the Conqueror.¹³⁰ During his princely internship in Amasya, Bayezid had become close to the Halveti Sheikh Müeyyedzade and allowed him to escape to Iran when royal executioners came calling. As sultan, Bayezid brought Müeyyedzade to Istanbul, where he became one of the most powerful jurists in the empire, serving as Kadı of Edirne and Kazasker of Rumeli. Under Bayezid the official ulema helped roll back the harshest of Mehmed’s fiscal measures. This relieved the pressure on the dervish orders as well as themselves. For their part many dervish groups settled in the capital with Bayezid’s blessing, taking the opportunity to voice their loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty, and to reconcile themselves to royal authority and to Constantinople, the royal city. Aşık Paşazade himself moved to Istanbul to live after his retirement and invested in the city.

Box 2.7: Aşık Paşazade’s Dedication

Alluding to a passage in the prose introduction of Rumi’s *Mesnevi*, Aşık Paşazade wrote,

Of all the gazas and acts of his own time and those who accomplished them, this poor one has chosen a few, *as if*

scooping up a handful of grains from the winnowing floor.
And in the writing the memory beholds their wonder. My
only wish is that prayers be offered for their souls. May
God bless those who read or who listen to these deeds of
the House of Osman.^a

Later he added a poetic blessing:

Pray for this house, Aşıkî,
Your dates are signs in script:
In the days of Bayezid Khan Shah
Joy and prosperity are registered in time.^b

^a My translation. Aşık Paşazade, *Menâkıb ve Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 136.

^b Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 222.

Istanbul and Afro-Eurasian Commerce

Conquest of Constantinople gave the Ottomans a decisive advantage in a sprawling conflict over the trade routes and shipping lanes of the Black Sea, Aegean, and eastern Mediterranean.¹³¹ The conflict involved four major and several minor powers. Besides the Ottomans the major players were Venice; Mamluk Egypt; and the Akkoyunlu Sultanate, centered at Tabriz and ruling Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. The minor actors entered the stage from time to time, including the Knights of Saint John on Rhodes and the Muslim sultanates of Karaman in Cappadocia, Ramazan in Cilicia, and Dulkadir east of the Taurus. Through aggressive diplomacy, intimidation, and force, by 1541 every urban center and all overland routes between Buda and Baghdad, and between Cairo and the Crimea, were in Ottoman hands. All the major Islamic pilgrimage destinations were in Ottoman hands, too – Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Najaf, and Karbala.

Redirection

With Constantinople's rehabilitation as the center of commercial life, routes neglected for decades gained new life. The blockade of the Straits ended, and seaborne communication was reconnected with Black Sea ports such as Trebizond (Trabzon), conquered by Mehmed in 1461, and Kefe, conquered in 1475. West of the Straits ancient overland routes still functioned. The old Roman *Via militaris* led from the capital to Belgrade, the *Via egnatia* west to the Adriatic, and the Constantinople Road north to Varna. The route between Edirne and Bursa did not cease to be important, but connection between Istanbul and Bursa by sea was also possible. In this way it took little additional effort to reconnect Istanbul to the silk routes. There was also interest in underdeveloped regions and routes. Many new towns were established.¹³² One example was Novi Pazar, on the route from Sarajevo to Skopje via Kosovo. It was founded by a governor, Gazi Isa Bey of Skopje, with a mosque, bath, inn, soup kitchen, and fifty-six shops.¹³³

Sarajevo was another example, a quintessentially Ottoman town, created from trusts endowed by two beylerbeyis. Ishak Bey Ishaković selected the site. It took advantage of a small tributary in the proximity of the Bosna River, the main north-south Bosnian waterway, and the Neretva, which flows westward past Mostar to the Adriatic. At the bridgehead he constructed a mosque, named the Conqueror's (Fatih) Mosque in honor of Mehmed II. Its trust deed (1462) also provided for a bath, a dervish lodge, a caravanserai, a market, and millworks. The minaret of the mosques and the domes of these buildings, roofed in characteristic curved clay tiles, defined the look of an Ottoman town from the hills above.¹³⁴ By 1477 Sarajevo had already attracted over 150 households of settlers, about two-thirds of whom were Christians. Everything was burned to the ground in a Hungarian and Slav attack in 1480, but forty years later the conquest of Belgrade and the defeat of Hungary ensured the security

of Bosnia, and Sarajevo was rebuilt by a second major benefactor, another governor, Gazi Hüsrev Bey, a grandson of Sultan Bayezid.¹³⁵ Sarajevo grew rapidly into a major Ottoman city and a center of Islamic culture in the southern Slavic lands.¹³⁶

A key conduit of commercial intervention was monetary policy. Monetization and increased demand put chronic pressure on the money supply. Though the basic Ottoman coin, the silver akçe, was supplemented with Venetian gold ducats restamped at the Ottoman mint, and with other foreign coinage, it was not enough. The akçe was debased six times by Mehmed II, including three times in the last ten years of his reign, and additionally, the Ottoman mint began producing a small amount of its own gold coins. The strategy of debasement was probably doomed, since inflation inevitably brought prices back to their real market value. But by prohibiting the old akçes and charging a hefty fee for conversion to the new, the palace turned a quick profit, as it did also in restamping the Venetian ducats.¹³⁷

Sultan Mehmed and the Ottoman Expansion

The war for Afro-Eurasian commerce was ignited by Sultan Mehmed's conquest of the south Slavic lands of Serbia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina in the early 1460s. This gave the Ottomans control of the land routes to the Adriatic and produced a border along the Danube–Sava line that remained basically stable until the 1520s. Defeat of the Albanian warlord Skanderbeg brought Ottoman power to the Adriatic coast – Dubrovnik (Ragusa) voluntarily capitulated in return for trade privileges. Conquest of the Peloponnesus (Morea) provoked a war with Venice. In the first phase of this war Mytilene and the isle of Lesbos, and Negroponte and the Euboea fell to the Ottoman navy. Operating from the shipyards at Gallipoli, the Ottoman fleet maintained a constant vigil against pirates in the Aegean, protecting the trade in slaves, spice and silk, as well as the local grain commerce.¹³⁸

The war spread when Ibrahim of Karaman died in 1464. Mehmed captured Konya, sent the various Karamanid claimants into exile, and made the kingdom into an Ottoman province. Venice and the Akkoyunlu sultanate of Uzun Hasan formed a coalition backing the would-be Karamanid successors. Uzun Hasan plundered the silk transit city of Tokat and took Konya in 1472. He then challenged the Mamluks, taking several fortresses on the route to Aleppo, including Malatya and Ayntab. A Venetian envoy arrived at the Akkoyunlu court in Tabriz in August 1473 just in time to witness the Ottoman army's rout of Uzun Hasan at the Battle of Başkent.¹³⁹ Sultan Mehmed made indirect pursuit – he granted asylum to Uzun Hasan's son, installed him as Ottoman Sancakbeyi of Sivas, and gave him his daughter in marriage.

The crucial blow in the war was the Ottoman capture of two Genoese fortresses in the Crimea, Kefe (Theodosia) and Azak (Azov). Uzun Hasan's death in 1478, and Mehmed's siege of Shkodër on the Adriatic, turned up the heat on Venice. The senate was forced to sue

for peace and pay tribute. Since the Greek Kingdom of Trebizond had already capitulated, the Ottoman navy now dominated the Black Sea. Ottoman revenue contractors took over the customs duties at Kefe, the terminus of the overland route across central Eurasia, export center for grain and, above all, the key port for the slave trade.¹⁴⁰ This trade was the economic basis of the Crimean Khanate, a confederation of semi-nomadic Turkic clans in the steppe under the leadership of the Giray dynasty, who now became Ottoman vassals. Their slave raids ranged deep into Eastern Europe and southern Russia, and their rich cargo flowed to the slave market of Istanbul.

The biggest splash perhaps was the Ottoman landing at Otranto, on the Italian peninsula, in 1481. The intent was less to target Rome than to prevent Venetian aid to the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt. The simultaneous siege of Rhodes must have had a similar purpose. It failed, but Ottoman forces occupied Otranto for a year and only withdrew when Mehmed died and a succession struggle broke out between his two sons.

Bayezid and Cem

Of Mehmed's two sons, support for Cem was strongest among those in Ottoman society who identified closely with royal authority over against the old Turkish nobility, and who benefited from Mehmed's expansionist foreign policy. Bayezid, in contrast, cultivated relations with people who had been damaged by the fiscal policies of Mehmed's last years.

These factions were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and the succession struggle did not produce complete vindication for either. The ulema sometimes identified with the palace (the medrese institution owed itself to the sultan's endowed trusts), but sometimes were victimized by confiscations of private estates and vakıf properties, as were the dervish groups. The janissaries preferred the sultanate's active military stance; but they were negatively affected by the currency debasements. When Bayezid triumphed over Cem, he did roll back some of Mehmed II's most antagonistic fiscal measures. He returned some endowed trusts and private property that had been seized. He stabilized the akçe by ending currency debasement. Local Turkish nobility must have liked Bayezid's granting of timars to "truly begotten sons" (*sahih sulbi oğlu*) of earlier sipahis – not, by implication, to sons of the palace household.¹⁴¹ Bayezid's empire-wide levy of *cizye*, the canonical poll tax on non-Muslims, probably pleased those Muslims who liked to keep proper communal distinctions.

Bayezid continued the expansionist activities of his father but was hampered because several neighboring states, desperate for leverage against the Ottomans, attempted to make use of Cem. The Mamluks declined to send the customary kudos to Bayezid at his accession, and detained the delegate of the Bahmani Sultanate of the Deccan and his Ottoman escort at Jidda.¹⁴² It was to Cairo that Cem first fled, and it was there that his family continued to live throughout his long ordeal. Bayezid dusted off old plans of Mehmed for an Egyptian campaign, but the war, fought mostly in the neighboring Ramazan and Dulkadir

Sultanates of Cilicia and the Taurus, was inconclusive. Cem escaped to the Knights of Saint John at Rhodes, and eventually ended up a hostage of the Pope, in confinement in the Vatican.¹⁴³ Bayezid's agents got to Cem in Rome in February 1495 and poisoned him.¹⁴⁴

The Ardabil Sufis and Ottoman Authority

As Aşık Paşazade noted, towards century's end residual anti-establishment impulses took theological and political form in a new religious movement, the Kızıbaş, associated with the Sufi lodge at Ardabil in the Caucasus.

The story had a long background. The piety of the Caucasus and the upper Tigris and Euphrates had long been suspect in the post-Mongol Islamic world. The Baba'i rebellion had convulsed this plateau in the 1240s. In 1323 the Mamluk governor of Syria referred dismissively to the lands "on the far side of the Euphrates" as full of unbelief, hypocrisy, and heresy.¹⁴⁵ A century and a half later a Persian historian still described "The fools of Rum, who are a crowd of error and a host of devilish imagination."¹⁴⁶ The cumulative effect of migrations, wars, and cultural fads make the religious stratigraphy of the area often indecipherable.¹⁴⁷ Wandering ascetics were a permanent feature of the terrain, simultaneously fascinating and abhorrent, evidently enjoying the irony of their own weird popularity.¹⁴⁸ Some just shunned outward show, while others showed a cheeky indifference to personal appearance and seemed to almost welcome condemnation of their flagrantly antisocial behavior.¹⁴⁹ They wore sheepskins or other distinctive dress or shaved their heads, and carried emblems and instruments – castanets, horns, horsetails, bags. Annoyed critics wrote scathing denunciations of them as charlatans or simply mad, and had little but scorn for an ignorant and naïve public too easily taken in.¹⁵⁰

Another wave followed the saint, Fazlullah of Astarabad, who lived around 1400 in a cave north of Tabriz. Taking seriously all creation as the manifestation of the Divine Names, he saw humanity as a continually evolving theophany. He developed an esoteric numerology known as *hurufism* from the letters of the sacred text (*hurūf* is the Arabic plural of *harf*, meaning letter), which are also

written across the human body. Tamerlane had him executed, but his spiritual insights seeped into the soil and re-emerged everywhere, among the Bektashis and many other groups. Sultan Mehmed II was evidently once held spellbound by a hurufi harangue in Edirne in 1444. The ulema, unimpressed, had the preacher burned at the stake. The poet Nesimi, a personal friend of Fazlullah, was skinned alive in Aleppo, a hideously exact retribution. Such suffering was experienced by its victims as a theodicy.

The Kızılbaş

It seems extraordinary that even in this libertarian spiritual landscape the Kızılbaş movement should cause such tremors. The Kızılbaş accepted the concept of the Imamate, or spiritual kingship, of Ali and his descendants. Since Ali had married the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima, their sons, Hasan and Hussein, were the Prophet's grandsons. Belief in the Imamate and veneration of Ali's line through Hasan and Hussein and the later Imams that went with it were shared with mainline Shiism and with other Ottoman groups, notably the Bektashis. What exactly the Bektashis themselves taught and how they worshipped was a matter of secrecy and thus some uncertainty. Their Ali devotion was well enough known, but besides this, the eclectic Bektashi ritual and mythology set them apart – their disregard for mosque worship, their use of a shared Eucharistic meal, and concepts like transmigration of souls, for example. But the janissaries were heavily Bektashi, and the janissaries were the most loyal of Ottoman troops. Hence Bektashism was part of the Ottoman mainstream. And still the Kızılbaş were deemed something wholly different.

Their devotional intensity and ecstatic spirituality made the Kızılbaş baffling but also threatening. They were secretive about their belief and practice, a fact further complicated by their alleged dissembling (*takiyye*) when questioned. They neglected fasting and prayers and other public expressions of faith. They were said to curse the four Rightly Guided caliphs. They were suspected of "Incarnationalism," belief that God could take on normal worldly appearance. To suggest that the Divine might suddenly be perceived as real in any person, place, or circumstance, was something a good many Ottoman mystics could affirm by experience. But to believe that the Divine gave itself specific embodiment in the charismatic sheikhs of the Safavid order of Ardabil – this was something else. It raised a challenge to the spiritual and political underpinnings of Ottoman authority.

The Safavid Order

The early history of the order affiliated with the lodge of Sheikh Safiüddin of Ardabil – the Safavid order – seems to have been unexceptional. A portentous schism occurred, however, around 1450, when the resident master of the order, backed by the sultan of the Kara Koyunlu Turkmens, banished his nephew and rival, Sheikh Cüneyd. Cüneyd approached the Ottoman Sultan Murad II. According to the story in Aşık Paşazade's *Deeds and Dates*, Cüneyd offered three totems – a prayer rug, a Koran, and a rosary. This was no mere request for asylum, it was an invitation to discipleship. Vezir Halil Pasha Çandarlı commented ominously, “Two kings cannot sit on one throne.” Choosing not to take offense, Murad sent Cüneyd two hundred gold florins and a thousand silver akçes to distribute to his dervishes. He denied his request for safe haven.

Cüneyd tarried for a time at the lodge of Sadreddin Konavi in Konya, but fell afoul of the master. He slipped through the hands of Ibrahim of Karaman, narrowly averted capture by the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, fled to the Black Sea coast, and finally got a hearing in pre-conquest Christian Trebizond, where the Comneni ruler was linked by marriage of his daughter to Uzun Hasan. Uzun Hasan could see the value of an alliance. He took Cüneyd's offer of twenty thousand horsemen and had his sister Hadice Begam married to him. Cüneyd now laid siege to the home lodge at Ardabil, but the assault was beaten back. Defeated, he fled north to the Shirvan valley along the Caspian shore and announced his intention to wage gaza against the non-Believers of Abkhazia and Georgia. According to Aşık Paşazade the outraged local Muslim lord ordered Cüneyd to leave his Christian subjects alone. He sent an army out that met Sheikh Cüneyd in battle and killed him.¹⁵¹

Cüneyd's son and successor Sheikh Haydar did, however, capture Ardabil. It was during Haydar's thirty-year career of gaza, plunder, and slaving that Safavid Sufis of Ardabil became known as *Kızılbaş*,

the “red capped,” after their red felt headwear, having twelve folds for the Twelve Imams.¹⁵² Haydar doubled the order’s alliance with Uzun Hasan – by marrying his daughter, he became son-in-law besides nephew. When Haydar died in battle in the Caucasus, succession passed first to Haydar’s older son, and when he was killed in summer 1494, to his younger son Ismail, who was 7 years old.¹⁵³ The tenth Islamic century began in October.

Notes

- 1 Silay, ed., *History of the Kings*.
- 2 Emecen, “İlk Osmanlı Kroniklerinden Timur İmajı,” in *İlk Osmanlılar*, 161–73.
- 3 Zachariadou, “Manuel II Palaeologus.”
- 4 Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, 29.
- 5 Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 175.
- 6 Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins*, 149–83.
- 7 Manz, *Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, 72–73.
- 8 For an account of his terrors, Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 55–56.
- 9 For the chronology, Kastritsis, *Sons of Bayezid*.
- 10 Note Richards, *Mughal Empire*, 162.
- 11 For example, Abd ül-Vasi Çelebi’s *Halilname*, in Kastritsis, *Sons of Bayezid*, 221–32.
- 12 Kastritsis, *Sons of Bayezid*, 153–58.
- 13 Kastritsis, *Sons of Bayezid*, 159–84.
- 14 Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 79–95.
- 15 The incident has attracted a large amount of attention, including a twentieth-century poem by Nazım Hikmet and a documentary film. Recent studies are Balivet, *Islam Mystique*, and Köker, *Şeyh Bedreddin*.
- 16 Trans. Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*.

- 17 Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 244.
- 18 Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 119–21.
- 19 Köprülü, “Bemerkungen,” 209, quoting the text of Şukrullah.
- 20 Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 121.
- 21 A not unheard of fate, however. Armanios and Ergene, “A Christian Martyr under Mamluk Justice.”
- 22 Gölpınarlı and Gungurbey, eds., *Simavna Kadıoğlu*; Babinger, ed., *Die Vita*.
- 23 Çıpa stresses the dynastic connection, “Contextualizing Şeyh Bedreddin.”
- 24 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*. For the significant differences among the extant Aşık Paşazade manuscripts, see the introduction to Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, 81–85.
- 25 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 92; Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, 153–54; ed. Giese, 81–82.
- 26 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 1.
- 27 Halil İnalcık, “How to Read.”
- 28 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 91–92 (Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, 153–54) with the Giese anonymous, *Die altosmanischen Anonymen Chroniken*, 49–55.
- 29 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 264–69; Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, 249–52.
- 30 On Murad’s religious commitments, Taeschner, “War Murad I. Grossmeister?”; and Reinert, “From Niş to Kosovo Polje,” in Zachariadou, ed., *Ottoman Emirate*, 167–211, esp. n. 95; on his burial site and shrine, Heywood, “1337 Bursa Inscription,” 223.
- 31 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 132–33.

32 Giese, ed., *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, 9–10. Ménage published a different version, “On the Recensions,” 317–19.

33 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 6.

34 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 33.

35 Kazancıgil, *Osmanlılarda Bilim*, with bibliography.

36 Kazancıgil, *Osmanlılarda Bilim*, 57–58; Chodkiewicz, “La Reception de la doctrine d’Ibn Arabî,” in Ocak, ed., *Sufism and Sufis in Ottoman Society*.

37 Karamustafa, “Origins of Anatolian Sufism,” in Ocak, ed., *Sufism and Sufis*, 67–95.

38 On this lodge, Faroqhi, “Vakıf Administration.”

39 Ibn Arabi, *Bezels of Wisdom*. See also Tahralı, “A General Outline.”

40 V. L. Ménage, “The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography,” in Lewis and Holt, eds., *Historians*, pp. 168–79; and Ménage, “On the Recensions.”

41 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 60–117.

42 Examples of this type were published by Turan, *İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce*, and by Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Takvimler*. For the term takvim, see Turan, 5.

43 King, “Astronomy,” in Young, Latham, and Serjeant, ed., *Religion, Learning, and Science*, 274–89.

44 Thorndike, “True Place”; Krämer et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, pp. 165–75, s.v. “Astrology” (Charles Burnett). Fleischer has stressed the need to take into account Ottoman astrological practice; see “Secretaries’ Dreams,” in Baldauf and Faroqhi, eds., *Armağan: Festschrift für Andreas Tietze*, 77–88.

45 Saliba, *Islamic Science*.

- 46 *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. “Ahmed-i Dâî”, vol. 2, 56–58 (Günay Kut).
- 47 Ménage, “Annals of Murād II’,” 570, n. 3.
- 48 Turan, *İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce*, 54–55.
- 49 Zachariadou, “Religious Dialogue,” in Lewis and Niewöhner, eds., *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, 289–304.
- 50 Flemming, “Poem in the Chronicle,” 175–84.
- 51 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 269–74; Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, 252–55.
- 52 On the eras, Kennedy, “World-Year Concept,” in King and Kennedy, eds., *Studies*, 351–71.
- 53 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 222.
- 54 Using the text of Ménage, “Annals of Murād II’.”
- 55 Shechter, “Market Welfare.”
- 56 Sahillioğlu, “Sıvış Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire,” in Cook, ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, 236, 242–43.
- 57 Ménage, “Annals of Murād II’,” 575.
- 58 Fisher, “Studies in Ottoman Slavery.”
- 59 İnalcık, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” in Ascher, Halasi-Kun, and Király, eds., *Mutual Effects*, 25–52, at 30.
- 60 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 186.
- 61 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 116.
- 62 His memoir was published in Mainz in 1486 and translated into English by Johnes, *Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquiere*.
- 63 Yerasimos, *La Fondation de Constantinople*.

64 Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins*, 201–7.

65 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 85–86.

66 İnalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rûsûmu.”

67 For the Ottoman theory of land tenure, Imber, *Ebu’s-su’ud*, 115–22.

68 For trusts in the Ottoman Empire, Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., s.v. “Wakf IV. In the Ottoman Empire,” vol. 11, 87–92 (Randi Deguilhem).

69 Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda.” See also Lifchez, ed., *Dervish Lodge*; Wolper, *Cities and Saints*.

70 Rogers, “Waqf and Patronage.”

71 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 93–94. On the trusts of Evrenos, Lowry, *Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans*, 15–64.

72 Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 23, 46.

73 Published by Halil İnalcık, *Hicrî 835 tarihli*.

74 Atsız, *Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Takvimler*, 105.

75 The register is Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Tapu-Tahrir M. 1/1. Some of its more interesting entries were transcribed and published by Akın, *Aydın Oğulları*, 126–30.

76 İnalcık, “Stefan Duşan’dan,” repr. in İnalcık, *Fatih Devri*, 137–84.

77 Oruç, “Christian Sipahis.”

78 İnalcık, “Stefan Duşan’dan,” 147.

79 İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest.”

80 Thanks to combined scholarly efforts, this is the first Ottoman prose chronicle to be fully translated into English. The text was edited by İnalcık and Oğuz, eds., *Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd b.*

Mehemmed Hân; the translation is by Imber, *The Crusade of Varna*.

81 İnalçık and Oğuz, eds., *Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân*, 5; Imber, *Crusade of Varna* 45, 86. For the dates and the chronology, Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 122–34.

82 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 45.

83 İnalçık, “1444 Buhranı,” in İnalçık, *Fatih Devri*, 1–53.

84 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 49.

85 İnalçık and Oğuz, eds., *Gazavât-ı Sultân Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân*, 14, 37; Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 54, 80.

86 Ménage, “Annals of Murâd II,” 577. For the current state of knowledge on the janissaries, Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., s.v. “Yeñi Çeri,” vol. XI (2001), 323–31 (Rhoads Murphey).

87 Ménage, “Annals of Murâd II,” 577.

88 Turan, *İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce*, 28–29.

89 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 55–69; summary in Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 122–25.

90 İnalçık, *Fatih Devri*, 59–60.

91 İnalçık, *Fatih Devri*, 55–67.

92 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 74–76.

93 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 86.

94 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 94–101; for the correct date, Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 133.

95 Ménage, “Annals of Murâd II,” 578; Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 186.

96 Sahillioğlu, “Sıvış Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire,” in Cook,

ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*.

97 For the chronology, İnalçık, *Fatih Devri*, 69–136.

98 Mihailović, *Memoirs*, 71–73; Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 55–57.

99 İnalçık, *Fatih Devri*, 92–108.

100 Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 145–46.

101 Giese, ed., *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, text, 74.

102 İnalçık, “Policy of Mehmed II,” 232.

103 This summary of the dispute relies on Yerasimos, “Foundation of Ottoman Istanbul,” in Nur et al., eds., *7 Centuries of Ottoman Architecture*, 459–79.

104 İnalçık, “Policy of Mehmed II,” 233.

105 Necipoğlu, “Life of an Imperial Monument,” 212–13.

106 Ousterhout, “‘Bestride the Very Peak of Heaven’,” 318.

107 Necipoğlu, “Challenging the Past,” 171.

108 İnalçık, “Istanbul: An Islamic City,” 11.

109 Yerasimos, “Foundation of Ottoman Istanbul,” 463; İnalçık, “Hub of the City.”

110 Yerasimos, “Foundation of Ottoman Istanbul,” 460–62.

111 Lowry, “From Lesser Wars,” 47–63, and Lowry, “Portrait of a City,” 65–99 in Lowry, *Studies in Deftology*.

112 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, 5–10.

113 Imber, *Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, 228.

114 Yerasimos, “Foundation of Ottoman Istanbul.”

115 Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, 219–22.

- 116** İnalçık, “Jews in the Ottoman Economy and Finances,” in Bosworth et al., eds., *Islamic World*, 513–50.
- 117** On which, İnalçık, “Policy of Mehmed II.”
- 118** Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power*, 13.
- 119** Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power*, 32–37.
- 120** The best short description, using all the sources, is Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, 145–62.
- 121** See Jones, trans., *Nicolò Barbaro*.
- 122** Runciman, *Fall of Constantinople*, 155ff.; for the anti-union stance of Gennadios, Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 204.
- 123** Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall of Byzantium*, 236–39.
- 124** İnalçık, “Istanbul: An Islamic City.” 1–23.
- 125** Its contents were summarized by İnalçık and Murphey, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*.
- 126** See İnalçık’s and Murphey’s introduction to *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, 11–17.
- 127** As suggested by İnalçık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” 109–10.
- 128** Stavrides, *Sultan of Vezirs*.
- 129** Reindl, *Männer um Bāyezīd*, 129–46; on Hersekzade, Lowry, *Hersekzāde Ahmed Paşa*.
- 130** Tansel, *Sultan II. Bāyezīt’in Siyasî Hayatı*, 1–6; Reindl, *Männer um Bāyezīd*, 34–36.
- 131** Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower*.
- 132** Stoianovich, “Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” 242.

- 133** Kiel, “Ottoman Mineral Baths (Kaplıca) on the Balkans,” in Ergin, ed., *Bathing Culture of Anatolian Civilizations*, 212.
- 134** On the curved tiles, Kanetaki, “Ottoman Baths in Greece,” in Ergin, ed., *Bathing Culture of Anatolian Civilizations*, 236.
- 135** Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, vol. 1, 35–36.
- 136** Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., s.v. “Sarajevo,” vol. IX (1995): 28–34 (A. Popovic).
- 137** Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 47–58, 60–61.
- 138** On the navy, Imber, *Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, 287–317.
- 139** Woods, *Aqquyunlu*, 113–23.
- 140** Fisher, *Precarious Balance*.
- 141** Kunt, *Sultan’s Servants*, 25; Howard, “Ottoman Timar System,” 92 and 132 n. 67.
- 142** İnalçık and Murphey, eds., *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, 64–65; text ff. 167a–168a.
- 143** İnalçık, “A Case Study.”
- 144** On the Cem affair, Tansel, *Sultan II. Bâyezit’in Siyasî Hayatı*, 23–69; and İnalçık, “A Case Study.”
- 145** Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 108–9. On the religious disputations of the Ilkhanid period, Mazzaoui, *Origins of the Safawids*, 22–40.
- 146** Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478–1490*, 65–66.
- 147** Mélikoff, “Le Problem kızılbaş.”
- 148** Karamustafa, *God’s Unruly Friends*.
- 149** Imber, “Malāmatiyya in the Ottoman Empire,” repr. in Imber, ed., *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 145–52.

150 Karamustafa, “Origins of Anatolian Sufism,” in Ocak, ed., *Sufism and Sufis in Ottoman Society*, 67–93

151 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 264–69.

152 For an eyewitness account of his career, Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478–1490*, 65–82.

153 For the date, Woods, *Aqqyunlu*, 278, n. 27.

A World View, 1494–1591

The tenth Islamic century opened with a stunning convergence of calendars. On a pilgrimage to Ardabil on the holy day of Ashura in the Islamic year 905 Ismail Safavi emerged from concealment. In this blessed child, grandson of Sheikh Cüneyd on his father's side and Uzun Hasan on his mother's side, heir also to the defunct throne of Trebizond through his Christian grandmother – in this fortunate child appeared the avatar of Imam Ali, the manifestation of the Hidden Imam. Ashura, the tenth day of the first month of the Islamic year, commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein, the son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad who died at Karbala in AD 680. In this particular year, which was 905 of the hegira and also AD 1499, Ashura fell in early August, at the midquarter festival between the solstice and the equinox. Ismail called on followers to gather at Nowruz the next year – so it was that Ismail appeared at the spring equinox of 1500, the midpoint of the second Christian millennium.

The air was electric. Ottoman provincial governors were on high alert, their orders to intercept Kızılbaş pilgrims, seize their goods, and hang them.¹ The advancing Ottoman army put down a sympathetic uprising in Karaman. Thanks to such Ottoman security measures only “seven thousand” Kızılbaş reached the gathering. Yet Kızılbaş armies entered Tabriz triumphant in fall 1501. Ismail was proclaimed shah; the old realm of the Turkmens was reunited.² The new dispensation commenced with a righteous revenge meted out by the sacred house of the Safavids. Over the next decade Safavid forces conquered the Iranian plateau and made amends with the Twelver Shiite ulema of Iran. In 1508 Shah Ismail took Baghdad.

A World Empire

For Ottoman officials, the question of the Kızılbaş and Shah Ismail and his Turkmens inevitably became enmeshed in complex strategic concerns, attention to which had the unforeseen outcome of creating a world empire. Over the previous several years, after his brother Cem's death, Sultan Bayezid had returned to the great Afro-Eurasian commercial conflict. With the famous corsair Kemal Reis now in Ottoman service, the navy scored a major victory over Venice and forced a peace treaty in 1503, but the situation was changing rapidly, and Bayezid was aging. Besides Shah Ismail's new Safavid Empire another new power arose too, Portugal, whose naval presence challenged Mamluk domination of the seaborne Indian spice trade. Four months after Shah Ismail entered Baghdad, in February 1509 the Ottoman navy engaged the Portuguese at the Battle of Diu, off Gujarat in the Indian Ocean, and lost. With hundreds of Ottoman merchants living in Calicut, Gujarat, and Diu, the India commerce was too important to yield the sea lanes.³ Joining a diverse coalition of the Mamluks, the Muslim Sultanate of Gujarat, the Hindu Zamorin kingdom of Calicut, and Catholic Venice, the Ottoman navy kept a presence on the Southern Arabian coast and closely monitored passage to the Red Sea.⁴ In such circumstances the Kızılbaş could not be ignored.

Box 3.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Tenth Islamic Century

Bayezid II 1481–1512

Selim I 1512–20

Süleyman I 1520–66

Selim II 1566–74

Murad III 1574–95

Among Bayezid's sons, Selim, the youngest, advocated a forceful response. Alarmed at the strength of Kızılbaş spirituality among the people, Selim feared that residual anti-Ottoman dissent might be turned to revolution. The Turkmens seemed to express the very same culturally ingrained contempt of urbanized royal authority nursed in the upper Tigris and Euphrates since the Baba'i Rebellion 250 years earlier.⁵ Many Muslims in the Ottoman lands found the Kızılbaş repugnant. The nonagenarian Aşık Paşazade, writing shortly after Ismail's conquest of Tabriz, described the "Ardabil Sufis," their coarse and jocular way of speaking, their neglect of fasting and prayer, their routine lies about what they were doing. They greeted each other not with "Selamu aleykum" but *Shah*. When they got sick, instead of praying they chanted *Shah*. Who could forget the Kızılbaş sack of Tabriz, with its rape, plunder, and persecution against Sunni Muslims?

⁶ Yet other Muslims sympathized with the Kızılbaş, including some among the timariot cavalry in Anatolia whose autonomy had ebbed away under Ottoman rule. The standing army of the Ottoman palace, however, including the janissaries, backed Selim, notwithstanding the decidedly Ali-oriented piety of their own Bektashi traditions.

Plans for joint action with the Mamluks had to be scotched because of drought, disease, and disaster.⁷ Trebizond (Trabzon), where Prince Selim was governor, struggled to feed itself. The tightened security had slowed grain shipments both by sea and by caravan from the interior.⁸ In August 1509 a massive earthquake struck the whole region from Sivas to Thrace, Transylvania to Cairo.⁹ In Istanbul the ground broke open and the shores of the Golden Horn flooded. More than five thousand people died, a thousand homes and a hundred mosques fell, and the walls of Yedikule and other fortresses were damaged, as well as Bayezid's new trust complex with its mosque and soup kitchen, next to the covered bazaar. The sultan directed repairs from a temporary shelter put up in the palace gardens, raising the funds in an extraordinary tax levy. A major aftershock caused a fire that destroyed as many homes as the original

quake, and there was widespread looting, especially in the Jewish quarter of Istanbul. Bayezid wintered in Edirne, where the damage was less.

Shah Kuli

What finally led to action was competition among the sons of Bayezid. Once repairs to the walls were done and his mosque complex nearly ready, Bayezid returned to Istanbul, but his failing health paralyzed the court and a preemptive fight for the throne broke out among his sons.

As it had a century before, the succession war became the occasion for a revolt that challenged the fundamental spiritual principles of Ottoman rule. Selim left Trabzon for Kefe, in the Crimea, where his son Süleyman was stationed, and angled to control Rumeli.¹⁰ Ahmed and his son Murad controlled the Galatian plateau and Bithynia from Ahmed's base at Amasya.¹¹ Korkud, who was posted in Antalya, a Kızılbaş bastion, left for Mecca and self-imposed exile. When without explanation he returned and set off towards Istanbul, people guessed that Bayezid must have died,¹² and in Antalya on Ashura a dervish declared himself sultan. He was the direct spiritual regent of the Safavids of Ardabil, and called himself Shah Kuli, "the Shah's Slave."

Perhaps the feared revolution had come. Shah Kuli and his men captured Korkud's baggage train and treasury and put Korkud to flight. Hundreds of timar-holding sipahis joined, displaced men who had lost out to personnel from the Istanbul government,¹³ burning and plundering their way across the plateau.¹⁴ They captured the beylerbeyi of Anatolia, decapitated him, roasted his corpse on a spit, and massacred his men. Bursa castle sent a frantic cry for help. The grand vezir set out from Istanbul and Prince Ahmed marched hurriedly from Amasya. In the inconclusive battle both Shah Kuli on one side and the grand vezir on the other were killed. Knowing that his brother Selim was just outside Istanbul, Ahmed and the rebels suddenly discovered they had rather a lot in common. The rebellious cavalry, bereft of the Shah's Slave and facing the prospect of the janissary candidate Selim on the throne, quickly adopted the sultan's

oldest son, and Ahmed had himself a cavalry collected from all over the plateau.

When Ahmed and his army of the disaffected reached Üsküdar, across the Bosphorus from Istanbul, Prince Selim had been defeated by Bayezid's army and returned to Kefe to bide his time. But his time was now. His janissary allies assassinated the new grand vezir, barricaded Istanbul against Ahmed, and forced Sultan Bayezid to bring back Selim. Realizing they were beaten, Ahmed and his son Murad retreated, their men melting away towards Azerbaijan and Iran. They were known to be in contact with Shah Ismail.¹⁵ The hapless Korkud, seemingly always in the wrong place at the wrong time, arrived in Istanbul by boat, paid homage to Bayezid, and handed out gold in the hopes of buying janissary neutrality.¹⁶ His largesse availed him little. Prince Selim entered the city, deposed the bedridden Bayezid, and took the throne. He had Korkud strangled. Ahmed met the same fate in the spring.¹⁷

Çaldıran

Sultan Selim now set his face against Shah Ismail. Not for nothing is Selim known as *Yavuz*, often translated “Selim the Grim” in English, but maybe better Selim the Resolute, or Selim the Stern. The route to war was paved with public rhetoric. In a celebrated correspondence, the “holy people, religious scholars, and jurisprudents” in Selim’s employ coolly countered the impudent witticisms of Shah Ismail’s poets. They did not mask their disdain for the Kızılbaş, who flouted “the law and tradition of our Prophet” with their “sinful practices forbidden by God,” for the brutality against Sunnis in Ismail’s Iran, or for Shah Ismail’s contrived descent from the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁸ A fetva from the Mufti of Istanbul obliged true Muslims to fight the “unbelievers and heretics” to the death.¹⁹ One order for Kızılbaş executions mentions a register of “forty thousand” victims, “old and young, aged seven to seventy.”²⁰ Perhaps it was hyperbolic.

As the troops mustered Selim offered sacrifices, distributed alms, paid respects at the graves of his father and grandfather, and prayed at the shrine of Abu Ayyub the Companion. The army set out in April 1514, taking the route through Konya, where Selim gave alms to the poor and pointedly prayed at the shrine of Rumi.²¹ The long anticipated battle was joined at the plain of Çaldıran, east of Lake Van, in August 1514. Shah Ismail the boy messiah met defeat at the hands of Sultan Selim and the Ottoman army. The victors marched unhindered into Tabriz. Friday prayers in Shah Ismail’s capital were recited in the name of the Ottoman sultan and the Rightly Guided caliphs.

After Çaldıran Selim gave no hint of relaxing his attitude and did not tip his hand concerning his next move, whether in pursuit of Ismail or of the Portuguese, who had taken Kamran Island in the Red Sea.²² He worked with Kurdish chieftains and other well-disposed locals to gain the surrender of Diyarbekir, Mardin, and Mosul. Independent Dulkadir became a sancak under the command of the son

of its former sultan.²³ Malatya, on the upper Euphrates, capitulated in the spring of 1516. Safavid–Mamluk machinations gave Selim a rationale for another major Ottoman campaign.²⁴

Syria and Egypt

Crossing the Taurus, Selim accepted the submission of the Ramazanid house of Cilicia. This sultan too and his heirs became governors of new provinces created from their former kingdom. Selim met the main Mamluk army at Marj Dabik, near Aleppo, on 24 August 1516. The Ottoman field cannon won another crushing victory. The Mamluk sultan died of a heart attack. The Mamluk governor of Aleppo, who had gone over to the Ottomans, was made the Ottoman governor. The Ottoman army continued south. In Damascus the first Friday Prayers of Ramadan were recited in Selim's name. Selim entered Jerusalem, ceremonially viewed the "Pact of Umar," and confirmed Christian privileges at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.²⁵

Selim's commanders were divided on whether to continue on to Egypt or turn back and leave lieutenants in command of the border towns. As if to demonstrate the main argument in favor of going forward, the new Mamluk sultan executed an Ottoman envoy and marched on Gaza – obviously, in the event of an Ottoman withdrawal the Syrian cities would be hard put to resist Egyptian reconquest. So Selim made the Sinai crossing and defeated the Mamluk forces outside Cairo, 23 January 1517. Negotiations to recognize the Mamluk sultan as Selim's vassal governor failed, and after a second battle, at the pyramids of Giza in April, he was hanged at the Bab al-Zuwayla gate. Selim spent the summer of 1517 in Cairo. An embassy arrived from the Sharif of Mecca honoring the Ottoman sultan as Protector of the Two Sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina.²⁶

Hungary and Iraq


When Selim died three years later his son Süleyman, 25 years old, put down a rebellion not of any brothers, since he had none,²⁷ but of a former Mamluk and of a Kızılbaş upstart named Kalenderoğlu. The revolts were short lived and the executions swift. Süleyman took Rhodes, likely to have been Selim's next target – corsairs operating from the island constantly harassed the commercial routes between Istanbul and Cairo and threatened pilgrims.²⁸ Then he turned immediately against Hungary.²⁹ The Ottoman army captured Belgrade in 1521 and decimated the Hungarian nobility with a victory at Mohács in 1526.

Contrary to expectations, Süleyman's victories did not bring the full conquest of Hungary.³⁰ King Lajos, whom the sultan had hoped to make governor of the new province, died in the battle. The Hungarian nobility split over the succession – the diet elected the Transylvanian lord János Szapolyai, with concurrence from the Slavonian nobles, but a faction meeting at Pozsony (Bratislava), and backed by the Croatian diet, opted for Ferdinand Habsburg, the brother of Lajos's widow. Ferdinand was loyal to the Papacy, a significant issue now, just six years after the Edict of Worms.³¹

With the split among the Hungarian nobility and the unexpected entry of the Habsburgs into Ottoman affairs, Süleyman installed Szapolyai in Buda with the crown of Saint Stephen and moved directly against Vienna, Ferdinand's capital. Beset with disease and other difficulties, the Ottoman siege of 1529 failed, as did a second campaign in 1532, which never reached Vienna. When Szapolyai died in 1540 leaving only an infant heir, Ferdinand besieged Buda, hoping to reunite Hungary under Habsburg rule. Süleyman chased him off, but had to concede the partition of the Carpathian basin.³² The Ottoman army occupied central Hungary, with the Hungarian plain and Buda and the forts of the Danube bend, Esztergom and Visegrád. The Habsburgs controlled "Royal Hungary," a strip of land in the west

and north, including the mines of the Tatra Mountains, and paid an annual tribute to Istanbul. Transylvania evolved into an autonomous principality under Ottoman protection. Peace with the Habsburgs was signed by the government of Selim II in 1568.

Yet world empire beckoned. Shah Ismail died in 1524 leaving only a 10-year-old son, Tahmasp. Lengthy disputes among the Turkmens brought Ottoman intervention. Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha marched east and sacked Tabriz in the spring of 1534. Joining them late in the campaign season, Süleyman and the main body of the Ottoman army marched south into Iraq and took Baghdad in the fall of 1534. Mehmed II the Conqueror had found the tomb of Abu Ayyub at the walls of Constantinople; Süleyman ceremonially discovered and restored the tomb of Abu Hanifa, founder of the Hanafi School of Islamic law. He endowed a mausoleum for the Sufi saint Abd al-Kader al-Gilani, and made personal pilgrimages to the shrines of the Imams Kazim and Jevad at Baghdad, Imam Ali at Najaf, and Imam Hussein at Karbala.³³



Map 3.1: Partitioned Hungary.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

Süleyman ascended the Ottoman throne amidst an aura of apocalyptic anticipation that his own early conquests did little to diminish. Ottoman armies had crushed the Kızılbaş, the greatest movement in Islamic spirituality since the rise of Sufism. They had occupied both the Abbasid capital of Baghdad and the Mongol capital of Tabriz. They had put an end to the Mamluk sultanate, over 250 years old, and captured the great Arab cities of Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo. They had defeated the Knights of Saint John and seized the crusader stronghold of Rhodes. The crown of Saint Stephen too was in Ottoman hands. Ottoman territory encompassed all seven climes of classical geography.³⁴ Tenth sultan of a blessed dynasty, Süleyman heralded a monarchy that was the consummation of ages.³⁵ Some Jewish rabbis saw in his rule the final Ingathering of the Exiles that had begun with the Iberian expulsions.³⁶ Süleyman's court indulged the speculative fervor and picked up the mantle of world sovereignty.

Disorientation

It was not merely Ottoman military glory that fed the apocalyptic fever, it was a new world map that Selim's and Süleyman's conquests helped create. All across the Afro-Eurasian land mass new dynastic empires matched the Ottomans – the Ming, the Mughal, the Safavid, and the Habsburg. Of these only the Ming predated the year 1500. With the Portuguese sack of Kilwa in 1505 a formidable new naval power entered the competition for Indian Ocean commerce. Just two days prior to Süleyman's departure for the campaign that would become his victory at Mohács, in April 1526, Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat and conquered Hindustan. Hard pressed by Babur and by the Portuguese, Bahadur Khan of Gujarat asked for Ottoman aid.³⁷ In October of the same year in which Selim's armies took Cairo, Martin Luther published his Ninety-five Theses in Wittenberg. The main sponsor of anti-Protestant activity in Central Europe, the Habsburg dynasty, now ruled not only homelands in Austria and (because of Mohács) an empire with large Slavic territories on the Ottoman frontier in Europe, but also Spain and an empire in the Americas and the Pacific. Süleyman's alliance with Francis I, the King of France, who was surrounded by the Habsburgs, became the occasion for the first direct contact between the Ottomans and a sovereign of Northwestern Europe. All of these radical changes took place in full view of a single generation, the same generation that witnessed discovery of the New World.

Writers in the Ottoman lands coped with the shock of these sudden upheavals not in triumphalist paeans to the power of God but in evocations of disorientation and loss. Take the discussion of the discovery of the Americas in a work of the 1530s, *Book of the Seas* (*Kitab-ı Bahriye*). The author was the admiral and former corsair Piri Reis. Born in Gallipoli, home of the Ottoman naval arsenal, he came into Ottoman service when his uncle was recruited by Bayezid II. He

was present at the fall of Alexandria, and then mapped the Nile Delta for Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha. He also drew two world maps for presentation to Sultan Selim, only small pieces of which survive. The first, done in color on a gazelle skin and annotated in Ottoman Turkish, shows Spain, the Bay of Biscay, the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean, and the eastern coast of North America. The rest is lost. Piri Reis consulted some thirty other maps and charts in creating it, including Portuguese maps of India and China and “a map of the western regions drawn by Columbus,” which happened to fall into his hands in a raid several years earlier. His second map, done on camel skin in the 1530s, survives in an even smaller fragment, showing only the coastline of northern South America, the Caribbean, eastern North America, and Greenland.

Book of the Seas was a portolan based on Piri Reis’s experience as a captain. The verse introduction used the metaphor of the seas of life. Those in need seek a real guide, those who seek the way find wholeness – the terms make mystic allusions.³⁸ The deep covers the globe, with the seven seas – the South China Sea, the Indian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the “Sea of the Blacks” off Abyssinia, the “Western Sea” or Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Caspian. But also the “Great Ocean” encircles the world. “The way to China was by this sea,” Piri Reis wrote with palpable awe, “but until now it had not been found and no one knew this.” He then told the story of Columbus and the discovery of the New World, closing with a meditation on impermanence:

This world is permanent for no one;
Certainly whoever fears leaves nothing.
Let one memory remain of each person,
By it to commemorate him night and day.
And if you desire this path
Join yourself to a Guide whoever you are and be his
companion.³⁹

Epic Romance

Nothing suited the emotional impact of sudden change like lyric poetry and epic romance. If literary genres carry the freight for great cultural myths, lyric poetry and epic romance carried the great Ottoman cultural myth – the loss that lies at the heart of everything. Ottoman poetry expressed this through the metaphor of the Beloved. The ghazel, a short lyric poem in rhymed couplets, was the preferred form. Formal rules fixed the rhyme scheme and metric choices, each couplet ending with a repeated word or phrase called the *redif*, after the actual rhyming word. The standard setting had friends at an evening garden party, each a poet; the garden with its flowers, shrubs, trees, birds, and flying insects. Food and wine overflowed; musicians played; Saki, the muse of poets, was the wine server. All these elements were combined in creative variation, carrying layer upon layer of metaphoric association. The usual topic was of course love – joyous love, lost love, passionate love, helpless love, hopeless love.⁴⁰

Occasionally the lives of the poets matched their lines, though not often in quite so public a fashion as Figani, who met an unfortunate end while still in his twenties. After coming to Istanbul from his native Trabzon, he made his reputation during the public festivities for the circumcision of Sultan Süleyman's sons in 1530. A few years later, however, his quip got around about the statues brought back from Buda as trophies of war and set up in the hippodrome by Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha: "Two Abrahams have come into the world, one an idol smasher, the other an idol maker." He was arrested and hanged before anyone had time to come to his defense.⁴¹

Box 3.2: A Ghazel by Figani

My sad heart is burnt black in the fire of my breast
My tears mirror your lip, red as blood-colored wine
Above the torrent of my tears, the sphere of Heaven

turns

Just like a mill-wheel above the flooding stream
Since that heard-hearted one destroyed the province of
my heart

It appears a ruined city, no stone left upon a stone
The nine vaults of Heaven and the mighty throne of God
Seem only bubbles on the vast sea of my tears
Oh Figânî, the dust of your body borne by your cold,
cold sigh

Is only a handful of earth cast to the freezing gale^a

^a Trans. Walter G. Andrews, Najaat Black, and Mehmet Kalpakli, eds., *Ottoman Lyric Poetry: An Anthology*, Austin, TX, 1997, 60. Reprinted with permission of the University of Washington Press.

Of epic romances several were known by everyone, their characters, scenes, and plot constantly reused in other literature. Two bear mention. One was *Hüsrev and Shirin*, a love triangle involving the beautiful princess and her two suitors. Ottoman readers knew it first as a set piece from the Persian *Book of Kings*, but it also had a Turkish version by Şeyhi, the physician and spiritual mentor of Sultan Murad II. In the story, the exiled Prince Hüsrev falls in love with Shirin from a description of her, and Shirin falls in love with Hüsrev through a painting of him. After days of travel in search of him, she stops to bathe, and Hüsrev passes by just as her nude body is emerging from the pool. She throws a robe over herself; he turns away; but each suspects the other. When they do meet she rejects his overly eager advances, and they part. He returns to his rightful throne, marries a princess, and becomes a great king. She inherits a neighboring kingdom. Then Ferhad, the third corner of the triangle, falls in love with her. When Hüsrev hears about this he offers to renounce Shirin only if Ferhad can dig a tunnel through Mount Bisutun. Ferhad just

about succeeds against all odds, but Hüsrev falsely tells him that Shirin is dead and Ferhad throws himself off a cliff. Shirin is distraught and spurns Hüsrev. At last they reconcile and are married. The story ends with Hüsrev assassinated and Shirin stabbing herself on his funeral pyre.

The other epic, *Leyla and Mejnun*, was so famous it even got mention in the opening lines of Rumi's *Mesnevi* – not quite Holy Scripture, but not far off either. It also had a classic Persian rendition, by Nizami of Ganja. Fuzuli, a poet from southern Iraq, produced a Turkish version at the urging of friends. He dedicated it to the Sultan Süleyman, who had just marched into Baghdad.⁴²

Leyla and Mejnun is the story of lovers separated by circumstances beyond their control. Kays and Leyla meet in school. Leyla's mother hears about their love and keeps her home. Unable to understand why Leyla no longer comes to class, Kays falls into ever deeper despair and becomes Mejnun, the Madman. When the two happen onto one another Mejnun collapses and Leyla swoons. Mejnun's father and mother approach Leyla's family with a marriage proposal, but it is turned down due to the madness of Mejnun. His father takes him on pilgrimage in hopes that the Kaaba will cure him, but in Mecca Mejnun prays only for love, for affliction, and for death. Mejnun enters the wilderness, wandering with the birds and beasts. Leyla feels empathy only in the breeze, the clouds, and the moth at the candle flame. Her family marries her to an honorable man who loves her, but Leyla vows never to give herself to anyone but Kays. Her forlorn husband dies. Leyla sets out on a journey, but falls from a camel and becomes separated from the other travelers. Wandering in the desert, she stumbles onto a stranger. As they relate their sad tales each recognizes the other. Fuzuli's ending has Leyla offer herself to her beloved at last, but he declines – they are already one. She returns home, sets out her last will and testament, and passes from this world, his name on her lips. Mejnun dies embracing her tomb.

The First Household

If it can be said that the sultans' conquests made the Ottoman lands an empire, yet the Ottoman concept of empire was not separable from the sultans' charismatic sovereignty (*devlet*) and spirituality (*din*). In an empire whose fundamental records kept a regular count of households, the noun to which the adjective *Ottoman* most clearly attached was the dynasty and its household. The meaning of these terms was, moreover, not fixed for all time but evolved to fit new circumstances. As the political nexus of a now integrated, multidimensional Black Sea–Mediterranean Sea–Persian Gulf world, the Ottoman palace was also the epicenter of cultural patronage. The web of the Ottoman dynasty's extended household relationships, of marriage and heritage, slavery and clientage, became the model of all Ottoman society.⁴³



Figure 3.1: Leyla and Kays in school, from an illuminated manuscript of the epic. Leyla is kneeling in the center of the image,

facing the instructor; Kays is next to her, holding a book.

From p. 27, Isl. Ms. 417, Special Collections Library, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor. Used by permission.

The royal family

Süleyman's love for Hurrem, his favorite concubine and confidant, was the stuff of epic. Their letters survive. Their unprecedented marriage created new political structures and altered public perceptions of the empire's first household.⁴⁴ Previous sultans had not very often married, and even when they had done so their children were always produced through slave concubines. Hurrem and Süleyman's relationship complicated dynastic succession because Hurrem became the mother of more than one son and lived in the Topkapı Palace with Süleyman and their children. Since she did not go with her sons out to a provincial governorship, her political advocacy took different forms than that of the generations of concubine mothers of single sons who had gone before her. The execution in 1553 of Mustafa, Süleyman's popular older son by a different concubine, opened the way for one of Hurrem's sons to reach the throne. The oldest, Mehmed, had died of smallpox; another died in childhood; Cihangir, the youngest, was disqualified by physical deformity. The remaining sons, Selim and Bayezid, fought a war after Hurrem's death in 1559 (Selim was the victor). Vezirs bore her to her rest.⁴⁵ Today she and her husband lie in twin mausoleums at the sultan's mosque complex in Istanbul, the Süleymaniye.

Before Hurrem's time, few women lived in Topkapı Palace. The sultan's family lived elsewhere, in the first palace Mehmed had built in the middle of the city. The inner courtyard at Topkapı was a male domain, staffed by three or four hundred male pages, the "slaves of the Porte," *Kapı kulları*. Most of them had been born into Greek or Slavic Christian households in Rumeli and entered the palace through the regular devshirme levy of Christian boys, or else they came in slave raids beyond the empire's boundaries as the conquering sultan's canonical one-fifth of all the spoils of war. These boys converted to Islam and learned Turkish. In the palace they were supervised by eunuchs, who were slaves themselves.⁴⁶ (And if the devshirme

institution had a questionable legal status in sharia, the domestic origin and castration of at least some of the eunuchs exhibited “conspicuous heedlessness” of sharia.⁴⁷) The devshirme recruits received their formal education in the palace and most matriculated to go out to the provinces as the empire’s governing elite. A few eventually returned in mid-career, mature and experienced, as statesmen and members of the sultan’s divan. All this began to change with the presence of Hurrem and her children. Selim too married his favorite concubine Nurbanu. The daughter of a Venetian nobleman, Nurbanu was the mother of Selim’s successor Murad III, who in turn married his favorite concubine. Nurbanu survived Selim and continued to live in Topkapı as the Valide Sultan, the Queen Mother. Under Nurbanu’s leadership the imperial harem evolved into a political institution of great power.⁴⁸

As the complexity of palace life suggests, it had become impossible for one man to control the workings of this vast empire. Yet, as the sultan’s real power became more diffuse, the impression of absolutism was upheld by the evolving protocol at Topkapı palace. New traditions emphasized Süleyman’s seclusion and symbolized the sultan’s absent presence throughout the realm. Pages of the inner courtyard used a secret sign language. The sultan no longer attended council meetings, but a latticed screen in the wall of the chamber reminded members that proceedings could be followed by someone listening on the other side. A rebuilt Tower of Justice rose above the roof line, its high windows looking out in all directions as in security and watchfulness. What replaced personal involvement of the ruler in every activity was an expanded web of involvement by the ruler’s family. Palace politics shifted to accommodate the changed situation. Sons of the sultan prepared for the competition with their brothers; graduates of the palace school went out to govern the provinces; and the women of the dynasty played no small role, partly through marriage to vezirs and statesmen and partly through their philanthropy.⁴⁹ Of the nine grand vezirs of Süleyman six were married

to his sisters, daughters, or granddaughters.⁵⁰ Their families, servants, and clients became the Ottoman ruling class, in effect the sultan's extended household.

The downside of this development was the emergence of political factions. The power brokers under Süleyman were the vezirs and other council members – the kazaskers of Rumeli and Anatolia, the head treasurer, and the chancellor (*Nişancı*) – and also some officials without a seat on the divan. These included the Mufti of Istanbul (a.k.a. the *Şeyhülislam*), the Aga of the Janissaries, and key palace officials like the chief eunuch and the head of the privy chamber. Süleyman formed close personal bonds with these men. The stakes were enormous. Ibrahim Pasha, a gifted youthful companion of Süleyman, became grand vezir before age 30. His malignant vanity, already displayed in the incident of the poet Figani, his insatiable ambition, and a troubling prophesy by the court astrologer led to his own execution in 1536.⁵¹ Lutfi Pasha became grand vezir in July 1539, during an epidemic and, by his rueful retelling, at the time of evening prayers just when fire broke out along the Golden Horn wharf. The prison there burned down and all the prisoners perished.⁵² The blaze became a symbol both for the politics of his times and his own life when, two years later, he was abruptly dismissed after a fight with his wife, who happened to be the sultan's sister.⁵³

The statesmen of the second half of Süleyman's reign were towering figures, and indeed some were very tall. They ran affairs right through the reign of Selim II and into that of Murad III. Rüstem Pasha served as grand vezir for more than fifteen years and, like his predecessors Lutfi Pasha and Ayas Pasha, wrote entertaining political history. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, a statuesque south Slav, sat on the divan for thirty years, half of those as grand vezir. Gazanfer Aga, a Venetian convert in Selim's service, ran the harem for decades after he had himself castrated. Two major public intellectuals, Ebu's-Suud and Celalzade Mustafa, presided over a group of talented legislators who extended the bureaucratic reach of the capital through an

administrative restructuring of the empire. Most of these men came from established Muslim notable families rather than entering Ottoman service through slavery and conversion. Ebu's-Suud held the office of Mufti of Istanbul for three decades and his counterpart Celalzade Mustafa, the chancellor, was popularly known as the "Mufti of Kanun" for his influence on dynastic law. As this generation passed, sublimated tensions rose to the surface among groups that the system had ignored. In the 1580s events forced a reckoning with Süleyman's type of imperial order and its underlying assumptions. Yet the traditions of patronage and cultural production nurtured by these men and women outlasted the political structures and became the foundation of an Ottoman cultural style that deeply marked all regions of the empire.



Figure 3.2: The tower of justice, Topkapı Palace, Istanbul.



Figure 3.3: The latticed window in the council chamber, Topkapı Palace, Istanbul.

Photo courtesy of Emi Okayasu.

The royal family's philanthropy and patronage set the tastes in Ottoman art and architecture. Their projects focused on the sacred places and the pilgrimage routes, and memorialized the past. Süleyman's mosque complex took visual dominance over the Golden Horn skyline of Istanbul, extending the natural hillside with a

monumental man-made platform. In the floor plan and dome the royal architect, Sinan, paid another tribute to Hagia Sophia. Sinan encouraged an architectural culture that cherished antiquities. A red porphyry column from Baalbek was used in the sanctuary of the Süleymaniye. Orders directed provincial officials to search for usable marble from ancient sites, both in old buildings and in fields, and ship it to Istanbul. They should avoid damaging townsmen's homes in the process,⁵⁴ and sale of such antiquities to foreigners was strictly forbidden.⁵⁵ Süleyman also rebuilt the city walls of Jerusalem, sponsored new public fountains, and donated to numerous public trusts there. He restored the exterior of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem with underglaze painted tiles.

The royal women were equally as active in philanthropy as the men.⁵⁶ Süleyman's mother endowed a large complex in Manisa that included a mosque with two minarets, medrese, primary school, dervish hostel, and public kitchen. Süleyman and Hürrem's daughter sponsored two complexes in Istanbul. The leader in this regard was Hürrem herself, who commissioned several major trusts in Istanbul and Edirne, in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Her complex in Jerusalem included a mosque, a hostel for pilgrims, a caravanserai, public toilets, and a public bakery and kitchen.⁵⁷ In Mecca, where Süleyman had a new minaret added to the Kaaba, the couple's donations aided women and the poor, including public water works in Mecca and in Medina the remodeling of the home and mausoleum of Khadija, the wife of the Prophet Muhammad. These architectural monuments honored local styles of the past, while making unmistakably Ottoman statements in the updates.⁵⁸

Ottoman Households, Ottoman Communities

The divan took a cautious approach to provincial organization of the newly conquered lands. A manual, dating probably from the 1550s, outlined two basic principles.⁵⁹ The first principle was that each Ottoman province fit one of two fiscal models, either *hass ile* or *salyane ile*. In *hass ile* provinces the agrarian revenues were “parceled out” (*hass*) as estates to the beylerbeyi, sancakbeyis, cavalry soldiers, and palace servants. Where this seemed impractical, the *salyane ile* fiscal model was used, whereby provinces submitted their entire revenues in an annual (*salyane*) tribute payment directly to the treasury in Istanbul. The second principle was that for purposes of protocol, provinces were ranked in a hierarchy. The hierarchy was determined not by size, wealth, religious sanctity, ethnic prestige, or any other such criteria but by their order in a chronology of conquest by the House of Osman. The most important province of the Ottoman Empire was always Rumeli, and the second was always Anatolia.

Provincial Organization

Ottoman Rumeli covered much of what is known today as “the Balkans,” but it did not mean the same thing.⁶⁰ The Ottoman administrative structure of Rumeli did not take it as unified by any common way of life. To the contrary, it took for granted the region’s economic, political, and cultural diversity. Likewise Ottoman Anatolia (*Anadolu*) meant the river valleys of the Aegean, Marmara and Black Sea coasts and the northern rim of the Galatian plateau, as far as Ankara. The central plateau that is today commonly referred to as Anatolia was, however, divided between two other provinces. *Rum*, the northern plateau with the cities of Tokat and Sivas, preserved the ancient name of Rome, used by the Turks ever since their arrival; *Karaman*, the Cappadocian region of the plateau, kept the name of the former Turkish kingdom centered at Konya.


Loathe to disrupt existing structures of life unless to bolster the commercial position of the major cities, the Ottoman administration trod lightly in the former Mamluk lands. For at least two decades they were all lumped together into a single province, called simply “Arab province,” with fifteen sancaks, from Aleppo, Ayntab, Malatya, and Divrigi in the north to Damascus in the south.⁶¹ Fortress repairs along the route connecting the great Arab cities, and the route to the Hejaz, improved security against Bedouin raids. This and the infusion of demand from Rumeli and Anatolia contributed to revival of the Red Sea spice trade, Portuguese interference notwithstanding.⁶² Mamluk royal monopolies on commodities such as sugar were removed.⁶³ Aleppo and Damascus became *hass ile* provinces with resident governors. In Damascus, the first governors targeted the city center for a string of Ottoman-style monuments, but otherwise urban architecture showed little obvious Ottoman impact.⁶⁴ The Jezira plain of the Tigris and Euphrates, including Mosul on the upper Tigris, was made into *hass ile* provinces, but Baghdad was *salyane*.

Egypt became the *salyane* province par excellence. A council

made up of local notables ruled in Cairo under a governor appointed from Istanbul.⁶⁵ Istanbul also appointed the chief judicial magistrate. A new set of regulations was written which included instructions for the annual tribute and defined military linkages to land revenues. Mamluk-era fiefs were confiscated, but rather than being made timars their revenues were collected by salaried Ottoman tax agents.⁶⁶ Funding poured into construction at Bulaq on the Nile and at Alexandria and Rashid on the Mediterranean.⁶⁷ Over time Ottoman authorities seemed content to let Egypt evolve into a more open arena for financial experimentation.⁶⁸

Ottoman rule accepted regional variety as a given. There was no effort to create a single currency zone. Linguistically, whereas Turkish prevailed in Ottoman courthouses in Southeastern Europe, Asia Minor, the plateau and the Caucasus, Arabic continued to be used beyond the Taurus. The chief magistrate in Damascus was a Hanafi judge appointed from Istanbul, but local judges in places like the Transjordan, who were his subordinates, settled cases according to their own preferred school.⁶⁹ His counterpart in Cairo was likewise an Istanbul-appointed Hanafi judge, whose bench at the newly created courthouse of Bab al-Ali became the most important in Cairo.⁷⁰ But in the fifteen other courthouses in Cairo litigants could choose whichever of the four canonical schools of law best suited their needs. Cairo's great al-Azhar medrese retained its independence and prestige as an Islamic institution of higher learning, despite competition from the royal medreses of Mehmed II and now of Süleyman. The rigid hierarchy of professorial ranks and salaries in the Istanbul schools, and the organizational structure of the Turkish and Slavic lands, were not imposed in Syria and Egypt.⁷¹ In Rumeli and Anatolia in 1527 the majority of sancakbeyis were former palace officials, janissary officers, or their sons, and in the province of Karaman in the same year four of the five sancakbeyis had been appointed from the palace troops in Istanbul. In the upper Tigris–Euphrates and in Cilicia and Syria, by contrast, the first sancakbeys were local lords who had served the

previous regime, including Mamluks and members of other former ruling dynasties,⁷² and these local commanders largely controlled the granting of timars to men in their regions.



Map 3.2: The Ottoman Arab lands.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

Minor provincial adjustments were routine in the old Ottoman lands, but one major revision occurred when the corsair and conqueror Hayreddin Barbarossa entered Ottoman service with his considerable fleet in the 1530s. Barbarossa, the son of a Greek woman and an Ottoman sipahi from Macedonia, was named Kapudan Pasha, Grand Admiral. To finance this appointment, several Aegean coastal sancaks were separated from Rumeli and Anatolia and formed into a new province called the Archipelago.⁷³ The agrarian revenues of the new province became the admiral's estate and its timar-holding cavalry became a key source of naval manpower. The unrivaled strength of the Ottoman navy was first felt in the Mediterranean, where victory over an alliance of Habsburg Spain, the Papacy, and Venice resulted in Tunis and Algiers entering the Ottoman Empire as salyane provinces,⁷⁴ and then in the Indian Ocean. Yemen was created

as a salyane province at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula when, in 1536, returning from a siege of Portuguese-held Diu, in the Gujarat, the Ottoman fleet captured Aden.

Before Selim's conquests only a handful of Ottoman cities besides Istanbul had more than a thousand households. Size is not necessarily an indicator of importance, but a reminder of overall low levels of urbanization and the long shadow of disease. Most parts of the empire were surveyed twice during Süleyman's reign and again toward the end of the century. These records, which still survive in the Ottoman archives, lend a broad impression of recovery taking hold and gaining steam as the century progressed. Overall numbers of households still seem rather low two centuries after the Black Death, and anecdotal evidence suggests lingering localized labor shortages. In Temesvár for instance, villagers from Transylvania who came looking for work were allowed to settle, but not migrant laborers from within the Ottoman territories.⁷⁵ But in many places the earlier shortages, implied in the tax codes' concern for keeping villagers on the land, gave way now to expanded cultivation.⁷⁶ No data exists from Cairo or anywhere else in Egypt, since as a salyane ile province it was never surveyed. Aleppo and Damascus, however, with over ten thousand households each, were more populous than any other city in the empire save Istanbul.

Muslims and Non-Muslims

Non-Muslims probably outnumbered Muslims in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1516 and perhaps even after, though it is difficult to know with certainty, not just because the survey data were incomplete but also because the surveys gave the issue low priority.⁷⁷ Since it was not decisive in the way the empire functioned, Ottoman scribes did not keep statistics of this kind for the empire as a whole. The scribes did pay attention to divergences within sometimes quite small geographic areas, but they avoided generalizing about the numbers of non-Muslims and the conditions of their lives over the entire empire. No such uniformity existed.⁷⁸ Survey and *cizye* records done at the beginning of Süleyman's reign suggest that in Rumeli roughly 75 percent of the tax-paying population was non-Muslim, while in the province of Anatolia Muslims formed the majority, perhaps as much as 85 percent. Everywhere, strong regional variations existed.⁷⁹ Nor was it a simple matter that Turks were Muslims and non-Turks were non-Muslims. Some Greek and Armenian Christians, as well as Jews, spoke Turkish as their mother tongue; some Muslims spoke Greek or Armenian.⁸⁰

Anyway it was not the purpose of the cadastral surveys to take a census of the population, but to record anticipated tax revenues and their distribution according to the legal status of the land – whether property of the sultan, private property, or property in a trust. The unit that mattered was the *hane*, the taxpaying household. Widows and unmarried adult males were counted separately. Non-taxpayers, including military personnel and their families, civil servants, and medrese students, do not appear at all in these records, nor do slaves. Even the exact definition of the household differed regionally and over time and with the type of tax being collected.

Nor did Mehmed II and his successors develop a uniform policy toward their non-Muslim subjects. Even the *cizye*, the canonical poll tax on non-Muslims, differed from place to place – when it was

collected at all. In the Slavic lands the one-gold-piece tax paid by Christian villagers to their Christian lords prior to the Ottoman conquest was simply taken over by the Ottoman rulers and accepted as the equivalent of *cizye*. The canonical levy for Muslim villagers was the tithe (*‘öşür*). Yet even Muslim villagers occasionally paid the *cizye*, if they lived on land belonging to a Christian. The first empire-wide *cizye* survey was probably the one conducted by Bayezid II in the 1480s. Numbers of converts to Islam were typically small, but in Bosnia, where there had been no Muslims at all as of 1450, conversions transformed the province. By 1528 it was nearly 50 percent Muslim, by 1540 65 percent, and by 1604 in the last survey, over 90 percent.⁸¹ By contrast Smederovo, along the Danube east of Belgrade, fell into Ottoman hands at roughly the same time, but remained 85 percent Christian in the towns and 98 percent Christian in the villages.⁸² In Belgrade after its capture by Süleyman in 1521 the Hungarian garrison troops all went home, but a part of the Christian townsmen were deported to a village near Istanbul. In their place Muslim Turks, Jews, Christian Vlachs, and Gypsies – both Christian and Muslim families and some mixed – were resettled in Belgrade. Belgrade’s population was about 60 percent Muslim.⁸³ Edirne had over six thousand households in 1528–29, of which over 80 percent were Muslim, about 13 percent Christian, and 5 percent Jewish.⁸⁴ Bursa had about four thousand households. The Silk Road towns of Ankara, Tokat, and Sivas, as well as Konya, a pilgrimage destination and center of learning, all had over a thousand households, and so too the port cities of Athens and Salonika, Nicopolis on the Danube, and Serres. In Salonika all the Jews had been deported en masse to Istanbul after 1453, but by 1519 Salonika had a Jewish majority due to the huge influx of Jewish refugees from the Spanish expulsions.

Ottoman Christian Communities

The Greek Orthodox patriarchate functioned both as the most important advocate of the Orthodox community to the Ottoman court and as the symbol of Ottoman imperial authority to the Church. The tax exemption granted after the Ottoman conquest disappeared at the beginning of the reign of Sultan Bayezid II when rival Greek factions, each well-connected through relatives who had become Muslims and entered Ottoman service, showed themselves quite willing to pay tribute in return for a formal diploma of office.⁸⁵ The result of this competitive trend was, unsurprisingly, that Church authority became centralized in the Greek patriarchate, which alone was empowered by the sultan to collect ecclesiastical taxes. The patriarch also influenced the initial Ottoman decision to suppress the autonomous Slavic patriarchates of Peć and Ohrid. They were revived in 1557 thanks to the Slavic Grand Vezir Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, whose brother (in some sources, nephew) Makariye, archimandrite of the Mount Athos monasteries, was promptly made patriarch in Peć. Monasteries too survived the conquest of Constantinople, with their immunities intact, granted by the Ottoman sultans beginning probably with Orhan.⁸⁶ Mount Athos was a favorite beneficiary of wealthy Orthodox donors, who used it as a shelter and bank of deposit.⁸⁷

Having formally renounced the Union of Florence in 1484,⁸⁸ the patriarchate worked to build a sense of international community among Eastern Orthodox people both within the Ottoman Empire and outside its borders. Talented Greek students enrolled abroad at the University of Padua, where a Chair in Greek was established after the fall of Constantinople, and in Venice, where large Orthodox communities had taken root. Although the patriarchal academy in Constantinople continued, it produced few truly outstanding scholars, and the Church often drew from these diaspora communities in intellectual life and in appointments to Church office. Russian clergy, who had championed Russian ideology of Moscow as the “Third

Rome” after the fall of Constantinople – i.e., the *Second* Rome – were quieted when Patriarch Jeremias II traveled to Moscow to personally preside at the creation of a new patriarchate there in 1588.⁸⁹

Although the Orthodox patriarchs of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch had been nominally under Constantinople’s authority all along, in reality they had been cut off from Byzantine Christian life since the Arab conquests nine hundred years earlier. With the world of Greek Orthodoxy again united under the patriarchate’s single political umbrella, the patriarchs pursued an ambitious vision of restoring Greek leadership and drawing its far-flung churches more tightly into the orbit of Constantinople.⁹⁰ The patriarchate of Jerusalem came into exclusive Greek hands, and Greek prelates increasingly dominated at Antioch and Alexandria too.⁹¹ The Melkites of Syria and Palestine, though Orthodox, remained within the Arabic linguistic and cultural milieu.

Selim’s and Süleyman’s conquests also brought in non-Chalcedonian Christian communities, who did not accept the Christology of the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451) and rejected the ecclesiastical authority of Constantinople. The most important numerically were the Armenians, scattered across Rum, Karaman, and elsewhere. Their ecclesiastical center lay outside Ottoman control, in Etchmiadzin in the Caucasus, but after the conquest of Jerusalem the Ottomans created a rival Armenian patriarchate in Istanbul.⁹² In Egypt most of the large Christian community were non-Chalcedonian – members of the Egyptian Orthodox, or Coptic, Church. Around Mount Lebanon lived the Maronites. In Syria and Iraq the diverse non-Chalcedonian groups were known rather indiscriminately as Süryani,⁹³ including the Syriac Orthodox Church and the Aramaic-speaking groups of the upper Tigris–Euphrates region, who had a Nestorian Christology.⁹⁴



Figure 3.4: Mor Hananyo Monastery at Deyr al-Zafaran, near Mardin. After 1293 it was the seat of the patriarchate of the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch.

Photo courtesy of Steven Howard.

Roman Catholic missionaries, arriving through a treaty with France, further complicated matters. Schisms occurred in Ottoman churches when individual bishops led their congregations into communion with Rome. One such dispute occurred in the 1550s in the Nestorian Süryani community. A group of dissident bishops elected a patriarch who traveled to Rome with the encouragement of Catholic missionaries. There he was ordained by the Pope. He and his followers were called “Chaldeans” by the Catholics. On his return, his rivals prevailed upon the beylerbeyi to arrest him. He died in prison.⁹⁵ The rest of the Süryani Nestorians remained loyal to the See of Alqosh.

In Europe, by contrast, most Ottoman Catholics were native Hungarians, and therefore the situation was quite different. Here the Reformation divides piqued the interest of the Ottoman authorities. Senior Catholic clergy were expelled, but the lesser clergy were not, and the Ottomans did not dramatically transform Hungarian society.⁹⁶

There was no significant exodus of Hungarian Catholics, little conversion to Islam,⁹⁷ and Ottoman immigration came to under 10 percent of the population, mostly garrison soldiers and their families from the south Slavic lands.⁹⁸ The Counter-Reformation, regarded as a Habsburg program, was effectively limited to Habsburg-controlled Royal Hungary, while the great majority of Hungarians in the Ottoman lands became Protestant. Ottoman officials sometimes sponsored debates among the antagonists in Hungary, but the dynasty adopted a neutral position. In the Principality of Transylvania Ferenc Dávid, the Hungarian Calvinist preacher who had become an anti-Trinitarian, was court pastor. In 1568 the Diet of Torda declared religious toleration for Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and anti-Trinitarians (Unitarians). Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, the Bosnian-born grand vezir and master networker, created a small pipeline to Istanbul for Unitarians and other Protestants who wanted to become Muslims and enter Ottoman service.⁹⁹ But even among Unitarians few showed any interest in Islam and one Unitarian preacher was even hanged for insulting the Koran in a 1574 debate. Another Sokollu cousin, as Beylerbeyi of Buda, expressed the Ottoman attitude in virtually the same terms used by the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, to the effect that “the Almighty had not authorized either the emperor or the pasha to pass judgment on religious matters ... the pasha’s duty was to forbid the two denominations to offend one another either physically or verbally, and ensure that both parties remained loyal to their beliefs.”¹⁰⁰

Ottoman Jewish Communities

The diverse Ottoman Jewish communities had no central authority figure to compare with the Greek patriarch. Among the Istanbul Romaniotes, the ancient Greek-speaking Jewish community whose ancestors had lived in the Byzantine Empire for centuries, Rabbi Moses Capsali seems to have acted as an informal community leader until his death in 1495. He and later his successor Elijah Mizrahi made *cizye* payments to the Ottoman sultans, in return for which the Jewish community enjoyed considerable autonomy in its own affairs.¹⁰¹

The arrival after 1453 of thousands of refugees from the *Reconquista* and the inquisition stimulated liturgical renewal and a broad cultural renaissance. The close contact between Romaniote and Karaite communities, formed in Edirne, continued in a rich intellectual and literary life, focused prominently in study of the midrashic and kabbalistic texts and a major Karaite legal codification.¹⁰² Jews from the Iberian Peninsula and other parts of Christian Europe settled not only in Istanbul and Salonika but also in Edirne, Bursa, Nicopolis, Amasya, Tokat, and Sarajevo.¹⁰³ Germanic-speaking Ashkenazi Jews began to immigrate, encouraged by a letter from an Edirne rabbi touting the security of life under Ottoman rule. Differences based on native language and liturgy persisted, but significant forces moved in the direction of synthesis too, at least among the Sephardim.¹⁰⁴ Sephardic commercial networks led the empire's economic integration of the region. Jewish merchants were prominent in the international wine and textile markets, and Jewish entrepreneurs predominated at major ports such as Alexandria and Sidon on the Mediterranean, Avlonya (Valona) on the Adriatic, Salonika on the Aegean, and Kefe on the Black Sea, in addition to Istanbul. They also ran the financial affairs of Ottoman Egypt. The Castilian spoken by this community – overlaid with Turkish, Arabic, Greek, and Germanic influences – evolved into an international language of commerce.

The spread of texts and ideas was facilitated by printing in Hebrew, first on a press established by Iberian immigrants at Istanbul and then others, in Istanbul, Salonika, and Cairo.¹⁰⁵ Consensus formed around study of the law and kabbalah, the symbolic manifestations of the Divine, as the twin poles of an Ottoman Jewish intellectual and cultural outlook.¹⁰⁶ The centers of this movement were Salonika and Safed, the most important Ottoman Jewish city in Palestine, where both the rationalist kabbalah interpretation of Moses Cordovero and its contrasting, revolutionary reinterpretation by Isaac Luria were laid out. There also many leading immigrant scholars gathered and settled, including Toledo-born Joseph Karo, author of the *Shulhan Arukh*, which became the authoritative codification of Jewish law in the Mediterranean world for centuries.

Ottoman Muslim Communities

Incorporation of Rum and Karaman also encouraged a developing Islamic cultural synthesis. The Kızılbaş phenomenon never went away, and a vigilant sheikh in Sofia, Bali Efendi, reported on surviving cells of Sheikh Bedreddin's followers.¹⁰⁷ Over the course of several decades, however, the political significance of these sectarian rifts slowly diminished. Key figures such as Kemal Paşazade strove for a Sunni consensus. As a medrese professor in Edirne, Kemal Paşazade had written a theological rationale for the war against Shah Ismail. After Çaldıran Selim appointed him magistrate of Edirne and then Kazasker of Anatolia and brought him along on the Egyptian campaign. Süleyman made him Mufti of Istanbul. Convinced that Kızılbaş political and spiritual culture was intertwined with intangible aspects of the pastoral-nomadic lifestyle itself, Kemal Paşazade directed the new cadastral survey of the sensitive province of Karaman in 1518, meant to impress the citizenry with the finality of Ottoman rule.¹⁰⁸ Cadastral surveys counted herds of sheep and horses and recorded tax revenues expected from the tribes of the region, and spelled out military service obligations and restrictions on nomadic movement.

A complementary approach was to publicly support a certain Sufi spirituality and cultivate leading Sufi sheikhs. Kemal Paşazade declared Ibn Arabi's theology orthodox,¹⁰⁹ and he and his successors worked on careful, academic definitions of heresy for use in trials of controversial sheikhs.¹¹⁰ Selim I sponsored a new shrine at his mausoleum in Cairo. Selim II sponsored a mosque complex adjacent to Rumi's tomb in Konya. The evolution of formal Sufi orders, accelerated by the development of Istanbul, also worked to encourage absorption of some dissident groups and individuals.¹¹¹ Lodges offered reconciliation, a path of migration toward social and religious respectability, and a legitimate forum for dissent. Bayezid II had reached out to the Bektashis. The master of the major Bektashi lodge

at Dimotika, Balım Sultan, received a visit from the sultan at the height of the Kızılbaş fervor in 1501, and accepted appointment to the Bektashi home lodge.¹¹² Son of a Muslim father and a Christian mother from north of the Balkan Mountains, Balım Sultan became the second patron saint of the order, directing codification of the Bektashi rule and rite and revising the sacred biography of Haji Bektash. Bektashi eclecticism under his leadership was probably more effective in diffusing the political impact of dissident piety than all the legal rulings of the muftis combined. And Balım Sultan embodied one of the virtues of Haji Bektash himself – he was not interested in politics. The Mevlevis too made themselves attractive to fringe elements looking for a route to respectability. In 1491 Rumi's order had opened a lodge not in Istanbul but across the Golden Horn in Galata. Now a lodge appeared within the walled city itself and another in the Bosphorus town of Beşiktaş, and the Mevlevis expanded also into coastal Anatolia and Rumeli.¹¹³

Ideological conflicts formerly funneled into the Kızılbaş controversy were now dispersed, both among the Muslim communities and into hardening communal boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Issues that might cut across the differences between rich and poor, between Arab, Turk, and Slav, or between Islam in Arabic and Islam in Turkish or south Slavic or Persian, had the potential to produce new coalitions for effective political mobilization. Antagonism between Sufis and anti-Sufi critics was continually refreshed by new developments. Clashes often took the initial form of academic polemics and denunciations of popular devotional practices.

One writer who deeply affected these debates was Mehmed Birgivi. He finished his formal education in Istanbul but, lacking connections to the leading ulema dynasties, spent most of his career at a medrese in Birgi (whence his name). He was a prolific author of both devotional and academic works.¹¹⁴ The title of one of his most popular books, *al-Tarikatu'l-Muhammadiya* (The Order of Muhammad) took aim at all Sufi orders by suggesting that there was only one

master of Muslim discipline, the Prophet Muhammad himself.¹¹⁵ He denounced many standard Sufi practices such as music and dance, as well as argumentativeness in speculative philosophy. He taught that any new ideas and practices must be justified from the scriptures and the Prophet's own practice. The lifestyle of the Prophet, as understood by the wisdom of Muslims throughout the ages, stood as the basis of Muslim life. Since the Prophet's attributes were "made a mirror of [God's] beautiful attributes," true faith was made perfect through love of the Prophet.¹¹⁶ Birgivi's outline of a mystic path of devotion, through self-denial and submission to God, went beyond imitating the minutiae of the Prophet's example to the world and life view that lay behind them. Yet his stern insistence that Koran and hadith alone had the power to renew a believer's life,¹¹⁷ and that anything else was illegitimate novelty (*bidat*), confounded common piety. Trusts for chanting the Koran over one's grave were a case in point. It took as little as a few hundred akçe to endow candles and a chanter, and the practice was meaningful to a lot of people, elites and commoners alike, women and men. Birgivi's vituperative criticism of the practice drew a rebuke from the Mufti Ebu's-Suud, who ordered him to cease and desist.¹¹⁸



Figure 3.5: The mosque of Selim II next to Rumi's mausoleum in

Konya, with a graveyard in the foreground.

The photo was taken in 1884 by American archaeologist John Henry Haynes. Used by permission of the Archives of the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology.

This incident pointed to a hugely controversial trend, the cash trust.¹¹⁹ These were not quite new, but times were good and the desire grew to broaden and diversify their use.¹²⁰ A widely used textbook approved them, and Kemal Paşazade defended them. But the Kazasker of Rumeli banned them, and he exercised real administrative power compared to the mere scholarly prestige of the mufti. Public protest was vocal. There were more than 1,150 cash trusts in Istanbul alone, almost half of all trusts registered in the city in 1546.¹²¹ Bali Efendi, the sheikh from Sofia, complained directly to Sultan Süleyman himself. In the Slavic lands many Sufi organizations invested their financial reserves in cash trusts, and the ban had caused quite an upheaval.¹²² “Piety that leads to evil is evil itself,” he wrote. Ebu’s-Suud began his thirty-year tenure as mufti in 1545 with a detailed affirmation of the legality of the cash trust.

Some still sought an empire-wide ban. Birgivi too weighed in, summarizing the objections to the cash trust with his usual textbook clarity. First, he wrote, with no apparent sense of irony, that if people saw the much greater charitable value of cash trusts they would no longer give alms (*zakat*), which were canonical. Second, cash trusts alienated property from owners, thereby failing to protect the inheritance rights of heirs. Third, investing the principle risked the original gift, which was supposed to be permanent.¹²³ Birgivi also condescendingly wrote that cash trusts were too complicated to be managed by common trustees. Finally, he pointed out that the Abu Hanifa himself had rejected the cash trust. Ebu’s-Suud, however, managed to find a strain within the Hanafi tradition that defended its permissibility.¹²⁴ Ebu’s-Suud was not alone in taking a liberal point of

view, but his eminence as a scholar and his close ties to the throne helped ensure that the cash trust would become one of the financial pillars of the era's widespread prosperity.

Interfaith Relations

Ottoman rule provided a forum for face-to-face interactions between subjects in the courts of the magistrates, the kadıs. While the sancak organization maintained security and raised contributions to the army, civil authority was extended to the new territories through a parallel network of courthouses located in urban centers. Each sancak was divided into several kazas, i.e., districts under the jurisdiction of a kadı, a judge with an Islamic legal education. Ottoman kadıs personified the administration's commitment to the Hanafi School, especially in regions with Kızılbaş sympathies and tribal loyalties, and worked to attract the confidence of the population. Transferring judges from one seat to another every few years communicated a sense of standardized, transferrable justice. Holding proceedings in a public venue, in a building put up specifically for that purpose if necessary, and keeping a permanent, written record of commercial and legal transactions,¹²⁵ the courts of the district magistrates quickly became an important instrument for the social and economic assimilation of the common citizenry.

In the kadı's court everyone, non-Muslims as well as Muslims, could hash out and record the full gamut of legal matters, from contracts to inheritance, marriage and divorce, from trusts to loans and credit, and manumission of slaves, complaints against neighbors, and more. Jews, Christians, and Muslims all may have harbored the ideal that disputes between members of one community ought to be handled by that community's own authorities, but in fact sectarian courts and their processes were not off-limits to outsiders. Muslims sometimes brought cases to the Jewish authorities, boosting relations with Jewish merchants. Jewish rabbis kept in touch with the Muslim kadıs and absorbed debates about the validity of Ottoman law into their own legal tradition.¹²⁶ The kadı did indeed apply sharia, but as the appointed magistrate for the Ottoman regime he also applied royal law, the kanun.¹²⁷ Christians and Jews used his jurisprudence in

situations where they thought it benefited them. Divorce, for example, was permitted in Islamic courts. Vakıf trusts were used by non-Muslims for the upkeep of churches and synagogues, to care for the poor, and to clean the streets of Jerusalem.¹²⁸ The kadi's rulings were universally accepted as binding because he was the agent of Ottoman political authority. The activities of his court were recorded by scribes and its archive was the office of public record.

A layer of cordiality typified interactions at the kadi's court, but suspicions sometimes surfaced too, with ingrained caricatures and conventional stereotypes of the other. Dangers were real enough. Take for example Christian anti-Semitism. Armenian mobs looted and burned the Jewish quarter of Amasya in 1530 after Armenian priests and notables claimed that an Armenian woman saw Jews slaughter a Christian boy and use his blood in the Passover. The Ottoman governor extracted confessions from leading Jews, including the rabbi. The supposedly murdered boy was found and the false accusers brought to justice – but not before several innocent people had been hanged. Right after this a similar charge led to violence in Tokat. Süleyman's personal physician Moses Hamon was said to have intervened at court, and the sultan ordered that any further accusations of "blood ritual" come straight to the divan.¹²⁹ The magistrates' courts repeatedly denounced such anti-Semitism. It was particularly common in the Slavic Christian lands.¹³⁰

The right of appeal, even to the divan, however rare in practice, was the stuff of legend. Wild rumors occasionally spread among Jews and Christians that they would all be destroyed. One had it that the sultan issued a decree that the Jews in the empire be slain because a Jewish woman was seen in the streets wearing a necklace worth 40,000 ducats. Only the intervention of the rabbi and the grand vezir prevented the decree from being carried out.¹³¹ Another common one was that the sultan planned to make all the churches of the city into mosques and enslave all the Christians because Constantinople had resisted in 1453. This time it was the patriarch who appeared before

the divan with the grand vezir, dramatically producing aged veterans of 1453 who swore that the city had surrendered peacefully; thus were the Christians saved.¹³² In one story, “dervishes” who went to pray at Haghia Sophia at midnight on Easter were met with a very bright light and the sound of voices chanting *Christ Has Risen*. They fetched the sultan who, seeing it with his own eyes, ordered the place searched. The light went out and the singing ceased. The furious sultan “rushed again to kill the Christians, but again Piri Pasha restrained his fury.”¹³³ In one anti-Semitic version a “Jewish magician” warned Süleyman of an impending Christian revolt and urged the sultan that he should kill them all. It is not hard to see the biblical Esther story in the background of these tales, in which the sultan is cast as the all-powerful Xerxes, God’s people are threatened with annihilation, and “Esther” intercedes with the ruler. But the stories also were a subtle reminder that non-Muslims did have recourse to power. Their holy places were protected by Muslim legal tradition. They could petition the divan, and divan records show that they did so regularly, and not just the patriarch, and not just influential Jewish bankers like Joseph Nasi and Moses Hamon.¹³⁴

The Church property issue came up again in 1587, when Sultan Murad III turned the Pammakaristos church, once the seat of the patriarchate, into a mosque commemorating the Caucasus war. The very name given the new mosque, *Fethiye* (Victory), reminded everyone that the churches of the city were not in fact destroyed in 1453, nor their congregations. At about this time, the only synagogue in Jerusalem was seized on the grounds that it had been built after the Muslim conquest. The divan in Istanbul quickly sent out a decree to provincial governors that such confiscations in Istanbul should not be taken as a model for their own domains. It was especially important to protect the Christian shrines in Jerusalem.¹³⁵

Often at issue was the so-called “Pact of Umar,” a set of canonical provisions for interfaith relations in a Muslim kingdom. At the time of the Muslim conquest under the Caliph Umar II (AD 717–720), the

“People of the Book,” as non-Muslim monotheists were called, agreed to several restrictions in return for recognition as protected populations (*zimmi*). They would not build any new churches or monasteries or repair old ones, and they would not wear the same clothing as Muslims. Medieval theologians added more, including paying the *cizye* poll tax, not riding a horse, and others. Selim I was shown this document in 1516 and ratified it – whether authentic or not, it was taken to be such. The existence and general outlines of these stipulations were more or less familiar to everyone, Muslims and non-Muslims. Their implementation in any given situation, however, depended heavily on the attitude of specific authorities in specific communities at specific times and were matters of negotiation between local rulers and their subjects. In the Ottoman lands many of the restrictions were ignored, and in general the appeal to dynastic precedent or documentation of prior Ottoman practice was far more likely to be decisive in particular contexts.

This state of affairs did not of course prevent Islamic canon law from being a frequent bone of contention. Rules about communal distinctions in clothing had to be periodically reiterated – evidence enough that in practice enforcement was lax.¹³⁶ Similarly, contemporary Jewish writers debated endlessly with each other whether or not Islamic law permitted Jews to own slaves, while Jews in the Ottoman Empire did in fact own slaves.¹³⁷ After the conquest of Cyprus in 1571 a controversy raged because Muslims accused Jews in Istanbul, Cairo, and Damascus of buying slaves; of buying slaves who were Muslims; and of buying Muslim slaves and forcing them to convert to Judaism. Royal decrees were duly issued forbidding Jews of Istanbul to own slaves, supported by *fetvas* of the mufti, who added cautiously, “*if* they (the slaves) were Muslims.” So rather than dealing with actual cases brought before them, the statements of the authorities often arose from the necessity of responding to public hearsay and innuendo.

Alcohol was another such mundane source of friction. Normally

such conflicts were handled at the local magistrate's court, but occasionally when people getting drunk and wreaking havoc became a security concern, a district kadi might request input from Istanbul. The court records make it indisputable fact that members of all faith communities owned vineyards, and there can be little doubt that they were put to use in the usual ways. One of the most memorable metaphors of the human condition in Rumi's poetry is waking up in a tavern and not being able to remember how you got there.¹³⁸ It is almost impossible to find an Ottoman poem without a reference to wine. Ottoman poets equated drunkenness with the soul's experience of the total love of God. Nevertheless alcohol remained a sensitive issue with more modestly inclined Muslims. In one incident in a town near Erzurum, residents complained about a bunch of dervishes who "don't pray, don't fast, get drunk, don't hide their privates," and violated acceptable boundaries of gender relations.¹³⁹ The kadi of the Black Sea town of Sinop reported another situation, where Christian craftsmen had been employed at the wharf: "people with useful skills" such as carpenters, boat caulkers, and rope makers. Over time, they attracted other people whose business was not quite so welcome – sellers of alcohol and "women who get what they want."¹⁴⁰ Council letters referred to "many earlier commands" about "dens of iniquity and vice" – pubs, coffeehouses, and places where wine and a grain alcohol called *boza* (and the Tatar rendition was the really good stuff) was produced – in Istanbul and the suburbs.¹⁴¹ The effectiveness of these orders is obviously questionable, as was the will to make them stick.

War and Opportunity

For most of the last dozen years of the tenth Islamic century Ottoman armies fought a war with Iran in the Caucasus, a war that became a vortex of change due to financial and manpower needs. The empire's basic fiscal and political model had to be revised to allow a more fluid system. It meant higher stakes for the players, but also better integration of the diverse regions of the empire.

The Caucasus War

Since Süleyman's Iraq campaign of 1534 Ottoman–Safavid relations had been disturbed only once, when Shah Tahmasp's rebellious half-brother Mirza fled to Istanbul, accepted Sunnism, and swore allegiance to the sultan. Süleyman had exploited this, marching straight through Kızılbaş country all the way to Tabriz with the Safavid prince – a son of Shah Ismail – in tow. After the Peace of Amasya (1555) Shah Tahmasp distanced himself from the Kızılbaş and the Ottoman eastern frontier was quiet, even when Prince Bayezid fled to Iran after his defeat by Selim II. Tahmasp turned him over to Ottoman agents.

The period of peace ended when Shah Tahmasp died in 1576 after a nearly fifty-year reign, and the dense network of ethnic and tribal alliances at the Safavid court dissolved in civil war. Grand scenarios were spun out in Istanbul. The main strategic issue was defense of the Black Sea. The silk trade and the slave trade were other considerations. The advance of the Muscovite Tsar Ivan IV, who had captured the Muslim khanates of Kazan (1552), and Astrakhan (1556) at the Volga mouth on the Caspian, made Muscovy an attractive partner for marital alliances among the Christian aristocracy of the Caucasus kingdoms. An Ottoman campaign of 1569 failed, and with it Sokollu's great engineering scheme of a canal connecting the Don and Volga.¹⁴² The death of Shah Tahmasp had some in Ottoman military circles hoping to occupy the Caucasus and dislodge the Muscovites. Intervention, fed by maneuvering among the patronage networks at the Ottoman court, became harder to resist when an Uzbek attack on Iran's eastern frontier further distracted the Safavids.

Ottoman court rivalries were intense. The old guard, including many hangovers from Süleyman's reign, clashed with Murad III and the group of young confidants he brought from his princely court when he replaced Selim on the throne in 1574. The old guard was itself split by various grudges. One faction orbited around Grand Vezir

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who saw war as a bad combination of high expense and low benefit.¹⁴³ Sokollu was a Slav of minor nobility who had been taken in the devshirme in his youth.¹⁴⁴ Appointed by Süleyman, he had been in the divan for over thirty years, and grand vezir for fourteen of those years uninterrupted. He was married to Selim's daughter Esmahan and had a residence on the hippodrome, a short walk from Topkapı Palace. During his lengthy career he peopled the upper levels of Ottoman government with his relatives and clients, often South Slavs like himself. Besides the brother (or nephew) who became Patriarch of Peć, Sokollu's father, who became a Muslim, was supervisor of numerous trust properties in Bosnia; a cousin was Beylerbeyi of Buda; two sons were ranking military officers; two other cousins and a brother-in-law served as sancakbeyis of Bosnia.

Murad III found ways to assert himself.¹⁴⁵ By expanding the size of the divan, and by staying away from its meetings and keeping himself informed via memoranda, he effectively diluted its power. He balanced the divan with the palace, expanding its staff, using its existing structures, and creating new positions of authority for his favorites. Sokollu's many enemies gathered around these palace officials, particularly the chief gardener, the chief white eunuch, the great scholar Hoca Sadeddin who was the sultan's tutor, and key harem figures such as the female harem steward, the chief black eunuch (a new supervisory position), and Murad's mother Nurbanu Sultan.¹⁴⁶ These all looked for allies both inside the divan and outside it, in the great Muslim families who dominated the ulema hierarchy of teachers, scholars, and judges, and in key military leaders who could counter Sokollu, such as Koca Sinan Pasha and Lala Mustafa Pasha.

The old guard did not go quietly. Koca Sinan and Lala Mustafa had a long history and belonged to different political camps. Lala Mustafa, a South Slav devshirme recruit and distant relative of Sokollu,¹⁴⁷ had come up in the palace service as the mentor of Selim II (whence his name, Lala). He married a granddaughter of the last Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and made a fortune in various provincial

posts. Selim brought him into the divan, but Lala Mustafa did not play Istanbul politics well and never was given the grand vezir's seal. Koca Sinan, an Albanian, had supported Prince Bayezid in his unsuccessful bid for the throne against Selim. Koca Sinan's brother, Beylerbeyi of Erzurum at the time, gave Bayezid safe passage to Iran and paid dearly for it. Koca Sinan blamed Lala Mustafa for his brother's execution.¹⁴⁸ With malice aforethought Sokollu gave command of the Caucasus campaign jointly to these two enemies. Predictably, they found it impossible to cooperate, but rather than scuttle the whole project as Sokollu hoped, the sultan relieved Koca Sinan and gave sole command to Lala Mustafa. Once the army set out for the east it enjoyed good success, occupied Tiflis, forced the submission of several Safavid vassals, and conquered Shirvan.



Figure 3.6: The Pergamum urns. Sultan Murad III had two matching, single-piece marble urns, about two meters in height, brought from the site of Pergamum and placed on the sanctuary floor of Haghia Sophia mosque. Used for fresh water, each had a small spigot inserted near the base and an Ionic capital as a stool. ¹⁵⁰ The urns originally lay filled with gold and embedded within a large

marble funerary vase, which was gifted to King Louis Philippe of France by Sultan Mahmud II in 1837 and now is displayed in the Louvre Museum, Paris.¹⁵¹

Back in Istanbul, however, the ground was shifting. Sokollu was assassinated in the spring of 1579. Lala Mustafa, recalled from the front, died a few months later. The pasha who eventually oversaw incorporation of the Caucasus into the Ottoman provincial order was Özdemiroğlu Osman, a grandnephew of the last Mamluk ruler. Özdemiroğlu spent five years in the Caucasus, returned to Istanbul to accept the office of grand vezir, and then led the conquest of Tabriz. The Ottomans now held Tabriz for twenty years, something that had eluded even Selim I. With the accession of Shah Abbas in 1587 Iran sought peace, and the Safavid dynasty gravitated toward mainline Shiism, slowly escaping the pull of Kızılbaş spirituality.¹⁴⁹

Financial Restructuring

When Özdemiroğlu died in 1585 the old guard was gone and with it the unchallenged Slavic sway at court. The generation of Murad III took full responsibility. In the provinces the transition was already in motion years before, as the former independent dynasts, kept on as provincial governors east of the Taurus and in Syria, passed away. They were replaced by men appointed from Istanbul – new beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis who brought with them their own household servitors, including janissaries, scribal and financial officials, and new urban magistrates. These appointments turned into contests for access to the revenues of the province, both through rights of direct collection and through processes of bidding for collection contracts. In this way the linkages between the conquered provinces and the imperial center gradually changed, from incorporating existing networks of provincial nobility leftover from the previous regimes to establishing new networks focused on the appointees arriving from Istanbul, their servants, and their local clients.

The fiscal dimension of the old system was separate currency and commercial zones, roughly divided by the Taurus range; and the financing of imperial endeavors (such as bureaucratic expansion and the conquest of Hungary) in gold, from the annual remittances in Egyptian *şerifis*, struck at the Cairo mint from Central African gold. Pressure on the system had grown enormously. This was partly due to agrarian prosperity over several decades, seen in increased land under cultivation and, arguably, larger populations,¹⁵² but even more from urban and commercial activities. Accelerating demand fueled monetary instability. The akçe, the imperial unit of account, was still the main coin between the Danube and the Taurus, but was no longer the only silver coin in circulation. The larger Egyptian silver para was used in Egypt and throughout Syria, and in the upper Tigris and Euphrates and Iraq a number of other silver coins of various sizes were in use. Conquest of Iraq and other former Safavid territories had

broken down trade barriers and introduced the silver *shahi* into the Ottoman lands. Clipping and counterfeiting were widespread, the market exchange rate of the akçe to gold was falling, and the shahi was overvalued.¹⁵³

To this were added the requirements of warfare. The Ottoman version of the feudal bargain – agrarian revenues collected by provincial timariots in return for service; salaries paid from the central treasury to a small standing army and administration – sufficed so long as warfare consisted mostly of pitched battles. Warfare lately, however, was fought typically by sea and by siege. The naval campaigns of Selim II did not only bankrupt Habsburg Spain by 1575, they brought stress to Ottoman finances too, despite treasury reserves in gold. The remarkable rebuilding of the fleet after Lepanto (October 1571) could be financed from gold, but personnel still had to be paid in silver akçes. Powerful merchants, often Jews and Christians, were a source of short-term domestic credit through tax farms, better termed revenue contracts (*iltizam*).¹⁵⁴ The customs duties of major ports were contracted in this way. The Ottoman navy attacked Malta unsuccessfully; Cyprus was conquered in 1572 and Tunis in 1574. Besides this there was the cost of putting down a rebellion in Yemen (1569), 2,000 miles from Istanbul and more than 1,300 miles south of Cairo.

For the Caucasus war armies need not necessarily be large, but attacking, repairing, and maintaining forts was expensive.¹⁵⁵ Temporary revenue boosts were a partial answer. One novel approach was to extend Ebu's-Suud's reform of trust law to Church and monastic properties. Monastic trusts, though they were quite common in practice, violated Hanafi principles both because churches and monasteries were not supposed to create trusts and because their largely agrarian holdings should normally have been made royal estates and distributed in timars. The sultans had always turned a blind eye to such technicalities. Selim II confiscated the monasteries of Rumeli and the monks, though given usufruct of the land like all

peasant cultivators, were obliged to repurchase their buildings, flocks, vines, and the like as private property. As private property these effects (though not the land itself) could now be converted to trust. Hanafi jurists finessed the sharia by avoiding the wording “trust of a church” – they were the “trust of the poor of the church.”¹⁵⁶ The sultan gained a tidy profit in the exchange.

Another short-term fix was currency devaluation. Famine in 1584, continuing into the next year, brought a wave of migrants into Istanbul. The devaluation occurred in the summer of 1585, probably on the heels of a similar Safavid move.¹⁵⁷ The size of the devaluation – a whopping 44 percent – suggests both that the famine was severe, and that the divan likely hoped to fund the war from profits made on the exchange of old akçe. There was resistance and sporadic violence. People hoarded the old coins. The palace tried to impose an official exchange rate, and a tax was imposed to offset ongoing costs. Clipping and counterfeiting continued. The governor of Egypt was overthrown by his janissary troops in 1586.¹⁵⁸ When the treasury paid part of the Istanbul palace guard in defective coin in the spring of 1589, the soldiers revolted and lynched the two men in charge of the monetary transition, the head treasurer and the Beylerbeyi of Rumeli.¹⁵⁹

At best, these measures provided stopgap funds while the divan felt its way towards fiscal reform. Commanders of the Ottoman army on campaign began making ad hoc changes, hiring troops on an annual basis, putting guns in their hands, redistributing tasks, and paying them accordingly. None of this was really new – Ottoman military planners had always preferred to recruit from an assortment of sources, and commanders had used mercenaries on campaign before.¹⁶⁰ Now some of these men applied for timars. Because of their greater numbers, rather than find new revenues in rural cadastral accounting it made better fiscal sense to tap urban areas for “extraordinary” levies.¹⁶¹ An empire-wide cadastral survey, underway before the Caucasus war began, was immediately obsolete and was the last of its kind ever done.

The recruiting changes of the Caucasus war were noted by the council and tracked in the registry office. Data from one sancak, Aydın, along the Aegean in Anatolia province, reveal increasing use of recruits at the front who had no family history of military service. This intensified a trend that had begun during the naval wars of the 1570s. In the last years of Süleyman's reign 65 percent of the first-time timar holders in Aydın sancak had been sons of sipahis, their status proven by witnesses and written documentation. All the other initial timar holders either had some kind of military connection that gave them a rightful claim to a timar or they were getting a timar to replace a central treasury salary. But in 1576–77, the year before the Caucasus war began, the number of initial timars bestowed on sons of sipahis in Aydın decreased to just over half, and by 1588–89, near the end of the Caucasus war, this figure fell to under 20 percent. More and more of the men receiving first-time timars gave no evidence at all of belonging to the hereditary cavalry class. Rather these men, who were presumably villagers or slaves, won approval for their timar petitions by campaign service. And with war dominated by sieges, sipahis receiving timars for service in battle were outnumbered by mere laborers, men who carried loads of stone, hauled timber, dug trenches, and worked on the water supply. Their supervisors, members of the palace guard corps, submitted lists of their names.

The council simply followed the lead of the field commanders, earmarking a small amount for raises to current timariots doing fortress repair and construction.¹⁶² As the field commanders and janissary officers took on more of the responsibility to raise funds and personnel for the campaigns, the ability to do so became an evident qualification for the job.¹⁶³ The pattern was clearly discernible in the palace of Murad III, as more vezirs were put on the divan, from three to four or more at once, their terms of office made ever shorter, and their role in actual governance reduced proportionally.

The Sultanate and the Sacred

Many in the scribal intellectual class complained that a great Ottoman system no longer worked the way it should. They grumbled that since the passing of Süleyman's age permissiveness and indulgence had taken over. Weak sultans had lost control of both the processes of appointment and the personnel carrying them out.¹⁶⁴ Their failure to personally lead campaigns meant that the Ottoman camp was no longer a mobile government but a duplicate government.¹⁶⁵ Unscrupulous clerks wrote appointment certificates for unqualified people, using the blank imperial orders they took with them on campaign. The historian Selaniki documented an embezzlement scandal discovered towards the end of the Caucasus war. Two scribes were executed (one from the council secretariat), and six more had their hands amputated.¹⁶⁶ Other writers too shared the sense that the order of Süleyman's age, an age of merit and protocol and proper career lines, had begun to come apart.

Kanun Legalism

Perhaps Süleyman's system had been a thing important only to the scribes. It has never been easy to defend pragmatism against principle. For the scribes principle meant upholding the kanun regulations, the body of law whose origin was the decree of the sultan and whose guardians they were. And scribes were the ones who tended to commit their views to the written record, in histories of their own times such as Selaniki's (1600), which narrates career moves along a plot line of the acts of the ignorant and unqualified. Even more direct was "advice for kings." An old genre, a favorite of the scribal class since the Abbasid age, advice for kings saw its greatest development now, beginning with Lutfi Pasha's *Asafname* (1545). In this political apologia Lutfi Pasha assumed the guise of the biblical Solomon's legendary counselor Asaph, warning the king of the consequences of injustice. Lutfi Pasha was a conscientious administrator by all accounts, who used his term as grand vezir to rein in the early extravagance of Süleyman's court.¹⁶⁷ His refrain, that things were "contrary to the kanun," expressed justice in terms that scribes found compelling. Maybe the best example is the "self-appointed genius" Mustafa Âlî of Gallipoli,¹⁶⁸ who in both advice for kings and in history took the already dense composition style to new levels of intricacy. The last of the four chapters of his *Counsel for Sultans* (1581) laid out in excruciating detail "the author's sufferings and frustrations" during his mediocre career.¹⁶⁹

Were it not for their poetic poignancy it might be easy to discount these writers' bitterness as class snobbery, condescension, and self-interest. But like all legalisms theirs too expressed a human protest against meaninglessness amidst constant change. As with Süleyman's youthful messianism, his mature legislative activity reached for a reality beyond the concrete events of his own reign. For participants, it was as if their lifetime of service in the Ottoman dynastic household were history itself. Their mastery of the litanies and language of

service became a profession of faith in the Ottoman order. It was kanun and sharia, the way of the sultanate and the way of God. These gave harmony to a unified world order that transcended specifically Islamic religious precepts.

Liturgical Time

Sultan Murad III came at convictions about a unified world order from a slightly different angle. As the end of the first Islamic millennium approached, with the year 1000 of the hegira in October 1591, it became apparent that the tenth Islamic century would close as it had opened, in cosmic convergence. Celestial signs indicated impending doom as early as 1564 in the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, long associated in astrology with big political events.¹⁷⁰ A comet appeared in Ursa Minor in 1577, another worrisome predictor for kings.

Murad pushed forward plans for an Ottoman observatory, hoping to update his horoscope. His grandfather Sultan Süleyman and his father Sultan Selim had both died under suspicious heavenly circumstances (following close on eclipses).¹⁷¹ Takiyüddin, the chief astrologer, coordinated the work, which aimed to update the astronomical tables produced at the famed Samarkand observatory using new data from a more westerly location. Takiyüddin was one of the great intellectuals of the age. Trained in Cairo and Damascus, he operated within large Mediterranean scientific and professional circles.¹⁷² He built some of his own instruments and imported others, including from Western Europe. A globe can be seen among other instruments in a miniature painting of the observatory workshop. Takiyüddin understood the linkages between political aspirations and the manipulation of the natural world. Mechanics and mathematics, astronomy and astrology, these were integral sciences, revealing the inner spiritual structure of the heavens.¹⁷³ But the observatory project ran into problems. Just which one of them caused its demise is unclear¹⁷⁴ – Takiyüddin's optimistic predictions about the Caucasus war were not borne out; his patron, Hoca Sadeddin, had enemies; two of Murad's children died in 1580.¹⁷⁵ The observatory was closed and torn down.

New science had failed to improve on destiny, but the calendar might have other secrets to reveal. For Ottoman Muslims, the New

Year commenced with Ashura, in the first ten days of the first month of the Islamic year, marking the death of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. After four small festivals called *kandil* in the first half of the year, the liturgical cycle intensified with the fast in Ramadan, the ninth month. Each evening in Ramadan families and communities broke the fast together. Towards the end of the month came the Night of Power, commemorating the first descent of the Koran. The end of Ramadan brought the “Great Festival,” known in Turkish and Slavic regions as Bayram (in Arabic-speaking lands, *Eid al-fitr*). The second major annual festival for Sunnis was the “Pilgrims’ Festival” (*Hacılar bayramı* in Turkish, *Eid al-adha* in Arabic).¹⁷⁶ The two bayrams were occasions for family visiting and public celebrations. The divan held ceremonial meetings where the Chief Mufti was hosted by the grand vezir for a learned discussion.¹⁷⁷ Paintings show musicians and dancers, tightrope walkers, and acrobats. The Habsburg ambassador, Busbecq, commented about public dinners, and watched archery competitions up on the hill across the Golden Horn from Istanbul, where there was a shooting range.¹⁷⁸

Since the lunar year is ten or eleven days shorter than the solar year, these major holy days of the Islamic calendar rotate through the seasons of the solar year in repeating cycles. About three times each century, the Muslim holy days align with festivals pegged to the solar calendar, such as Nowruz and the Nile Flood in Egypt, but also Christian and Jewish holy days. For Ottoman Christians, whatever their denomination, the main festival of the liturgical year was the Holy Week cycle of spring, which was preceded by the great fast of Lent. Holy Week culminated in Good Friday, Holy Saturday, and Easter Sunday. For Jews, the liturgical cycle was bracketed by the New Year festival and Yom Kippur in the fall and by Passover in spring. Both Christians and Jews celebrated festivals of light surrounding the winter solstice. Christmas came on 6 January in Orthodox and Armenian circles and on 25 December in the Roman

rite. Hanukkah began in late November or early December, on 25 Kislev of the Jewish calendar.

It might seem at first that Muslims would find little to recommend in these seasonal solar celebrations, and indeed many found nothing. Yet the promise of light in darkness transcends religious boundaries, and the Nativity of the Prophet Muhammad, or Mevlid, gave opportunity to express this.¹⁷⁹ Mevlid was celebrated in the month of Rebiülevvel, with music and dancing, parties and fairs, candlelight processions, and with chanters reciting tales of the Prophet's birth. Of the many Prophet's Nativity poems (more than a hundred, according to one Ottoman bibliophile) by far the best was Süleyman Çelebi's *Vesiletü'n-Necat*, or *The Means of Salvation*, written just after 1400.¹⁸⁰ Also known simply as *Mevlid-i Şerif*, "The Noble Nativity," everyone knew this epic, and it is still probably the best-loved text ever written in the Turkish language. It presented the advent of Muhammad as the culmination of God's grace in making the world and its creatures. For some Muslims this was all too much like Christmas and Candlemas,¹⁸¹ yet it was probably these very resemblances that Sultan Murad III must have had in mind in initiating the observance of Mevlid at court in 1588. The historian Selaniki reproduced the sultan's decree, that each year on this date the minarets of Istanbul's mosques be illumined with candles, and that the evening be honored with hymns and recitations of the tale of the Prophet's birth.¹⁸²

Box 3.3: The Birth of Muhammad

Now Amine, Muhammad's tender mother
(Mother-of-pearl, her one pearl like none other),
Had been with child by Abdullah, the faithful,
And time had sped, her hour was fast approaching.
But in that night when he to earth descended,
A host of herald signs bespoke his coming.
It was the happy month, Rebi-ul-evvel,

And of this month the twelfth, Isney, the Blessed,
On which was born the Welfare of the Peoples,
'Mid marvels by his wond'ring mother witnessed.
"I saw," said she, "a wondrous light up-springing,
And streaming from my house, with blaze increasing.
Round it the sun revolved, moth-like and dazzled,
While earth and sky gave back this matchless
splendor.
Heaven's radiant doors stood wide, and Dark was
vanquished.
There came three angels bearing shining banners;
They raised one at the world's east brink, another
At farthest west, the third atop the Kaaba.
Then rank on rank the heavenly host descended,
And round my dwelling marched, as 'twere God's
mansion.
This multitude made clear to me that straightway
Their lord to earth would come, to bless his people.^a

^a From Süleyman Çelebi's *Means of Salvation*, trans. F. Lyman MacCallum. Reprinted by permission of John Murray Press.

As the Islamic millennium loomed, the three festivals of light – Jewish, Christian, and Muslim – overlapped. In 1588, the year of Sultan Murad's decree (the Muslim year 997), Mevlid occurred on 31 January (Julian), two days before Candlemas. During the next three years Mevlid cycled backward through the Christmas season and Hanukkah, falling in the year 1000 of the hegira on 18 December (AD 1591). Thus did the tenth Islamic century, the century that opened with Shah Ismail's Ashura of the Century, close with a cosmic crescendo, in visions of the Mevlid of the Millennium. It was honored by the palace, on behalf of all the Ottoman households.

Notes

- 1 Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Qizilbash ‘Heresy’,” 6–7.
- 2 Allouche, *Origins and Development*, 69–82.
- 3 İnalçık, “Ottoman Cotton Market and India,” in İnalçık, *Middle East and the Balkans*, 264–306.
- 4 Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower*, 143–74.
- 5 Woods, *Aqquyunlu*, 54–56.
- 6 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 264–69.
- 7 Lutfi Pasha, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 195, 199; Tansel, *Sultan II. Bâyezîd’in Siyasî Hayatı*, 11.
- 8 Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu? [I],” 75–76.
- 9 Ambraseys, *Earthquakes*, 422–33.
- 10 Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides*, 24–29.
- 11 Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim [I],” 77–78.
- 12 Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim [I],” 60.
- 13 Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba,” 35–36.
- 14 Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba,” 54–56.
- 15 Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides*, 29–30.
- 16 Fleischer, “From Şehzade Korkud to Mustafa Âli,” in Lowry and Hattox, eds., *IIIrd Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey*, 67–77.
- 17 Reindl, *Männer um Bâyezîd*, 79–99.

- 18 Partly translated by John Woods in McNeill and Waldman, eds., *Islamic World*, 337–44.
- 19 Repp, *Mufti of Istanbul*, 212–21.
- 20 Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak,” 53–56.
- 21 Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak,” 57–60.
- 22 Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavids*, 50–127.
- 23 Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, 101–7.
- 24 Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, 124–35.
- 25 According to Evliya Çelebi, cited by St. Laurent, “Ottoman and Turkish Restorations,” in Nur et al., eds., *7 Centuries of Ottoman Architecture*, 391–401.
- 26 Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 38–41.
- 27 See Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 85.
- 28 Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, 242–50.
- 29 Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521,” in Dávid and Fodor, eds., *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations*, 47–76.
- 30 See Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary.”
- 31 Kann, *History of the Habsburg Empire*, 25–45.
- 32 Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary.”
- 33 Gökbilgin, “Venedik,” doc. 185, 111–13.
- 34 Subrahmanyam, “Tale of Three Empires,” 68, citing Seyyidi Ali Reis, *Le Miroir des pays: une anabase Ottomane à travers l’Inde et l’Asie Centrale*, trans. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Paris, 1999), 86–87.
- 35 Andrews, “Literary Art of the Golden Age,” in İnalcık and Kafadar, eds., *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, 353–68.

- 36 Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges*, 22–23 and n. 56.
- 37 Lutfi Pasha, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 357–58.
- 38 Piri Reis, *Kitab-ı Bahriye*, vol. 1, 58–65.
- 39 Piri Reis, *Kitab-ı Bahriye*, vol. 1, 106.
- 40 Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, 143–74.
- 41 Şentürk, *Osmanlı Şiiri Antolojisi*, 159. See also Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent,” 418–19.
- 42 Fuzuli did not know of earlier Turkish versions. Huri, trans, *Leylâ and Mejnûn by Fuzûlî*; see the introduction by Allesio Bombaci, 84.
- 43 Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households”; Brummett, “Placing the Ottomans;” Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*.
- 44 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 61–63.
- 45 Blackburn, ed., *Journey to the Sublime Porte*, 200–202.
- 46 Dikici, “Making of Ottoman Court Eunuchs.”
- 47 Dikici, “Making of Ottoman Court Eunuchs,” 131.
- 48 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 187–91.
- 49 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 57–90.
- 50 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 66–67.
- 51 Fleischer, “Shadow of Shadows,” 58–59.
- 52 Lutfi Pasha, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 370–71.
- 53 Köprülü, “Lütfi Paşa.”
- 54 Refik, *On altıncı asırda*, 21, doc. 15.
- 55 Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, 141–43, 156, 284.

- 56 Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 198–205.
- 57 Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence*.
- 58 Necipoğlu, “Challenging the Past.”
- 59 See the edition by Hadžibegić, “Rasprava Ali Čauša,” 146.
- 60 Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*.
- 61 See the list of provinces published by Barkan, “H. 933–934 (M. 1527–1528),” 303–7.
- 62 Hanna, *Making Big Money*, 51, 73–75.
- 63 Walker, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, 200–201.
- 64 Weber, “Transformation of an Arab-Ottoman Institution: The Sūq (Bazaar) of Damascus from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century,” and Kiel, “Caravansaray and Civic Centre of Defterdar Murad Çelebi in Ma’arat an-Nu’man and the Külliye of Yemen Fatihi Sinan Pasha in Sa’sa’,” both in Nur et al., eds., *7 Centuries of Ottoman Architecture*, at 103–10 and 244–53 respectively.
- 65 Hathaway, *Arab Lands*, 51–56.
- 66 Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 9.
- 67 Hanna, *Making Big Money*, 124–25.
- 68 Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 11–12.
- 69 Walker, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, 182–83.
- 70 El-Nahal, *Judicial Administration*, 12–14 and Appendix A, p. 74.
- 71 Hanna, *In Praise of Books*, 106–7.
- 72 The list was published by Kunt, *Sultan’s Servants*, 101–16.
- 73 Imber, “Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent.”
- 74 Goffman, *Ottoman Empire*, 145–49.

75 In an order to the Beylerbeyi, published in 7 *Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, case 166, September 6, 1567.

76 Cook, *Population Pressure*.

77 Lowry, "Ottoman Tahrir Defterleri as a Source," repr. in Lowry, *Studies in Defterology*, 3–18; Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, 86–95.

78 See Minkov, *Conversion to Islam*, Table 2, 41–42, and Table 4, p. 49, and the map, p. 43.

79 Minkov, *Conversion to Islam*, 41.

80 Balta, "Tracing the Presence of the Rum Orthodox Population in Cappadocia: The Evidence of Tapu-Tahrirs of the 15th and 16th Centuries," in Balta and Ölmez, eds., *Between Religion and Language*, 185–214.

81 Kiel, "Ottoman Sources."

82 Géza Dávid, "Limitations of Conversion: Muslims and Christians in the Balkans in the Sixteenth Century," in Andor and Tóth, eds., *Frontiers of Faith*, 149–56, at 153.

83 Hertz, "Muslims, Christians and Jews," in Ascher, Halasi-Kun, and Király, eds., *Mutual Effects*, 149–64.

84 Gökbilgin, *XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda*, 65.

85 Zachariadou, "Great Church in Captivity," in Angold, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, 175–77.

86 Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents."

87 Zachariadou, "Mt. Athos and the Ottomans," in Angold, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, 154–68.

88 Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*, 193–95.

89 Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*, 320–37.

- 90** Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*, 176–77.
- 91** Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem*, 98–100.
- 92** Sanjian, *Armenian Communities in Syria*, 100–106.
- 93** O’Mahony, “Syriac Christianity,” in Angold, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, 511–35.
- 94** On the Nestorians, Joseph, *Modern Assyrians*.
- 95** Joseph, *Modern Assyrians*, 55–58.
- 96** Fodor, “Ottomans and their Christians,” in Andor and Tóth eds., *Frontiers of Faith*, 137–47.
- 97** Dávid, “Data on the Continuity.”
- 98** Dávid, “Demographic Trends,” in Panzac, ed., *Histoire économique et sociale*, 331–40; Dávid, “Demographische Veränderungen.”
- 99** Krstić, “Patron of the Protestants?”
- 100** Fodor, “Ottomans and their Christians,” 144.
- 101** Epstein, “Leadership of the Ottoman Jews,” in Braude and Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews*, 101–15. See also Rozen, *A History of the Jewish Community*, 28–34.
- 102** Bowman, *Jews of Byzantium*, 143–56.
- 103** Rozen, *History of the Jewish Community*.
- 104** Shaw, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 37–108.
- 105** Shaw, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 106–108.
- 106** Levy, *Sephardim*, 13–41.
- 107** Tietze, “Sheykh Bālī Efendi’s Report.”
- 108** Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 60.

- 109** Le Gall, *A Culture of Sufism*, 123–27.
- 110** Imber, “Malāmātiyya,” 227; and “Persecution of the Ottoman Shī’ites,” 123–28, both in Imber, ed., *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*.
- 111** Holbrook, “Diverse Tastes,” in Lewisohn, ed., *Heritage of Sufism*, vol. 2, 99–120.
- 112** Birge, *Bektashi Order*, 56–58.
- 113** Işın, “Mevlevî Order in Istanbul,” in *Dervishes of Sovereignty*, 12–41.
- 114** Atsız, *İstanbul Kütüphanelerine Göre*.
- 115** Birgivi, *Path of Muhammad*.
- 116** Birgivi, *Path of Muhammad*, 29, 11.
- 117** Suggested by Nagel, *History of Islamic Theology*, 136–40.
- 118** *Peçevi Tarihi*, ed. Baykal, I, 328.
- 119** For the debate, Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*.
- 120** Mandaville, “Usurious Piety”.
- 121** Barkan and Ayverdi, *Istanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri*.
- 122** The text of Bali Efendi’s letter was translated by Mandaville, “Usurious Piety,” 301–3.
- 123** Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 47–50.
- 124** Imber, *Ebu’s-Su’ud*, 139–63.
- 125** Peirce, *Morality Tales*, 98–100, 276–85.
- 126** Shmuelevitz, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 41–54.
- 127** al-Qattan, “Inside the Ottoman Courthouse,” in Aksan and Goffman, eds., *Early Modern Ottomans*, 201–12.

- 128** El-Nahal, *Judicial Administration*, 69 and note 36 with these documented examples.
- 129** Shaw, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 84–86.
- 130** Heyd, “Ritual Murder Accusations.”
- 131** Goodblatt, *Jewish Life in Turkey*, 120, where the grand vezir is Mehmed Sokollu and the rabbi is Solomon Ashkenazi.
- 132** The various versions were published by Christos Patrinelis, “Exact Time of the First Attempt,” 567–72.
- 133** Quoted in Patrinelis, “Exact Time of the First Attempt,” 571.
- 134** Sahillioğlu, ed., *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H.951–952*, cases 17, 396. Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*, 189–91; Zachariadou, “Great Church in Captivity,” in Angold, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, 183–84.
- 135** Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem*, 64–76.
- 136** Boyar and Fleet, *Social History of Ottoman Istanbul*, 172–82.
- 137** Shmuelewitz, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 36–39.
- 138** Coleman Barks opens his translation of Rumi, *Essential Rumi* with this image, p. 2.
- 139** 7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, case 2131, 23 September 1568.
- 140** 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, case 1023, 10 March 1572.
- 141** 7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, case 155, 28 September 1567 and case 1453, 23 May 1568.
- 142** Allen, *Problems of Turkish Power*.
- 143** Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 76.
- 144** Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. “Sokollu Mehmed Pasha,” vol. IX (1997), 706–11 (Gilles Veinstein).

- 145** Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” 155–66.
- 146** Dikici, “Making of Ottoman Court Eunuchs.”
- 147** Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. “Mustafa Pasha, Lala,” vol. VII (1992), 720–21 (J. H. Kramers).
- 148** Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 45–54.
- 149** Babayan, “Safavid Synthesis.”
- 150** Noted by Çelik, “Defining Empire’s Patrimony,” in Bahrani, Çelik, and Eldem, eds., *Scramble for the Past*, 473–74.
- 151** I am indebted to Marianne Sághy for this information.
- 152** Cook, *Population Pressure*.
- 153** Tezcan, “Ottoman Monetary Crisis.”
- 154** Stoianovich, “Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” 240.
- 155** Stein, *Guarding the Frontier*, has good general material on Ottoman siege warfare.
- 156** Imber, *Ebu’s-Su’ud*, 156–162.
- 157** Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 131–38, and 135, n. 11.
- 158** Hathaway, *Arab Lands*, 62–63.
- 159** The most detailed study is Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew,” 61–80. See also Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 141–142, and Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 133, 297.
- 160** For examples, Julius Káldy-Nagy, “The ‘Strangers’ (Ecnebilir) in the 16th Century Ottoman Military Organization,” in Kara, ed. *Between the Danube and the Caucasus*, 165–69.
- 161** Suggestions from Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 190.
- 162** Amending the data calculations in Howard, “Ottoman Timar System,” 164–73.

- 163 Fodor, “Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier.”
- 164 Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 118–23.
- 165 I owe the point to Virginia Aksan.
- 166 İpşirli, ed., *Tarih-i Selânikî*, vol. 2, 227.
- 167 Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent,” 185.
- 168 In the wonderful title of Haarmann, “Plight of the Self-Appointed Genius.” See also Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*.
- 169 Trans. Tietze, *Mustafâ ‘Âlî’s Counsel for Sultans*.
- 170 On millennium anxiety, Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 134–35, 244–45. Fleischer is preparing a fuller study of Ottoman apocalypticism.
- 171 Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges*, 14, 17, 38.
- 172 See Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges*, 8–46.
- 173 Kazancıgil, *Osmanlılarda Bilim*, 85–91.
- 174 Hagen, “Order of Knowledge, the Knowledge of Order: Intellectual Life,” in *Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 2, 407–56, esp. 418–20.
- 175 Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges*, 43.
- 176 The terminology used by Lutfi Pasha, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 199 and 283; he notes *kadir gecesi*, 384.
- 177 Kütükoğlu, “Lütfi Paşa Âsafnâmesi,” 74.
- 178 Forster, trans., *Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*; Busbecq describes the Ramadan fast, 151–54; for the pre-Ramadan public fast, 220; the archery competition, 134.
- 179 Gottfried Hagen, “*Mawlid*, Ottoman,” in Fitzpatrick and Walker, eds., *Muhammad*, vol 1, 369–73. I have benefited by the

theoretically informed study of Tapper and Tapper, “Birth of the Prophet.”

180 Süleyman Çelebi, *Mevlid*.

181 Dedes, “Süleyman Çelebi’s Mevlid,” in Kut and Büyükkarcı, eds., *Uygurlardan Osmanlıya*, 305–49.

182 İpşirli, ed., *Tarih-i Selânikî*, vol. 1, 197–98.

Ambiguities and Certainties, 1591–1688

If Sultan Murad's embrace of numerological marvel bespoke a calm Ottoman inclusiveness in the face of millennium anxiety,¹ not all were of one mind. When his presence with the army on campaign a couple of years later raised reminders of the sultan as gazi conqueror, few dissented. The present moment offered ample opportunity to wonder whether both of these images, for all their anachronistic staying power, in different ways voiced a wish for a simpler certainty that always seemed just out of reach.

Ambiguity was everywhere, starting at home. Elite politics are rarely simple. In marriage, in patron–client networks, in slavery and service, the royal family was the model and the mirror of Ottoman society at large. Not only did Murad not curb factionalism, he made it a natural feature of his household relations. Consent granted and consent withheld, by members of the extended royal household especially army officers and their allies, was a kind of public pressure, brought upon the government by the governed. The model was, however, inherently unstable. Violence or the threat of violence became almost routine as a means of negotiating political change. Murad's successor Mehmed III appointed and dismissed seven grand vezirs in his eight-year reign (1595–1603). In such constant political turmoil, the Ottoman sultans often appeared to have little day-to-day political or military authority. Yet beneath the surface instability, Murad's model had the effect of reinforcing the role of the Ottoman dynasty as the common denominator that kept the various segments of the empire together.

War, Rebellion, and Reform

The divan squandered the peace dividend before it had a chance to fully process the lessons of the Caucasus war, which ended in 1590. A campaign against Spain was announced. Koca Sinan set about readying the navy, somewhat neglected since the Cyprus campaign twenty years earlier, but ran into difficulty raising the necessary funds. Provincial governors and treasurers throughout the empire, assessed for the costs, were ordered to start by collecting delinquent taxes. These went back nine years in some cases.² Not just districts like Kars and Erevan were in arrears, where the Caucasus war had made collections difficult, and tribal regions like Diyarbekir, where protestors forced the governor to resign, and Bosnia on the remote frontier. Even supposedly unexceptional provinces like Ankara and Aleppo were in trouble.³ Additionally, vezirs and pashas had to pony up personally; and the Venetian ambassador reported that the Jewish community of Istanbul was assessed for 300,000 gold ducats.⁴ Still only about two-thirds of anticipated funds came in.⁵ The entire naval project had to be scuttled.

Box 4.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Eleventh Islamic Century

Murad III 1574–95

Mehmed III 1595–1603

Ahmed I 1603–17

Mustafa I 1617–18, 1622–23

Osman II 1618–22

Murad IV 1623–40

Ibrahim 1640–48

Mehmed IV 1648–87

The funding debacle proved that Ottoman provincial tax policy did not really operate in reality as it seemed to do on paper, and had not for some time. Population growth over several decades was probably one root cause. In Rum and Karaman, according to the latest cadastral surveys, marginal lands were being cultivated that had gone unused since probably the Black Death. The average size of family plots shrank while the numbers of landless villagers and unmarried men swelled.⁶ Large numbers of villagers followed demand for labor into the cities, while some seem to have returned to a pastoral-nomadic lifestyle. Of the landless young men, many were recruited into the retinues of local Ottoman military officers as musketeers. Others seemed to melt into the countryside. Drought and famine accelerated the exodus from the land, starting in the 1590s, during preparations for the ill-fated naval campaign.⁷ Food shortages were reported by provincial governors in Syria in 1592, and an epidemic hit Istanbul. In 1593 food ran short in Baghdad, and in Egypt the Nile floods failed, affecting Mecca and Medina as well.

The Long War in Hungary

Long-term fiscal reform was put off while a land war against Habsburg Austria loomed. Financing was improvised in the theater. Skirmishes between Ottoman garrison troops and the Habsburg irregulars had been intermittent, and the annual tribute from Vienna arrived later and later each year.⁸ Sensing opportunity, the governor of Bosnia, who was a favorite of Murad, provoked a clash. Sinan Pasha launched a full Ottoman attack in 1593. Even though he did not arrive at the front until mid-July, he was able to take two fortresses. But by autumn a number of forts northeast of Buda fell to the Habsburgs.

That is substantially how the Long War went, back and forth, for the next thirteen years. Several fortresses changed hands more than once, while the central Carpathian basin was devastated in the repeated sieges.⁹ The most dangerous period of the war from the Ottoman point of view came in 1595–96, after two consecutive hard winters. The forts of the Danube bend fell, leaving Buda exposed. With Zsigmond Báthory, the rare Roman Catholic Prince of Transylvania, cooperating with the Habsburgs, the Ottomans were forced to open a second front on the lower Danube to protect their supply routes from the Black Sea. This was where Sultan Murad himself led the army in 1596, becoming the first sultan to do so since Süleyman's last campaign thirty years earlier. In one of the few major battles of the war, the Ottoman army defeated the Habsburgs at the Mezőkeresztes plain and Eger fell to the Ottoman army in October. The Ottomans recognized an anti-Habsburg candidate when Báthory abdicated, and worked with the lords of Wallachia and Moldavia to counter Habsburg efforts in the Carpathian Basin. They recaptured the Danube forts, and from this position of strength negotiated peace in 1606.

The Celali Rebellions

Conditions in Karaman and Rum had worsened in the meantime. Some of the more well-off locals fled to Istanbul complaining about the breakdown of security on the plateau, with so many soldiers off fighting in Hungary.¹⁰ Ottoman officials used the collective term *Celalis* for the bandits, but it was hardly a unified movement.¹¹ Two eccentric brothers were early instigators, one a mercenary musketeer named Kara Yazıcı, the “Black Scribe,” and the other some sort of mystic, judging from his name, Deli (Crazy) Hasan, and a description of his followers (see [Box 4.2](#)).

Box 4.2: Peçevi’s Description of Deli Hasan’s Celali Rebels

The orphaned son of a Hungarian convert to Islam, Ibrahim Peçevi was adopted into the Slavic clan of the Sokollus. While in retirement in Buda after a career in the finance administration, he wrote a history of the Ottomans. It was here that he witnessed Deli Hasan’s motley crew:

Some had a camel bell tied to their stirrups, some two strings of bells strung like scabbard straps down their stark naked backs; some with bald, rough heads, some with hair like a woman’s hair falling over the two sides of their chest; some their heads covered, some their legs and feet naked, pikes and lances in hand; two-thirds with cloaks of mismatched rags, a piece of cloth for a banner; in conduct and behavior all indescribable, in appearance baffling, amazing.^a

^a Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, vol. 2, 271. My translation.

The brothers might have given the rebellion a classic dual

political and religious character, as in earlier centuries, but this never really developed. The term Celali went back about a century to a certain Sheikh Celal, a contemporary of Sheikh Cüneyd the Kızılbaş founder and cut from the same cloth.¹² Names like Shah Verdi and Shah Veli, often indicators of Kızılbaş faith, did occur among the Celalis,¹³ and Kara Yazıcı signed his correspondence as Shah Halim, “the Meek,” and claimed descent from unnamed shahs of the past. He said that the Prophet appeared to him in a dream.¹⁴ Yet he and his brother lacked the messianic appeal and the dynastic credibility of a Shah Ismail or a Sheikh Bedreddin, and the apocalyptic potency of those earlier rebellions was absent from this one. The Ottoman council records for these years have unfortunately gone missing, but surviving chronicles and the Venetian consular reports from Aleppo make little of religion among the rebels’ motivations. They suggest instead that persistent insecurity and the hardships of life moved these ne’er-dowells into the alluring life of men who know no master.¹⁵

Kara Yazıcı’s profile showed less a desire to overthrow the Ottoman order than grievance over rules of inclusion in it. For janissaries and the other troops of the palace, service in the sultan’s extended household opened the gates to privilege and patronage, through revenue contracting and collection.¹⁶ These troops were all drawn from the same recruitment pool, the devshirme and other slaving operations, and sons of corps members could also enroll. Interdivisional rivalries were intense between the janissaries on the one hand and the smaller and more privileged “six regiments” of palace cavalry on the other. A third group was the artillery corps of armorers, gunners, and carters.¹⁷ Janissaries might be recruited for high-risk/high-reward special forces assignments. These offered promotion to one of the cavalry regiments, meaning a higher pay grade and access to lucrative administrative and financial positions outside of combat or after deactivation.¹⁸

Collection of the cizye, for example, the poll tax on non-Muslims, was controlled by members of the six regiments. They made up 78

percent of the names in a list of cizye collectors in a register of 1571–72, and by 1615–16 this figure was 90 percent.¹⁹ The six regiments were so closely equated with revenue contracting that tax farmers were sometimes appointed to one of them without any military experience at all. Such was the case of a certain Mustafa, for instance, who together with his father received a three-year contract for the customs dues of the up-and-coming port of Izmir,²⁰ in March 1575. The father's name, Haji Mehmed, suggests that he had made the Pilgrimage, or else was a wealthy merchant, but he was no soldier. He was added to one of the six regiments anyway, and the son Mustafa was given a large timar. The father-and-son team outbid someone named Süleyman to win the contract from the imperial treasurer.²¹ It was not an isolated example, and it was not just the sultan's household guard who were involved in broader commerce and finance. A few pages earlier, the same register records the case of an imperial courier receiving an increase in his timar for standing as surety in negotiations for a large revenue contract.²²

Opportunities opened up in provincial service as well, which is where Kara Yazıcı got his start, as aide to a sancakbeyi in Rum province. When his patron was called up for the 1596 Hungarian campaign, Kara Yazıcı was left in charge of home security; and when his patron was dismissed Kara Yazıcı too was dismissed. The cause of dismissal was an incident that took place after the Battle of Mezőkeresztes. The Habsburg troops thought they had won the battle and were already plundering the Ottoman camp, but the Ottoman troops turned the tables. In the aftermath of this unlikely victory the Ottoman field commander called a spot inspection. He purged the rolls of any who failed to appear. Provincial cavalry members always lived with the knowledge that failure to muster meant losing their timars, even if this was rare in practice. In this case the commander, Çıgalazade Sinan Pasha, made good the threat. According to the Venetian consul in Aleppo, Kara Yazıcı got the news of his discharge while on a policing action against rioting medrese students in Cilicia.

He refused to stand down. He was, after all, doing his duty.

Kara Yazıcı was not the only retainer turned rebel after the post-Mezőkeresztes purge. Among their ranks were a diverse lot of landless villagers, out-of-work urban and rural laborers, armed hangers-on, disgruntled seminarians, low-level religious functionaries, and, in the words of one scornful contemporary historian, “heretics who know nothing of either religion or theology.”²³ The Beylerbeyi of Karaman, sent out against the rebels, joined them instead, defeated a government force, and holed up in Urfa. As the grand vezir’s son approached with troops, Kara Yazıcı turned state’s evidence in return for promotion to sancakbeyi.²⁴ Or else, according to a different account, he never gave up his rebellion and died after a defeat on the upper Euphrates. Deli Hasan too sent feelers to Istanbul, looking for a palace appointment. This was met by incredulous protest from the palace guards in the capital. He was actually commissioned Beylerbeyi of Bosnia on the far frontier, but rumors of sedition dogged him and he finally was condemned and executed.²⁵ The rebellion went on without the brothers. A disgruntled Tatar prince joined. Rebel forces troops burned part of Tokat and assassinated an Ottoman general, marched west, sacked Ankara, and laid siege to Kütahya.

The return of Shah Abbas and the Persian army to the Caucasus in late 1603 meant that for the next three years the Ottoman army fought on three fronts – an interesting sign of military vitality even if the results were mixed. They took the field against the Habsburgs in Hungary and the Persians in the Caucasus, and all the while Celali activity did not abate on the plateau. Tabriz fell to Shah Abbas, and Erevan in the spring of 1604. With war in Hungary ongoing, success of this eastern campaign, led by the same Çıgalazade Sinan Pasha, would depend on neutralizing any Celali rebels still at large. One, Halil the Tall, was given the governorship of Baghdad for himself and sancaks for twelve of his men.²⁶ Another, Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, client of a Sokollu cousin, had shown talent both as a captain of musketeers and as tax agent under several provincial officials.²⁷ He too fell victim to

the Mezōkeresztes purge and he too turned outlaw. Now he accepted the revenues of Ankara as a “pension.” And many other such petty local heroes and thugs had to be coopted. Government forces marched east only to meet defeat at the hands of Shah Abbas near Lake Urmia in late 1605, thanks in no small part to the passive-aggressive Kurdish chieftain of the Canbulad clan of Kilis, whose troops never showed. Infuriated to find them calmly camped at Van on his return, Çıgalazade Sinan Pasha had the chieftain executed.²⁸

During the following year, both the Ottoman and Safavid armies withdrew and Çıgalazade died. Istanbul could find no consensus on a course of action. In Aleppo, Canbulad’s son Ali defiantly minted his own coins and had Friday prayers recited in his own name.²⁹ He coerced the two southern Syrian sancaks of Damascus and Tripoli into submission. He cut a commercial treaty with the Duke of Tuscany, the Florentine rival of Venice,³⁰ probably hoping to replace some of the trade that the whole region had lost to Izmir during the rebellion – Izmir was safer now than Aleppo, and English and French merchants were already there, buying cotton and mohair.³¹ The region east and north of Lake Van was reportedly in anarchy, ravaged by local strongmen and bandits, both Muslim and Christian. The population fled the towns and hid in caves as roving gangs of armed men plundered and demanded food. Arakel of Tabriz wrote of a locust devastation and told stories of cannibalism and people eating dogs and other unclean animals. The Armenian population migrated wherever they could to find food – to Rumeli, Wallachia, Poland, Kefe and the Black Sea, Tabriz, Ardabil. Famine spread everywhere.³²

In late 1606 the grand vezir’s seal came to Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the Welldigger. A South Slav devshirme conscript now over 80 years old, Kuyucu Murad had enjoyed a distinguished military career. He was the one who had just negotiated the treaty ending the war in Hungary, and now a month later he led the army of Rumeli against the Celalis. Crossing the drought-ridden plateau in early fall 1607, he brought suspects to heel, by turns cajoling and intimidating. After

resting at Konya he burst through the Cilician Gates and descended on Adana. His forces defeated Canbulad Ali in October 1607 and took Kilis. Canbulad Ali himself was sent to Temesvár, where he spent a year as governor in political oblivion and in constant risk of his life from the janissaries. When he left for Belgrade he was captured and executed by Kuyucu Murad's agents.³³

That left Kalenderoğlu, whom Kuyucu Murad had left in his rear. Kalenderoğlu tried to take his promised post in Ankara, but the local magistrate refused him entry and the citadel withstood his assault. His men sacked Bursa, causing some exaggerated panic in Istanbul, the fright of a ruling class unused to seeing itself in the mirror of anyone else's ambitions. But like all the rebels, Kalenderoğlu had insufficient artillery to either take a fortress or to seriously challenge the main Ottoman army on the battlefield. Kuyucu Murad's troops defeated him,³⁴ and by 1609 the Celali rebellions were mainly over. According to Arakel of Tabriz, the famine too lifted.³⁵



Figure 4.1: Sultan Ahmed mosque. In gratitude for victory over the Celali rebels, Sultan Ahmed erected a new mosque on the Istanbul hippodrome, opposite Haghia Sophia. Famed for its six minarets, it is also called the Blue Mosque for its interior tiles. This fresco, in the harem of Topkapı Palace, Istanbul, dates from after the palace fire of 1665.

Fiscal Reform

Circumstances called for not just minor administrative adjustments but a thorough rethinking of the Ottoman fiscal model. The recently completed cadastral surveys were obsolete as soon as the ink dried in the registers, made moot by a new set of socio-political realities. Facing these realities meant that the whole practice of the periodic land and revenue surveys, hallmarks of the Ottoman agrarian regime for two centuries, would have to be shelved. They were replaced by a program of revenue contracting that bolstered local loyalty and functioned as a system of short-term domestic credit for the government.

The new taxation structure built a symbiotic web of interrelationships between imperial center and local elites, initially using the *cizye* and the *avarız* or “extraordinary” tax. The *cizye*, the canonical poll tax on non-Muslims as contrasted with the tithe for Muslims, was popularly associated with subjugation and exemption from military service. The *avarız* was notionally an occasional tax for supplementary war financing. It now became a permanent annual levy. The taxation unit was still the household, but for *avarız* purposes the “household” was a variable administrative category that might contain anywhere from three to fifteen actual families, meaning that real tax burdens were distributed depending on ability to pay. Both *avarız* and *cizye* were now collected by community and privatized, in three-year *iltizam* contracts to agents called *mültezims* who were typically connected in some way to notable families in the provinces. Local magistrates managed the changes and maintained the records. The concept trusted local knowledge of local conditions, and allowed greater autonomy for local leadership in return for investment and cooperation. In this way the Ottoman administration came to terms with provincial notables and military commanders whose on-the-ground knowledge and personal connections were essential for good governance. Lessons learned in Egypt informed the changes. Egypt’s

salyane structure tended to make it a financial trendsetter. The revenue contracting or iltizam structure was developed in Egypt since the 1560s to prevent diversion of revenues into private trusts. In the iltizam the Ottoman administration found a form of investment that could compete. In Egypt the key financial posts were, first, the treasurer who managed the annual tribute; second, the commander of the pilgrimage caravan, which brought access to the Red Sea trade in coffee and the Indian Ocean trade in spices; and third, the chief eunuch of the Istanbul palace harem. He managed the Holy Cities trusts and brought in his trail numerous commissioners of village-level revenues dedicated to these trusts.³⁶ Agrarian revenues that had been collected by appointed treasury agents were now contracted to mültezims.³⁷ Members of two old military corps in Egypt were given exclusive rights to the office of sancakbeyi, which in Egypt had financial responsibilities specifically. The structure of the tributary relationship to Istanbul meant that Egypt was a safe testing ground for the transformation of provincial governors from military commanders into financial managers.

Dynastic Distress

Warning signs of a looming dynastic emergency appeared as early as the accession of Sultan Murad III. He had only two sons when he took the throne in 1574, one of whom (the later Mehmed III) was only 15 years old with as yet no heirs, and the other died early in his reign. Murad's mother Nurbanu urged him to take other concubines besides Safiye, his favorite, to try to produce more heirs. Murad resisted, but when he took to this task he had spectacular success. Nineteen more sons and more than two dozen daughters were born to him by the time he died in 1595. Mehmed III, however, immediately executed all these little competitors, none of whom were of age, as well as his own oldest son, who was quite popular. This meant that when Mehmed III himself died unexpectedly in 1603, his remaining son and successor, Ahmed I, was still a minor. And thereafter for the next fifty years, the only Ottoman princes who reached maturity before reaching the throne were mentally unstable. Among the many consequences of this situation, none of these sultans was able to gain experience governing a province before being called on to govern the empire.

When Ahmed I came to the throne his 9-year-old brother Mustafa was not put to death, for several reasons. Mustafa was known to be mentally fragile. And had he been executed, Sultan Ahmed, who had not had sexual relations and was not even circumcised, would have been the only living male member of the Ottoman dynasty. Besides this, the public shock and revulsion of seeing the parade of tiny coffins trailing out of the palace gates eight years earlier – the unfortunate younger children of Murad III – had a profound impact.³⁸

The poet Nev'i, who had taught several of those boys, wrote an elegiac ode that voiced both the grief felt by the public, and the painful discretion demanded of artists and intellectuals whose life depended on patronage. *It is the season of roses, he began, you can see their signs everywhere, but one of our buds lies lost in the ground.* When

he wrote it was spring and the feast after Ramadan had the whole world making merry. “So why are these eyes of mine moist at such a time?”

Whoever is the sultan, we are bound by his order –

The prudent one does not say – this was a sacrifice for his
sake³⁹

For all these reasons executing Mustafa was a risk the palace was unwilling to take. Yet the decision *not* to execute him brought the Ottoman dynasty to an unprecedented impasse when Ahmed I died suddenly in November 1617.

The Assassination of Osman

By the time Ahmed died he had produced two sons; thus Mustafa was no longer the only other male member of the dynasty. This fact led to a divided court, some favoring the feeble Mustafa and some supporting Ahmed's older son Osman. For the moment Mustafa took the throne – the first time an Ottoman sultan was succeeded by someone other than his own son. There was no hiding Mustafa's mental condition from the crowds at the accession ceremony. Still, he had the support of the grand mufti, who wrote in a surprising legal brief that Prince Osman was "too young." Though only 14, Osman was older than his father had been when he became sultan. Within three months the chief eunuch, a rising harem figure in these days of young Queen Mothers and their boy sultans, deposed Mustafa in favor of Osman. Once again Mustafa was not executed, but kept in confinement in the harem.

The gulf between the chief eunuch, who brought Osman to the throne, and the mufti, who had passed him over, was wider than that between two men. In the palace the leaders of both sides were in fact women – Ahmed's favorite concubine Kösem, and Mustafa's mother, a slave concubine whose name is unknown. Prince Osman's own mother had died early in his childhood, leaving him without this most crucial political ally. Although Osman reportedly had a decent relationship with Kösem, there was little political incentive for her to champion Osman over her own sons.⁴⁰


The gulf was wider even than that between the two palace factions. The word can be overused, but if any Ottoman sultan's reign can be described as tumultuous it was Osman's.⁴¹ Even the weather was extreme – in 1621 not just the Golden Horn but the Bosphorus actually froze over, ice covering the water from Istanbul to Üsküdar for the first time in memory.⁴² As soon as Osman reached the throne the controversial role of the chief eunuch in getting him there came under scrutiny. The chief eunuch had warned everyone, in writing, of

what to expect were Mustafa to continue. Now, critics blamed him for not being more discreet about what went on within the harem walls. He was exiled to Egypt.⁴³ But the episode also hinted at some critical weaknesses of Osman, different than Mustafa's to be sure but in the end every bit as debilitating. Osman lacked native political skills. These might have been remediated had his mother lived, or had he opportunity to apprentice as a provincial governor. He also lacked interpersonal skills. He badly mishandled his relationship with the senior officers of the palace militia and the janissaries. Undoubtedly these failings resulted from political attitudes already apparent during Ahmed's lifetime, and must have been the real reasons the mufti had backed Mustafa.

When Osman did take the throne he issued a series of decisions which seem, at least from the surviving reports, to be incoherent. The chief eunuch's replacement antagonized the palace troops. The grand vezir was dismissed after a defeat in the Caucasus, and the second vezir too. Power over ulema appointments was taken from the chief mufti and given to Osman's tutor Ömer Efendi. Ömer Efendi quarreled with the new grand vezir. The standing army resented Osman for many reasons, among them his going about in disguise to check their hangouts in the taverns of Istanbul. And he earned the ridicule of the general populace too, for appearing in public dressed as a simple man of the street.

His credibility crumbling, Osman decided that what he needed to do was lead his army on campaign. He accepted the invitation, urged by a delegation from the Protestant League, to step into the Central European conflict soon to be known as the Thirty Years War. The Ottomans' target was the fortress of Hotin, on the upper Dniester in Moldavia, which had fallen into the hands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth some years before. Coming only a few months after the Habsburg victory over Bohemian Protestants at the Battle of White Mountain, the Ottoman campaign might also produce benefits for their client Prince of Transylvania, who was a Protestant. Prior to

departure, to prevent a palace coup in his absence, Osman wanted to have his oldest son put to death. The chief mufti refused to issue a fetva, but Osman got documentation from a lesser ulema figure and the deed was done. His younger sons were not harmed, nor again was Mustafa. The army left Istanbul in May after a cold, wet winter, but although fed and outfitted, the troops lived in constant fear of their provisions running out.⁴⁴ During the march Osman turned a ceremonial monetary “gift” to the troops into a spot inspection of the ranks, which infuriated them. Then little Hotin fortress rebuffed several direct assaults and withstood the prolonged Ottoman siege. The performance of the standing army was decidedly uninspired, and a popular commander was killed in action. The sultan and his army returned to Istanbul in January 1622 having neither taken the fort nor improved their relationship.



Map 4.1: Key monuments in Ottoman Istanbul.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

It was as if Osman had read the script for a new model sovereign, but could not perform the role. In an attempted compromise, he

married the grand mufti's daughter. But in the doing, he cast aside three centuries of basic Ottoman political prudence – to avoid marital entanglements with Turkish nobility. Then he floated the trial balloon of a pilgrimage to Mecca, something no Ottoman sultan had ever done or would ever do in the future. The mufti delicately ruled that the pilgrimage was not strictly obligatory for a sovereign. In the absence of a clear rationale, Osman's motive was debated. Some said that the sultan meant to go to Egypt and make Cairo the new capital of the empire. Probably more accurately, others read him as intending to raise an army in the provinces to replace the palace cavalry and the janissaries.

If the political elite reacted with bafflement, the troops reacted with mutiny. Revolt erupted on the night of 18 May 1622, when the sultan ordered his personal pavilion transferred across the Bosphorus, the customary first step of a campaign. Since no military campaign had been called, it was taken to be part of the pilgrimage plan. The standing army demanded that the sultan abandon the march and punish those who were behind the plan. An ulema delegation presented their petition to Osman. He agreed to give up the pilgrimage but not to turn over his advisors. This was not good enough. Next day the troops marched into the palace grounds, stormed the second court, and broke into the harem by tearing a hole in the domed roof. Having seized Mustafa, they forced the ulema at the point of arms to put him back on the throne, collected his mother from the Old Palace, and took them both to the janissary mosque under armed guard. The grand vezir and the aga of the janissaries, sent by Osman to negotiate, were murdered.

The troops then arrested the sultan himself and took him to the janissary mosque. The scene in the eyewitness chronicle hauntingly evokes the Via Dolorosa – the sultan disheveled and mounted on an ordinary workhorse, led through a jeering mass of onlookers. "Is this the precious Prince Osman who raided the coffee shops and put the sipahis and janissaries on the galleys? Was it with mercenaries that

your forefathers conquered provinces?”⁴⁵ A conference was held with Mustafa’s mother. She did not wash her hands of the matter. Her spiteful appointment as grand vezir of a general who hated Osman sealed the sultan’s fate. He was taken to the Yedikule fortress and strangled.

Pro- and Anti-Osman

The assassination of Osman fell like a hard rain across the generation that witnessed it. Mustafa's second term on the throne saw five grand vezirs and somehow lasted sixteen months before he was removed in favor of Kösem's oldest son, Murad IV. But this was not mere palace infighting. The palace divide laid bare the main fault lines of Ottoman society.

Writers of this polarized era tended to divide everyone into two camps.⁴⁶ On one side were the standing army of the palace and their financial and administrative allies, both in the capital and in the provinces. Though they might regret the assassination of Osman, they defended his deposition as necessary to protect "Ottoman tradition." By this they meant both the privileged status of the standing army as the household guard of the dynasty, and the system of patronage networks of office holding and revenue contracting that went with this. Ethnicity had no small effect,⁴⁷ and there was a religious dimension as well. Many, though not all, in the standing army were Slavs and Albanians, still recruited through the devshirme slave system, and the era saw the first grand vezir ever appointed from the janissary corps, Hüsrev the Bosnian. Albanians and Slavs were more apt to be Bektashis or Sufis, suspect to sober Sunnis.

On the other side were the Osmanists, defenders of Osman, such as Mehmed Pasha the Abkhazian, the governor of Erzurum, who stood for unrestricted royal authority. Their patronage networks tended to originate in the eastern provinces, especially the Caucasus, Rum and Karaman, and sometimes the Syrian cities, but they were not without palace connections. They often had been recruited by vezirs augmenting their forces for campaigns on distant fronts. Most were Sunnis, but the ethnic connection could trump even the Muslim-Christian divide. Among Mehmed Pasha's allies in the capital was the eunuch grand vezir who was a Georgian; and he was memorialized by one Armenian Christian chronicler as someone who knew and loved

his people, having lived among them in Erzurum. When Mehmed Pasha turned on the janissary corps in its eastern garrisons and slaughtered the company, some managed to escape by disguising themselves as Armenians.⁴⁸ He was fired, but no matter – once winter was over he marched west with his army and set siege to Ankara, and though defeated he was pardoned, probably due to the eroding Ottoman position in Iraq. Shah Abbas took Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk, great cities, conquered by Sultan Süleyman ninety years earlier. Two attempts over the next several years failed to dislodge the Persians while Mehmed Pasha refused orders to attack. Relieved of command, he was exiled to the governorship of Bosnia.

The conflict came to a head after the second failed effort to retake Baghdad. Hüsrev the Bosnian retreated with the army to Mosul, passed the spring and summer 1631 in Mardin and Diyarbekir, then headed south to try again. When he was dismissed in favor of an Osmanist supporter, he turned the army around. He was murdered in Tokat. His troops went on, stormed into Istanbul, executed the Osmanist grand vezir, and instigated a reign of terror. But when Sultan Murad's personal friend Musa Çelebi fell victim to their violence, "God awakened the sultan," to quote one observer.⁴⁹

Sultan Murad was one of those rare political geniuses, the radical reformer who convinces conservatives that he is a throwback to a bygone era. He called an extraordinary, expanded meeting of the divan, and personally presided at sessions held in the Seaside Pavilion of the palace for several weeks in June and July 1632. Decisions taken at the meetings had two main goals, to end the strife in the Ottoman army and to reverse the Safavid conquest of Baghdad. A wide group of military, administrative, judicial and religious officials met. The protesters were heard. There were numerous executions. A thorough evaluation of palace and military affairs was done, suggestions for reforms were solicited, and a remarkable compromise took shape. Hüseyin Pasha, nicknamed "the Rogue," a general old enough to remember Sultan Süleyman, was sent to Sofia with the intendant of

the registry. Although his orders summarized the great history of the timar administration in nostalgic rhetoric, they downplayed old requirements such as giving timars to sons of former sipahis, in favor of locally resident soldiers. Simultaneously, throughout the provinces, in Rumeli, Anatolia, Bosnia, Hungary, Karaman, Diyarbekir, Trabzon, Maraş, Sivas, Syria, Erzurum, and Raqqa,⁵⁰ army inspections weeded out people who had acquired rights to timars through “retirement” grants and other kinds of absentee revenue contracts. It was a clear acknowledgment of the transformation of the previous generation, and it worked. The sultan himself led a campaign that took Erivan in 1635 and then marched triumphantly back into Baghdad in 1638, setting the name of Murad IV next to Süleyman’s as Ottoman conquerors of the ancient Abbasid capital.

The Sultan and his Entertainer

The most intimate portrait of Murad IV comes from the pen of the sultan's entertainer and friend Evliya Çelebi. Evliya participated in the Erivan campaign with his father, a goldsmith who had worked on the Ahmed I's Blue Mosque. Back in Istanbul that fall, Evliya attracted the sultan's attention as he chanted the Koran at the Night of Power services in Haghia Sophia during Ramadan. That evening Evliya was introduced to the sultan and brought into the palace. Asked to sing, Evliya chose a haunting lament:

I went out to meet my beloved Musa; he tarried and came not.

Perhaps I have missed him in the way; he tarried and came not.

The sultan tearfully exclaimed that he had forbade this song ever to be sung in his presence and demanded to know how Evliya had learned it. Evliya answered that he had learned it from two slaves whose master had died in the last plague outbreak. Recovering his composure, the sultan bade him continue, and Evliya switched to a Sufi standard. When he finished, Murad revealed that the first song had actually been composed by none other than he himself, for Musa Çelebi, his beloved friend who lost his life in the terror of 1632.⁵¹

Murad and Evliya were the same age. The sultan liked Evliya's comedic style and his storytelling. Murad, wrote Evliya, was competitive and had an athletic build, and "frequently stripped himself and wrestled." On such occasions it was Evliya who "read the usual prayer of the wrestlers." Evliya claimed that he once saw the sultan seize his two swordbearers, "both remarkably stout men, take them by their belts, lift them over his head, and fling them one to the right and the other to the left." Once after a bath, when Evliya joked that Murad would not be getting oiled up for wrestling, the sultan laughingly "seized me as an eagle, by my belt, raised me over his head, and whirled me about as children do a top." Evliya received

forty-eight gold pieces for his trouble.⁵²

Preaching to the Crowd

The seemingly endless chronology of wars, mutinies, riots, disasters, epidemics, and scandals were to some a confirmation of the sickness of Ottoman society. Self-styled physicians examined the social symptoms, made diagnoses and offered remedies. Imperial clerks and scribes mourned the loss of the Ottoman order, while mosque preachers warned of the decay of Islamic society.

Though only the elderly could remember Süleyman anymore, essayists continued to use the advice for kings genre to mourn the lost order of Ottoman law, or *kanun*, which most associated with Süleyman, called by the Ottomans not the Magnificent but *Kanuni*, the Lawgiver. From the divan to the janissaries, from the ulema to the provincial cavalry, from the sultan's tutors to his concubines, the scribal class drew links between dynastic law and the divine nurture of society. In *Guiding Principles* one writer, a man of capacious scientific ability named Katib Çelebi, longed for a “man of the sword” to set things right, for violence to confront violence. Their self-interest and class resentment seemed little disguised. In *Laws of the Ottoman Dynasty*,⁵³ Ayn Ali wrote of God as “Scribe of the editions of tablet and reed pen,” echoing the Koran, but in terms straight out of the Ottoman feudal lexicon. God endowed “livelihoods” according to the ranks of life and gave gifts from the yield of limitless “fields” of munificence. God “ordered” – the verb for the sultans’ orders – the Prophet Muhammad to make plain the law. The Prophet was “Head of the register of the pages of apostleship, the sum total of the account book of greatness, the writer of the registers of law and religion.” He was the intendant of the registry – a bureaucratic appointment Ayn Ali himself had held – of “the inspired word of the Lord of the Two Worlds.” The Ottoman system paralleled God’s created order, the Ottoman registers its sacred archive.⁵⁴

Mosque preachers cast similar arguments in similar terms, using

however not the idiom of Ottoman dynastic law but of Islamic canon law, sharia. Their remedies were delivered to the crowds in Friday mosque sermons. Preaching had not always been so prized an art. Its new popularity suggests a sudden intersection of social concerns with a literate audience. Good preaching encouraged individual reflection on the inner life while, paradoxically, it thrived on the energy of the crowd. The urban migrations and dislocations of the post-millennium era fed an expanding appetite of expectations, for employment and upward mobility, for education, and for entertainment. At the same time, the urban environment created problems of proper public decorum and of social control that overlapped with old worries, for example about Sufi worship and its unpredictable emotionalism. When done well, preaching transcended specific situations, yet addressed contemporary need.

Several charismatic preachers led the charge, stimulated by the writings of Mehmed Birgivi, the cantankerous professor of the previous century whose dim view of cash trusts has already been mentioned. Birgivi wrote widely used textbooks on Arabic syntax and other subjects. His devotional works, *The Order of Muhammad* and another, a Turkish-language catechism, were bestsellers – a modern bibliographer identified more than 220 manuscript copies of the former and more than a hundred of the latter in the libraries of Istanbul alone.⁵⁵ He was particularly popular with female readers, at least according to Katib Çelebi.⁵⁶ As with Birgivi so with the preachers, a strident style not only came along with the message, it was the message – it voiced the anger of God. Conflating personal contrition and social reform, they preached a morality of individual responsibility for the temptations of urban life. Just as social ills – alcohol, tobacco, prostitution, and the like – were personal vices, so too personal virtues, like sobriety and self-control, were proper public behaviors. It was only a short jump to suggest that their behavioral norms should be enforced by public authority. Peçevi, the historian mentioned earlier, connected the religious scolds and the “unalloyed

pleasure” going on in the literary and social happenings of the coffeehouses.⁵⁷ Paul Rycault, secretary of the English Levant Company in Izmir, saw another similarity. He likened the preachers to Calvinists, “Severe, morose, and covetous ... admitting of no Musick, cheerful or light discourses ..., exact and most punctual in the observation of the rules of Religion.”⁵⁸



Figure 4.2: The peaceful grave of Birgivi, in a cypress grove in Birgi, northwestern Turkey.

The Prophet's Nativity Sermons

Two of the greatest preachers of the age squared off in a dramatic confrontation at the annual Nativity of the Prophet (*mevlid*) commemorations in September 1633, in Haghia Sophia mosque in Istanbul, in the presence of the sultan.⁵⁹ Less than three weeks earlier, a great fire had broken out in the Golden Horn shipyard. Workers were caulking a boat for an evening festival when flying sparks blown by the wind lit buildings on fire ashore. Before it was put out a fifth of the city was destroyed. The sultan closed the coffeehouses on rumors that the fire was started by someone smoking. Some were torn down and others turned into shops. The closure spread to the provinces, even Arabia and Egypt, and in some places twenty years passed before things got back to normal and the coffeehouses reopened. Katib Çelebi wrote wryly that people who could not get their coffee switched to wine instead.⁶⁰

The two preachers who faced off at the *mevlid* service three weeks after the fire were Mehmed Kadızade, the Friday preacher at Haghia Sophia, and Sivasi Efendi, his counterpart at the Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque. Their mosques were opposite on the Hippodrome, they had diametrically opposed political and religious views, and they despised each other. Sivasi Efendi, who spoke first, was an aging Halveti sheikh, a poet, and a great communicator of Sufi spirituality. He had come to Istanbul fifteen years earlier from his native Sivas at the invitation of the sultan to take the job of Friday preacher at the Blue Mosque when it opened. He used his sermon to heap ridicule upon Kadızade. Katib Çelebi, an eyewitness and a student of Kadızade at the time, thought that the audience was turned off by this tactic.

Kadızade followed Sivasi into the pulpit. A student of Birgivi and possessed of a similar temperament, Kadızade had gained notoriety for an open letter to Murad IV listing in verse a long litany of the faults of Istanbul, the City of Sin.⁶¹ He arrived in Istanbul about the time of Osman's assassination, succeeding Birgivi's own son at the mosque of

Selim I. His populist preaching spoke to social and cultural issues, and propelled him rapidly through a series of important posts. Soon he was promoted to the Bayezid Mosque; then he took the call at the Süleymaniye in 1631. Later that year he moved to Haghia Sophia.

Scripture and Authority

For the mevlid sermon, Katib Çelebi remembered that Kadızade spoke on this verse:⁶²

Behold, God bids you to deliver all that you have been entrusted with unto those who are entitled thereto, and whenever you judge between people, to judge with justice. Verily, most excellent is what God exhorts you to do: Verily, God is all hearing, all seeing!

By itself the text suggests not a narrow polemic but a general appeal to a cluster of related concerns. Humanity is answerable to holy ordinances, a “Straight Path,” discerned in the primeval texts, the Koran and the Hadith. To enact it in this life is to imitate the Prophet’s example. It was an appropriate message for mevlid, but it was also a not-too-subtle “Osmanist” – i.e. royalist – text, judging with justice being the prerogative of royal authority.

Kadızade had many followers, even some Sufis. Ascetic discipline enabled an authentic experience of the Prophet’s message; sober study was a reliable guide to God, far better than the senses, which were always vulnerable to temptation and corruption. Beliefs or practices and worldly novelties not grounded in the scriptures were *bidat*, the antithesis of the Sunna. The way this cashed out in society is perhaps suggested by the literary context of Kadızade’s sermon text. The verse occurs midway through Sura 4, “Women,” which contains lengthy admonitions about marriage, divorce, adultery and fornication, inheritance, orphans, and polemical denunciations of Jews, Christians, and hypocrites. Common Muslim prejudice had it that Christians and Jews were drunks, their women loose, and that tobacco was filth imported by the English, but non-Muslims needn’t have felt singled out. Kadızade’s teaching derided dervishes too, with their singing and dancing, their veneration of saints, their use of wine drinking and lovemaking as metaphors of the divine encounter. Even seemingly

harmless practices like shaking hands and invoking blessings upon the Prophet, *Peace be upon him*, drew Kadızade's condemnation.⁶³

The sultan liked Kadızade's sermon. The stress on textual authority over tradition, and the censorious scrutiny of life, overlapped his own attitudes. Katib Çelebi reported that after he issued his ban on smoking Sultan Murad went about the city in disguise and summarily executed smokers he caught in the act.⁶⁴ But Murad was no "Kadızadeli," as the zealous acolytes of the controversial preacher became known, and he was no friend of Sufis either. Murad was both the first sultan to execute an ecumenical patriarch, and the first to execute a grand mufti.

As in the Protestant Reformation, Kadızade's appeal to the authority of texts credited the capacity of the masses to comprehend those texts. It presupposed audiences with a basic literacy, who were ready to listen. Literate people, readers, tend to think that the answers to questions can be found in books. The Kadızadelis turned the sermon genre into an effective tool of mass education within a generation. Their message assured listeners that true learning was not difficult to attain. Long years of formal education and training were unnecessary. It was not the learning of human wisdom that mattered but mastering one single Book, whose meaning was transparent. That the supposedly clear meaning of this Book dripped through quite selective filters of hadith and theology, and that in the doing God's other "Book," the Book of Creation, was being neglected, became glaringly obvious to observers. Katib Çelebi, an early follower, acknowledged the reality of the movement's anti-intellectualism, no matter the depth of Kadızade's own learning.⁶⁵ The mosque thus became the locus of mass literacy – albeit of a certain limited kind.

Box 4.3: The Incognito King

One of the most famous stories about Murad IV was that he used to go around town observing his subjects in disguise.

Evliya Çelebi has the story:

[S]ometimes Murad walked around in disguise to observe the conditions of the world, traveling with Melek Ahmed Aga and his bodyguard. Often he would catch some brigands, dispatch their bodies to the earth, their spirits to the land of nothingness, and display their heads on pikes. He banned the coffeehouses, taverns, bars, and smoking dens, and in this way daily executed a hundred or two hundred men.

... Still, while he was so violent, yet he could converse with great and small alike with no go-between, and he went around day and night incognito to see the circumstances of the poor and needy, and to learn the price of food he often ate out in disguise.^a

Similar tales were told of other sultans – Osman II has been mentioned; and Ducas related that Mehmed II rode around dressed as a soldier, or wandered around Edirne on foot, “listening to what was being said about him.”^b But not just of Ottoman sultans. In the Islamic tradition the original incognito king was the Caliph Umar (or Omar), who according to the Arab historian al-Tabari liked to check into the lives of ordinary Muslims.^c (According to Evliya, Umar appeared to Sultan Murad in a dream and girded him up with his sword.) *Newsweek* reported in 2002 that Mollah Omar of the Taliban went around on a motorcycle,^d in imitation of his ancient namesake. And not just Muslims. Folklorist Stith Thompson catalogued many ancient versions of the “king in disguise” legend.^e Whether or not the tales are true, the collective memory honors the incognito king who knows his people’s suffering through first-hand experience.

^a *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 92–93, 103; my translation.

^b Magoulias, ed., *Decline and Fall*, 201.

^c Smith, trans., *The History of al-Tabari*, vol. 14, 108–13.

^d January 21, 2002, 26–27.

^e Thompson, *Motif Index*, vol. 4, K1812.

Preachers found many points of empathy with the urban crowds.⁶⁶ In the mosque, always the great social leveler, not class and privilege but rather righteousness was the social distinction that mattered. Like Kadızade, most of the great preachers did not belong to Ottoman aristocracy, they were usually not great theologians, medrese professors, or leading sheikhs, and they came not from Istanbul but from the provinces. At the main mosques people could hear a sermon every single day. They could fill up their idle time not in taverns but in religious courses, taught by truly gifted men. In his early years in the capital, Kadızade himself taught classes in a mosque in his neighborhood several days a week and also gave private lessons.⁶⁷

Echoes of the Ordinary

Sultan Murad's reconquest of Baghdad (1638) capped a mid-century recovery amply attested in the courthouse records of Ottoman magistrates, not just in the major cities of Istanbul, Salonika, Cairo, Aleppo, and Damascus, but also in modest towns like Kayseri. A widening literacy prevailed not just among scholars but also among a managerial class motivated to read and keep sums. At least some in the crowds who came to hear the popular preachers also hired private teachers for their children, collected more books, and built nicer houses. They blossomed into an urban middle class of merchants and intellectuals, distinct from government officials and their families.⁶⁸ Revenue contracting and the cash trust became the foundation of a system of credit. Lands and towns beyond the Taurus range helped weave an emerging Indian Ocean–Mediterranean–Black Sea commercial integration, an integration built not of a perfectly ordered system of ranks and processes decreed by a lawgiving monarch like Süleyman, but of a fluid structure of interpersonal and patron–client relations stretching across Ottoman society.

A General Prosperity

Wealthy merchant families made Cairo the center of long-distance trade particularly in sugar, pepper, textiles, and coffee.⁶⁹ They rode the Red Sea routes, their networks reaching sub-Saharan Africa and India, and they had access to the Venetian and Adriatic markets through the Jewish agents who mostly ran Ottoman customs offices.⁷⁰ Families like the Abu Taqiyyas of Cairo raised enormous funds for long-distance ventures, several times coming close to a million silver *nisfs*.⁷¹ To be sure, in most locales sums were smaller, running in Kayseri for example into the tens of thousands of akçe at the most – and the akçe of the time was probably worth only half the Egyptian *nisf*.⁷² But everyone used the credit markets without prejudice, women as well as men, Muslims, Christians and Jews alike,⁷³ and no Ottoman court seriously considered interest-bearing loans (rates ranged from 10 to 20 percent) to be anything but standard in Islamic law.

Thanks to migration, Kayseri became the most populous city in Karaman province.⁷⁴ Simeon the Pole, a monk who documented Armenian communities from Jerusalem to Cairo, Skopje, and Sarajevo,⁷⁵ found large numbers in eastern towns like Kayseri. Refugees of the Safavid invasion, the Ottoman–Safavid war, and climate-induced famine, many Armenian silk merchants settled in Kayseri due to its position on the caravan routes to Istanbul. According to Simeon they spoke Turkish rather than Armenian as in the surrounding villages. The working population was highly mobile, with a number of laborers, merchants, and others away in Istanbul or other cities for parts of the year. The opium trade also brought big investors.⁷⁶ One merchant raised a total of 87,000 akçe from four separate investors, one of whom – a woman named Ayşe bint Ahmed – took over the business from her late brother. This same lady was majority owner in a group of eight shops in town, and endowed and leased a coffeehouse near Kayseri castle.⁷⁷ Yet even tiny cash trusts lent money. The linkage between the trust, revenue contracting, and

credit can be seen in cases where the stated charitable purpose of the trust was to pay the *avarız* tax of the donor's neighborhood.⁷⁸ In one typical case a woman named Fatma guaranteed a loan to her son, at 20 percent interest with a house and garden as collateral.⁷⁹ The loan must have been used to leverage a bid for the *avarız* collection contract. Once he won the contract the *mültezim* used the profits of collection to repay the loan.

Guilds controlled processes from collection of raw materials to manufacturing, marketing, sales, and quality control; and they provided insurance, workman's compensation, and welfare benefits. Guilds became formally recognized organizations in practically every conceivable profession and craft, whether artisans, merchants, or laborers. There were even guilds of public-bath owners, slave dealers, book dealers, and coffeehouse storytellers.⁸⁰ They functioned with customary regulations, elected their own sheikhs, and resolved disputes internally before they reached the courthouse.⁸¹ They also offered an additional site of workplace education. Training went beyond both private home schooling and the education available in medreses and primary schools attached to trust complexes.

Box 4.4: From Evliya Çelebi's Travelogue: The Great Bridge at Mostar

Despite the great height of this bridge, when some viziers and deputies and great notables and exalted magistrates come to sightsee and while they are residing in one of the above-mentioned castles [at either end of the bridge], some brave boys stand ready at the edge of the bridge and, in the presence of the viziers, cry *Ya Allah* and leap into the river, flying like birds. Each boy displays a different skill, whether somersaulting or plunging upside-down or sitting cross-legged; or they go in twos or threes, embracing each other and leaping into the water. God keeps them unharmed and they

immediately clamber onto the shore and up the cliffs to the head of the bridge where they get rewards from the viziers and notables.

Other men do not dare look down, let alone jump off; if they did, their galls would burst; because the height of this bridge from the surface of the water is 80 fathoms, and the depth of the Neretva River is another 80 fathoms. Also there are rocks in the river the size of bath-house cupolas, and the river itself flows very wildly, with many eddies and whirlpools, flashing like lightning and roaring like thunder. It takes tremendous courage to plunge into water like that.



Figure 4.3: The bridge at Mostar, in a postcard produced by the Photoglob company, 1890s.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-PPMSC-09467.

But the boys have trained. First they jump off low rocks, then higher and higher. Another form of training is that the boys who are apprenticed to tradesmen in the city, when they bring lunch from their masters' houses to their shops and have trays of food and loaves of bread in their hands and on their

heads, do not go in the middle of the bridge with these heavy loads but rather hop up and down on the thin railings that run along the bridge on either side. Prudent men do not even dare approach the edge of this bridge when they are crossing it, but immature boys hop on the railings! It is quite a spectacle.^a

^a *An Ottoman Traveller: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi*, p. 215. Used by permission of Eland Press.

The Refined Classes

Nowhere was the general prosperity better exhibited than in the salons hosted in the urban mansions of the upper classes, in major cities and minor towns. Music, poetry, and conversation were the fare, with much smoking and drinking, coffee and conviviality. An order of 1617 distributed to officials in Konya and Karaman described “alcohol and tobacco use in gardens and yards, and its sale in markets and shops.”⁸² Music too had moved beyond the lodge. Distancing itself from Iranian and Central Asian models and older Ottoman practice, music seeped into mainstream Ottoman popular culture. The palace was the pace setter, but households of leading merchants as well as Ottoman officials shared and spread the cultural wealth.⁸³

Two popular genres especially captured the feeling of the salons, the biographical dictionary and the literary album. Unlike diaries or personal spiritual journals,⁸⁴ these were not necessarily autobiographical or introspective. Like other works of the day – Yusuf al-Maghribi’s dictionary of colloquial Arabic,⁸⁵ for example (produced in Cairo), or manuals of public etiquette – each expressed a characteristically Ottoman knack for discovering the common in the context of the classic.

The biographical dictionaries were called *tezkere*. They appeared by the dozens. Some took a profession as their organizing principle – poets, Sufi sheikhs, ulema figures. Others might honor men of hometown renown. A biographical dictionary of Ottoman poets written by Sehi Bey of Edirne provided one model. Supplements and continuations appeared for a century, with new poets added, entries expanded or shortened, different issues subtly highlighted, and original poetry and personal comments included.⁸⁶ Entries were alphabetized by poets’ names, with a separate section dedicated to poets of the Ottoman royal family. The prose introductions written by each new editor were timely critical essays on poetics and literary history. Another example, Taşköprüzade Ahmed’s biographical

dictionary of sheikhs, written originally in Arabic in 1558, saw rapid translations into Turkish and eight supplements and updates to 1632. Surviving manuscripts show that owners often annotated their private copies with copious marginal notes and personal observations.⁸⁷ If, as Mustafa Âlî of Gallipoli wrote, historians were like Jesus, raising the dead,⁸⁸ these biographical dictionaries read like eulogies for communities, the Ottoman practitioners of ancient literary arts.

The other popular salon genre, literary albums, went by the term *mecmua*, meaning “collection.” The very earliest Ottoman examples, going back before the conquest of Constantinople, had been style manuals for the scribal class and harked back to the ecumenical Ilkhanid heritage.⁸⁹ By now, the Ottoman literati had transformed this “manual” into a personal literary scrapbook. Poems, letters, lists, weather reports, and official documents were poured into the *mecmua*, and anecdotes, folktales, decrees of the sultan, stories of biblical and Koranic heroes, and much more, some copied and some of their own creation, and shared among their circles of writers and artists in the salons. Their popularity, in Turkish, Slavic, and Arabic, points to overarching, trans-regional and trans-ethnic social values of literate Ottoman subjects.⁹⁰

Scholars and Students

Cairo together with Istanbul, Damascus, and Salonika formed an Ottoman quadrangle of a shared Mediterranean learned culture. Scholars, pilgrims, diplomats, and merchants from as far west as the Atlantic seaboard and as far east as the Caucasus, Jews and Christians as well as Muslims, crossed paths within and beyond the Ottoman frontiers.

Many leading Ottoman scholars, scientists, and physicians received their training in Egypt. The foundation of learning was the classic texts of figures like Ibn Sina whose works informed scholarship throughout the Mediterranean basin, in Christian Europe through Latin translation and in the Ottoman lands in the original Arabic. In Cairo, the Ayyubid and Mamluk era medreses were still held in high esteem, and the Mansuriyye Hospital had an unsurpassed reputation. This did not mean resistance to new learning; quite the contrary. Ibn Sina's *Canon* was studied, for instance, but through an update done by Ibn Nafis in Mamluk Cairo.⁹¹ Ibn Nafis's revision was used in turn by Shems al-Din Itaki in his manual *Anatomy of Parts of the Body*. Itaki too added his own corrections and interpretations, for example on the human embryo and on the nervous system. Siyahi produced an influential dictionary of medical and pharmaceutical terms, also researched in Egypt. The Arabic classics were often translated into Turkish as well, laying the foundation of a Turkish scientific and medical vocabulary. Perhaps the most important medical work of the time was *Patterns of Medicine*. A systematic discussion of illnesses and treatments that stressed anatomy and advocated use of cadavers, it began with an essay on the interrelationships of climate, topography, and health, the standard context of all medical practice.⁹² Its author, Emir Çelebi, had formerly been head physician at the Mansuriyye before being hired as chief physician to three successive sultans.

Scientific assumptions and research agendas, and manuscripts and books, readily crossed political and religious boundaries. Book dealers

played an underappreciated role in this cultural exchange.⁹³ At markets in Istanbul, Aleppo, Cairo, and other major cities they supplied buyers both Ottoman and non-Ottoman. Evliya Çelebi wrote that the book market outside the Covered Bazaar in Istanbul had sixty shops and employed three hundred people. Another operated at the courtyard of the Conqueror's Mosque. In Cairo, the book market at al-Azhar had twenty shops.⁹⁴ Individual writers and teachers criss-crossed the Ottoman lands as well. Itaki, for instance, was from Shirvan and came west in the same wave of refugees that brought so many Armenian silk merchants to places like Kayseri. Itaki went to Cairo; others among the refugee scholars, mostly Sunni Azeris and Kurds, were attracted to Damascus. What Cairo was for the physical sciences and medicine, Damascus was for philosophy and theology. Another influential example was Mulla Mahmud al-Kurdi. In his more than fifty years of teaching after settling in Damascus, al-Kurdi introduced recent Persian scholarship and method, grounded in logic, semantics, and rhetoric. Defending the independent role of philosophy against the growing distrust of theologians and preachers such as Kadızade, he trained a generation of outstanding Ottoman scholars that included Ibrahim al-Kurani (d. 1690) and Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (1640–1731).⁹⁵ In the midst of this cultural commerce, scholars did not always cite each other's work or even know each other's names. Itaki, for instance, adapted illustrations from an earlier anatomy in Persian and also certainly knew Vesalius's Latin *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*, published in Basel in 1543, though he did not cite it.⁹⁶

Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars from the northwestern Mediterranean lands also sometimes made their way to Ottoman centers of learning. Men such as Pietro della Valle of Rome; Joseph Solomon Delmedigo, a Jew who had studied at the University of Padua; John Greaves and Edward Pocock, English Royalists who were protégés of the English Archbishops Laud and Ussher; and many others, spent years travelling in the Ottoman Empire and further east.

They did not think that medieval Islam had merely preserved for their benefit the science of Greco-Roman classical antiquity. They shared the same commitment to the integral nature of science with Muslim scholars of their own time, and gained insight not just from medieval Arabic science but contemporary Ottoman and Persian works as well.⁹⁷ They looked for ancient artefacts and collected manuscripts in Arabic, Syriac, Hebrew, Greek and other languages, and consulted with local authorities.⁹⁸ As a result of these exchanges some Ottoman scholars too became aware of the Copernican system and debates surrounding it. At the Ottoman court the issues were introduced in the 1660s by way of an Arabic translation of Noël Duret's book *Nouvelle théorie des planetes*, done by Ibrahim al-Zigetvari. Duret's original Latin work had been a gift to the court from Cardinal Richelieu, who himself owned thirty-seven Turkish, Arabic, and Persian manuscripts.⁹⁹ Although al-Zigetvari urged consideration of the work primarily for its updated astronomical tables, it was received with some skepticism.

Katib Çelebi and Ottoman Scholarship

The intellectual range of leading Ottoman scholars can be seen in Katib Çelebi (1609–57) who, despite his later fame, does not seem to have been extraordinary for his time.¹⁰⁰ He did not come from one of the elite scholarly families – his father was a Christian convert trained in the palace. As a youth Katib Çelebi took a position in the army financial administration and accompanied the army on campaign. He never enrolled in a medrese, whose curriculum, he complained, marginalized classical philosophy, astronomy, arithmetic, and geometry.¹⁰¹ Rather, he was taught at home by a number of private teachers, the first being Kadızade himself, whose lectures he found eloquent and inspiring. After the Erivan campaign of 1635, however, he decided (quoting the hadith) to *Turn from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad*, to self-mastery and a life of learning.¹⁰² His way was eased by an inheritance from his mother and another wealthy relative. He used the money to supplement his small income from private tutorials, and spent the rest on books.

Katib Çelebi wrote more than twenty works spanning several genres, from his early mirror for princes, *Guiding Principles*, mentioned above, to an encyclopedia of literary biography and bibliography of amazing breadth, called *Pronouncement of Opinions on Books and Writings*, usually known by its abbreviated Arabic title, *Kashf al-Zunūn*. Probably the most important reference work on Islamic literature and scholarship ever written, it contains more than ten thousand authors and fifteen thousand titles in all fields, including poetic anthologies and compilations, besides science, religion, language, politics, history, and more, and over three hundred essays on fields of science and scholarship.¹⁰³ Katib Çelebi also wrote a major chronicle of his times and a history of the Ottoman navy. His last finished work, a systematic rebuttal of the Kadızadeli movement called *The Balance of Truth*, shows how far he had distanced himself from his early admiration.¹⁰⁴

At his death Katib Çelebi left a massive, unfinished geography in Turkish called *Cihannüma*, or *World Panorama*. He started writing this in the manner of Ottoman and earlier Persian and Arabic geographies, a kind of phenomenology of the earth,¹⁰⁵ with descriptions of the cities, flora and fauna, human social customs, and rare oddities of various world regions. While working on it, his research in new geographies, translated for him from Latin and French by a French convert, including the *Atlas Minor* and Ortelius's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, made him completely reconceptualize his own work. He started over, in a new style, and was in the middle of this revision when he died. He wished for a printing press (he complained that there were none in the whole country), predicting that future copyists would skip his maps.¹⁰⁶

Box 4.5: Vices of the Times

Katib Çelebi's wife told a close friend how he died. He had eaten some melon before retiring for the night. In the morning he took a cold water ablution (after intimacy with his wife) and made himself a coffee. Suddenly the cup fell from his hand and he collapsed of a heart attack. The detail about the melon, a natural anti-oxidant with powers to detoxify the liver, shows how well Ottoman medicine understood holistic health. It also shows that Katib Çelebi probably liked his coffee laced with opium.^a

^a Hagen, *Ein osmanischer Geograph*, 76–78.

The Urban Working Class

An urban working class bubbles up from below in the chronicles and other literature both Christian and Muslim. Writers spoke uneasily of the city boys, rabble, wits, base and coarse folk,¹⁰⁷ people who stood out from the respectable classes of merchants, soldiers, scribes, ulema, sheikhs, and seyyids (descendants of the Prophet). A market existed for porters, masseurs, shop errand boys and other kinds of wage labor. An Armenian writer said that many caught on with the construction crews and craftsmen working on the Sultan Ahmed mosque.¹⁰⁸ Some of these jobs held the promise of informal education that the lower classes aspired to, at least for their children. Writers who knew the eastern regions mentioned the migrants and refugees of the Celali rebels and the Persian wars. Twice the sultans tried to order them all back where they came from.¹⁰⁹ According to Evliya Çelebi, an Abkhazian himself, some Abkhazians in Istanbul sold their boys to officials, hoping they would become administrators instead of joining the anonymous urban rabble.¹¹⁰

The faceless crowds reminded some of the climate. Both were driven by impersonal, unidentifiable energies. But while the weather was composed of acts of God, when events seemed provoked by a crowd, concepts of Providence went reaching into regions so far little explored.¹¹¹ It was not just that mobs were sometimes responsible for what happened. Rumor and hearsay lay somehow behind the mobs, as in the murder of Sultan Osman and in the Istanbul terror of 1631–32;¹¹² and what lay behind rumor and hearsay? It seemed nebulous, intangible, not traceable to anywhere in particular.

Coffeeshouses focused the fear. Gathering places for crowds of urban sinners, they were easy targets for the security minded and the sanctimonious. The only thing comparable to the coffeeshouse for sociability was perhaps the bath house, but bath houses had the canonical connection of cleanliness and godliness going for them. Coffee drinking was not exactly new. Coffeeshouses had opened right

away in Istanbul and spread to all parts of the empire as soon as the brown bean arrived from Yemen, decades earlier.¹¹³ Coffeehouses stood in as the equivalent of the household salons of the wealthy and well-heeled for men of modest means, whose homes were inadequate for hosting discussions, music, and other entertainments.¹¹⁴ Where there was coffee there was tobacco, even worse in the “public culture of fun.”¹¹⁵ Coffee caused bad breath, but it could scent a whole room, whereas tobacco left a stale stink, stained the teeth, beard, and nails, and generally made people dirty. Mosques started turning people away who smelled of smoke or who had coffee breath, just as the scriptures rather humorously allowed them to do when people reeked of garlic, leeks, and onions. But these were serious matters. Theologians tarred tobacco with the infidel brush,¹¹⁶ reminding everyone that it was Englishmen who introduced the vice.

Evliya Çelebi is a revealing source both of the kinds of stories that might have been set pieces for coffeehouse evenings and their rollicking tone. After the death of Sultan Murad he joined the retinue of Melek Ahmed Pasha, a powerful cousin who served a brief term as grand vezir. But Evliya found his true calling as a traveler. His *Seyahatname* (Book of Travels), an immense, vivid literary kaleidoscope of Ottoman culture, is one of the truly joyous monuments of world literature. More than the narrator, the real star of the book is the empire and its diverse peoples. Much of the entertainment value of the book relies on audience interest in Ottoman ethnic groups and their regional languages and culture. Evliya’s description of a region begins with vocabulary lists in the local language, whatever it might be. Typically, he taught the reader how to count to ten and gave a few basic words such as bread, meat, barley, and the like, before descending into the more colorful vocabulary of body parts, cursing, and other deprecations. In his description of the Albanian language, he first claimed that the term “Albanian” meant *May there be no shame*, then launched into a torrent of vulgarities, finishing innocently, “In short, when dervishes are

travelling, they should know such expressions as well, so that they can avoid trouble by not going to places where they will be abused.”¹¹⁷

Box 4.6: Henry Blount in a Coffeehouse

A young English nobleman named Henry Blount visited the Ottoman Empire independently in 1634. He booked passage on a Venetian galley to Zara, traveled to Istanbul overland, and went on by sea to Egypt, “the font of all science.” His travel memoir included the following description.^a

They have another drinke not good at meat, called *Cauphe* made of a *Berry*, as bigge as a small *Beane*, dried in a Furnace, and beat to powder, of a soote colour, in taste a little *Bitterish*, that they seeth, and drink as hote as may be endured: it is good all houres of the day, but especially morning, and evening, when to that purpose, they entertaine themselves 2 or 3 houres in *Cauphe-houses*, which in all Turkey abound more than *Innes*, and *Ale-houses* with us; it is thought to be the old blacke broth used so much by the *Lacedemonians*, and dryeth ill Humors in the stomach, comforteth the Braine, never causeth drunkennesse, or any other surfeit, and is harmelesse entertainment of good fellowship; for there upon Scaffolds, halfe a yard high, and covered with Mats, they sit *cross-legg’d* after the Turkish manner, many times two or three hundred together, talking, and likely with some poor *Musick* passing up and down: The *Musick* of *Turky* is worth consideration; through all those vaste Dominions, there runnes one tune, and for ought I herd, no more, nor can every man play that; yet scarce any but hath a *fiddle*, with two strings, and at Feasts, and other meetings, will confidently play upon it, but hee knows not to what tune, nor can play the same twice over; this I’m sure of; for to make experiment, I have ventured to play at diverse

meetings, pretending the ayres of my countrey, to note whether they had skill or no; and took so well as they have often made me play again; then I found their skill and mine alike, for I never understood the least touch of any instrument; Nothing could more disguise their *Genius* unto me, who was used to guess at the fancies of men by the ayres wherewith I found them most taken, almost as much as by their discourse.

^a Blount, *Voyage*, 105–6.

Box 4.7: The Wonder of Science

Evliya Çelebi poked fun at the common person's gullibility and fear of novelty in a story about Hezarfenn Ahmed and the sultan. Hezarfenn used to conduct experiments in flight, up in the open fields above Galata. Evliya wove a droll tale of Hezarfenn launching himself from the Galata Tower and landing in *Falconers' Square*, across the Bosphorus in Üsküdar – for Evliya, the pun was probably the point. A delighted Sultan Murad, who watched the exhibition from a seaside pavilion, rewarded the scientist with a bag of gold. Then he was suddenly seized with second thoughts. A person like that was dangerous – he could get anything he wanted! So he banished him to Syria.^a

^a Gökyay, ed., *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, book 1, 359.

Foreigners

One final group capturing the interest of observant Ottomans were the foreigners, growing in numbers and diversity. Besides merchants there were also scientists and missionaries, as well as adventurers like the English nobleman Henry Blount. Blount credited climate with the paramount influence on human culture, and came to the Ottoman lands to find the opposite of wet, cold Englishmen. Blount, who visited just after the winter of the bloody terror of 1631–32, wrote that “he who would behold these times in their greatest glory, could not find a better Scene than Turkey.”¹¹⁸ He booked passage on a Venetian galley and happily found himself the only Christian among a group of fellow travelers proceeding overland from Zara to Istanbul. Along the way he got into a fight in Sarajevo with a Christian Slav who threatened to sell him into slavery. The kadi found in Blount’s favor and released him. His fascination was Egypt, in antiquity “the fountaine of all Science and Arts civill.” Cairo he found to be “clearly the greatest concourse of Mankinde in these times.”¹¹⁹

Although Blount traveled on his own and did not represent any company or official mission, most foreigners in the Ottoman lands were merchants, with the Italians, especially Venetians, traditionally the most prominent. Over the century, Portuguese development of the transit route around the Cape of Good Hope to India had a gradually depressing effect on Venetian commerce. A contemporary Ottoman analysis of the situation warned of a similar impact on Ottoman commerce unless the sultan acted. Writing in the margins of an older Ottoman work called *The New World, or History of the West Indies*, an anonymous essayist called for military action against the Portuguese and Spanish, complaining, “There is no place on the face of the earth the size of the palm of a hand that their ships do not reach, and there is no harbor or port or landing place where they do not build forts and castles.”¹²⁰

The Ottoman divan preferred to maintain its share of the transit

trade by offering privileges to French and English merchants. These agreements included exemption from the cizye poll tax, and a kind of limited extraterritoriality for themselves and their local clients, even if these clients be Ottoman subjects. These “capitulations” were for the Ottoman dynasty a version of the limited self-governance it allowed Jewish and Christian community leaders, and had the same name. Although the terms also gave the Ottomans reciprocal rights to establish diplomatic missions in their opposite capitals, they were not equal. Ottoman merchants abroad did not have the rights their own government granted foreign merchants, nor was there freedom of worship for Muslims abroad, who were in any event banned from most parts of Northwestern Europe.¹²¹ Joint stock companies from Northwestern Europe now entered the attractive Ottoman market directly, alongside the more experienced Italians. The French had concluded the first such agreement with the sultan in 1569. English merchants initially traded under protection of the French, until the Turkie Company was chartered by Queen Elizabeth I in 1581.¹²² Renamed the Levant Company in 1592, it established a presence in both Istanbul and Izmir, and enjoyed a royal monopoly on English trade with the Ottomans. Dutch merchants were at first covered under the Levant Company, but within a few years the Dutch Republic chartered its own East India Company.¹²³

The welcome presence of foreigners in Ottoman eastern Mediterranean ports, and the coming and going of Ottoman Christians and Jews, who enjoyed a greater cross-border mobility to Europe than did Ottoman Muslims, highlighted a cosmopolitan consciousness. It also ensured that controversies within Western Christendom crossed into the Ottoman lands. Evangelizing Jesuits caused irritations among Armenian and Eastern Orthodox communities. In 1620, in the very same week as the Battle of White Mountain, the anti-Catholic Cyril Lucaris became Patriarch of Istanbul. He worked at Church reform to combat Roman Catholic missionary influence, and was sympathetic to Protestantism. He had many Dutch and Polish Protestant friends,

corresponded with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and had the strong support of the English representatives in Istanbul. He set up the first Greek printing press and had the New Testament translated into vernacular Greek. His controversial *Eastern Confessions of the Christian Faith* showed a Calvinist perspective. A movement to oust him gained traction among the Ottoman Orthodox metropolitans, who raised the money to buy out Cyril at the Ottoman palace. Cyril's supporters fought back and reclaimed the see. The metropolitans hatched a conspiracy with the Habsburg ambassador, blaming Cyril for a Cossack raid in the Sea of Azov. Murad, perhaps weary of the intrigues at the patriarchate, had Cyril imprisoned and executed on the eve of the Baghdad campaign.¹²⁴

Islam and Empire

Dynastic survival was endangered again when Murad IV died in 1640. Since he had put his three sons to death – two with the Erevan campaign (1635) and the third with the Baghdad campaign (1638) – Murad was succeeded on the throne by his unstable brother Ibrahim. Ibrahim exiled his mother Kösem and executed the grand vezir, but continued on the throne for eight years despite his erratic behavior, largely because the only other male members of the dynasty were his own infant sons.¹²⁵ At length court officials could tolerate Ibrahim no longer, deposed him, and brought back Kösem as regent for six-year-old Sultan Mehmed IV – that is, until Kösem was assassinated at the order of Mehmed's own young mother, Turhan.¹²⁶ The upheaval continued through the first several years of Mehmed's reign, now under Turhan's regency.

During these very chaotic years at court, in late 1644, an incident in the Aegean suddenly offered focus. Maltese pirates attacked an Ottoman pilgrimage ship in the Aegean with several high officials and an enormous treasure on board – the cash remittances of the Holy Cities trusts, under the guard of the chief harem eunuch. He and others were killed in the attack, slaves were taken, and the captured ship and loot were hauled into harbor on the Venetian island of Crete. The enraged Ottoman leadership, grasping at the moment of clarity, demanded immediate punishment and restitution. The Venetian Senate had little control over Maltese piracy and no capacity to meet these demands.¹²⁷ The next spring Ottoman troops landed on Crete, advanced quickly and took Rethymno and Chania and most of the island by 1647.¹²⁸ One lone fortress, Candia, eluded capture. Candia held out for two decades.

Order slowly evaporated in Istanbul as Venice turned the war into a blockade of the Straits. In the fifteen months from May 1655 to October 1656 seven different grand vezirs were appointed and

dismissed, six grand muftis, and five grand admirals. Troops mutinied over debased coinage, and there was a riot over the call to prayer at Fatih mosque. Kadızade's demagogic successor as Friday preacher at Haghia Sophia, whose name was Üstüvani, was blaming the frustration of Candia on the fact that the grand vezir was a Halveti Sufi. Üstüvani, who was rumored to have killed a man in Arabia,¹²⁹ repeatedly incited violence by his irresponsible public rants. Now a mob of peddlers, shopkeepers, and seminarians gathered in the hippodrome, ready for vigilante action against Halveti lodges. In early summer 1656 Venice defeated the Ottoman fleet and seized three islands at the Mediterranean entrance to the Straits, even briefly landing troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Mehmed Köprülü

At this critical juncture Mehmed Köprülü Pasha stepped into the grand vezirate. Over 80 years old, Köprülü embodied stern, old-fashioned discipline. He had come into palace kitchen service as a devshirme youth from Albania and protégé of Hüsrev Pasha the Bosnian. When Hüsrev became Aga of the Janissaries Köprülü went out to provincial service, and when Hüsrev became grand vezir Köprülü returned as his household treasurer. His best political connections were among the Albanians, and his enemies were, with some exceptions, easterners – Abkhazians and Georgians.¹³⁰ Under other Albanian grand vezirs he kept active in politics in a variety of roles: as superintendent of guilds, director of the arsenal, division commander, and provincial governor.

Köprülü made his acceptance of the grand vezir's seal conditional on being granted exclusive powers – not in itself unique,¹³¹ but Köprülü knew how to work the system masterfully. He purged his enemies and put his allies in positions of power, including the grand mufti, chancellor, head treasurer, and janissary aga. He expelled Üstüvani and two other preachers to Cyprus.¹³² He played rival troops off against one another, getting key janissary officials on his side as a check on their rivals, the six regiments. Preparing for the coming campaign against Venice, Köprülü earned some timely support. To commemorate the startling discovery that he, and a certain Sheikh Mehmed, and the sultan too, all shared the Prophet's name (Mehmed being the Turkish form of Muhammad), 101 men began chanting the Koran 1,001 times through, in mosques throughout Istanbul. Meanwhile, ninety-two palace servants named Mehmed continuously chanted the ninety-second chapter of the Koran, *By the night when it sheds its cover; by the night when it shines in splendor*, an utterly unambiguous moral judgment of rewards for good and punishments for evil. Since a guild procession had heralded the reconquest of Baghdad nineteen years earlier, this was repeated.¹³³ The Venetian fleet was defeated, the islands at the Straits were recovered, and

Istanbul celebrated with parades and three days of fireworks.¹³⁴ Köprülü aimed to end the war on Crete with a quick overland strike at Venice itself.

This he could not do alone, however, and once again complications arose, at home of course, but first in the confused politics of Eastern Europe. The Hetman of the Cossacks of the lower Dnieper, whose revolt against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had upset the entire region,¹³⁵ died in 1657. This was no idle concern. Cossack sailors had delivered a shock not long before, crossing the Black Sea to sack Sinop and sailing right into the Bosphorus, plundering the villages along the shore a few miles north of Istanbul. To stabilize the situation, the Ottoman vassal Prince of Transylvania György Rákóczy II took matters into his own hands. He invaded Poland, hoping to capture the Polish crown and create a unified Eastern European kingdom. He failed, yet there were consequences for Köprülü. The other Ottoman vassal prince-governors (*voivodes*) of Moldavia and Wallachia spurned orders to muster against Venice and signed on with Rákóczy instead. Protecting the Ottoman system of tributary vassals on the Black Sea rim meant dealing with the ambitious Rákóczy.

The complication at home came from the usual political divisions. Hasan Pasha, an Abkhazian enemy of Köprülü, defied orders to muster against Rákóczy. Köprülü's Bosnian-Albanian administration, he said, was too absorbed with their Christian allies and feudal politics.¹³⁶ Hasan had come up not in the janissaries but through the six regiments, Köprülü's opponents. During the Venetian campaign Köprülü decided not to muster against Hasan Pasha but to neutralize him, appointing him governor of Aleppo. Hasan made his charge even more explicit, creating an army which he had the effrontery to call *Cunud-ı Muslimîn*, the "Troops of the Muslims." They marched on Bursa, demanding Köprülü's resignation. The sultan rebuked him, and Köprülü added, "If you are true Muslims, join us."¹³⁷ Some were seeing in Hasan the Renewer of the Age, but Köprülü was no more

impressed than he had been with the Kadızade hysteria. He had Hasan and his lieutenants executed at Aleppo in February, 1659.

Sultan Mehmed the Hunter

For the next fifty years the household of Mehmed Köprülü dominated Ottoman politics – two sons, two sons-in-law (one of whom had been his slave), a nephew, the chief of staff of one son, and two members of the household of a son-in-law all became grand vezir.¹³⁸ A physical relocation paralleled the shift of power from palace to grand vezir's office. After fire damaged the palace in 1665 and the court was displaced to Edirne, the divan began the practice of meeting in the suite of the grand vezir, in gardens across the street from the palace in Istanbul.

The era's stability was the product of an odd alliance, court and Kadızadeli, sealed with a Köprülü grand vezir. Sultan Mehmed IV reigned for nearly forty years, the longest reign of any Ottoman sultan except Süleyman the Magnificent – and he liked the comparison. With no apparent sense of irony, Mehmed got a fetva officially declaring himself a gazi. He made his mark in courtly culture, where his legendary indolence was transformed first into virtue, in the metaphor of hunting as warfare by other means, and then into piety. If for his uncle Murad IV it was the use of force that allowed conservatives to think he was one of them, for Mehmed IV it was religion. In Mehmed IV and his mother Turhan, the Kadızadeli had a team of true believers. And in Grand Vezir Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü, Mehmed Köprülü's son, they had a Kadızadeli who was a Köprülü. He had been steered away from an ulema career into politics by his father. As grand vezir, Fazıl Ahmed declaimed against coffee, tobacco, wine, rakı, and other popular pleasures, and called for segregation of the sexes outside the home.¹³⁹ Whether or not enforcement was real or even possible, in the rough and tumble of urban chatter such pronouncements mattered.

To many Ottomans the superficiality of Kadızadeli morality was matched by its hypocrisy. In the prosperous times the populist social concerns that originally propelled the Kadızadeli movement could be

forgotten, and what remained were its narrow obsessions – sex and alcohol, music and dance. Mehmed IV was a lover and patron of the arts, including secular arts, and admired and employed non-Muslim musicians at court.¹⁴⁰ Yet, for court chaplain, Fazıl Ahmed brought in Vani Mehmed, a Kadızadeli preacher from the Caucasus. Vani was, in the words of the English envoy John Covel, “an old huncht-back man, very gray, a crabb’d countenance.”¹⁴¹ Already owners of large tracts of land in the east, Vani and his twelve sons gorged themselves on gifts of property and investments around Bursa after entering court service. At the same time, they fulminated against the immorality of Ottoman troops in Crete. Kadızadelis refused even to perform funeral prayers for Muslims who did not satisfy their standards of orthodoxy.¹⁴² And inevitably, the righteous fail to live up to their own requirements. Individual tragedy reached the palace itself when Fazıl Ahmed, grand vezir for fifteen years, died of complications from alcoholism.¹⁴³ As he had embodied the Köprülü–Kadızadeli coalition, so he embodied its contradictions.

As the war dragged on and Candia stood firm, war and resistance sank into the Ottoman identity. Conversion became a trend, then a movement. The Ottoman court got behind it. Numbers of Greek Christians on Crete entered Islam and joined the Ottoman auxiliaries, and the janissary corps, to take part in the fighting against Venice.¹⁴⁴ Interfaith debate seemed analogous to warfare – victory and conversion two sides of the same coin. As conquered sites were being converted, churches into mosques,¹⁴⁵ so also people, in public spectacles. Ceremonies were held at the divan, and gifts showered on the converts – new robes, cloaks, white turbans, and coin purses. The public treasury took over the gift giving and the bureaucracy documented everything.¹⁴⁶ The royal chaplain Vani excelled at debate. The Englishman Covel reported that after a long discussion with Sir Thomas Baines, physician of the English, Vani “bad him welcome, desired more frequent converse, assuring him all security and freedome.” Covel’s Ottoman Christian interpreter confided that he

himself felt no such freedom.¹⁴⁷ With religion more about identity and belonging than any kind of inner transformation, a default cultural chauvinism now acquired political expediency, and conduct of the war on Crete made it that much harder to credit the value of anything with perceived Christian origins, such as the new science.



Figure 4.4: Scene from the Turkish Harem. This painting of women in an Ottoman home was done by three Austrian artists in the suite of the Habsburg ambassador. In the large canvas (1.9 x 1.3 meters), dated 1654, the painters paid homage to the Ottoman miniature style, with its upper and lower panels, its two-dimensionality, and limited use of perspective. The women's costumes and musical instruments, and the room furnishings, are shown in lavish detail. The German caption in the top-left corner reads, "As it is not customary for distinguished Turkish ladies to leave the house or meet strangers, they invite each other to their homes and amuse themselves with dance, comedy, and similar forms of entertainment."

The painting is now in the Pera Museum, Istanbul. Used by permission of Art Resource, New York.

Candia finally capitulated in 1669. The conquest of Crete meant

an entirely Ottoman Aegean. Fazıl Ahmed had a cadastral survey done and issued a law code, both anachronisms deliberately invoking the memory of Süleyman. In fact the regime created for Crete was diametrically opposed to Süleyman's system, with private property, revenue contracting, and canonical Islamic rural taxes. Timars were given out, mostly as compensation to the local irregulars, but within a few years these too were converted to iltizam contracts for Istanbul investors.¹⁴⁸ And now that the last Latin holdout of the Crusader era had fallen and the island's Venetian Roman Catholic community left, the Ottoman patriarchate set about organizing the Orthodox, with an archbishopric and seven bishops on the island. Local Greek monks, however, who had run things on their own under Venetian rule, did not find that their interests necessarily coincided with those of the patriarchate and the Greeks of Istanbul.¹⁴⁹

Mehmed IV put an exclamation point on Ottoman triumph three years later. When the Polish General Jan Sobieski tried to resolve the muddle in Eastern Europe the sultan personally led the capture of Kamianets, playing gazi to perfection in wonderful imperial theater. The Province of Podolia was created, complete with a cadastral survey and an appointed beylerbeyi. With that, the Ottoman Empire reached its greatest geographical expanse ever.

Sabbatai Sevi

Of all the conversions of the age the most intriguing involved the Jewish mystic Sabbatai Sevi of Izmir.¹⁵⁰ Sabbatai Sevi had a traditional Jewish education. He taught kabbalah and drew young students in with his understanding of God's mysterious outward manifestations. But he was a strange man. There were cycles of euphoria and melancholia.¹⁵¹ He married twice but consummated neither. He publicly pronounced the Tetragrammaton, the holy name of God, a sacred transgression, and was condemned and banned by the rabbis. Then he created a scandal in Salonika, marrying himself to a Torah scroll. He proclaimed atonement for the sins of Israel by his personal celebration of all the three pilgrimage festivals in a single week. After the great Istanbul fire of 1660 Sabbatai traveled among Jewish communities in Izmir, Egypt, Tripoli, and finally Palestine. In Egypt he married again, a beautiful girl this time not a scroll, named Sarah, "the messiah's consort," who had a reputation for witchcraft and sexuality both promiscuous and pure.

In a transcendent moment in Gaza in May 1665, a prominent kabbalah scholar, Nathan of Gaza, recognized Sabbatai from a vision. He interpreted Sabbatai's suffering as the advent of the Kingdom of God. While Jerusalem rabbis put him out, common people joyfully embraced Nathan of Gaza's proclamation of the messiah. The name of Sabbatai Sevi was read in the prayers instead of the sultan; the calendar of the new dispensation began; liberation from the dominion of the sons of "Edom and Ishmael" was at hand.¹⁵² News spread rapidly, within the Ottoman Jewish subculture and abroad, even as far as Amsterdam and Hamburg. At Hanukkah in Izmir Sabbatai and a throng of believers seized the Portuguese synagogue and drove his opposition into hiding. He read the Torah from a printed book, to spontaneous outbursts of prophesy and visions, and appointed rulers of the new Kingdom.

Government intervention loomed. The kadı of Izmir seems not to

have made a move, but Ottoman courthouse records are missing,¹⁵³ having probably perished in the Izmir fire of 1922.¹⁵⁴ Besides complaints of libertine behavior, a riot had broken out in Istanbul when Sabbatai replaced the fast of the Ninth of Ab – commemoration of the destruction of the First and Second Temples – with a feast for the Birth of the Messiah, his own birthday. His arrival in Istanbul was anticipated with a mixture of feverish excitement and rabbinic chagrin. When a winter storm delayed him, street wags heaped abuse on Jews, mocking their new greeting, *Geldi mi?* “Has he come?” and making up derisive little ditties.¹⁵⁵ Forced into harbor at Gallipoli by the storm, Sabbatai Sevi was arrested by Ottoman authorities and imprisoned in Gallipoli fortress. Poor pilgrims flocked to him by the thousands, many disguising themselves as Armenians to escape ridicule by Turks.¹⁵⁶ The controversy was everywhere throughout the Ottoman Jewish communities, in Salonika, Edirne, Buda, Sarajevo, Baghdad, Kurdistan, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen.¹⁵⁷

Shortly Sabbatai was summoned to the Edirne palace, where a group of officials interrogated him, among them the grand mufti, the chief of Istanbul security, and Vani Efendi. Ottoman records of this event have not been found, and surviving Christian and Jewish accounts differ in the details.¹⁵⁸ He was denounced by a Polish kabbalah devotee who had debated with him for three days in Gallipoli. He declined to produce a miracle on demand. Offered conversion or death, he entered Islam. He took the name Mehmed, the Prophet’s name, and the sultan’s. He accepted the rank of gatekeeper, with a stipend.

Astonishment, confusion, and disillusionment clouded the whole of the Jewish diaspora for a very long time. Some gleefully scorned those who had been taken in; others let it pass in gracious silence. Everywhere the rabbinic leadership toiled to manage the fallout. Nathan of Gaza, after visiting Sabbatai in Edirne, spent several months traveling quietly among Jewish communities in Thrace, Macedonia, along the Dalmatian coast, and in the Italian peninsula. Himself

condemned, Nathan affirmed the necessity of the messiah's sojourn among the Unbelievers, seeing in apostasy a final renunciation of law and tradition – and a prelude to final glory. Sabbatai lived the last ten years of his life among a small group of followers who also converted, a sect in the making, teaching and sometimes preaching. He died in exile in Dulcigno, on the Adriatic coast, in 1676.

Entangled in its own imagery, the Ottoman regime could not see the irony of Sabbatai Sevi's life. So invested in religious boundary enforcement that it could even invent a bureaucratic process to document shahada, the court now celebrated a convert whose core message was that the power of law is broken by breaking the law, that only in sin can be found the space for grace and mercy.

The Vienna Campaign and Aftermath

A few years before the century ended, Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa Pasha assembled the Ottoman army at Edirne for a northern campaign. The Habsburg emperor, Leopold I, had no interest in a Turkish war and in fact wanted to renew the most recent peace, signed in 1664. The mufti's fetva forbade attacking an enemy who was trying to make peace. But the Ottoman leadership, wanting to support a Protestant rebellion against Leopold in Hungary, readied an assault on Vienna.¹⁵⁹ Vani Mehmed, who had just finished writing a blatantly militant Koran commentary, was taken along to harangue the troops.

The Ottoman army arrived at Vienna on 14 July 1683 and laid siege, the Tatar cavalry raiding the whole area as far as the edge of Bavaria. After two months the walls seemed about to be breached,¹⁶⁰ when twenty thousand Polish troops under the command of Jan Sobieski appeared to relieve the city. On 12 September Sobieski dealt the Ottoman army a catastrophic defeat. The Ottoman camp, including hundreds of documents and registers and the grand vezir's very tent (now on display in a Vienna museum) fell captive as the Turkish troops turned and ran. A month later Habsburg forces took Esztergom, on the Danube bend, 30 miles from Buda.

The court laid blame all around – on the Tatar cavalry for not preventing Sobieski from crossing the Danube; on the Hungarian Protestant rebels; on the partying and prostitutes in the Ottoman camp; on Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa – his execution in Belgrade in December deprived the army of its most capable commander. Some thought the blame should fall on the sultan himself, whose public piety and gazi pretensions masked extravagance and puerile interests. He had forfeited the lands of Islam to infidel kings and brought disrepute on Islam.¹⁶¹ Vani Mehmed was banished to Bursa, where he died on his family estate. The Queen Mother, Turhan, had already died while the army was away. Severe drought and famine in 1686

was followed by a winter so extremely cold that the Golden Horn froze over again. Buda fell in September, and then Belgrade. Athens too succumbed to a Venetian siege. A full reversal of storied victories came with defeat at Nagyharsány, just 20 miles from Mohács, at the hands of Eugene of Savoy in the fall of 1687. Public patience wore thin, the army mutinied, another grand vezir was executed, and in the last year of the century Mehmed IV was dethroned in favor of his brother Süleyman II.¹⁶²

A Century's Reckoning

The Ottoman dynasty had survived its boy emperors, and yet the eleventh Islamic century ended as it had begun, with war in Eastern Europe. Fiscal restructuring had enabled a broad prosperity and strong Ottoman military achievement until the latter Vienna campaign, but the loss revealed underlying social contradictions. One was the need to reimagine the purpose of the tribute-paying vassals in Eastern Europe, and along the western Black Sea from the Danube to the lower Dnieper, as something more than a launching place for plunder and slaving in the Cossack steppe.¹⁶³ By contrast with the European frontier, the Persian border had been quiet since the treaty of 1639. This was an indication that the weight of Ottoman strategic concern had shifted westward, yet Ottoman societal eyes seemed afflicted with astigmatism. Public discourse was badly misleading. The Kadızadelis were not prone to second-guessing their role in the world or questioning the idea that the Ottoman Empire was essentially a Muslim nation. The court's underwriting of the conversion movement during the more than twenty-year siege of Candia had cast the war as a straightforward victory of Islam over Christianity, yet the frustration of the Greek Christian leaders of Crete towards the patriarchate in Istanbul showed that it was not nearly so black and white or so simple.

It would be unfair to let the dramatic difference in the dynasty's public religious persona stand as the symbol of the century, from Murad III's mystical ecumenism at the beginning of the century to Mehmed IV's aggressive exclusivism at the end. It is perhaps a better summary to say that the Köprülü-Kadızadeli alliance – a coalition of Ottoman east and Ottoman west, however uneasy – had allowed some healing of the deep social chasm exposed by the assassination of Osman II. The Kadızade controversy had happened, and it was seismic. Yet it had not gone without censure. One of the more caustic (and colorful) of the palace's critics was a charismatic Sufi master

named Niyazi-i Mısri. Like Sabbatai Sevi, Mısri had a prophet's penetrating sense of God's presence in the everyday¹⁶⁴ and, like Sabbatai Sevi, his scandalous personal conduct announced his radical rejection of the established order.¹⁶⁵ He was the pole of the earth, he said, the Kaaba itself. He was persecuted; the sultan's agents had violated his own household. Personal illness and paranoia aside, these unusual claims might be read as a parable of the ruin of Ottoman values. It was not just that military defeat discredited the project of conquest and conversion at century's end. It was that this project itself misconstrued the Ottoman dynasty's providential purpose, to bring about the worldly conditions for an encounter with Divine Wholeness.

Notes

- 1 Suggested by Fleischer's comments in "Mustafa 'Âlî's Curious Bits of Wisdom," 107–9.
- 2 Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," in Baldauf and Faroqhi, eds., *Armağan: Festschrift für Andreas Tietze*, 89–111.
- 3 The list was published by Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 99–103.
- 4 Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 103.
- 5 Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 109–10.
- 6 Cook, *Population Pressure*.
- 7 White, *Climate of Rebellion*, 140–62.
- 8 Fine, *When Ethnicity Did Not Matter*, 216–19.
- 9 Ágoston, "Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet"; for a year-by-year summary of the military action see Finkel, *Administration of Warfare*, 7–20.
- 10 Griswold, *Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 27.
- 11 Recent research is summarized by Özel, "Reign of Violence," in Woodhead, ed., *The Ottoman World*, 184–202.
- 12 Aşık Paşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 267; Lutfi Pasha, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, 283, 331.
- 13 Griswold, *Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 38.
- 14 Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," 124, and 348 note 175.
- 15 I owe the point and wording to Virginia Aksan.
- 16 Tezcan makes this argument, "Searching for Osman," 240–58;

for the example of Baghdad, Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 118–23.

17 Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, chart p. 45.

18 Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 163–65.

19 Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 169–72.

20 Goffman, *Izmir*.

21 The unpublished document is in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul (the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Ruznamçe no. 46, p. 420, entry 1, dated 17 June 1576.

22 See Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Ruznamçe no. 46, p. 418, dated 15 June 1576.

23 Yılmaz, ed., *Topçular Kâtibi*, vol. I, p.321.

24 Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, vol. 2, 235.

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The Global and the Local, 1688–1785

At the turn of the twelfth Islamic century the royal household and all Ottoman society grappled with defeat in Central Europe and considered the condition of the empire. Two perspectives clashed during the relatively short reigns of Süleyman II and Ahmed II, and came to a head in the reign of Mustafa II. In one perspective, the Ottoman Empire belonged to the House of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), whose great civilization stood against unbelief in an irreconcilable conflict with the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*). The other perspective, however, found such distinctions hard to pin down in reality. International finance crossed borders, borne by the vessels and in the hands of an international brotherhood of merchants, and also ideas and pathogens and more. No boundary was impermeable. It was not just that the global affected the local – even more, the global was already present in the local. Each small instance manifested a general reality.

Box 5.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Twelfth Islamic Century

Süleyman II 1687–91

Ahmed II 1691–95

Mustafa II 1695–1703

Ahmed III 1703–30

Mahmud I 1730–54

Osman III 1754–57

Mustafa III 1757–74

Abdülhamid I 1774–89

Defeat and Victory

For a champion of the first perspective, one need look no farther than Sultan Mustafa II, who announced his aim to march into battle against the Unbelievers. Striking a pose not unlike Mehmed IV, he would reclaim the initiative of the sultan in Ottoman social life, he would push back encroaching irreverence and immorality. As before, this depended on the double helix of military glory and legalistic piety, the very caricature of kanun and sharia. And, as before, it foundered on military defeat. Not that militaristic piety was unique to the Ottomans. Fighting on four fronts, they faced a coalition known as the “Holy League.”¹ Habsburg delegates at the court of Saint Petersburg exhorted the Orthodox, “Fight for the Cross of Christ! ... Occupy Constantinople where your Patriarch is forced to be a guest ... Regain your seat of your Church where now idols reign.”²

Mustafa II rejected peace and marched with his troops into battle, elated by discovery of the Sword of David, puffed up by a prophecy of victory delivered by a Christian convert.³ Disaster followed. In the sultan’s absence the fortress of Azak (Azov) fell to Peter the Great in 1696; in his presence Eugene of Savoy surprised the Ottomans as they crossed the Tisza River at Zenta in September 1697 and dealt them a crushing defeat. Habsburg forces decimated the Vojvodina, raided deep into Bosnia, and sacked Sarajevo.

The Karlowitz Controversy

The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed on January 26, 1699, settled the war, with the addition of a separate, bilateral agreement with Russia.⁴ All Ottoman lands in the Carpathian basin and Transylvania were lost to the Habsburg Empire, except Temesvár. Podolia and the fortress of Kamianets were lost to Poland. The Morea and parts of the Dalmatian coast were lost to Venice. Russia kept Azov. Although the Ottoman diplomats, Rami Mehmed, head of the chancery, and the court translator Iskerletzade Alexander (a.k.a. Mavrocordatos), a Greek Orthodox Christian from the Phanariot aristocracy of Istanbul, negotiated with skill, forcing Habsburg evacuation of Temesvár and Polish withdrawal from Moldavia, such consolations did little to soften the impact of the military debacle.

Feelings of loss after Karlowitz affected all layers of Ottoman society. If Mustafa II stood for the House of Islam perspective on the empire, with its sharp cultural edges and moral clarity, Karlowitz was his undoing. The court historian Naima narrated the controversy about a Muslim ruler ceding territory.⁵ It had happened before, but this was a permanent loss with no expectation of recovery, with fixed boundaries that the sultan had agreed to enforce in an institutionalized peace settlement. To those espousing the House of Islam–House of War dichotomy, this seemed unconscionable. Practically, moreover, Tatars and other semi-nomadic groups who lived by the ideal of the free raid for plunder saw in Karlowitz a government rationale for cracking down on their movements, the better to tax them and monitor their theological deviance. In response the treaty's defenders cited famous precedents from history, including peace with the crusaders after the fall of Jerusalem, and the Prophet Muhammad's peace with the pagan city fathers of Mecca.

The financial, religious, and military aristocracy of Istanbul backed the treaty. They preferred the climate of fiscal and social accommodation that revenue contracting symbolized. Yet they had

other reasons for wanting Mustafa II gone, and it was they who lay behind the rebellion that overthrew him in 1703. The armorer corps, ordered to Georgia, mutinied in Istanbul. The janissaries joined, and a coalition quickly formed that included other divisions of the standing army, many in the ulema, the households of leading government pashas and vezirs, and large numbers of merchants and artisans of Istanbul.⁶ Their two public demands were, first, dismissal of the chief mufti, Feyzullah Efendi, and second, return of the sultan and his court to Istanbul. By living in Edirne the sultan and Feyzullah and his cronies had damaged the financial position of the merchants and artisans, laborers, and service providers of Istanbul; and Feyzullah, the son-in-law of the Kadızadeli court chaplain Vani, had built his own household dynasty. For grand vezir the rebels touted a Köprülü client who was one of the peacemakers at Karlowitz. The coup of 1703 thus signaled victory for the financial circles of the capital and their vision of empire.

The Danubian Principalities

Subsequent Ottoman military moves offered some reassurance. Having lost Azov, Istanbul closely monitored Muscovy's transition into the Russian Empire under Peter the Great. King Charles XII of Sweden accepted Ottoman asylum after his defeat by Peter, and in 1711 he, together with Ottoman armies and the Crimean Tatars, made a coordinated attack. The goals were to restore Ottoman border fortifications from the Black Sea to Belgrade and to re-establish the damaged Ottoman role in Wallachia and Moldavia (now usually called collectively the Danubian Principalities).⁷ A massive Ottoman force crossed the Danube, surrounded Peter's army at the Prut River, and won a stunning victory. In the settlement the Ottomans regained Azov and drove Russia from the Black Sea. In Moldavia and Wallachia native princes who had supported Peter were replaced with Ottoman-appointed governors, chosen from among the Phanariot Greek aristocrats of Istanbul.

Following on the successful Prut campaign, Ottoman armies attacked Venice, easily retaking the Morea with the support of Orthodox inhabitants who had suffered under Roman Catholic Venetian rule. The patriarch in Constantinople threatened excommunication on anyone assisting Venice. After Habsburg forces under Eugene of Savoy defeated the Ottoman army at Petervardein, however, Temesvár and western Wallachia were lost. Prince Eugene besieged Belgrade, fought off the Ottoman relief force, and captured the city. With the Peace of Passarowitz (1718) the Ottoman loss of the Carpathian basin was complete.⁸

Fiscal Reform

Despite defeat, the Ottoman government undertook fiscal reforms that meanwhile ushered in a long period of prosperity in Ottoman society, with Istanbul as its unchallenged political, financial, and cultural center.

The reforms were implemented piecemeal over several decades. Going back to the Crete war, military needs had shown the limitations of the *iltizam* structure of short-term borrowing through leased tax collection on three-year terms. A new legal compilation (1673), concerned with land tenure, inheritance, and taxation, had distilled sultanic decrees with the legal opinions (*fetvas*) of great jurists such as Celalzade (d. 1567), Ebu's-Suud (d. 1574), Yahya (d. 1644), Mehmed Baha'i (d. 1654) to redefine canonical terms for new times.⁹ Note that all of these were Ottoman jurists of the previous century and a half, not Arab theologians of the Middle Ages. In 1677 the Ottoman government had instituted an intercalendral correction to address the budgetary implications of the solar-lunar misalignment.¹⁰ And the positive commercial climate, for example in the urban real estate market, had Ottoman authorities pondering the further potential of domestic capital.¹¹

Midway through the war of 1683–99 that ended at Karlowitz, the treasury announced an auction of certain imperial revenues to contractors on a lifetime lease. It was a bold step. Such life-term tax farms, called *malikane*, had no precedent in traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Yet they proved to be a durable solution to the government's long-term credit needs.¹² Tax reform, implied in the 1673 legal codification and now implemented with the new financial instruments, reassured potential investors. They as much as the government would benefit from accurate assessment. New provincial surveys were taken. Non-Muslim populations, liable for the *cizye* tax, were enrolled in registers with the hope of eliminating inconsistencies

in applying this canonical levy.¹³ The government also made the move to a solar-year calendar (spring to spring) for salary payments, while revenue–expenditure calculations were kept on the lunar year.¹⁴

Central government auctions were held annually in Istanbul or Edirne, with bidding open to Muslim males. The highest bidder received a charter in exchange for a substantial deposit and several years' expected profits. The charter granted him exclusive rights to collect the tax, provided he made specified annual payments to the treasury. Contracts could be subleased, divided into shares, and traded privately. Though non-Muslims were barred from bidding, they were indispensable to the operation of the whole system, since few investors had the resources to enter the bidding market without loans from local bankers (called *sarrafs*), most of whom were non-Muslims. *Sarrafs* loaned the funds for down payments on the contracts and acted as accountants and agents in the market for shares and other financial instruments based on them. Ties between Ottoman Jewish, and Greek and Armenian Christian, families and the banking houses of Central Europe ensured that the Ottoman system was linked to the financial environment of the European subcontinent.¹⁵

Lifetime tax farming changed central government power, though it did not mean a total loss of it. Contractors and the central government forged important bonds through the charters; and each side had the means to protect its prerogatives.¹⁶ Exclusive collection rights insulated contractors from interference by local authorities, a serious handicap to investors under the older system. Their heirs could inherit the contract by repaying the initial deposit. The central government tweaked the system with regulations to curb abuses and to deal with unforeseen developments.¹⁷ It could and did step in, for example to demand additional payment from contractors when it found that it had undervalued contracts, or to change the rules, or even to rescind contracts altogether and reissue bids. This happened, for example, during the war of 1715–18. An accession tax was imposed when a new sultan took the throne. Excessive splitting of

shares was prohibited so that the government could limit the number of agents it dealt with, and the government officially certified the bankers who conducted this business. To be awarded a contract, a successful bidder was required to have the backing of one of these government-approved guarantors.

Investor interest was robust despite the level of government intervention. Envisioned initially for agrarian revenues, the *malikane* process was widened to cover a range of taxes and customs revenues, including market and guild dues, excise duties, the lease of offices, and village and tribal taxes throughout the empire. As it developed, most of the investors were family “firms.”¹⁸ They used these new instruments to diversify their portfolios, which might also include urban real estate and *vakıf* trusts. Many held shares in several tax farms in various regions, distributed among relatives and clients. Widely available credit, including installment loans,¹⁹ lubricated the system, with explicit ratification by new Islamic legal rulings. Bills of credit, guaranteed by the central treasury, circulated throughout the empire and internationally too, with French and Italian merchants. Treasury capacity to back the system was strengthened with a new Ottoman silver coin, the *kuruş*, the first successful native coin since the demise of the *akçe*. A new gold coin appeared as well.²⁰ In fact the lending capital of many of the Armenian *sarrafs* of Istanbul came from their investments in the silver and gold industries of Karaman province. The chief moneychangers at the customs of Istanbul, Izmir, Salonika, Aleppo, and Cairo were all Armenians, as was the director of the Istanbul mint.²¹

Provincial Networks

At the revenue contract auctions in Istanbul and Edirne, wealthy Istanbul household firms dominated the process. Vezirs, army officers, palace officials, senior administrators, members of their staffs, and their extended patronage networks took away most of the prizes. Even in a place as far away as Aleppo, more than three-quarters of the wealth invested in revenue contracting was held by officials connected in one way or another with Istanbul.²²

This created another level of competition, and not a little resentment, in the provinces. As the imperial treasury expanded its staff of salaried officials in the provinces, appointments that promised even a tiny government stipend were highly sought after and jealously guarded. They meant connections and increased odds of winning contracts.²³ The original decree establishing the malikane process criticized abuses under the old system, accusing provincial collectors and agents of taking advantage of the limited-term iltizams to maximize short-term profits at the expense of residents. But while the new system did aim to counter the power of provincial elites, the central government had no wish to totally shut them out of the process. Thus it lured local entrepreneurs by letting them control local revenues, which were anyway not as lucrative and harder for outsiders to collect. These kinds of revenues were leased at auctions held in provincial centers,²⁴ with great regional variety as to which and how many revenues were converted to life-term. Local investors also were called on to provide seed, credit, and other services to villagers. In targeted areas such as Karaman and Rum, the upper Tigris and Euphrates, and Syria, the new system stimulated a commercial boom. Rural investment remained low by comparison, even in places like Bursa,²⁵ and in Europe between the Black Sea and the Adriatic less than a quarter of existing iltizam contracts were converted to life-term.²⁶ The players in the provinces included janissaries; bazaar merchants and artisans and their household members, including wives

and concubines, and sons and daughters and slaves; Christian clergy and Jewish rabbis; Muslim ulema, Sufi masters, and disciples; the titled aristocracy of seyyids (Descendants of the Prophet); and even foreign merchants.²⁷

The “capitulations,” or limited exemptions and extraterritoriality held by select foreign merchant communities, became significant advantages under these circumstances. Of little import when granted, a century or more ago to a tiny group of English and French merchants, they had been extended to Ottoman clients, agents, and proxies of the foreigners over time. In places such as Aleppo and Izmir, where foreign communities were larger now and more financially powerful, especially the joint stock companies, these privileges left a growing segment of commercial activity outside of Ottoman purview. Ottoman authorities expressed concern and launched investigations to verify that the Ottoman subjects who claimed these advantages were in fact employees and clients of the foreign merchants. Even if they were, most prominent Christian and Jewish families also took care to build alliances with Muslim merchant families, whose connections to the revenue-contracting process in Istanbul were of great value.²⁸

Dynastic Disruption

The financial reforms positioned the empire to benefit from greater integration in an emerging global commercial system, but at the same time left it vulnerable to global disruptions. Ottoman accounting shows that the reforms produced a budget surplus and remarkable stability for twelve years in the council under Grand Vezir Nevşehirli Damad Ibrahim Pasha. Depending on the vantage point, it was a time of great flowering of the arts, or of frivolity and gross disparities of wealth,²⁹ symbolized for better or worse by a popular craze for tulips and by Ibrahim Pasha's magnificent Sadabad Palace on the Golden Horn. The era ended in unrest that brought the execution of Ibrahim Pasha and the abdication of Sultan Ahmed III in 1730. These events were closely tied to dramatic changes beyond Ottoman borders that reverberated worldwide and for a very long time.

Fall of the Safavid and Mughal Houses

Within the decade preceding the abdication of Ahmed III, political crises engulfed neighboring Iran and India and brought down both the ruling Safavid and Mughal dynasties. These two storied Turkic Muslim houses, rulers of empires of vast wealth, collapsed suddenly and almost simultaneously. The Safavid crisis began when Ghalzay Afghans seized Qandahar in 1709. The Afghans inflicted a series of defeats on the Safavid army, culminating in an invasion of Iran and the capture of Isfahan after a long siege in 1722. The Safavid shah was overthrown and most of his family massacred. In Mughal India, the aged Emperor Aurangzeb died in 1707. Aurangzeb was so old that his son and successor, Bahadur Shah, was already 65 years old and sat on the throne for only five years before he too died. Two succession wars in such a short span of time paralyzed the Mughal central government.



Figure 5.1: Prosperity and natural beauty. This detail of a fresco shows the rural landscape and country estates outside Edirne. The fresco covers the inner surface of the dome of a small kiosk, on a bridge over the Tunca River.

The disintegration of Safavid authority alarmed its neighbors. Peter the Great sent a huge army to the west coast of the Caspian in July 1722, as the Afghan siege of Isfahan was ongoing. The Russian landing was not without local Georgian and Armenian support, but the tsar had to withdraw due to the threat of an armed Ottoman response, not to mention the extreme heat and disease that took the lives of a third of the Russian force. The Ottomans found themselves in the awkward position of supporting restoration of the Shiite Safavids against the conventionally Sunni Ghalzays. Although many Ottomans preferred maintaining peace with Iran in the interests of trade, and the Afghans' leader enjoyed great respect among many Ottoman Muslims, others thought the prospect of controlling the Caucasus too enticing to let pass. Afghan proposals for peace were turned down in Istanbul with tortured theological justifications and, after a secret agreement with Russia, the Ottoman army invaded the next year. It occupied large sections of the Caucasus and brought a huge windfall of Georgian, Circassian, and Abkhazian slaves into Ottoman service. Peter the Great died not long after.

The Ottoman invasion penetrated deeper into Iran than Ottoman troops had ever gone. Although they eventually met defeat at Khurramabad, on the route across the Iranian plateau to Isfahan, their Caucasus conquests were confirmed in exchange for recognizing Afghan rule. Political turmoil continued in Iran nonetheless. Pledging a Safavid restoration, the Turkmen warlord Nadir Khan defeated the Afghans and gradually extended his authority. In 1730 Nadir marched north, undid most of the recent Ottoman gains in the Caucasus, and took Tabriz.³⁰ It was this news, which reached Istanbul in July as the Ottoman army sat encamped at Üsküdar poised for a march to Persia, that sparked the rebellion that overthrew Ahmed III.

Meanwhile India descended into political chaos as various dynastic factions and their imperial candidates thrust themselves

forward. Aurangzeb's son Bahadur Shah, and three of his grandsons, all briefly held the throne in the mere dozen years after Aurangzeb's death. Under this extreme stress the Mughal Empire fractured and regional successor states appeared under Hindu and Muslim noble dynasties in different parts of the subcontinent. Emperor Muhammad Shah (1720–48) ruled a rump Mughal state around Delhi, completely dominated by his ostensible vassal, the Nizam of Hyderabad in the Deccan.³¹ So defenseless was the Mughal sultanate that in 1739 Nadir – now wearing the elevated title Nadir Shah – crossed the Hindu Kush and sacked Delhi.

The Patrona Halil Rebellion

The unrest in Istanbul began because news of the fall of Tabriz to Nadir cast the Ottoman campaign into doubt. A demonstration started in the covered bazaar. The main instigator was an Albanian named Patrona Halil, a petty thug who had inaugurated his colorful career, and got his name, some fifteen years earlier with a failed mutiny on a ship called the *Patrona*. The grand admiral thought he seemed useful, spared his life, and made him a janissary. Then he got involved in a garrison revolt in Vidin. After that he faded into the fabric of street hustlers in Istanbul, hanging out in the taverns with other Albanian gang members. He killed a man in a barroom brawl, once again was rescued from death row by the grand admiral, and was currently working for tips in the Bayezid bathhouse. As the bazaar demonstration gathered steam, guildsmen and laborers, Greeks, Armenians, and Muslims alike threw in their lot with the rebels. Having just paid the ad hoc war tax, they were incensed that the campaign might be called off, since it was their only hope of recouping their enforced investment. The rioters broke into jails and released the inmates. Veterans returning from the front signed on too.

Sultan Ahmed III caved in and handed over his chief mufti and grand admiral, and the long-serving Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha, to mob justice. Besides this the rebellion saw little immediate loss of life. Its leaders seemed most interested in flattering themselves with appointments to high office. Patrona Halil, who fancied himself as grand admiral, rode ahead of the new sultan (Mahmud I) in the accession parade, dressed in everyday clothes and in bare feet. Friends and clients enrolled in the janissaries and related corps, the guarantee of a long-term government stipend. But commercial stagnation set in, and unrest continued intermittently over the next two years.³² At length the army grew weary of the rebels' pretensions. The new sultan lured the leaders to a dinner in their honor, where they were captured and executed. Albanians, notorious already back in Evliya Çelebi's day

among the ethnically diverse lot of Istanbul laborers, were watched even more closely now. Now bathhouse managers had to register all their employees, and mark the Albanians in red ink.³³

The Dynastic Ideal

Considering what had happened in Iran and India, it is remarkable that throughout the whole episode the survival of Ottoman rule never seemed in doubt. Despite the grievances of bazaar merchants and the prevalent social resentments among the lower classes of all ethnic and religious groups, somehow articulated by the unlikely Patrona Halil, hardly anyone anywhere seriously considered replacing the Ottomans with other rulers. One factor perhaps was that the existence of several mature candidates for the succession ensured the viability of the dynasty when Ahmed III surrendered the throne. Yet the evident willingness to see the dynasty continue also suggests that the fiscal reforms and innovations of the preceding generation had preserved a reservoir of loyalty among the military and financial stakeholders of the empire, who stood to gain more by keeping the current system than by overturning it.

Dissolution of the old order in Iran and India meant, however, a far-reaching transformation of global relations by which no major power could possibly remain unaffected. The Persian crisis brought Russia and the Ottomans immediately into confrontation in the Caucasus. In this case, due to the death of Peter the Great, the Russian position was somewhat weak. In time, however, with no significant power left in Iran or India, over the course of about a century and a half not just the Caucasus kingdoms but also the great Turkic sultanates of Central Eurasia were swept aside piece by piece by Russian conquest. In India, the unraveling public order drew in the European trading companies, who scrambled to protect their own assets and interests. The British East India Company's militia rapidly conquered Mughal Bengal and, by the end of the Islamic century, built a ramshackle empire that controlled half of India. The conflict between British and French trading companies in India became an aspect of the global Seven Years War (1756–63) and spilled into the eastern Mediterranean also. Enhanced Mediterranean security,

enabled by Ottoman control of Crete, allowed the French and British to greatly expand their activities. Besides Istanbul, the port of Izmir played an increased role because of its access to Ottoman cotton and grain production. Something like 30 percent of French exports to the Ottomans entered at Izmir, and half of Izmir's exports went to Marseilles.³⁴

It was not merely that the charisma of these particular dynasties, Safavid and Mughal, had expired. The principle of dynastic charisma itself, the body in whose bosom Ottoman sovereignty was conceived, to recall the old dream story told by Aşık Paşazade, was dealt a potentially fatal blow. The fall of the Safavid and Mughal dynasties touched intangible political assumptions that had held sway across the western Islamic world since the time of Chinggis Khan and the Mongols. These were charismatic Turkic dynasties, sanctified through links to saintly Sufi lineages in ways very similar to the Ottomans. Babur, founder of the Mughal Empire, was a direct descendant of Tamerlane and in his memoir claimed descent from Chinggis. In the time of Emperor Akbar (d. 1605) a Chishti saint had saved the dynasty with the promise of a son. As for the Safavids, besides the half-forgotten royal houses of the Comneni and Uzun Hasan and the Akkoyunlu Turkmen, they were direct descendants of Shah Ismail and the sheikhs of Ardabil, through whom Safavid legitimacy rested on a lineage that went back to the Seventh Imam.

Rival political ideals, naturally, existed alongside the dynastic ideal, and now took on a greater importance. One was fixed borders. The Ottoman–Safavid relationship, for instance, had evolved towards recognition of territorial boundaries since 1639. Afghan peace feelers to the Ottomans after their capture of Isfahan were based explicitly on mutual territorial inviolability, on the grounds that equal Muslim sovereigns could rule in separate geographic climes. The Ottomans did not reject the reasoning but – building their rationale for invasion – argued instead that natural geographical barriers, such as those separating the Ottomans and Mughals, did not exist between the

Ottomans and Iran. With their victory the Afghans dropped the issue, but the treaty signed by the two sides did provide for regular diplomatic representation and letters of exchange – a kind of mutual recognition.³⁵ Similarly, on the Ottoman northwestern frontier, territorial boundaries had been drawn on maps and marked by posts after Karlowitz. In the late 1730s, Ottoman armies confronted Austrian forces at Vidin and Nish, on the Danube routes to the Black Sea. In the peace of 1739, Belgrade reverted to Ottoman control and the border between the Habsburg and Ottoman lands was fixed at the Una, Sava, and the Danube east to Orsova.³⁶ Vienna and Istanbul both determined that the threat of each to the other was not as great as the threat of Russia and Prussia to both. Austria faced the Prussian “Rape of Silesia,” and its own succession crisis, while, for the Ottomans, Tatar raiding activities on the Russian frontier in the steppe were the greater concern, since they threatened the Crimean Peninsula and Ottoman sovereignty of the Black Sea.

Besides territorial integrity, two alternative concepts of sovereignty to replace the crumbling dynastic ideal can be discerned in Nadir Shah’s negotiations with the Ottomans in the 1730s. Nadir proposed equal relations based, first, on Ottoman recognition of the legitimacy of Twelver Shiism as a fifth school of orthodox Islamic law. And second, he proposed something akin to an ethnic or national concept – equal relations based on Nadir Shah’s identity as a member of the noble Turkmen family of peoples.³⁷

Prosperity and Pathos

It is impossible to estimate Ottoman population numbers at this time with any confidence.³⁸ Since fiscal and military reforms made cadastral surveys no longer needed, they were done quite infrequently and only for specific small districts, and as a result uniform data is lacking. What little usable data does survive from the early 1700s, such as cizye tax records, leave the sense of a demographic trough, hard to explain, between 1600–1750 with some recovery thereafter, and regional variations.³⁹ Anecdotal evidence and data collected much later, in the first Ottoman censuses, tends to reinforce an impression of low overall numbers in comparison to the rest of Europe. It is easy enough to blame the usual suspects – war, disease, famine, natural disasters, and fires.

Fires

In Istanbul as in most Ottoman cities great fires were a topic of local fascination and lore. A Venetian resident noted that “It was customary for the sultan to go to a fire, or to go early in the morning if it had occurred during the night,” to throw coins and otherwise encourage the firefighters.⁴⁰ Istanbul writers made fires a literary topic. An Armenian native of the previous century, Eremya Çelebi, claimed there was a link between Istanbul’s fires and Ottoman military victories over Christians, and wrote a history to prove it.⁴¹ He gave a first-hand account of the devastating 1660 fire. Another fire in 1665 severely damaged Topkapı Palace. One Ottoman diarist recorded 136 fires in Istanbul in the period 1711–35, and twenty-one earthquakes.⁴²

Disease

As for disease, Ottoman cities endured epidemics of one kind or another so often that they become too numerous to mention. Major outbreaks occurred in several cities in 1719–20 (including Istanbul, Aleppo, and Cairo) and in 1733 (Istanbul and Baghdad). European diplomats living in Pera, the district across the Golden Horn from Istanbul proper, reported epidemics almost annually in the 1720s–30s. The plague of 1733 reached into the sultan's palace.⁴³

The mecmua of a Sarajevo writer named Molla Mustafa opens a window on the times. Molla Mustafa owned his own public scribal business in the Sarajevo bazaar, where he employed a couple of secretaries. He also taught classes in an elementary school and worked as imam and mosque preacher. He related many accounts of plague in Bosnia and left detailed stories of two outbreaks.⁴⁴ Omens and signs of plague abound in his journal, and macabre jokes. His dreams portended plague, too, and unusual weather was a bad omen. One time during a snowstorm in Sarajevo a bunch of young boys got a huge snowball fight going in the market and many Jewish and Christian merchants were injured. Such unheard-of disrespect, wrote Molla Mustafa, would surely bring on plague. Another time there were so many judges and apprentices in town, more than he ever remembered, that he was sure an epidemic was coming. In the Istanbul outbreak of 1778 even the dogs sang a dirge – they were heard howling the call to prayer.⁴⁵

The first outbreak of plague he wrote about started in nearby towns and reached Sarajevo in May–June 1762. “It started first on the city's outskirts, among the poor, and did not reach the rich.”⁴⁶ He listed the urban neighborhoods where it appeared, and estimated that over three years some fifteen thousand people died in Sarajevo alone. *O God whose kindness is hidden*, he prayed, *protect us from our fears*. Twenty years later the second outbreak began, on “Ali Day,” forty days after the solstice, in August 1782. Molla Mustafa went around to

all the coffeeshops in town, interviewing people about the epidemic in their neighborhoods. He concluded that about eight thousand people died, including women and children, unbelievers and Jews. “Probably not more,” he wrote, with a hint of local defensiveness, “But if you ask idiots who don’t know anything, they might tell you twenty thousand.”⁴⁷

The following spring, for a month after Saint George’s Day, forty days after the equinox in spring, the two mosques in the marketplace near Molla Mustafa’s office were holding twenty to thirty funeral prayers every day, morning and afternoon.⁴⁸ Services were full, ladies and gentlemen attending in person rather than sending servants. Molla Mustafa lost two of his own daughters. When the sheikh of a leading Sufi lodge lost his son, Molla Mustafa went down to the funeral. A large crowd gathered in the bazaar outside the mosque as Sheikh Osman Dede officiated. “As he began to declare the *Oneness*,” Molla Mustafa wrote, the crowd burst in and attacked him, led by a “perpetually unsmiling” Kadızadeli imam named Molla Ömer, who was screaming, “You pack of Innovaters!” Sheikh Osman Dede, however, “grabbed him by his coarse beard and threw him to the ground, and the congregation chased the fanatics as far as Başçarşıya.”⁴⁹



Figure 5.2: Sarajevo's Ottoman-era old town (Baščaršija), in a stereographic image by the Keystone View Company. The image dates from 1910, two years after the Austrian annexation.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-106349.

Molla Mustafa's journal makes up most of his mecmua. He decided to describe some of the events and history of Sarajevo and Bosnia province. Three extraordinary events in 1757, when he was in his late twenties, motivated him to start it. "As the saying goes," he wrote, "What is written down remains, but what is remembered disappears."⁵⁰ In that year three bandits were publicly executed, ending ten years of unrest in Bosnia; a campaign was launched against Montenegro; and the pilgrimage caravan returning from Mecca was attacked outside Damascus. He kept the journal until 1804–5. It is filled with mundane events, narrated in an intensely colloquial Ottoman Turkish with heavy Slavic vocabulary. Troops are raised locally and sent off to war; a dead tree falls in the garden of the library; a boy kills himself with a gun; a local scumbag and two

buddies foist a hajj scam upon innocents. Two lengthy lists of the deceased of the town make up about 40 percent of the journal – not just those who died of plague but everyone he knew or heard of who died. He kept the lists as a spiritual discipline, he wrote, a meditation on the reality of death in the midst of life. The death of “Sultan Mustafa, emperor of the House of Osman,” appears too, along with all the others, right between a shoe smith and a haberdasher and button maker.

Sufis and Kadızadelis

While the overt Kadızadeli presence at the Ottoman court ended in 1703, and the wave of conversions to Islam tapered off,⁵¹ Kadızadelis did not disappear, as Molla Mustafa's funeral incident shows. Kadızadeli postures often stood out in high relief against traditional Sufi spirituality. There was the Kadızadeli moralizing, obsessed with sexuality and gender roles, family relations, and identity politics. Kadızadelis projected a cultural chauvinism with sharp lines of differentiation. (And, naturally, there were those Muslims who considered even the Kadızadelis too liberal.⁵²)

Yet it was not a matter of simple opposition, Kadızadelis vs. Sufis. Kadızadelis exerted a strong pull on Sufi piety, too, and a more sober religious orientation crept into the contemplative tradition. Fazlızade Ali exemplified the trend. To speak of the "aim" of Sufism would seem to indicate some kind of misunderstanding – Sufism being fundamentally not goal oriented – yet for Fazlızade as for many there was an aim, and the aim was not union with God. It was behavioral perfection. Failure nullified all righteous acts, even if done with innocent intent.⁵³ Ismail Hakkı Bursavi (1653–1725) illustrated another contentious issue.⁵⁴ He wrote more than a hundred works, best known of which were a commentary on the Koran, a commentary on the first several hundred couplets of Rumi's *Mesnevi*, and a commentary on a beloved fifteenth-century biography of the Prophet Muhammad. But his damning of Muhammad's parents and ancestors as unbelieving pagans was an exclusivist, condemning position, better suited to Kadızadelis. The cross-currents between Sufism and Kadızadeli spirituality could be more subtle, too. Each found analogies between interior and exterior behavior compelling, for example, but a traditional Sufi understood inner transformation as leading naturally to a modified lifestyle. With a quick reversal, Kadızadelis turned this insight into rules-oriented religiosity, where godliness could only be produced by strict legal self-policing.⁵⁵

At the same time, classic Sufi masters, even Ibn Arabi, were being popularized in much the same way that theology had been simplified for everyday application by the previous century's preachers. The great scholar Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (1640–1731) vigorously defended the Sufi outlook and practice in more than two hundred works, including commentaries on both Ibn Arabi's *Bezels of Wisdom* and on Birgivi's *Order of Muhammad*.⁵⁶ Bursavi's new commentary on the *Mesnevi* joined two others written in Turkish since the Kadızade explosion in the previous century. One, by Sarı Abdullah (d. 1660), a chancery official, took five volumes just to cover book one (of six). The other was by Ismail Ankaravi (d. 1630), late rector of the Mevlevi lodge in Galata.⁵⁷ Viewing Rumi's epic through the lens of Ibn Arabi, these teachable syntheses reiterated for contemporary readers the very Ottoman consensus that Kadızade and his followers attacked. In Ankaravi's discussion of the famous opening couplets of the *Mesnevi* (see [Box 2.2](#)) the essence of faith is not striving, but expectant waiting. Emptied of self like the hollow flute, Sufis await filling with the breath of God – it is done to them. This is the truth of Islam.⁵⁸

Unavoidably, Ottoman Islam contended with commercial growth.⁵⁹ Wealth and power left a deep imprint, for better and worse, on both the leading ulema families and the sheikhs of the leading Sufi orders and lodges. The diffusion of financial and administrative power going on across Ottoman society was experienced in Ottoman religious life. Membership in Sufi orders filled the void as commercial culture eroded traditional guild structures. Orders and suborders proliferated, in active competition with one another. Aspiring members sought sheikhs, craving holiness while not willing, or – in the case of many women whose husbands resisted – not able, to compromise their lifestyles.⁶⁰ How could it be helped? Sufism was talked about exhaustively, it was popular, it was public, and its paths were well-studied and easily traveled.⁶¹

Times were different, and Ottoman people knew that they did not always share the outlook of their ancestors. The philanthropic

endowments of their own day, though perhaps modest when set next to the stone monuments of past dynasties, filled in the urban spaces. Public fountains, little Sufi lodges, and neighborhood mosques, schools, and even public libraries,⁶² each in its way referenced the same interest in individual transformation. New lodges and hostels were built, the fruit of increased donations and expanded trusts. Some struggled to manage the expectations of wealthy donors, whose gifts often came with expectations of influence. Some orders and sheikhs became concerned about a loosening of rigor in education and training of initiates, of ascetic indiscipline, and in declining cultural standards. New trust charters sometimes stipulated that when the sheikh died he had to be replaced by his son. “Cradle sheikhs,” as these children became known, grew up having all the advantages and disadvantages of inherited wealth and status, with worrying consequences for spiritual life.⁶³ Success was hard to take. If scholarly and legal debates are barometers of the times, stress on rigorous hadith study suggests that one preoccupation was to find a way for piety to embrace wealth and worldliness.

Books, Manuscripts, and Libraries

This spiritual and cultural life, like the commercial revival, was grounded in a widespread literacy, and it did not stop at interfaith boundaries. Hebrew-language printing presses operated in Istanbul, Salonika, and Cairo,⁶⁴ an Armenian-language press in Istanbul. In 1726 an Ottoman Turkish printing press was also founded, by a pair of Istanbul Muslim businessmen. Ibrahim Müteferrika, a Hungarian Unitarian native of Cluj in Transylvania, who had become a Muslim in his youth; and a member of the grand vezir's staff, whose father had led a famous embassy to France. The two partners won the enthusiastic support of the grand vezir, the sultan, and the Mufti of Istanbul. The Müteferrika press knew its audience and its product. Books were expensive to produce, and the Arabic script, cursive by nature, did not lend itself easily to the technicalities of printing. Printing could, however, prove superior under certain conditions. Among its sixteen publications the Müteferrika press concentrated on lengthy, technically difficult titles, and on works of current intellectual interest, especially philology and history. It did not attempt to compete with religious books and the Koran, since most households already either had a nice handwritten copy or could order one cheaply. And some Muslims did object to printing the scriptures, as did some Jews (recall that Sabbatai Sevi had courted condemnation by reading the Torah from a printed book). What Müteferrika did publish, in print runs of five hundred or a thousand, were several multi-volume works, Katib Çelebi's *World Panorama* with its many maps and illustrations, and dictionaries. A qualified success, the Müteferikka Press survived the breakup of the original business partnership and sold more than two-thirds of the copies printed before it folded with Müteferikka's death.⁶⁵ His will left the remaining stock to his daughter.⁶⁶

Demand ensured the continued vitality of the manuscript trade nonetheless, among both Muslims and non-Muslims.⁶⁷ Molla Mustafa

of Sarajevo knew many who were copyists on the side as he was, even a blacksmith and a grocer. Libraries throughout the Ottoman world contain many more manuscripts copied in this period than earlier, in all fields from the sciences to poetry, and probate records show the impressive extent of private manuscript collections in Istanbul, Cairo, Damascus, the Lebanon, and elsewhere. Paper was cheap, a copy of a work could be ordered quickly, and the book-manufacturing guilds could provide a fine appearance and a sturdy binding, good for multiple readings shared among friends. Individual desire, rather than mass marketability, governed production. Molla Mustafa mentioned that a friend of his had produced a manuscript of Vankulı's massive Arabic-Turkish dictionary, a prodigious accomplishment, even decades after it was printed by the Mütfeferikka Press. In the probate inventory of his friend's library, it was listed as his most valuable text.⁶⁸

A great number of independent libraries appeared in Istanbul and elsewhere, even in faraway border fortresses.⁶⁹ The first public library, the Köprülü Library in Istanbul (1661),⁷⁰ was part of the philanthropic complex founded by Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü in honor of his father. Its holdings consisted of Fazıl Ahmed's personal collection and books added by other family members over the next two generations, totaling 2,773 volumes, mostly manuscripts except for 180 printed books. Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's collection of Arabic-language manuscripts, the oldest dating back to the thirteenth century, was especially valuable. Quite a few were anthologies, containing hundreds of popular shorter works, often in multiple copies. Although the collection was strong in the Arabic and Islamic classics, it was also current. Roughly half the holdings were written since the Islamic millennium (1591–92). Nor were books by Christian authors neglected. Among the printed books were a 1568 edition of Andrea Mattioli's Italian commentary on the *Materia Medica* of Dioscorides, several European geographies, including the *Atlas Novus*, the *Atlas Minor*, the *Atlas Curieux*, and the *Atlas Geographica* by Mattheo Leuter,

published in Augsburg in 1720, as well as Ibrahim Müteferrika's edition of Katib Çelebi's *World Panorama*.

Pilgrimage and Commerce

The overlapping domains of religiosity, commerce, and politics can be seen in one of the main events on the yearly calendar, the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. The Ottoman sultans had overseen the pilgrimage since 1517, when the Sharif of Mecca submitted to Selim I after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. Management of the hajj informed the Ottoman domestic and international reputation, and helped ensure commercial prosperity – the pilgrimage was a religious, political, and commercial festival, simultaneously and inseparably.⁷¹



Figure 5.3: The Köprülü Library, Istanbul. The best libraries had their own little buildings with well-ventilated book storage, a reading room, a staff, and a lending system.

The Pilgrimage Ritual

Those who made this journey of a lifetime did so partly to fulfill a sacred obligation, one of the five “pillars” of Islam. Since numbers were never kept it is difficult to say exactly how many people made the pilgrimage to Mecca, but it was never more than a tiny fraction of Ottoman Muslims. The journey was difficult and costly. Casual observers, decades apart, gave estimates of several tens of thousands of pilgrims assembled on the plain of Mina, and the main caravans likely had more than ten thousand camels.⁷² Birgivi began his discussion of the pilgrimage this way in *Last Will and Testament*, quoting the Koranic verse (3: 97), “It is the people’s duty to God to make pilgrimage to [that] house – for those who can make a way to it.”



Figure 5.4: Reading room of the Sultan Bayezid II public library, in a photograph by Abdullah Frères (ca. 1880–93).

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
Abdülhamid II collection, LC-USZ62-81982.

Yet even for this most doctrinaire of Ottoman theologians, who a few pages later could remark, “It is an obligation for every Muslim to know what to do, how to behave, how to lead his life, even if he does not know or consider why,” obligation hardly described the full experience of pilgrimage. Birgivi walked his readers through every ritual step, from the initial ablution, donning the pilgrims’ white

gowns, and declaring intent; to reaching Mecca and entering the sanctuary, seeing the Kaaba, and circumambulating the shrine and touching the Black Stone; running between the Mounts Safa and Marwah; going to Mina; standing in repentance on the Plain of Arafat; stoning the Devil; to re-entering the Kaaba and drinking the water of the sacred well of Zamzam; and finally leaving Mecca to return home. Birgivi took the reader into the inner meaning of the rituals, advising that “the form of any kind of worship is a means to find Truth. If Truth is not found through it, form has no meaning or purpose by itself.”⁷³

Pilgrimage manuals guided Ottoman pilgrims through each of these stages. The genre offered the reading public a version of the pilgrimage by means of devotional literature, whether or not they actually made the journey.⁷⁴ A popular example was *Gift of the Two Sanctuaries* by Nabi, who did make the journey in 1678. He left early, pausing for several weeks in his family home in Urfa before continuing on the main Istanbul–Konya–Adana–Aleppo–Damascus route. From Damascus he went to Cairo, since he had never been there. In Cairo he joined the official pilgrimage caravan. Having longed to undertake the journey since childhood, when he used to hear stories from returning pilgrims, the emotion of seeing the Kaaba overwhelmed him when he finally reached it. He shed tears of spiritual ecstasy. But Nabi’s description was more travelogue than manual. He gave relatively little space to minutiae of the sacred rituals and rather seemed to enjoy the experience of travel, not only the historic mosques and other sacred places but also the coffeehouses of Damascus.⁷⁵

Pilgrimage Politics

Even though no Ottoman sultan ever made the hajj himself, the sultans' presence was keenly felt in Mecca and Medina. Several sultans contributed to architectural remodeling of the holy places. Süleyman rebuilt the six minarets of the main mosque and added a seventh, and built a domed pavilion where the Hanafi rite was celebrated. His four medreses made another quintessentially Ottoman statement. Selim II and Murad III renovated the galleries. The Kaaba was restored from the ground up during the reign of Ahmed I.⁷⁶ Ongoing expenses were funded through the Holy Cities trusts, an endowment of the Valide Sultans.



Figure 5.5: A pilgrimage tile. On their return from Mecca, some pilgrims with means had commemorative tiles of the Kaaba fired, for donation to mosques. The tiles were often placed in the wall next to the mihrab. This one is embedded in the porch wall of the Rüstem Pasha Mosque, Istanbul, to the right of the entrance. It is a diagram of the Kaaba sanctuary. Important spots are labeled, including the Pulpit of the Prophet and stations of the four schools of sharia law. In the center is the Black Stone and the Golden Spout on the roof of the house. The inscription gives the name of the donor, a certain Etmekçizade Mehmed Beşe, and the date 1070 (AD 1659–60).

Muslim rulers abroad expected the Ottoman sultans to discharge their duties as Protectors of the Holy Sanctuaries. The sultans indeed took the responsibility seriously. This meant organizing and protecting travel within Ottoman borders, and subsidizing and overseeing the readiness of Mecca and Medina to host pilgrims. In the 1560s letters reached the Ottoman palace from the Sultan of Aceh (Sumatra) urging action against Portuguese pirates who molested pilgrimage shipping in the Indian Ocean, and from the Khan of Khwarezm when the Muscovite Tsar Ivan IV blockaded the pilgrimage route by his conquest of Astrakhan.⁷⁷ The Ottoman government organized two official caravans annually, each under a commander appointed by the sultan, one embarking from Damascus and the other from Cairo. Pilgrims had to get themselves to one of those two cities from points all around the Muslim world. From the north, from Anatolia, the Balkan Peninsula, the Crimea and beyond, they could join a major caravan that left from Istanbul and reached Damascus via Adana and Aleppo. From Northern Africa as far west as the Atlantic, the aim was to meet in Cairo. Travelers from the east, from all around the Indian Ocean rim, could join others at Basra, or sail up the Red Sea to Jidda, the port of Mecca.

Pilgrims in the caravans funded themselves and carried their own supplies, making for huge discrepancies between affluent pilgrims and

the poor. A number of documents of safe passage survive, mainly issued to great ladies and gentlemen from abroad. Those of lesser means depended on the supply depots stocked by the official caravans at fortified stopping points on the route, fifty-six of them on the Cairo route.⁷⁸ The sultan paid for a charity tent for the indigent. Procurement of these supplies, and beasts of burdens from merchants and contractors, was a major undertaking requiring personal subsidies from the sultan and the two caravan commanders.

The sultans' pilgrimage subsidies also supported the permanent residents of the Holy Cities, partly as a way of offsetting the logistical expenses of the Sharif of Mecca and those who worked with him, and also partly to support scholarship. Besides being the destination of pilgrimage, Mecca and Medina were international centers of learning. Medina was among the great centers of Ibn Arabi study, for example.⁷⁹ Many who came on pilgrimage took the opportunity to stay for months or years of study with the teachers and sheikhs in residence. The influential Indian scholar Shah Wali Allah of Delhi forged his concept of the ideal Islamic society during the fourteen months spent in the Holy Cities in the 1730s. Fanatics, however, did not necessarily find a welcome – another who came, probably at the same time, was Muhammad Ibn abd al-Wahhab, the Hanbali preacher from Arabia whose allegiance to the Emir of the Najd, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, became the source of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance. In the 1740s the Sharif of Mecca had a group of Wahhabis expelled and barred Wahhabi pilgrims.⁸⁰ Wahhabis bore some resemblance to the Kadizadelis, but there were crucial differences. Wahhabis took their teaching from the theologian Ibn Taymiyya of Damascus (d. 1366) and, unlike the Kadizadelis, the Wahhabi movement arose outside of Ottoman domains and was fundamentally anti-Ottoman. Even allowing for the cultural distance between Istanbul and the Arabia peninsula, Ottoman authorities took Wahhabi disputation and intolerance as a kind of cultural betrayal.

Egypt, Damascus, and the Commerce of the Pilgrimage

On the trip down to the Holy Cities, the Damascus caravan carried the sultan's subsidy and remittances from the numerous Holy Cities trusts that were scattered throughout the provinces of Rumelia, Anatolia, Rum, and elsewhere. On the return trip both caravans came heavily laden, with coffee the richest commodity. Both caravans also carried large numbers of African slaves, purchased in Jidda (the port for goods coming from the Horn of Africa) and destined for market in Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, and Istanbul. The Damascus caravan was vulnerable to raids by Bedouin tribal gangs, during the long route through Transjordan and the northern Hejaz, and also the 200 miles between Medina and Mecca. In 1693 when the writer al-Nabulusi made the pilgrimage, a conflict with Bedouin tribes made it impossible to visit Medina.⁸¹ In 1701 and several times in subsequent years Bedouins attacked the caravan on the return route from the Hejaz, including four years in a row (1725–29), when the pilgrimage season came in the oppressive heat of mid-summer.⁸² And in 1757 the shocking raid took place that made Molla Mustafa of Sarajevo start keeping his journal.

Due to these security concerns Istanbul reorganized the Damascus caravan. Command of the caravan was upgraded in rank and put in the hands of the governors of Damascus after 1703, instead of sancakbeyis from places like Gaza or Nablus. In return they were relieved of normal campaign duties with the main Ottoman army. The pilgrimage had become practically a military campaign in its own right, requiring the governor's personal supervision for several months each year.⁸³ Since the financial reform tended to concentrate local revenues with governors, who controlled provincial contracting processes, the Damascus governors had the tools to take charge of the situation. Damascus got control of caravan security under the al-Azm family of governors, which dominated Damascus society for about fifty years. They worked effectively with janissary commanders, tribal

chiefs, leading ulema figures, and bazaar merchants, and maintained their own private militia.

The most powerful rival of the al-Azms was the chief eunuch (*Kızlar Ağası*) of the imperial harem in Istanbul. For the past century the chief eunuch had invariably been a black man who, after falling from favor in Istanbul, spent his retirement in Egypt. The rivalry resulted from the fact that the main income of the chief eunuchs came from their management of the Holy Cities trusts – but this cash was physically carried from Istanbul via the Damascus pilgrimage caravan under protection of the governors of Damascus. Beshir Aga, one such immensely powerful chief black eunuch, during his thirty years in office conspired with the Treasurer of Damascus to seize the governorship when the current al-Azm incumbent died. The plan failed because Beshir Aga died in 1746.⁸⁴ The al-Azms got revenge by orchestrating the dismissal and execution of the defterdar for malfeasance.

Ten years later, however, again through the machinations of a Cairo-based retired chief black eunuch, the al-Azm governor Esad Pasha was indeed unseated by a wealthy notable from Gaza. It was his overthrow that led to the Bedouin raid of 1757, referred to in the journal of Molla Mustafa of Sarajevo. Bedouin tribes, allied with the al-Azms, mounted a large force and brutally attacked the caravan as it returned from Mecca. Hundreds were killed and twenty thousand people were left to die in the desert, robbed and stripped of even their clothing, without food and water, exposed to the heat of the day and the cold of the night. Esad Pasha was executed for colluding with the Bedouins; the chief black eunuch was executed for his machinations; and the governor was relieved of duty for his incompetence.⁸⁵ The governorship returned to the al-Azm family with the appointment of a Georgian Circassian former slave of the household, Osman Pasha al-Sadiq, in 1760.⁸⁶

Compared to Damascus, Egypt had a more complicated political and commercial structure, as the episode implies. The governor of

Egypt and the commander of the Egyptian janissary corps were appointed from Istanbul, but they operated within an evolving, uniquely Egyptian-Ottoman system of regimental commands on the one hand and provincial management positions or *beyliks* on the other. The beyliks functioned basically as revenue contracts for agrarian and commercial taxation. From these positions, and from the pilgrimage management that cut right across this structure, hundreds of lesser posts and investment opportunities could be handed out to loyal allies, supporters, and favorites. Life-term revenue contracting intensified the competition between leading Egyptian households.

Memberships in the regimental ranks of the Egyptian janissaries and other armed forces were always simultaneously major commercial ventures. After the Crete war and the wars of the Holy League ended, dreams of getting rich had lured many to Egypt. Demobilized regular troops, ambitious officers, the mercenaries in their trails, and not a few freebooters all came. The regimental ranks were infiltrated by immigrant Turks, Bosnians, Circassians, and Georgians who made their way to the Nile. Through life-term revenue contracting, which arrived at the same time, these new groups infected, affected, and eventually destroyed the previously all-encompassing Egyptian political and social divide between the Qasimi and the Faqari clans and clients. The Qazdağlı household rose to prominence in its place, started by a soldier of fortune from Anatolia who entered the household of an Egyptian janissary regimental officer sometime after the Crete war.⁸⁷



Figure 5.6: Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. The image is a detail from a large, glazed tile mural, one of three in the small prayer hall within the black eunuch's apartments in Topkapı Palace. The other murals show Mount Arafat and a prayer niche with a diagram of the Kaaba. They date from after the fire of 1665, when the palace was renovated.

The Qazdağlıs built a huge conglomerate through aggressive recruitment within the janissary corps and adept management of investments in coffee. In general, grain and coffee offered the highest potential profits, and the two commodities were connected through Mecca. In Mecca, besides feeding the poor, Egyptian grain was exchanged for Yemeni coffee at the huge commercial fair that coincided with the pilgrimage. Because of this, in Egypt, unlike elsewhere in the empire, agricultural revenue contracts offered steady profits even at the village level, with a fairly predictable degree of safety. Truly spectacular profits, and the highest risks, lay in urban revenue contracts directly tied to the coffee trade at the Red Sea ports. Janissary officers were heavily invested, not just in contracts for caravan security, but also in both grain and coffee. But they had difficulty acquiring the beylik-level revenues, which were all in the hands of the appointed governors. The Qazdağlıs gained the tax farms of key ports such as Suez on the Red Sea, and Alexandria, Damietta, and Rosetta on the Mediterranean, built relations with merchants in Jidda and the Holy Cities, and controlled the main pilgrimage appointments. They worked their Istanbul connections through good relations with the exiled chief harem eunuchs. In time their subordinates and clients were able to crack the beyliks, and took over the most important positions in Egypt, including governor of Cairo.⁸⁸ The Qazdağlı era reached its apogee with Ali Bey, a Georgian slave commander who rose in the household ranks of the Qazdağlı clan patriarch in the period after the Seven Years War.

The Ottoman Empire and International Trade

The kinds of shared interests and responsibilities encountered in the pilgrimage, and the resulting mutual cooperation and conflict, were acted out in relationships between Istanbul and all the provinces. Revenue contracting as a fiscal model enabled Ottoman participation in all aspects of the emerging Indian Ocean commercial system.

The Indian Ocean and the Gulf

The Ottomans gave more attention to their piece of the Indian Ocean commerce after the Karlowitz treaty freed them from conflict in the Danube basin. Southern Iraq and especially Basra, the port on the Shatt al-Arab where India shipping left and came in, played a key role in Ottoman efforts. Basra's governors, who might double as ambassadors to the Mughal court, were also susceptible to the lure of Mughal wealth and sometimes took refuge in Mughal service when threatened by Ottoman authorities.⁸⁹ Absent a strong client in Basra this business was left to Arab tribes of southern Mesopotamia, but after Karlowitz the Ottomans regained Basra. They built a new fleet on the Euphrates, for both commercial and military purposes, and the former supervisor of the Danube was brought in to work on the navigability of the river's upper reaches.⁹⁰ The long-term strategy was to incorporate Basra into the province of Baghdad and use it to direct Gulf traffic through Ottoman customs stations on the rivers, away from the desert routes favored by the Arab nomad guides.

Under Hasan Pasha, a former Georgian slave become governor of Baghdad, and his household and descendants, this trade came steadily into Ottoman hands. As Persian administration floundered with the fall of the Safavids, Ottoman Basra replaced Persian Bandar Abbas as the main port at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. Duties on transit goods accounted for nearly half of Basra's revenues by official accounts submitted to Istanbul, and most of that figure came from ships from India. The Aleppo caravans were timed to arrive in Basra just about the time the India boats came in, around June or July. Indian goods included spices, but also rice and sugar and other items from Bengal; chintz and cotton thread from the Coromandel Coast; and cotton fabrics from the Malabar Coast. Basra exported dates, grown along the banks of the Shatt al-Arab, and, despite official prohibition, Arabian horses.⁹¹ Hard currency also left, since the Ottomans never really managed to export as much to India as they

imported.

Basra's boom was inseparable from the political turmoil in Iran after the fall of the Safavids. Nadir Shah systematically plundered the whole region. After sacking Delhi, he captured Oman and besieged Ottoman Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.⁹² After Nadir Shah's death Karim Khan Zand, who came to power in Iran in the 1750s, developed a more coherent trade policy, but foreign companies stayed with the port of Basra for its security. Traffic through Basra spiked after the English defeated France in the Seven Years War, but by the end of the twelfth Islamic century several factors combined to depress Ottoman fortunes in the Gulf. When a hitch in Hasan Pasha's lineage coincided with Ottoman defeat in another war with Russia (1768–74), and when an epidemic hit Baghdad and Basra in 1773 – either smallpox or bubonic plague, carried from Istanbul – Mesopotamia began to move out of Istanbul's orbit.⁹³

From the Gulf to the Mediterranean

The same tension between local agency and Istanbul's interests also played out in the towns along the route between the Gulf and the Mediterranean, especially Mosul and Diyarbekir. Mosul was an army town, an important fortress city in the eastern frontier defense system.⁹⁴ During the happy decades after the Persian peace of 1639, Ottoman governors installed from Istanbul served a dual role as the major revenue contractors. As elsewhere, locally stationed janissaries became gradually integrated into native society. Over time, however, tax collection, payroll, and logistics of the military supply route running along the border down to Baghdad tended to function independently of the Ottoman governor's authority. This led to competition, sometimes violent, among local financial interests, and consequently, dipping customs revenues, and diminished capacity to organize a campaign should one become necessary.

When the Afghans overthrew the Safavid dynasty in the 1720s the Istanbul government, frustrated with the internal conflict in Mosul, turned to Ismail Jalili, a merchant who had made a fortune as a subcontractor for the Ottoman governor. The Jalili family, originally Christian, had migrated from Diyarbekir in the previous century. The younger generation of Jalilis became Muslim, invested in revenue contracting, and used their wealth to buy some rural malikanes. They had strong connections with local bankers, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim, and good working relationships with the local janissary corps. Their success in developing the commerce along the Tigris to Baghdad and Basra suggested ability to make good on a logistics and supply contract. In 1726 Ismail Jalili won the big urban tax collection contract in Mosul, in essence buying the governorship in the bargain. The family earned the confidence of Istanbul with reliable leadership of the defense of Mosul, first in the 1720s and then during Nadir Shah's siege. It monopolized the governorship of Mosul for the rest of the century.⁹⁵

Diyarbakir, on the upper Tigris where it comes within about 60 miles of the Euphrates, straddled the route to Aleppo and the Mediterranean in one direction and the route through the Anti-Taurus to the plateau and the Caucasus in the other.⁹⁶ It also lay very close to important mines. Caravans made the connections. Armed escorts, contracted locally through Ottoman officials or their proxies, funneled the traffic through Ottoman controlled customs stations. Competition came from semi-nomadic Arab, Kurdish, or Turkmen tribes, whose security specialists had their own preferred routes.

Diyarbakir was not merely a stopping point on the way to somewhere else. The city was a thriving center of agriculture and textile manufacturing, and had an active intellectual and cultural life. Frequent turnover in the governor's office, with an average term of one to three years, meant that Istanbul relied to a large extent on local administrative expertise and control. The governor's council included not just his own senior staff but also the city magistrate, the mufti, the commander of the urban security apparatus, the powerful chief financial officer who managed the revenue contracts, and representatives of the urban gentry. Diyarbakir's wealthy families maintained connections through relatives in the capital, and it is likely that the Istanbul elites who contracted for the most lucrative tax farms in Diyarbakir had local roots.

With lifetime tax farming, Aleppo evolved in ways similar to Diyarbakir. Though Aleppo was not on the sea, its proximity to the port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) made it a Silk Road terminus and the most important city of Ottoman Syria. The caravans were the life of the city. Long-distance caravans reached Aleppo from the Gulf and from the Hejaz, sometimes two thousand camels strong, and over shorter distances from Cilicia and southern Syria, using mules and donkeys as well as camels. After registration at the customs house, porters (typically Kurds) carried goods to caravansaries run usually by the amazingly multilingual Armenians. Since the Ottoman governors and kadis served short terms and were rotated frequently, continuity

was achieved through local Muslim gentry who held the positions of chief tax farmer and kaymakam, or acting governor. The main social fissures among Muslims ran between, on the one hand, old families with wealth, public office, education, or a titled pedigree going back to the Prophet and, on the other hand, upstarts whose money and title were grounded in service to one of the Ottoman military corps based in the city.

Aleppo was ethnically and religiously diverse, home to Muslim Turks and Arabs; Jews; Greek Orthodox Melkites, who spoke Arabic; both Iranian and Ottoman Armenians (the Catholicos of Sis was here); a large community of dissenter Süryanis; French Roman Catholics; and Dutch and English Protestants. Muslim and Christian Arabs worked in the silk trade and traveled to Iran, but the key role in the silk industry was played by Armenians, through their connections to the Armenian community in Julfa. They received a *cizye* exemption for this.⁹⁷ There was Egyptian rice, coffee from Yemen, dried fruit and silk cloth from Damascus; there was mohair from Ankara and woolens from Mosul and Salonika; the English traded broadcloth or bought silk with silver; and Aleppo itself was known for olive oil and olive oil soap. The customs dues contractor, the only urban office open to non-Muslims, was dominated by the Jewish community. Everyone used the *kadi's* court as the ultimate arbiter.

Although Aleppo's reputation for religious amity rivaled Istanbul's, relations among the Christian groups expressed another side of the tension between the autonomy of local cultural life and the intervention of Istanbul. A conspicuously large group of missionary-minded French Catholic clergy, who had arrived in the middle of the previous century, said mass in the Latin rite at one of the caravansaries in the city and worked among the other Christian denominations. Some Aleppo Christians found Catholicism appealing, for several reasons. The French offered a new-style education at religious schools, where they taught from texts printed on the first Arabic-language printing press in the Ottoman Empire. Becoming a

client of French merchants meant, for the Arab Ottoman subject, both tax-exempt status and opportunities for personal advancement and wealth. Upset by defections, the Süryani, Armenian, and Melkite clergy complained to Istanbul and got an order forbidding local Christians to go to Latin mass. The Melkite community split when the Patriarch of Antioch died in 1724. The Melkites of Aleppo supported a bishop who favored closer links to Rome, while the Damascus community backed Constantinople's candidate, a Cypriot Greek. The local Aleppine favorite left for Mount Lebanon and received investiture from the Pope, and his congregation back in Aleppo got a Catholic metropolitan and gave their loyalty to Rome for the rest of the century – with support from local Muslim authorities.

The Western Black Sea

Two factors contributed to the rapid spread of the new fiscal model in Rumeli, the uncertainties of war notwithstanding. One was that Istanbul investors coveted the cizye poll tax, the herd tax, and avarız tax for their high cash value and liquidity. The other was the close proximity to Istanbul of the rich agrarian lands along the western Black Sea coast, the Marmara, and the Aegean. Hence the highest concentrations of life-term contracts in the whole empire were found around Sofia. The average contract here was worth five times that of an average contract in Aleppo or Diyarbekir, whose fields were comparatively low-yielding.⁹⁸ High levels of commercial agriculture were practiced on large agrarian estates in Rumeli, created out of former timar lands as the army moved to seasonally hired troops over the past century. Wheat especially went to export, but also wool and hides, through Vienna and, during the war years, Salonika.⁹⁹

The loss of Hungary and Transylvania, the pressure of Muscovy in the steppe, and the growth of the export trade on the Danube transformed the tribute-paying Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia into lands of vital commercial and strategic importance.¹⁰⁰ Many Orthodox Slavs, Albanians, Jews, and old Ottoman Greek families of merchants and clerics migrated and settled there, marrying into local nobility. The Habsburg–Ottoman wars added thousands of Muslim refugees, who crowded the area around Vidin on the Danube. They spilled into the farmland north of the river even though the Ottomans had long-standing agreements to prevent Muslim settlement in the Principalities. An Ottoman commission of 1759–60 investigated and ended up confiscating about one thousand three hundred of these farms.¹⁰¹

In the Principalities three factions emerged. One favored the Austrians. A second favored Russia. Among this second faction was Moldavian Hospodar Dimitri Cantemir, who had lived a long time in Istanbul and authored a history of the Ottomans and a groundbreaking

work on Ottoman music.¹⁰² But he collaborated with Peter during the Prut campaign and fled to Saint Petersburg when Peter lost. The third faction, which favored the Ottomans, was composed of Ottomanized Greek Orthodox families and members of their vast clientage networks, Greeks and non-Greeks. This group ran the Principalities after Prut and pulled them more closely into the commercial and financial orbit of the empire.¹⁰³ They were generally referred to as the Phanariots because so many of them came from the Phanar (Fener) neighborhood of Istanbul, home to the Orthodox patriarchate and to a large number of Greek Christian aristocrats. A few old Byzantine families were found among them, like the Cantacuzenes; Șerban, the first Phanariot Prince of Wallachia back in 1679, belonged to one of these. Others had made their fortunes in places like Chios or Izmir and then relocated to Istanbul. These Greek Christians had influence at court and a level of comfort with upper-class Ottoman society,¹⁰⁴ through medicine, the sciences, commerce, and their facility in Western languages, as was also reflected in the architecture of their villas and the layer of Turkish vocabulary in their dialect.¹⁰⁵

As high culture in the Principalities became Phanariot Greek and thus Ottomanized, the dynamics of political and social life resembled what took place elsewhere in the empire under Muslim Turkish and Arab provincial aristocracies, though with key differences.¹⁰⁶ In Moldavia, when Cantemir left for Russia the Ottoman sultan appointed Nicholas Mavrocordatos as prince, the son of the Alexander Mavrocordatos who had negotiated the Karlowitz treaty. He moved to Wallachia three years later when that throne became vacant, and another Phanariot was found to replace him in Moldavia. In both cases the venerable tradition of autonomy and local election of princes ended. Instead, a new regime began in which the Ottoman sultan installed governors (*voivodes*, later *hospodars*). These mostly came from Phanariot Greek aristocratic families, though they were not a single dynasty. Two other typical routes to Ottoman provincial power that we have seen, control of security and life-term tax farms, were

not available to the Phanariots in the Principalities. There were no Phanariot private militias; security was mostly in the hands of the janissaries; and being Christians, the Phanariots could not bid for life-term revenue contracts. Yet they did still control massive financial resources, through short-term iltizam contracts for collection of revenues such as the salt monopoly, and through investment in the wheat trade in the Black Sea. Their solemn investiture ceremonies at the Ottoman palace in Istanbul gave them the heavy weight of imperial backing.¹⁰⁷

Harmony and Discord

As in the Danubian Principalities, Ottoman interfaith relations everywhere always covered the spectrum from the prominent to the mundane. Insightful illustrations of both ends of the spectrum can be seen in the Ecumenical patriarchate and in Palestine.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate

The Ottoman Greek ascendancy in the Danubian Principalities rested upon Phanariot domination of the Orthodox upper clergy and Phanariot lay control of the Church bureaucracy in Istanbul. But there were consequences. Like other high Ottoman appointments, appointment to Church office too included a financial commitment and was highly competitive among potential investors. Greek financial power became the means of Phanariot control, but also a source of resentment.

Critics warned that the sale of Church office amounted to ecclesiastical forfeiture of Christian leadership and the commodification of spiritual direction. Some clergy tried to fight back. They got a sultan's ferman (1741) that the synod's choice for patriarch – always swayed by the Phanariots – had to be ratified by regional metropolitans. Patriarch Cyril V, twice elected and twice deposed between 1748–57, balanced Phanariot power by raising taxes on bishoprics and bringing guild leaders into decision-making. For Cyril, guarding the spiritual integrity of the Church meant preventing easy re-entry to Orthodoxy for parishioners who had gone over to Catholicism, for example in the Morea during its two decades of Venetian rule. Cyril rejected Armenian and Catholic baptism as invalid and made rebaptism a prerequisite for re-entering Orthodoxy. Anti-Catholic usually meant pro-Ottoman, but in this case Cyril was opposed by his own metropolitans, who wanted an easier route to re-entry. Street violence required intervention by Ottoman authorities. Deposed a second time, Cyril lived out his life at Mount Athos.¹⁰⁸

Phanariot Greek dominance eroded the ecumenical character of the Church.¹⁰⁹ The Slavic Orthodox Patriarch of Peć, who had backed the Austrians in the war of the Holy League, and called for a general Christian uprising against Muslim rule, fled to Hungary in 1690. Thousands of Slavic Christians followed him. Emperor Leopold I nursed the exiles with new Orthodox metropolitanates, at Karlovci in

Habsburg-held Slavonia, and at Belgrade. These became centers of Slavic Orthodox culture, while their nominal superior, the patriarchate of Ottoman Peć, was gradually weakened by poverty and the continual emigration. During the 1736–39 war the Ottoman Serbian patriarch again defected, to the Vojvodina, and Vienna maneuvered to sever ties between its Orthodox Slavs and Peć.¹¹⁰ Competition raged between Greek and Serbian Ottomans in Istanbul. Under Phanariot influence the Greeks prevailed upon the sultan to eliminate not only the patriarchate at Peć (1766) but also at Ohrid, which had been autocephalous for almost four hundred years.¹¹¹ Both dioceses were placed under the direct authority of the Greek patriarch in Constantinople, effectively confining Slavic clergy to parish ministry. Unsurprisingly, Slavic–Greek tension spilled outside the church doors to language, literature, and memory. Andrija Kašić Miošić’s *The Pleasant Story of the Slav Nation* appeared in 1756; Jovan Rajić’s *History of the Different Slavonic Nations, Especially the Bulgarians, Croats and Serbs*, was written about the same time (and published in four volumes in Vienna in the 1790s). It was in these circumstances that Kosovo began its move from folklore to epic.¹¹² And as in Syria, Christian clergymen and financial elites used client status with foreign merchants to manipulate their own range of options for greater independence, often striking alliances with commercial partners in the Northwest European joint stock companies.

Palestine

At least two issues kept Istanbul keenly interested in Palestine. Pilgrimage security was one.¹¹³ Southern Palestine – i.e., the sancaks of Ajlun and Lajjun, Nablus, Gaza and Ramle, and Jerusalem – belonged to the Province of Damascus. Galilee, Haifa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut made up a separate province. At Sidon, the Druze, the Metwalis, and the Bedouin more or less ran their own affairs. In the fifty years after Karlowitz (1699) there were more than forty governors in Sidon, and the situation in its various sancaks was similar, the appointments being sold for payment to the Istanbul treasury. The attraction here was the port of Sidon, a lucrative tax farm. The main figure in Sidon was not the governor but the Sheikh of Tiberias Dahir al-Umar, who was the revenue contractor (*mültezim*). Through this post Dahir became quite wealthy and far stronger than the actual governors. Istanbul constantly tried to eliminate him, using first the governors of Sidon and then the governors of Damascus, but never succeeded. Dahir for his part avoided open hostilities with Istanbul and hoped for appointment to the governorship, though he never got that. At the same time Istanbul needed him to submit his revenues, so its attitude towards him noticeably eased during wartime. After he died in 1775 his successor, Ahmed Cezzar Pasha, did receive the governorship of Sidon and brought the province under greater Istanbul control. With customs dues and monopolies, especially of cotton, he built a personal fortune and a powerful local militia, in addition to paying larger Istanbul remittances. He was rewarded with appointment as governor of Damascus as well.¹¹⁴

The second factor that kept Istanbul involved in the nitty-gritty of Palestinian life was Jerusalem. Its sacred shrines brought Christian, Jewish, and Muslim pilgrims, and the communities that managed them were prominent and powerful. The governors of Damascus intimidated both the Jewish financial nobility and the Christian monasteries and churches, using threats of “inspections” of the holy

places as extortion, ignoring orders from Istanbul to cease and desist.

And the communities complained about each other. The routine mixing of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim populations occasionally struck some Muslims as unseemly. One such place was the public baths, where fees were so low even the poorest people could afford them and all classes and social groups mingled together. Well-known rules maintained public decorum and kept men from loitering about at women's bath times, or at the separate women's entrance of the bigger establishments. Muslims and non-Muslims were supposed to use separate towels, razors, clogs, and bowls. City inspectors were supposed to check that the rules were enforced. One time in Jerusalem a bathhouse manager, accused of having threadbare towels, defended himself by saying that those ones were reserved for Christians, Jews, and peasants!¹¹⁵ In another case, dervishes from a lodge on Mount Zion, which property they had confiscated from the Franciscans a century earlier, objected to Christian Palm Sunday processions. Appeals from all sides, Franciscans, French consuls, and the dervishes, produced sultanic orders – not necessarily contradictory – both protecting the right of Christians to worship in this way and enjoining Christians to do nothing in opposition to the sharia.¹¹⁶

Roman Catholic missionaries presented an additional headache for Orthodox officials, especially because of their intellectual tradition and better schools. Patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheos (1669–1707), born in the Morea and one of the most important Orthodox figures of his generation, wrote a monumental history of the Eastern Church and worked with other leaders to produce a new confession as a spur towards Orthodox intellectual revival.¹¹⁷ Dositheos solicited a draft from Dionysius IV of Constantinople (nicknamed “The Muslim” for all his Muslim relatives). It was edited and revised with the input of several predecessors, and published at a newly established Orthodox press in Jassy. Known as the *Confession of Dositheus*, it was passed by the Synod of Jerusalem in 1680.

As for the Jerusalem Christian shrines themselves, the two most


important were the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Through relentless efforts the Greek Orthodox Church had, during the reign of Sultan Mehmed IV (1648–87), wrested both from the Franciscans, who had controlled them for centuries, since before the crusades.¹¹⁸ The Orthodox decided to renovate the Church of the Nativity, including some parts of the site visited by Muslims too. It was, after all, the sacred birthplace of the Prophet Jesus, and Muslims had been gathering there for contemplation, worship, and everyday affairs for decades. Some of these Muslim pilgrims, however, made a nuisance of themselves, demanding of the shrine's Christian custodians the full menu of services – shops and accommodations and the like – customarily funded by a vakıf trust at other places.

Now the planned remodeling of the building became for the Christians a means of ridding themselves of the Muslims. On appeal, the divan in Istanbul responded with unequivocal support for Christian rights over the holy places. As if that were not enough, the mufti took the trouble to upbraid Muslim pilgrims for visiting the shrine at all. Its authenticity as the birthplace of Jesus was not certain. An inspection committee was formed by the kadı of Jerusalem, who patiently heard all these disputes, to supervise the repairs of the site and ensure they were done in accordance with sharia. In the event, the Greek Orthodox created “a more splendid prayer hall than had ever existed since the Ottoman conquest,” and evicted the Muslims. The Ottoman government accepted this as a *fait accompli*, reasoning that at least the appearance of sharia compliance was preserved, since the exterior of the building was unchanged and Islamic sovereignty over the site was affirmed.¹¹⁹ Indeed it restored the whole place to Franciscan control during the wars of the Holy League out of sensitivity to French attitudes, and the Greek Orthodox only got the Holy Sepulchre back in the 1760s.¹²⁰

Ways of War and Peace

More than a quarter century of relative peace was interrupted by the worst military defeat the Ottoman Empire had ever experienced. The Ottoman army had not sat completely idle, especially in the Caucasus, where several small kingdoms emerged after the death of Nadir Shah (1740), some under Muslim rulers and some under Christian rulers. The Ottomans defended their interests, intervening, for instance, to place their own candidate in power in Kutaisi when the Christian Imereti kingdom in Georgia tried to crack down on the slave trade.¹²¹ But in the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, wars that fundamentally reshaped power relations in Europe, South Asia, and North America and marked the rise of Russia and Prussia, the Ottomans had avoided direct participation. When they did return to European battlefields, their performance showed some technology gaps, as in use of the bayonet and in light field artillery, key aspects of post-1756 European warfare.¹²² Sultan Mustafa III worked to rectify these problems, particularly with regard to artillery, where French experts gave needed attention.¹²³ But the problems ran deeper.

It was Russia that drew the Ottomans back to battle. There were two main concerns: the steady Russian absorption of Cossack territories and fortification of the steppe borderlands, and Russian pressure on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ahmed Resmi, sent to Berlin on official embassy by the sultan and grand vezir in 1763, gave a grave assessment of the situation in Poland after the death of King Augustus III. Polish Catholic nobles rebelled against the new king, who was Orthodox and backed by Russia, and appealed to Mustafa III for aid. At the same time a Cossack rebellion also broke out, and the Russian army violated Ottoman territory in marching against it. The Ottomans protested and declared war.¹²⁴



Map 5.1: The Black Sea rim.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

War with Russia, 1768–74

The Ottoman army was woefully unprepared for a major war. The long period of peace meant that processes of recruitment and traditions of military discipline needed to be recreated. As the Crimean Tatar cavalry set to harassing Russian positions, muster was announced and recruits began making their way to the war theater in the winter of 1768–69. They came from the Black Sea region, from Anatolia, some from as far away as Syria. Repairs had to be made along the Ottoman defensive line, the fortresses on the lower Dniester, the lower Danube, and the Black Sea, and the supply routes between the warehouses and bivouacs connecting them. Villagers rejected the requisition orders and revolted or left, and in some cases supplies had to be shipped in from Istanbul. In April the Russian army attacked across the Dniester but withdrew when it met Ottoman resistance at Hotin fortress, not knowing that inside the fort the Ottoman garrison had killed its own commander. In July, the Russians went against Hotin again, and withdrew again after a month when both sides were weary and the surrounding countryside denuded of supplies. In September the Ottoman army bridged the Dniester and attacked the Russian camp at Kamianets. Beaten, they just got back across their bridge before it collapsed. By the time the Russians ventured to Hotin a third time, the Ottomans had abandoned it because their supplies had run out.¹²⁵

Wracked by desertions, in 1770 the Ottoman army was defeated several times in Moldavia. In August at Kartal (Kagul), on the Prut near the Danube mouth, a massive Ottoman force of perhaps a hundred thousand evaporated away until the janissaries stood virtually alone and were defeated. They dropped the cannon and baggage train, then were cut to pieces in a chaotic effort to cross the Danube. Thousands of corpses floated in the river. At the same time, a revolt broke out among villagers in the Morea; and two dozen Russian ships appeared in the eastern Mediterranean, having sailed from Saint

Petersburg through the Straits of Gibraltar after resupply and repairs in Britain. The fleet attacked Ottoman forts along the coast of the Morea unanswered, and destroyed an Ottoman flotilla harbored at Çeşme, on the Karaburun Peninsula west of Izmir.¹²⁶

The two sides called a truce and tried to make peace. The Russians had plague in their camp in Moldavia and the hapless Ottoman supply system had individual commanders in debt trying to feed their troops. But Russian demands included free navigation of the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, permanent occupation of two fortresses on the Sea of Azov, and Crimean independence, which the Ottomans could not possibly accept. Anxious because of the Pugachev rebellion at home, Empress Catherine pressed forward, trying to get a surrender. The Ottomans fought fiercely along the Danube during summer 1773, with forces made up increasingly of local recruits and commanders. Their fortifications held, but they could not maintain this strength indefinitely. In 1774 Kilburun fell, on a peninsula facing Ottoman Özü (Ochakov) on the Dnieper mouth, and the main Ottoman army was surrounded at its headquarters at Şumnu (Şumen), south of the Danube. They had lost the war.

More than the technological or tactical deficiencies,¹²⁷ the main Ottoman problems were rather the social processes of recruitment, muster, and training. The last devshirme was decades ago – not that slavery ended, but Ottoman slaves were coming from the fringes of empire in the Caucasus and Africa, and they were not becoming janissaries. And the janissary army functioned in no recognizable manner. Poor training, indiscipline and desertion, and the lack of experienced commanders or a unified command, plagued the Ottoman war effort. Supply processes did work, but more for the benefit of entrepreneurs and profiteers than the Ottoman war strategy. By contrast with the lifetime conscription and training of Russian peasants, who gladly fought for ideals they themselves had no hope of ever realizing, the Ottomans stayed with attainable goals, as of old. They emphasized participation, plunder, and profit, and did ad hoc,

localized recruiting. The Ottoman system of contractual relationships gave discretion to local notables, who raised the troops; supplied the provisions, horses, and wagons; and ran the bivouacs. The Ottoman camp resembled a “disturbed beehive,” its march to and presence at the front still a theatrical show.¹²⁸

In short the Ottoman failure was due in no small measure to its success over the past century in cultivating and developing the very social relations that had given the empire deep roots of trust and partnership with local elites. This success had ensured that the Ottoman dynasty was not overthrown and the empire did not collapse in the 1703 or 1730 rebellions, as compared with the contemporary experience of both Safavid Persia and Mughal India. But the downside of this approach showed itself now.

The Rise of Regional Strongmen

As the war demonstrated, the fiscal reforms meant that local elites played a decisive role in any Ottoman war effort, through their cooperation with and challenges to the Istanbul government. During the war the empire filled its manpower needs through locally recruited volunteer militias as much as with its professional army, and paid for this by raising taxes in the war theater and in districts along the route to the front, in addition to funding from the treasury in Istanbul. Provincial magistrates, with committees of respected notables, oversaw mobilization, supply, logistics, and provisioning.¹²⁹ In his journal Molla Mustafa of Sarajevo related how, when the war began, the need for troops made Istanbul willing to forgive quite a bit – inflated muster rolls, embezzlement, and all manner of corruption schemes engaged in by local janissary officers and police chiefs prior to the war. Orders came from Istanbul to muster a thousand volunteers and conscript every fifth man in Sarajevo, for a total of seven thousand; to these were added four thousand sipahis from the province of Bosnia and two thousand more by the personal means of the governor. They were sent into neighboring Montenegro.¹³⁰

Yet conflicting interests between provincial leaders and Istanbul hindered a unified response to threats. Ali Pasha of Canik illustrates the quandary. His family held the life-term malikanes of Canik (Samsun), a Black Sea port, and expanded its control over large tracts of mountainous shorelines from Kastamonu to Trabzon, and the east–west route on the inland plateau from Amasya as far as Erzurum.¹³¹ During the war with Russia the family firm raised troops and supplies and guarded the sea passage to the Crimea. Ali Pasha distinguished himself both as a commander in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, and in suppressing a rebellion at home. In the doing, however, he aroused sensitivities. Istanbul made increasing demands on his resources. Local complaints about him from a rival family in the Sivas-Tokat area gave Istanbul an excuse to brand Ali Pasha a rebel and begin confiscation

proceedings. Twice he fled, returned, and was reinstated. Were this the only such case, the government's alternating condemnation and toleration of Ali Pasha's power might be difficult to comprehend, but the reality was that Istanbul found itself "relying on hundreds of such mini-despots,"¹³² all over the empire. They were, like Ali Pasha of Canik, both the happy result of, and the unfortunate problem created by, the astonishingly successful fiscal model of the life-term revenue contract. Almost all of them were basically loyal to the Ottoman dynasty.

An even more troubling example was Egypt. Prior to the Seven Years War, competition from coffee exports of French Caribbean colonies had depressed the profits of Red Sea coffee. The Qazdağlı household conglomerate covered its losses by maneuvering into the provincial beyliks and their fairly consistent agrarian revenues. Consistent control of these, they realized, required holding the governorship of Egypt, but that post was the prerogative of the Istanbul palace. The Qazdağlı household patriarch Ibrahim died just at the onset of the Seven Years War. One of his Georgian lieutenants, named Ali Bey, ruthlessly eliminated his rivals, thrust Qazdağlı allies into the beyliks where he could, and tried to get the sultan to name him governor.

As the war with Russia began Ali Bey seemed to angle for independence. He deposed two Istanbul appointees to the governorship in 1768–69, created a short-lived alliance with Sheikh Zahir al-Umar of Palestine, and solicited Russian backing.¹³³ Looking for ways to reassure Istanbul of his reliability, Ali Bey acted the loyal vassal, for example, in settling a dispute among rival claimants for Sharif of Mecca, while using the incident to make a statement of his own in the Holy Cities. He coyly punished, then rewarded, an imam who inserted his name alongside the Ottoman sultan in the Friday hutbe. After the Russian destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Çeşme, Ali Bey joined forces with Sheikh Zahir to challenge the Ottoman governor of Syria. Ali Bey was wounded in battle and captured in

1773. He died a week later.¹³⁴

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca

As the century began so it ended, the Ottoman public grappling with major defeat in war. The peace treaty with Russia, signed at Küçük Kaynarca, was disastrous. With the documentary fiction of political and civil liberty the Crimean Khanate fell under Russian domination. Conquered by the Ottomans three hundred years earlier, ruled by a dynasty with a deeply honored Chinggisid heritage, it was of incalculable commercial significance, the main Ottoman port of export to the north.¹³⁵ In 1776 Şahin Giray, the Russian favorite who had been to Saint Petersburg and met Catherine, was enthroned in Bahçeşaray. The Greek, Armenian, and Georgian communities of the Crimea were uprooted by the Russian rulers, both to make use of their commercial expertise and to deprive the independent Crimean Khanate of the same, so making it easier to annex. Many of the Armenians and Georgians were resettled on agricultural lands and the Greeks in new Russian towns along the Black Sea coast and the Sea of Azov. Greeks from the Aegean islands and the coast of Anatolia, who had supported the Russian assault on the Ottoman navy, left their homes to resettle here.¹³⁶

By the treaty Russia also took a commanding position on the Sea of Azov and on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. The fortresses of Azak (Azov), less than 2 miles upriver on the Don, as well as Kilburun, and Kerch and Yenikale, guarding passage to the Black Sea, all remained in Russian hands. In the northern Caucasus, Russia returned several fortresses in Georgia and Mingrelia to local control, and Greater and Lesser Kabarda were given to the Russian Empire, subject to Tatar approval. The Ottomans renounced slaving in these lands.¹³⁷ Russian merchants gained free navigation in the Black Sea, through the Straits to the Mediterranean, and on the Danube. Additionally, Russia was given the right to establish consulates anywhere in the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman merchants were supposed to be allowed in Russian territory.

A major theme of the Russian terms in the Küçük Kaynarca treaty was their obsession with religious identity. For example, Russia agreed to respect the Ottoman sultan as the “Caliph of Islam.” Superficially, this was a title of religious authority presumably derived from medieval Islamic history. But under the circumstances it was a Russian invention that said far more about the Russian vision of itself vis-à-vis Ottoman Christians than anything about Ottoman Islam. For another example, the article giving prisoners of war on both sides the right to return home made an exception for those who had voluntarily accepted Christianity in Russian captivity or Islam in Ottoman captivity.¹³⁸ The new Russian representative at the Ottoman capital would not be prevented from becoming a Muslim if he wished, but if he made such a decision while he was drunk he ought to be given time to sober up. If he committed a crime he would be tried under Ottoman law. And again, the Ottoman government was enjoined to protect the Christian religion and its churches, with specific mention of territories from which the Russian army withdrew, the Danubian Principalities and the Aegean Islands. Russian pilgrims to Jerusalem were not to be interfered with. A “Russo-Greek” church was planned for Beyoğlu, a section of Galata, under Ottoman protection. (It was never built.) These provisions were grossly distorted, beginning immediately with Catherine the Great herself, into a claim that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca made Imperial Russia into the protector of all Orthodox Christian people in the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁹

Outcry at the loss of the Crimea made treaty revision a top priority for the council and Sultan Abdülhamid I, who came to the throne in January 1774. They attempted to dislodge the Russian-backed khan by force. Not only did it fail, Istanbul was forced to expressly affirm Crimean independence. Worse, by violating the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottomans handed Catherine the perfect excuse to do what, no doubt, was the Russian intention all along. As the Islamic century ended Catherine annexed the Taman Peninsula, the Kuban river basin along the eastern Black Sea coast, and the

Crimean Khanate.

Notes

- 1 Barker, *Double Eagle*, 108–9, 160–61.
- 2 Quoted in Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 22.
- 3 Abou-El-Haj, “Narcissism of Mustafa II.”
- 4 Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz.”
- 5 Abou-El-Haj, “Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier.”
- 6 Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 16–40.
- 7 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 90–95. On the history of Ottoman rule in the Principalities, Panaite, “Power Relationships.”
- 8 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 98–102.
- 9 Text published by Köprülü, “Osmanlı Kanunnameleri.” See also İnalçık, “Islamization of Ottoman Laws.”
- 10 Unat, *Hicrî Tarihleri*, xiii.
- 11 Nina Ergin, “Bathing Business in Istanbul: A Case Study of the Çemberlitaş Hamamı in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Ergin, ed. *Bathing Culture*, 142–68.
- 12 Genç, “Osmanlı maliyesinde”; and “A Study of the Feasibility.”
- 13 Kiel, “Remarks on the Administration.”
- 14 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, xi.
- 15 Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited,” 403.
- 16 This is the argument of Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited,” 423.
- 17 Salzmann, “Measures of Empire,” 194–203.

- 18 The term is Salzmann's.
- 19 Salzmann, "Measures of Empire," 198–208.
- 20 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 159–71.
- 21 Salzmann, "Measures of Empire," 202–3.
- 22 Salzmann, "Measures of Empire," 187.
- 23 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 77–81.
- 24 Salzmann, "Measures of Empire," 147–89.
- 25 Faroqhi, "Indebtedness," in Afifi et al., eds., *Sociétés rurales ottomanes*, 197–213.
- 26 Salzmann, "Measures of Empire," 174–77.
- 27 Hathaway, *Arab Lands*, 79–113.
- 28 Masters, "Aleppo: the Ottoman Empire's Caravan City," in Eldem, Goffman, and Masters (eds.), *The Ottoman City*, 53–62.
- 29 For two recent efforts to study it, Ergene and Berker, "Wealth and Inequality;" and Canbakal, "Reflections."
- 30 Tucker, *Nadir Shah's Quest*, 24–31.
- 31 Richards, *Mughal Empire*, 253–81.
- 32 Karahasanoğlu, *Kadı ve Günlüğü*, 112–19.
- 33 Ergin, "Bathing Business," 148–49; and "Who Worked in İstanbul's Hamams?," 599, 603.
- 34 Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 119.
- 35 Tucker, *Nadir Shah's Quest*, 26–28.
- 36 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 102–17.
- 37 Tucker, *Nadir Shah's Quest*, *passim*.

- 38 The records and problems interpreting them are discussed by Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, 82–109.
- 39 McGowan, “Population and Migration,” in İnalcık and Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History*, vol. 2, 646–57.
- 40 Shay, *Ottoman Empire*, 33.
- 41 Andreasyan, “Eremya Çelebi’nin Yangın Tarihi,” 60–61.
- 42 Karahasanoğlu, *Kadı ve Günlüğü*, 164–80, 133–35.
- 43 Shay, *The Ottoman Empire*, 38–39.
- 44 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair*. I thank Snježana Buzov, who analyzed it in an unpublished paper, for bringing the text to my attention.
- 45 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 121, 136, 138, 155, 213.
- 46 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 77.
- 47 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 169.
- 48 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 165–69.
- 49 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 166.
- 50 Filan, ed., XVIII. *Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair.*, 69.
- 51 Minkov, *Conversion to Islam*, 60.
- 52 Kurz, *Ways to Heaven*.
- 53 Kurz, *Ways to Heaven*, 81–105.
- 54 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, s.v. “İsmail Hakkı Bursevî,” vol. 23, 102–6 (Ali Namlı).
- 55 Kurz, *Ways to Heaven*, 89–105.
- 56 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 238–39; El-Rouayheb, “Opening the Gates,”

57 Kuşpınar, “İsmâ’il Ankaravî.”

58 Ateş, “Mesnevî’nin Onsekiz.”

59 Gran, *Islamic Roots*, 39–56.

60 Kurz, *Ways to Heaven*, 129.

61 Kurz, *Ways to Heaven*, 147–48.

62 Cerasi, “Historicism,” and Kubilay, “Typological Examination,” both in Nur et al., eds., *7 Centuries of Ottoman Architecture*, at 34–42 and 156–60 respectively.

63 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 274–79.

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- 75 Coşkun, “Most Literary Ottoman.”
- 76 Farooqi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, 100–103, 113–16.
- 77 Farooqi, *Mughal–Ottoman Relations*, 144–72.
- 78 Blackburn, ed., *Journey to the Sublime Porte*, 237–300.
- 79 El-Rouayheb, “Opening the Gates.”
- 80 Vassiliev, *History of Saudi Arabia*, 64–82, 91–92.
- 81 Farooqi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, 67.
- 82 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 177–80.
- 83 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 33–56.
- 84 Hathaway, *Beshir Agha*, 75–77.
- 85 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 177.
- 86 Hathaway, *Arab Lands*, 87–90.
- 87 Hathaway, *Politics of Households*.
- 88 Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 139–64.
- 89 Farooqi, *Mughal–Ottoman Relations*, 61–68.
- 90 Salzmänn, “Measures of Empire,” 240.
- 91 Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder*, 57–63.
- 92 For a comprehensive analysis of Nadir Shah’s intentions, Tucker, *Nadir Shah’s Quest*.
- 93 Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder*, 39–56.
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- 101 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 141–42.
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- 103 Philliou, “Communities on the Verge.”
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- 106 Philliou, “Communities on the Verge,” 175–78.
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- 109 The thesis of Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*.
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- 111 Hupchick, *Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 67.
- 112 Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 258–66.
- 113 Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, 30–53.
- 114 Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, 53–77.
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- 118 Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem*, 105–10.
- 119 Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem*, 71–72, 82–96, 134–37.
- 120 Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem*, 112.
- 121 Suny, *Making of the Georgian Nation*, 57–58.
- 122 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 130–35.
- 123 Aksan, “Breaking the Spell.”
- 124 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 138–40.
- 125 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 149–50.
- 126 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 151–54.
- 127 Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’.”
- 128 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 142–51.
- 129 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 134.
- 130 Filan, ed., *XVIII. Yüzyıl Günlük Hayatı Dair*, 78–80.
- 131 Şahin, “Economic Power of Anatolian Ayans.”
- 132 The wording is Aksan’s, *Ottoman Wars*, 218.
- 133 Hathaway, *Arab Lands*, 86–87.
- 134 Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 92–101.
- 135 Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Cotton Market and India: The Role of Labor Cost in Market Competition,” in İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans*, 264–306, at 296–99.
- 136 Raeff, “In the Imperial Manner,” in Raeff, ed., *Catherine the Great*, 197–246.

137 Suny, *Making of the Georgian Nation*, 57–58.

138 For the text of the treaty, Hurewitz, *Middle East and North Africa*, 92–101.

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Collaborations and Breakdowns, 1785–1882

Amid talk of a new war and the need for reform, the thirteenth Islamic century opened with everyone reading a brand new contribution to the neglected genre of epic romance. In *Beauty and Love*, a gifted young poet, a Mevlevi sheikh named Galib, put an eloquent exclamation point to the whole of the Ottoman spiritual and literary canon.¹ In layers a love story, a compendium of Ottoman Islamic literary allusions, and a guide to the inner life, *Beauty and Love* was also a theory of poetics for new times.

Box 6.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Thirteenth Islamic Century

Selim III (1789–1807)

Mustafa IV (1807–8)

Mahmud II (1808–39)

Abdülmecid I (1839–61)

Abdülaziz (1861–76)

Murad V (1876)

Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)

Sheikh Galib related how once in a salon a gathering his friends were extolling the praises of Nabi, the poet of the past century. Galib took a contrary view. While certainly something of value can be found in every poem, he said, Nabi's clichéd evocation of the classics left him cold. The past is not necessarily superior for simply being past. "This world will pass, the afterlife abides" – if that were all age and

experience had to say to today's struggle, then youth and strength could do just as well.

The Necessity of Poetry

Annoyed by his irreverence, Sheikh Galib's friends demanded he do better. He took the challenge, and the result was "the greatest work of Ottoman literature,"² cloaked as a remake of Fuzuli's classic epic *Leyla and Mejnun*. In this version the boy Love is pursued by the girl Beauty.³ The fated pair, born to "a tribe in whom the fine virtues all coincide," whose elders seal their betrothal, meet in school, in Professor Madness's class. Separated by Mistress Modesty, they find a go-between in Poetry. The bride price, set by the elders, is precisely that series of life trials that brings Love to the end of Self. In his confusion and despair Love makes love to a mirage, only to discover mercifully that it was not so after all. In the climactic scene – prefigured in Galib's narration of the Prophet's Night Journey – (Spoiler Alert!) Love at last breaks through to a wondrous scene of the Eternal City. A "white-mantled regiment" escorts the stunned prince through streets paved with pearl to a throne room in a castle where Beauty awaits.

Set alongside the searing pain of Fuzuli's *Leyla and Mejnun*, Sheikh Galib's *Beauty and Love* overflows in joy and humor. And if every poem is also a statement about the nature of poetry, Galib's epic staked down the conviction that it is human labor that actualizes the always renewable divine inspiration.⁴ "New poetry is uttered constantly," he wrote.⁵ It is not merely that pastness inspires by example. Rather, past art and present art flow from the same inspired source.

Sheikh Galib's argument was about more than art. It was about finding fresh ways to see ever changing human circumstances. The virtuosity of the Qur'an's verse did not silence poetry, its inimitability has to be proved by more poetry. In the same way, God's effortless creativity can truly be appreciated only in continual human creative effort.

It was a message for modern times, for a new century that began with fantasies of a Greek Empire reborn circulating abroad, among Ottoman friends as well as enemies. Not that something so epic would be entrusted to Greeks! In the spring of 1787 Empress Catherine of Russia sailed down the Dniester to tour the Crimea with the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II, allies in the planned division of the Black Sea borderlands. Perhaps thinking of Constantine, her new grandson, Catherine processed through a triumphal arch proclaiming “the road to Byzantium.”⁶ Küçük Kaynarca’s nod to free trade allowed Russian shipping through the Straits and gave Russian merchants access to Ottoman buyers and commodities everywhere in the empire except Istanbul. By agreement with Austria, France, Britain, and Prussia, transit and import–export duties fell, but free trade was not neutral trade. Existing Ottoman commercial networks suffered, while the new conditions favored the Ottoman clients of foreign merchants. This meant Ottoman Orthodox Christians especially, who carried Russian shipping.⁷ The creeping Russian presence reached the nascent Georgian kingdom at Kartli-Kakheti, whose Christian lord appealed to Catherine to approve his heir. It brought a Russian fortress to Vladikavkaz and a Russian garrison to Tiflis, and a new road connected them through the Deryali pass. Absent any credible Iranian counter, there seemed little to prevent a Russian advance right down to the Aras River. Ottoman appeals for mediation went unanswered and war followed. After the janissaries failed to take Kilburun, the outcome hinged on Ottoman defense of its arc of fortresses from İsakçı, Tulcea, and Ismail on the Danube, to Bender north of the Dniester, and Kilia, Akkerman, and Özü (Ochakov) on the Black Sea. Hotin fell to combined Austrian and Russian forces, Austria occupied Jassy, and Özü fell to the Russians.

Box 6.2: Sheikh Galib on the Necessity of Poetry

In this passage Sheikh Galib argues that the Koran’s famous

challenge to skeptics, to produce poetry as good as this, is a divinely inspired blessing on continual human creativity.

Before Islam, in times of ignorance
All the world vied in claims to eloquence

The fair at Ukaz was set up each year
And poetry competitions held there

With sword and tongue they staked their
pretensions
Duels went in hand with improvisations

But when the one living, ever-praised Lord
By bestowing the Koran on the world

Made miracle with eloquence coincide
The eloquent tribesmen were terrified

So those wayward tribes should come to know
awe
Produce its parallel – thus proposed God

Still unparalleled stands that miracle
The word of the living, the powerful

If men lost the power to judge and reflect
That challenge, that miracle would lose effect

If all eloquence and poetry ceased
The Koran's virtue could not be perceived

If no poet could compose poetry
God's proof would inadequate prove to be

He made it to show man's powerlessness
But could God's empowering be powerless?

I've dismissed my foes with manifest proof

I've tested my talent by Koran's proof

From Galip, *Beauty and Love*, translated by Victoria Rowe
Holbrook. Copyright Modern Language Association (2005),
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Sultan Selim III, who succeeded Abdülhamid I in April 1789, overruled counsel and kept fighting, with unfortunate consequences. Austria captured Belgrade and occupied all of Wallachia, and Russia took Akkerman and Bender and defeated the Ottoman army in Moldavia. The Ottomans recovered Belgrade because Joseph II broke with Catherine and pulled out, yet the war was lost as Ismail fell to the Russians in a bloody battle to the last man.⁸ The Treaty of Jassy (January 1792) confirmed Russian sovereignty in the Crimea and a permanent Russian presence on the shores of the Black Sea. The evident Ottoman weakness was followed with keen interest by rivals and growing apprehension by partners.

Sheikh Galib's *Beauty and Love* cannot be taken as a simple-minded commentary on Ottoman society or political circumstances. But as an expression of confidence in the innate capacity of people to come up with new solutions to new problems, it put the young Sultan Selim III and his spiritual mentor on the same page.

The New Order and its Discontents

Determined to address Ottoman military failures, Selim III and his advisors made a realistic assessment. The Ottoman preference for pulling troops from multiple domestic sources had by now shown some obvious disadvantages. The various corps had overlapping responsibilities, ill-defined interrelationships, and no unified command. Significant authority for recruitment and supply lay in the hands of notables and their private guards and militias.⁹ Even among the standing palace corps, confusion reigned about actual numbers and their supposed activities. Selim burst out, “My God, what kind of situation is this? Two of the barbers who shave me say they are members of the artillery corps!”¹⁰ Indiscipline and a culture of negotiated compensation enveloped seemingly everyone, from troops to commanders to suppliers. The case of Russia itself offered an apt comparison, where Peter and Catherine had managed to override entrenched military and financial interests, over time and at some cost.¹¹ Like Abdülhamid before him, Selim and his advisors sought French advice. Istanbul needed a cutting-edge artillery, European style, and a small, intensively trained, rapidly deployable crack infantry corps. It was clear that the janissary corps could not fulfill this function.

Palace aims – to exert personal control, limit privatization, and marshal all internal resources to meet the Russian challenge – clashed with two powerful groups. One was the wealthy provincial notables, and the other was the armed forces of the extended Ottoman household. Both were heavily invested in the current model of Ottoman government, though they were at odds with each other.¹² The palace was satisfied with neither, as hinted in its chosen method of dealing with Küçük Kaynarca’s war indemnity. Shares (*esham*) of estimated annual revenues of key tax sources were sold to raise the funds. A kind of precursor to government bonds,¹³ they had another

salutary effect, namely to expand the social base of stakeholders.

Local notables took umbrage at reforming efforts emanating from the imperial capital mostly because they saw themselves as Istanbul's partners, providing manpower, goods, and services, including tax collection. Besides the Caniklis of Samsun, already encountered, others probably as well had come to think in terms of an Ottoman commonwealth, overseen by the Ottoman dynasty in Istanbul to be sure, but acknowledging their own local authority.¹⁴ With Istanbul preoccupied in the Black Sea, conditions elsewhere often had locals taking matters into their own hands. Sometimes this meant merely that town and village notables acted to protect their own assets, outside the areas of direct military deployment in Istanbul's wars. But also markets of production, consumption, and trade both home and abroad were in continual development, under quite specific conditions that were best managed locally.¹⁵ Relations with Istanbul grew strained, by differences in priorities and by growing mutual mistrust. In certain areas, prominent notables built personal fiefdoms. These powerful men (often referred to as *ayans*) had roots in regional notable households and aggressively manipulated evolving local networks. And they became quite wealthy. In places where no single lord or family monopolized financial control, competition ran between rival families. Everywhere, the financial potential opened up by revenue contracting fueled related forms of small credit and domestic production, in innumerable regional variations.

The privileged status of the standing army, and the strength of its commercial networks, made it the second formidable foe of increased royal authority. To cut into its power, Selim tried to separate military from administrative functions, streamline rank hierarchies, and regularize recruitment. Janissary rolls were trimmed and their barracks remodeled. Updated weapons and munitions were issued. Promises were made for timely pay. Their tenacious defense of rights and privileges, however, and their opaque, spiritual guild-like organization made the janissaries seem impervious to reform.¹⁶ In the

public attitudes towards the corps it was difficult to disentangle class resentment and envy from bigotry against its Bektashi spiritual commitments. Concomitantly, the rhetoric of reform could sometimes take recognizably Sunni tones,¹⁷ though Sunnis themselves were divided. Progressive Muslims like Sheikh Galib, who became Selim's spiritual guide and also master of the Mevlevi lodge at Galata after 1790, supported reform. But not all Sufis were progressive, not even all Mevlevi – the master of the Mevlevi home lodge in Konya lined up on the other side. A knee-jerk Sunni rejection of novelty could come out as pious cultural chauvinism, and could also provide cover for very worldly financial self-interests.

Selim's signature program was the *Nizam-ı cedid*, the "New Order," mainly a new army under palace direction, with a naval technical school, an army engineering school, European officers, training, and uniforms, and a separate funding arm, the New Order Treasury (*İrad-ı cedid*). It received earmarked funds from the tribute of the Holy Cities, from confiscated life-term revenue contracts, and from incomes of non-functioning timars. The manpower came from Turkish Muslim villages, whose boys were recruited by governors and commanders in the province of Anatolia. Spiritual life was to be directed by Sheikh Galib, who was appointed corps chaplain. The initial rollout seemed unpromising, with an undisciplined body of men taking their recruitment as a license to raid the countryside and officers unable to control them. Provincial notables, who knew the situation best, were shut out of the process.¹⁸ In any case the reform was barely in its infancy when Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt at the head of an invading French army and Sheikh Galib died of tuberculosis, just 42 years old.

The French invasion shocked the Ottoman court. France had rebuilt its overseas commerce after the Seven Years War (1756–63) partly because old agreements with the sultans gave it competitive advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean. French luxury goods found a market in Egyptian Mamluk households, and Egyptian agriculture

responded with exported rice and wheat. French merchants built a network of Ottoman Christian clients, who thereby enjoyed the French privileges through consular protection.¹⁹ The Ottoman government's close relations with France and trust of French military advisors had survived all the ups and downs of the previous century, including the French Revolution. But after Bonaparte beat the Habsburgs in northern Italy, France suddenly seized the Ionian Islands, and in the summer of 1798 Bonaparte landed in the Nile Delta, took Alexandria and occupied Cairo. The occupation was not intended to be temporary: France sent armies of engineers to dig a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, armies of archaeologists to study Egyptian antiquities, and armies of soldiers to expel the British from the Red Sea and take the fight cross the Sinai into Palestine.²⁰ Yet Ottoman defenses at Acre held under Ahmed Cezzar Pasha, the governor of Sidon, with naval support from Istanbul and Britain and a contingent of New Order troops sent by Sultan Selim. The French evacuated Syria and were driven from the Ionian Islands. Ottoman troops retook the Delta and the French surrendered in August 1801.²¹

Provincial Strongmen

Brief as Bonaparte's invasion was, it destroyed the structure of governance in Egypt, shook up Ottoman ayans, and reverberated to Ottoman neighbors in the Caucasus and Arabia. Agha Muhammad Khan, the eunuch warlord of the Qajar Turkmen who had taken power in Iran, moved to re-establish Iranian rule in the Caucasus. Although Tsarina Catherine's death delayed a Russian response, as soon as France left Egypt Tsar Alexander annexed the Georgian kingdoms, demanded recognition of his candidate for the Armenian patriarchate in Etchmiadzin,²² and put Daghestan under Russian protectorate. A few Muslim rulers held out, including the khans of Erevan and Ganja.²³ In central Arabia, Egyptian events played into the hands of the Saudi-Wahhabi coalition. Their armies raided Karbala, destroyed the dome of the Mosque of Imam Hussein, and looted its treasury.²⁴ (Even Tamerlane had left that alone.) They sacked Mecca in spring 1803, with eyes on the prized Red Sea carrier trade and pilgrimage riches. Contemptuous of Ottoman orthodoxy, the Wahhabis destroyed tombs, domes, and anything else that fell short of their legalistic Islam. The Ottoman governor of Damascus tried to comply with Wahhabi demands, enforcing dress codes on non-Believers, and forbidding alcohol, music, prostitutes, and shaving on the hajj, but it was pointless. The Wahhabis still turned the pilgrimage caravan back from Mecca.²⁵

In Egypt, the French landing shattered the Qazdağlı lock on provincial finance and politics and threw the door open to brutal competition. Istanbul sent troops under a new Ottoman governor, Hüsrev Pasha, to take direct control of Egypt for the sultan.²⁶ But in the post-invasion confusion it was Mehmed Ali, a junior officer and deputy commander of three hundred Albanian men in the Ottoman army, who surprisingly emerged as the strongest man in Egypt. After the French evacuated, the Albanian contingent mutinied and overthrew Hüsrev Pasha. An outsider to the Egyptian political and

social mix, Mehmed Ali tamed his Albanians, sent Hüseyin Pasha packing to Istanbul, and by 1805 was rewarded with appointment as the Ottoman governor. He aimed to imitate Sultan Selim's New Order and transform Egypt into a model Ottoman province.²⁷ This meant facing down the Mamluk family firms and their company militias who, having sat out the war in Upper Egypt, now found their property confiscated and their positions given to ordinary Egyptian Muslims and Coptic Christians when they returned.

The French interlude also stretched Istanbul's relationship with provincial officials elsewhere. One of the most powerful was Ali Pasha of Janina. From a notable family of Albanian Bektashis, he got his start in Ottoman service in the 1770s as an officer in the local paramilitary bands that protected the mountain passes, inland from the Adriatic and overland from Janina to Skopje, Nish, and Belgrade. Ali Pasha turned his appointment as chief of security (1787) into a major military command within a few years. Control of policing allowed him to expand his land holdings and take over the agrarian revenue contracts for the Janina area. He effectively played off Albanian tribal forces against Greek rebels in the Morea. By the time the New Order was birthed in Istanbul he was easily the most powerful man in Rumeli. He more or less obliged the Istanbul government to give him the governorships of Janina and Tırhala. His authority reached a huge area, from Janina to Tırhala and from Lake Ohrid to the Gulf of Corinth. Ali Pasha, who probably spoke very little Turkish, made demotic Greek, the language of the great majority of his subjects in central Greece and the Morea, the language of his court.²⁸ Wealthy Greek patrons established schools and the Ottoman Greek cultural revival of the Danubian Principalities found a second home in Ali Pasha's Janina.

After Bonaparte's invasion, Ali Pasha's relationship with Istanbul depended on how he partnered with Selim III.²⁹ He had his sights set on the Ionian Islands and their mainland ports, keys to the Adriatic commerce and its revenues,³⁰ taken by France. He expected that his

reward for contributing to the Ottoman victory over the French would be to add the mainland ports and the islands to his own governorship. He was infuriated when instead the Ottomans collaborated in an independent “Septinsular Republic,” protected both by Ottoman troops but also the very Russian troops who had aided disgruntled Greeks in the Morea against himself.

Osman Pasvanoğlu was Ali Pasha’s counterpart in the Danube Valley.³¹ Pasvanoğlu’s father, a wealthy Bosnian Muslim landlord from Tuzla, had been a senior janissary commander. The family held some land around Vidin, on the Danube east of Belgrade, and had a fractious relationship with the Istanbul authorities. When his father was executed in 1788 Pasvanoğlu fled to Albania. There he leveraged his janissary credentials to raise a personal militia for Ottoman service against Austria. This got him reinstated to his father’s lands with the government *cizye* contract back at Vidin. His raids into Wallachia violated the treaty terms of Jassy, but his administration of Vidin won the appreciation of local Christian and Muslim public figures, who signed a letter of support. Over the next fifteen years Pasvanoğlu ran the eastern Danube and the rich Kraina valley, maximizing its agrarian potential and carrying on a strong commerce with Austria. Vidin, his home base, became a provincial expression of Ottoman Muslim culture, centered on Pasvanoğlu’s generous trust complex and public works.³²



Figure 6.1: Minaret of Pasvanoğlu's mosque, Vidin, with its unusual, spade-shaped emblem. The mosque and library of Pasvanoğlu's trust complex were restored in the early 2000s.

Photo courtesy of Milena Methodieva.

Pasvanoğlu resolutely opposed the reforms of Selim III and faced the constant antagonism of Istanbul, in the person of the commander of Belgrade castle and the governor of Rumeli. Selim raised an army from all over the empire to break him, led by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha

and including contingents from rival strongmen trying to prove their Ottoman bona fides, such as Ali Pasha of Janina. Pasvanoğlu's janissary allies seized Belgrade in December 1801, backed by the local mufti, who was miffed at the sultan for enlisting Christian mercenaries in his army. Pasvanoğlu was finally brought down by a coalition made up of Muslims loyal to Istanbul, armed Christian villagers, and their Christian and Muslim officers, all led by the Serbian Orthodox notable Kara George Petrović. Though he continued in Ottoman service, Pasvanoğlu was passed over for command against Russia in 1806 and died in January 1807.

Alemdar Mustafa and the Pact of Agreement

Nor could Istanbul itself be unaffected by the French invasion. Near civil war broke out when Sultan Selim announced plans to extend the New Order to Rumeli. Dissenting opinions were expressed at court, but Selim still saw Russia as the greater threat, and hoped for French support. After Bonaparte's victory at Austerlitz, Selim expelled Russia's puppet hospodars from the Danubian Principalities, and in the summer of 1806 sent a New Order force to begin conscription in Edirne. In coordination with anti-Nizam factions at court, the Thracian strongman Tirsiniklioğlu Ismail forced the sultan to back down. Turmoil continued over the next several months as Russia occupied the Principalities and blockaded Istanbul. When janissaries murdered a New Order officer at a Bosphorus fort, Selim lost control of the situation. With rioters in the capital streets, Selim was deposed and confined in the palace on 29 May 1807. He was replaced on the throne by Mustafa IV. Janissary rebels assassinated the grand vezir and several officers and began dismantling the New Order.

Whether for or against the New Order, most provincial notables wanted no part of janissary control of the empire. One, Alemdar (or Bayrakdar) Mustafa, a capable veteran who had taken over Tirsinikli's command in Thrace, began to perceive the New Order as the only means to forestall this eventuality. He marched into Istanbul and restored a semblance of order, but when Mustafa IV refused to make him grand vezir, he threw his hands up in exasperation and returned to his headquarters at Rusçuk, accompanied by a few resolute partisans of Selim III. In the summer of 1808 Istanbul's international position worsened. Russia and France signed the Tilsit agreement, Russian troops still occupied the Principalities, and Kara George's insurgency spread in Bosnia. Alemdar Mustafa marched back into Istanbul, this time to overthrow Mustafa IV and return Selim to the throne. But before Alemdar's troops could get the palace gates open, Mustafa's thugs caught Selim and murdered him in the harem. Selim's

younger brother, Prince Mahmud, just escaped onto the rooftops of the palace as a palace slave woman threw hot embers at his would-be assassins. Alemdar immediately made him Sultan Mahmud II.³³

Now grand vezir, after the coup Alemdar Mustafa convened an assembly of leading statesmen and notables. They met in Istanbul in October and drew up a Pact of Agreement (*Sened-i İttifak*). By the terms of this pact, the sultan would reaffirm the Ottoman model of provincial governance; revenue contractors pledged the imperial treasury its due; ayans committed themselves to good government and to raising troops both in defense of the empire and of the palace in the event of rebellion; and the grand vezir would uphold the laws of the empire (*kanun*) as the sultan's deputy. Essentially, the Pact of Agreement was an alliance between the provincial notables and the grand vezir, against the janissaries and standing palace cavalry, which "the sultan was invited to ratify."³⁴

Alemdar Mustafa began putting a new army together right away to give it teeth. The force, the New Sekbans, was the return of Selim's New Order thinly disguised, even housed in the same barracks. Seeing through it, the janissaries mutinied at the evening fast-breaking meal at the end of Ramadan, 14 November 1808. Next day Alemdar Mustafa was killed in a suspicious explosion at the grand vezir's headquarters, together with his bodyguards, as well as hundreds of janissaries. Sultan Mahmud quickly executed Mustafa IV, the only living male of the Ottoman family besides himself, and called the signers of the Pact of Agreement to his side as a janissary mob stormed the palace. An all-out battle ensued. The navy bombarded the janissary barracks from the Golden Horn. Fire broke out and burned large sections of the old city of Istanbul, killing thousands of people. When it was over the janissaries had surrendered, but the New Sekbans were disbanded. Vigilantes murdered many of the soldiers and provincial notables who had fought for the New Order and the Pact of Agreement. Secure on the throne, Mahmud got Russian withdrawal from the Principalities and peace in the Treaty of

Box 6.3: Astrological Musings of an Anonymous Ottoman,
1809

The year after the tumultuous accession of Sultan Mahmud II, someone pondered the meaning of events and jotted notes about astronomical occurrences and major dates in Ottoman history, on the last page inside the back cover of an unrelated codex. The person might have been the book dealer Esad Efendi, who owned the manuscript and a few years later founded a library and donated it, along with several thousand others from his personal collection.

conjunction, every 960 years by traditional calculations. They mark dramatic political changes. Along the way, four middle conjunctions, also associated with major political upheavals, occur when the pattern passes into a new “triplicity” of the Zodiac, traditionally every 240 years – though a more accurate figure, of 200 years, was used by the writer of these notes. He noted that one such middle conjunction occurred in the year the Ottoman dynasty emerged, which he dated to 687 (AD 1288), and that the next one would be due in 1287 (AD 1870–71).^a

^a I owe a debt of thanks to Cornell Fleischer and Tunç Sen for their help in interpreting this document.

The Old Order Divided

During the rest of his long reign Sultan Mahmud sought to bury the Pact of Agreement in concept – it was already a dead letter in fact – and strove instead to recreate Ottoman royal authority for modern times. The immediate cost was an unprecedented breakdown in relations with the governor of Egypt and the fracture of Ottoman Muslim society. Mahmud may have been somewhat naïve about the long-term viability of his own effective coalition – palace, ulema, and international capital, and its instinctive grounding in popular Islam. Yet to his mind the alternatives were few, and the destructive capacity of international financial systems evolved in the doing.

Mehmed Ali, the Wahhabis, and the Holy Cities

The backlash against the New Order in Istanbul was instructive for Mehmed Ali. He faced a similar situation in Cairo – entrenched opposition from the Mamluk notable households and his own Albanian troops. Mehmed Ali acted ruthlessly against both, making use of a joint attack with Sultan Mahmud II against the Wahhabis. Fortresses along the pilgrimage route to the Hejaz were readied, and a rapid shipbuilding project turned out dozens of vessels at Suez. In March 1811 Mehmed Ali invited leaders of the Egyptian financial aristocracy to a reception in the Cairo citadel to kick off the campaign. As they processed ceremonially through the narrow entry into the court, Mehmed Ali's Albanian troops opened fire, killing more than four hundred. In a bloody purge over the next few days more than a thousand Egyptian household heads were hunted down and murdered in Cairo alone, their homes ransacked, their wives and daughters violated. On a march up the Nile Mehmed Ali's oldest son Ibrahim rounded up and executed hundreds more.

Then the Wahhabi war was launched, with Ibrahim in command. Ibrahim exploited cracks in the Arabian alliance to crush the fledgling Saudi-Wahhabi kingdom and capture Emir Abdullah ibn Saud.³⁵ Three Wahhabi leaders were hauled off to Cairo and then Istanbul, publicly abused and beheaded, Abdullah on the Hippodrome in front of Hagia Sofia. Their bodies were put on display and then dumped into the sea. Congratulations arrived from all over.³⁶ The Hejaz had returned to Ottoman sovereignty; the pilgrimage caravans from Cairo and Damascus reached Mecca as of old; the riches of the coffee trade and of the Indian Ocean commerce flowed through Cairo and Damascus once more. Conveniently and perhaps with malice aforethought, the toll of disease, extreme heat, and battlefield losses decimated Mehmed Ali's troublesome Albanian army. Although they had brought him to power and formed the core of his support, he found them a public nuisance and was determined to eliminate them and build a new,

disciplined army. This he did at first from Sudanese slaves, and eventually from conscripted Egyptian villagers.³⁷

Taking his cues in turn from Mehmed Ali, Sultan Mahmud commenced a parallel campaign, starting against the lesser ayans. The commander was Halet Efendi, who won the sultan's respect despite his connections to the janissary corps. Sent to Iraq in 1810, Halet Efendi adroitly assembled a coalition to depose Küçük Süleyman Pasha, the strongman of Baghdad, and return Mesopotamia to Istanbul's control. After repeating this success against several lesser lords, in 1820 he was charged with bringing down Ali Pasha of Janina. From the sultan's perspective, Ali Pasha had made valuable contributions against Russia in the war of 1806–12, but his diplomatic approaches to Britain and France, independent of policy formulated in Istanbul, were too much. Ali Pasha was stripped of his titles and squeezed by Halet Efendi onto an island fortress in Lake Janina. He died in January 1822.

The Greek Rebellion

Seeing Ali Pasha's Greek fiefdom brought down, in January 1821 commoners called upon God and the sultan to end Phanariot abuses in the other Greek stronghold, the Danubian Principalities. The people of the Principalities had hosted three wars since 1768 and suffered through a savage experience during the last one.³⁸ Led by a moderately successful Romanian landowner named Todor Vladimirescu, the insurgents burned and pillaged their way to Bucharest.

At this news a Phanariot native son, Alexander Ypsilanti, abroad in Russia getting his education, leapt into action. He and his men had nothing in common with Romanian village revolutionaries. They wanted not to overthrow Phanariot rule so much as to transcend it in a Romantic restoration of Byzantium. In this they had the blessing of the tsar. Son of a former hospodar, appointed to Tsar Alexander's general staff without any military experience, Ypsilanti was head of a secret Greek idealist movement based in the Crimea, called *Philiki Hetairia*, the Society of Friends, with a membership throughout the Ottoman Greek world, even in the Church hierarchy in Constantinople.³⁹ Hoping they had not missed their moment, Ypsilanti and his men crossed the Prut, encouraging a general uprising. Mobs of Greek Christians massacred Muslims as they marched on Bucharest.

Janissary troops were sent to respond. Not to be outdone, they pillaged the affluent Greek villages along the Bosphorus on their way north. As they arrived in the Principalities, Ypsilanti fled over the mountains to Transylvania. (Repudiated by the tsar, he was captured and died in an Austrian prison.) Phanariot gangs captured Vladimirescu and tortured him to death. Back in Istanbul, janissary guards grabbed Patriarch Gregorios after the Easter service and hanged him at the gate of the patriarchate.⁴⁰ A pitiable group of Jews were made to drag the patriarch's body through the streets and throw it into the sea. Though he was an old friend of one of the rebel

leaders, the patriarch had been no fan of Ypsilanti, and had denounced him when ordered to do so. But the Greek rebellion was spreading, an assassination plot against the sultan had been discovered, and Gregorios became the scapegoat.

Violence against Muslims in the Principalities, the Morea, and the Aegean islands crossed paths with riots against Christians in Istanbul, Izmir, and other major cities, and cycles of revenge threw many assumptions of the Ottoman order into high relief. The unrest had local targets and little overt coordination – local notables, whether shipping magnates in the Aegean or village elders in the Greek hills, opposed all outside authority whether it be Ali Pasha's agents from Janina or the Ottoman government in Istanbul. Sultan Mahmud modeled a new kind of sovereign, interacting generously with citizens on trips into the countryside, yet also shared many of the inbred attitudes of Ottoman Muslims. Accustomed to the natural fitness of Muslims to rule, he was genuinely stunned by the Greek rebellion.⁴¹ Like many a European sovereign of his time, he was incredulous at the representative assembly – was this the Greek government? “Unspeakable nonsense,” he said.⁴²

Not even Halet Efendi, who had finished Ali Pasha of Janina, could contain the Greek rebels. The sultan turned to Mehmed Ali of Egypt, offering him the governorships of Cyprus, Crete, and the Morea in return for use of his Egyptian army. Mehmed Ali agreed, and disciplined troops under Ibrahim suppressed the rebellion first in Crete. Landing in the Morea in February 1825, they slowly restored order. Missolonghi, on the Greek mainland, fell after a siege that lasted a year, and Athens in August 1826. Only Nauplion and Corinth remained in rebel hands.⁴³ In Istanbul, a new patriarch petitioned the throne for amnesty for everyone involved in the seemingly failed Greek rebellion.⁴⁴

The End of the Janissaries

As of summer 1826, then, it seemed quite possible that Egypt, Albania, mainland Greece, Crete, Cyprus, and the Hejaz might be unified under Mehmed Ali's governorship. By the sultan's offer, the Ottoman Empire might split not into "Europe" and "Asia," with Istanbul straddling the two, but rather into a Black Sea zone ruled by the sultan in Istanbul and a Mediterranean zone, governed from Cairo by Mehmed Ali.

Several factors prevented this outcome. One was foreign intervention. The Greek rebellion had fired imaginations abroad, where assumptions were of Ottoman Muslim *mis*-rule, and where dreams envisioned a restoration not of Byzantium but of Periclean Athens. In the English-speaking world the whole complicated situation was somehow reducible to the Rebirth of Greece. Volunteers began arriving, Lord Byron most famously, and hundreds of other "Philhellenes," nicknamed the Byron Brigade. A Scotsman, George Finlay, wrote an early history of the movement, describing its dreams and atrocities. George Jarvis, the first American volunteer, kept a journal that survived his own death at Argos a few years later. Jarvis's combat experience left him disappointed with the Greek irregulars, who fought not for grand ideals but for booty and slaves, and sold their own for the price of a captive.⁴⁵ While Egyptian troops mopped up the Morea, Tsar Nicholas I, who rose to the Russian throne in December 1825, noisily demanded a return to the *status quo ante* in the Danubian Principalities, and Russia and England insisted on negotiations. Mahmud II protested in the standard idiom of European diplomacy – these were rebels against a legitimate sovereign, and so how was this not an internal Ottoman affair?⁴⁶

More important than foreign intervention, however, neither Mehmed Ali nor Sultan Mahmud II favored partitioning the empire. As he aged Mehmed Ali felt personally ambivalent about his reach beyond Egypt's borders, not wishing to challenge the prestige of the

Ottoman sultans and conscious of his own humble origins. He wanted his family to enjoy the rewards of his success, yet he loathed a legacy as a rebel against Ottoman sovereignty. And far from a willingness to share the Ottoman Empire with a partner, Sultan Mahmud ruthlessly eliminated roadblocks to his personal authority.⁴⁷ He executed his erstwhile enforcer, Halet Efendi, and seized his sizable assets after imprisoning and torturing his Jewish banker.⁴⁸ Galib Pasha, earlier in the retinue of Alemdar Mustafa, became grand vezir, and a suitable chief mufti was installed. Then the sultan turned on the janissaries. He ran quickly through seven janissary agas in three years, searching for someone pliable.⁴⁹ Finding no one, he attacked.

At an assembly in the mufti's offices in May 1826 Galib Pasha bluntly announced the abolition of the janissaries. A brand new corps was to be created from within its ranks. Such a move had been in discussion for a while. The resemblance of its own scenario to Peter the Great's struggle with the Streltsy had already occurred to the Ottoman court. The Ottoman military had felt first-hand the results of reform carried out in Russia over the previous century, and Mahmud and his advisors had studied it closely – for example, the Grand Dragoman Yakovaki made an Ottoman translation of Jean Henri Castéra's popular *History of Catherine II, Empress of Russia* in 1813.⁵⁰ On janissary payday two weeks after the grand vezir's announcement, the treasury would not honor old pay tickets. Fights broke out, and the troops barricaded themselves in their barracks. Mahmud pulverized the building in an artillery barrage and burnt it to the ground, killing everyone inside.

A furious purge followed, surpassing even Mehmed Ali's earlier pursuit of the Mamluks. Ad hoc courts interrogated any survivors found in Istanbul. Some loyal men were kept on in new units, especially the artillery. Even the term janissary was abolished. The army Mahmud built to replace the janissaries was a civilized, modern army, fighting not for slaves and captives, not for body parts (ears, noses) and cash rewards, but for high ideals. It seemed to be the New

Order in all but name – but the name was important. Selim’s *Nizam-ı cedit* referenced the value of the modern, the revolutionary, perhaps the foreign. Mahmud’s army was the *Muallem asakir-i mansure-yi Muhammadiye*, the “Trained Soldiers Granted Victory by Muhammad.”⁵¹

Persecution of the Bektashis

The attack on the janissaries brought full government force against a powerful financial sector of Ottoman society and its best organized center of opposition to royal authority. As the name of the new army suggests, religious conflict was inherent in the assault. Since in the popular mind janissary meant Bektashi, by analogy janissary “sedition” was equated with Bektashi “heresy.” Some janissaries had crosses tattooed on their arms, it was rumored – proof enough for the prejudiced that Bektashis were actually non-Believers in disguise.⁵³ Some years earlier, general reforms for Sufi orders had been issued – sheikh appointments had to be centrally registered and involve the grand mufti, with no gifts or bribes; each order’s administrative center had to be at the founder’s tomb lodge; and the vakıf of each lodge was put under a newly created Imperial Directorate of Trusts.⁵⁴ But this was no reform. The whole Bektashi order was banned, all its branches and sects, and all its lodges closed. Property and assets of the entire Bektashi order were confiscated by the Ottoman central treasury. Lodges were demolished if less than sixty years old, older ones converted into Sunni mosques or lodges. Several Bektashi *babas* were executed, the rest sentenced to be schooled in proper Islam by Sunni sheikhs. Local imams were told to identify Bektashis and turn them in. Driven underground, Bektashi groups met in secret – or, sometimes, in their old lodge as their compassionate Sunni guardians looked the other way.⁵⁵



Figure 6.3: Firefighters in Istanbul, about 1875, photo by Abdullah Frères. When the janissaries were outlawed in May 1826, auxiliary units were also shut down and their tasks reassigned. Firefighting in Istanbul was taken over by the Armenian patriarchate. It faced a stern test before the end of summer with a huge fire – probably arson by ex-janissaries.⁵² After the fire a stone fire tower on the highest point of the city, designed by the Armenian royal architect Krikor Balyan, replaced the burned down former wooden tower.

Photo used by permission of Art Resource, New York.

Interfaith understanding had taken a hit with the Greek rebellion. Sunni piety mixed openly now with patriotism, and sober Sufism was in. Even the austere Naqshbandi order was getting a hearing, propagated by a rigidly exclusivist sheikh in Damascus. About half of the fifty or so new lodges built in Istanbul during the century belonged to Naqshbandi and like orders. The main lodge of Haji Bektash was turned over to a Naqshbandi sheikh. The Mevlevi did not lose their privileged status. Selim III was close to Sheikh Galib, Mahmud II maintained a connection with the Mevlevi lodge at Yenikapı,⁵⁶ and new Mevlevi lodges were being built.⁵⁷ Later,

Pertevniyal, mother of Sultan Abdülaziz, sponsored renovations at a major mosque at Rumi's tomb in Konya. As Sunnis hurried to show their zeal, Mahmud could count on public support. Ottoman Sunnis affirmed their allegiance to an invigorated royal authority, but they did so by colluding to violently strip a potent native Ottoman commercial class of its investment capital.

Istanbul and Cairo

Mahmud read well the public mood, which was supportive of reform so long as it revitalized Ottoman Sunni Muslim society. But he misread his military readiness. Mistakes led to a disastrous confrontation in which Britain, France, and Russia blockaded the Morea on behalf of the beleaguered Greek insurgents. In October 1827 the combined Turkish and Egyptian navies were sunk at anchor in Navarino Bay.⁵⁸ In the war that followed Russia took Kars and Erzurum in the Caucasus, and Varna and Silistre on the Black Sea. The Ottomans surrendered to avoid a siege of Edirne. In the terms of peace the independence not just of Greece but Serbia too was all but assured. Although the sultan could still appoint the hospodars of the Danubian Principalities, he lost meaningful input into their affairs. Kars and Erzurum returned to Ottoman sovereignty, but Russia annexed Georgia and eastern Armenia. The Black Sea was open to free trade and commercial vessels passed unhindered through the Straits. The Ottoman government paid a huge indemnity.

The Ottoman defeat brought the sultan and the governor of Egypt to loggerheads. Cairo, the greatest city of the empire after Istanbul and its only true rival as a commercial, intellectual, and cultural center, was never more Ottoman in outlook than under the leadership of Mehmed Ali. He was an Albanian Ottoman who spoke very little Egyptian Arabic. His mosque in the Cairo citadel made a striking statement of Ottoman visual simplicity above the city. Yet Mahmud's drive to bring all provinces under central supervision contradicted Mehmed Ali's parallel aim in Egypt.⁵⁹ Mehmed Ali was one of Mahmud's models for military reform, but at the same time he was one of the strongmen the elimination of whom was the main point of that reform. Mehmed Ali answered Istanbul's need for assistance, but the frustrating experience of putting his troops at Istanbul's disposal soured him on further cooperation with the sultan. Virtually the entire Egyptian and Ottoman navy ended up at the bottom of Navarino Bay,

the navy that Mehmed Ali himself had re-outfitted in Alexandria's docks the previous winter, after he had obligingly supplied the troops against Mahmud's Greek rebels. And the whole thing was due, Mehmed Ali believed, to Mahmud's refusal to even consider Greek independence. The debacle brought him around to his son Ibrahim's perspective: a full break with the Ottoman Empire was necessary.⁶⁰



Figure 6.4: Cairo citadel and Mehmed Ali's mosque, with Mamluk-era mausoleums in the foreground.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-104856.

In the spring of 1831 Mehmed Ali made his claim to Syria and Ibrahim invaded. Damascus and most of the major towns of Palestine and the Lebanon capitulated except Acre. Acre was put to siege, an Ottoman relief force of mostly Anatolian conscripts failed, and it fell in May 1832. Conquest of Syria accomplished, Ibrahim set up headquarters at Adana in the fall and offered an olive branch to Istanbul. Mahmud appealed to Britain and mobilized. Ibrahim's army

crossed the Cilician Gates and defeated Mahmud's forces in the snow and fog at Konya in December. By the end of January 1833 Ibrahim was at Kütahya. With no British aid forthcoming, a desperate Mahmud turned to Russia. To the great consternation of the people of the capital, fourteen thousand Russian troops landed on the Bosphorus. A treaty was brokered, by which Egypt paid an annual tribute to Istanbul,⁶¹ and the sultan had to recognize Mehmed Ali as governor of Egypt, the Hejaz, and Crete, and Ibrahim as governor of Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo and revenue contractor of Adana.⁶² Ibrahim occupied Syria for an eventful decade. The population, never really reached by Istanbul's reforms, did not take kindly to Cairo's, particularly when "reform" came down to taxation and conscription.⁶³

Although Istanbul recovered Syria in 1841, the conflict between Cairo and Istanbul permanently divided the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim, father and son, died within months of each other in 1848–49, and rule of Egypt passed down through Mehmed Ali's family thereafter. Mahmud II did not live to see the line of the last of the Ottoman provincial strongmen granted hereditary rule of Egypt (with the title Khedive after 1867, something like "viceroy"). Nevertheless the destinies of the two dynasties, Mahmud's and Mehmed Ali's, were inevitably intertwined by finance, and even by marriage. Pertevniyal, mother of Mahmud's grandson Sultan Abdülaziz, and Hoşyar, mother of Mehmed Ali's grandson Khedive Ismail, were sisters.

The Coercive State

A new set of Ottoman reforms called the Tanzimat was given ceremonial inauguration on 3 November 1839. The reforms were continuous with the centralizing actions of Selim III and Mahmud II, but more comprehensive and calling up a slightly different configuration of support. The formal decree was read out before a group of invited dignitaries at the Rose Garden (Gülhane) of Topkapı Palace. The statesman who crafted the statement, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, like the young Sultan Abdülmecid, was confident in the readiness of Ottoman society to enter a new era.

Tanzimat Structures

Whereas Selim's New Order boiled down to an army to defend the sultan, the *Tanzimat-ı Hayriye*, "Blessed Reforms," as it was known after a phrase in the Rose Garden edict, tried to ensure dynastic survival through a program of directed development for Ottoman society.⁶⁴ It also aimed to better position the Ottoman state within the emerging Atlantic commercial system, after the signing of the trade agreement with England a year earlier. The more or less autonomous state that had arisen during the second half of Mahmud's reign took on greater formality. Three branches took shape – the bureaucracy (*Kalemiye*), often known as the "Sublime Porte" after the grand vezir's headquarters; military affairs (*Seyfiye*) headed by the commander-in-chief (the Serasker); and religious affairs (*İlmiye*) under the grand mufti, now more usually called the Şeyhülislam. The grand vezir (titled the *Baş vekil*, or prime minister), appointed by the sultan, chaired a council of ministers who headed ministries organized by function. Separate ministries of the army, navy, interior, foreign affairs, finance, religion, and justice were formed over the following years. Advisory councils of experts and officials served the ministries and managed significant aspects of government activity such as trade, public works, vakıf trusts, Sufi sheikhs, and education. A Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, whose membership and authority overlapped with the council of ministers, recommended legislation to the sultan. A new civil bureaucracy grew up alongside.⁶⁵ Even interfaith relations were thought of in terms of a structure of *millets*, officially recognized religious communities.

This preoccupation with structures of governance typified the Tanzimat over several decades. Hierarchies and lines of authority were repeatedly dissolved and recreated, new laws frequently promulgated. New branches of government appeared, were reshuffled, disappeared, and sometimes reappeared. There were two related reasons for this: first, the almost incredible complexity of existing

Ottoman systems of governance, having evolved over now more than five centuries and, second, the depth of the Ottoman political culture of patronage. Often criticized as a conduit of corruption, the sheer tenacity of this political culture and its resistance to change also suggests strong bonds. It proved difficult to do away with old governmental structures and bodies, no matter how outmoded and irrelevant they might have become. The old imperial council (divan), for example, whose functions were now completely eclipsed by the council of ministers, hung on anyway as a way of channeling favors and funding to important people. Even the new bureaus and departments worked practically by patronage, emanating from the offices of the ministers. This seems inevitable when one thinks for instance of someone like Hüsrev Pasha, who had entered Ottoman government under Selim III, served as the last governor of Egypt before Mehmed Ali, became Mehmed Ali's implacable foe, and then outlived him to be a hundred years old and witness the Crimean War.

Almost as soon as the Rose Garden ceremony ended, rifts appeared in the coalition that had united in support of reform. A few people like Hüsrev Pasha, while not unopposed to change as such, avoided it when it threatened them or when they could not personally control it.⁶⁶ Besides this type of individual opposition, major cleavages opened over interrelated issues of aim and method. The palace and the "Porte," essentially the grand vezir's offices and seat of government, clashed over which had the prerogative to lead developments. Intimate relations of marriage and servitude had long linked Ottoman officials to the palace through the women of the royal household, but the new structures implied a certain autonomy for state offices. A second issue was about process: would the reforms proceed by strengthening central control, or were they supposed to limit arbitrary authority? The Rose Garden edict's sense of the rule of law, and respect of property and personal honor, hinted at the end of executions and expropriations. Reference to sharia as the basis of public law – absent in the Pact of Agreement, for instance – raised yet

a third issue, whether the aim was a strengthened *Islamic* society, or an *Ottoman* society in which all subjects were citizens alike, irrespective of communal identities.

The sultans and the civil leaders of the reform movement used what means they could to solicit public support. To a certain degree this meant speaking an Ottoman Muslim idiom, which came across as clearly Sunni. The decree abolishing the janissary corps referred to Sultan Mahmud as not only Padishah of Islam but Commander of the Faithful (*Emirü'l-mu'minîn*). This was an exclusive, caliphal title, unavailable to any rival, whether Mehmed Ali or the British rulers of Muslim India. There was a public festival for Prince Abdülmecid's memorization of the Koran.⁶⁷ After regaining Syria, Abdülmecid restored the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem as well as Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, remodeled the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina, and built a new library at Mecca. In the meantime, Mahmud had himself portrayed as a Romantic rival of Peter the Great, in frock coat and fez; Abdülmecid made unprecedented royal visits to the capitals of Western Europe; and the sultans used the empire's territory and what it contained, above and below the ground, to assert both its antiquity and its organic unity.

The common resident of the empire met the reform movement first in the tax agent and the drill sergeant. A partial population survey of adult males (1829–31) was done, not for disinterested sociological analysis but for taxation and conscription. It was conducted, at the moment of Mahmud's showdown with Mehmed Ali, by a new Office of Population, with heavy input from military leaders.⁶⁸ The survey categorized Muslims, "Reaya" (referring to Orthodox Christians), Armenians, Jews, and Gypsies. Christians were classified by ability to pay – three groups: high, middle, and low – and Muslims for suitability for military service. Muslim male conscription followed, supposedly according to quotas by province, but actually according to coercion by government officials who acted much like the provincial strongmen they were replacing. Even government

estimates put rates of desertion at roughly one in four. Ibrahim had no better success on his side of the border.⁶⁹ Compliance came by corporal punishment and constant surveillance, drill, and stern reminders of the virtue of obedience and the value of jihad in defense of the faith.⁷⁰ An Ottoman reserve army, though poorly equipped and trained, began to inculcate standards of imperial service across the countryside.⁷¹ Village men universally hated it and resisted by any means, even self-mutilation.

Funding

The Achilles heel of the Tanzimat state was the financing of it.⁷² The bureaucracy was chronically underfunded and thus understaffed, relative to its ambitions. An illicit economy flourished alongside.⁷³ Traditional “tax farming,” i.e., the privatization of most revenue collection, had evolved into quite a culture of sale, gift-giving, and entitlement, and was the main means for dispersing social patronage and favors. As we have seen, over the previous century and a half it brought personal commitment among important sectors of Ottoman society, and early bond-like instruments such as the *esham* extended this. Its popularity was understandable, and even though all could see its downside the state had a difficult time convincing its beneficiaries of the need for change. By contrast, direct state taxation was irregular, inconsistent, and unequal. The state struggled to raise revenues or momentum for common projects, since such a large percentage went to overheads – such as commissions to collectors, agents, contractors, and household firm bosses. Meanwhile, the wealth gap between this class and the weaker taxpayers grew. As a result, the staple of state budgets were the less lucrative agrarian revenues, leaving them vulnerable to the ups and downs of agricultural production. Ottoman penetration by the emerging “free trade” commercial system deepened through bilateral treaties with trading partners such as the United States (1830) and Britain (1838), but what benefit this was to the state apparatus was unclear and the cost sometimes obvious, for example with the legal limitations it placed on tariffs.⁷⁴

The result was a growing budget deficit for the Tanzimat state. In the first decade it financed this deficit on domestic credit with loans from prominent private lenders, a fairly small number of Ottoman Jewish, Greek, and Armenian Christian families known collectively as the “Galata Bankers.”⁷⁵ Indirectly, they were middle-men between foreign lenders to the Ottoman government, for profit, because of their strong connections with Central and Western European financial

institutions. The Armenian Düzian family ran the Ottoman mint until the 1820s, when Mahmud appointed Artin Kazaz, another Armenian who became the court's chief financial advisor.⁷⁶ These resources did not suffice, however, as state expenditures nearly tripled in real terms in the fifty years between the beginning of the reign of Selim III (1789) and the end of that of Mahmud II (1839).⁷⁷ Mahmud sought other stratagems. He experimented with an interest-bearing paper currency, issued at first by Tanzimat offices to suppliers, and then expanded to quasi-legal tender.⁷⁸ Confiscation of the estates of wealthy Ottomans was increasingly used and increasingly resented.⁷⁹ And there was the old standby, currency debasement, overseen by Kazaz both as a revenue generator and a calculated inflationary measure against the Russian war indemnities. After the destruction of the janissaries, which took out the major source of opposition to debasement, the silver content of the kuruş was cut by 79 percent in four years. It stabilized after 1844 at about 40 percent of its pre-1828 value.⁸⁰ By the end of the 1840s talk turned to an imperial bank, as well as the possibility of an international loan.

Orthodox and Catholic

In Jerusalem, a dispute between Orthodox and Catholic Christians became a microcosm of Tanzimat quandaries – both intensely local and thoroughly imbedded in international fiscal and political structures.

Reversion to Ottoman rule after Ibrahim's 1841 withdrawal found local notables in Syria and Palestine, Muslim and Christian, in no mood to trade Cairo's centralizing autocrat for Istanbul's. They looked for opportunities to express local initiative. Their tentative efforts were supported by Catholic and Protestant missionaries from France, England, and the United States, and by Russian Orthodox pilgrims, who contributed thousands of rubles to rebuild the Church of the Holy Sepulchre after it burned down in 1808. Diplomats arrogated to themselves roles that seemed amplified in the fluid circumstances of post-Ibrahim Syria.⁸¹ When the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem died in 1843 – he was in fact a Greek aristocrat living in a mansion overlooking the Bosphorus, 750 miles away – local electors in Jerusalem elevated their own candidate for office instead of acquiescing in the choice of Constantinople as they had always done.

The raised voices of the Orthodox did not escape the ears of Rome. Pope Pius IX worked out a deal with the Ottoman government to appoint a Roman Catholic Patriarch of Jerusalem, the first since the crusades. This move was prompted by an incident in November 1847, when during an Orthodox service the Star of the Wise Men above the Church of the Nativity suddenly disappeared.⁸² The Catholics accused the Orthodox of stealing it and a riot broke out, monks cudgeling one another with candlesticks and crosses.⁸³ The upshot was a request from France that the sultan honor a 1740 agreement giving primacy at the Christian holy places to Roman Catholics.

The Ottoman foreign minister, Fuad Pasha, was up to the challenge. He masterfully managed the incident to address Ottoman state concerns. Just months earlier, Tsar Nicholas I had put Russian

troops to the service of the young Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef in crushing the Hungarian and Polish revolutions. The Russian–Austrian chumminess raised as many concerns in Istanbul as in Paris. Thousands of refugees had fled to the Ottoman Empire, including the rebel leaders Lajos Kossuth and Józef Bem, and the Ottoman government refused requests for their extradition. On top of this, two Slavic rebellions were luring villagers in Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina burdened by Tanzimat controls, one by the Catholic noble Jelačić and the other by the Orthodox Bishop-Prince Danilo in Montenegro.⁸⁴ Louis Napoleon might use Jerusalem to drive a wedge between Russia and Austria, and revise the anti-French balance of power in Europe;⁸⁵ but for Fuad Pasha an Ottoman–French understanding over Jerusalem might bring French support for overtures to European bankers.

The reasonable solution to the shrines dispute in Jerusalem, at least to Fuad Pasha, was shared access, since Catholic desires backed by France and Orthodox desires backed by Russia were incompatible on the face of it. He drafted a clever reply to the French note, that the Ottoman Empire certainly honored its treaties but the very antiquity of the holy places meant that over the centuries many orders had been issued and declarations made to all the Christian sects. Any answer to legal rights must await a full examination of the records by a non-partisan commission. Fuad Pasha's defense of Ottoman prerogatives played well with Ottoman Muslims. The Ottoman government did appoint that commission. Its research found that Ottoman decrees given to the Orthodox over the centuries (twenty) outnumbered those to the Catholics (seventeen), and the oldest favored the Orthodox. Yet the Catholic claims too were justifiable. The commission recommended that the rights of both be put in writing, and that the Catholics should receive the "keys" of the Church of the Nativity. Naturally, this latter became the real prize.

From Jerusalem to Sevastopol

The Russian response was predictably overheated. Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov, the tsar's envoy, arrived in Istanbul with a large entourage on 28 February 1853. There were mixed feelings towards Menshikov's imperious behavior – Phanariot aristocracy, versus the Greek lower clergy, versus patriots in Greece proper. The differences were lost, however, on Ottoman Muslims and foreign observers alike,⁸⁶ who saw “immense and enthusiastic crowds of Orthodox Christians” hailing Menshikov as “their champion and savior.”⁸⁷ Menshikov demanded a formal acknowledgment of Russian protection of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, according to Russia's “ancient” rights. That this particular interpretation of Russian–Ottoman treaties bore no resemblance to their actual content went unnoticed by the tsar and his foreign minister, who had not read them.⁸⁸ That it was in fact the current Russian position meant simply that no agreement was possible, since it would amount to granting Russian sovereignty over approximately one-third of the Ottoman population.




Figure 6.5: Interior of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, 1858–59.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-104809.

Despite the stated willingness of all parties to avoid war, religious populism made war hard for any to back away from.⁸⁹ Ottoman representatives in Paris did get a loan agreement for fifty million francs, at 6 percent for twenty-three years, with a 2 percent commission. Sultan Abdülmecid at first reluctantly agreed to the terms, then repudiated the contract for fear of an Ottoman default –

but only after bonds for twenty million francs had already been sold. The reaction of European investors can be imagined, especially given the sultan's reputation for lavish palace spending. So the Ottoman Muslim masses screamed for a war that the state had no way of financing, while frustrated Ottoman statesmen complained about a naïve and "insolent" Ottoman public that still longed for the Crimea three-quarters of a century after Küçük Kaynarca.⁹⁰

Russian troops marched into the Principalities in July 1853, and the British and French gave a naval show of force outside the Dardanelles. A flurry of diplomacy followed. No concession to Russian claims of a protectorate over Ottoman Christians was going to be acceptable in Istanbul, and as the crisis escalated, the government drafted assurances to Ottoman Christians and Jews that their rights would be respected.⁹¹ In an enlarged Ottoman general council, the high command conceded that Ottoman forces were really no match for the Russians, but thought they might well slow them down for a while.⁹² Ulema members impatiently dismissed the problem of funding the war – they would pay for it with plunder! Reşid Pasha found himself having to defend the idea that yes, Christians could be reliable allies. Christians were not all the same; they too had their disagreements, much like the Ottomans and Iran, who were both Muslim.⁹³

Even as talks continued, the slide towards violence seemed unstoppable when the Ottomans declared war in October 1853 and attacked across the Danube. A late November sortie in the Black Sea provoked a Russian attack. The Ottoman fleet was destroyed, along with most of the coastal town of Sinop, and four thousand people lost their lives. Defeated in the Caucasus too, Ottoman armies fell back on Kars, as whatever Georgian sympathy existed for the Ottomans departed with the Georgian boys and girls being shipped off into slavery by Ottoman soldiers stationed in Batum.⁹⁴

Britain and France joined the Ottoman side in March 1854, after a terrible winter. Half the Ottoman garrison in Kars died in the cold,

hunger, poor sanitation, and disease. The leadership was caught in a financial scandal. Of the seventeen thousand troops still alive when new command arrived in March, eleven thousand were in hospital.⁹⁵ Tunisian troops joined the Ottoman side, sent by a governor anxious to get in good graces.⁹⁶ In August the English General Fenwick Williams took over the defense of Kars, and the garrison withstood a six-month Russian siege. Towards the end, the “gallant army” shared its bread with the starving townsmen. Without relief it succumbed in November 1855.⁹⁷ Elsewhere the outcome was different. French hopes were fulfilled when Austrian and Russian troops tore into each other in the Principalities.⁹⁸ The allies landed in the Crimea in September 1854, defeated a Russian force at the Alma River, and laid siege to Sevastopol. This siege lasted nearly a year before the Russians surrendered, through the brutal winter of 1854–55 and the whole following spring and summer. By the peace, reached at Paris in March 1856, everyone was supposed to respect Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Interminglings

Victory vindicated the alliance with France and Britain and strengthened the position of men who favored integration into the emerging Atlantic world system and alignment of Ottoman society with its liberal trends. State and provincial yearbooks and sponsored gazettes heralded the record of social progress and opened up space for a freer public expression.⁹⁹ Progress was not, however, a straight line.

The cumulative weight of new decrees and structures of governance deepened the impact of the bureaucratic state. Legislative and judicial authority were separated (in the council of state and the council of judicial regulations, respectively). A new land law (1858) and provincial law (1864) began to make some inroads against the fiscal model of revenue contracting and the entrenched power of provincial notables. Yet the two most powerful figures of the Tanzimat second generation, Fuad Pasha and Âli Pasha, who between them monopolized the posts of grand vezir and foreign minister for two decades, also nursed patronage culture along with its personal vindictiveness. Constitutionalism took root in the disaffected,¹⁰⁰ one model for which was, ironically, the Danubian Principalities. Both Moldavia and Wallachia elected the same hospodar in 1859 and passed a constitution with a parliament.

Tanzimat faith

If the state was neutral space in Tanzimat plans, the place of Islam was undefined.¹⁰¹ Just prior to the Paris peace conference, in late winter 1856, Sultan Abdülmecid issued an edict on religious equality. What exactly this meant was unclear. A new legal codification (the *mecelle*) made sharia the foundation of Ottoman law, yet this was rather vague, too, and was probably intended as an affirmation of cultural heritage. Its principle author, Cevdet Pasha, an ulema figure turned civil servant, preferred to leave Islam out of it. The penal and commercial codes promulgated after the war were essentially secular, not just because they were based on the French but because the entire impetus came from the Crimean conflict and commercial treaties with the United States and Britain.¹⁰² The *mecelle* took shape in secular courts under the direction of the Board of Judicial Ordinances, not the ulema. The whole process originated in state needs.

This accelerated the bifurcation in Tanzimat culture between the divergent interpretations of its aims: was it for directed development or the rule of law? If the rule of law, was it to be an *Islamic* society, or *Ottoman* society irrespective of religion? And in the doing, should central control be expanded? Or limited? The 1856 edict was a ringing endorsement of Ottoman pluralism, timed to preempt Paris and keep Ottoman religious freedom off the agenda. Yet the edict also came in the middle of Ottoman urban unrest in the Arab provinces. Muslim artisans, shopkeepers, and civil servants resented the mostly Christian merchants who were making a fortune in long-distance trade with Europe.¹⁰³ In the few years before and after the Crimean War, Muslim-Christian violence flared in many places – Aleppo, Mosul, Nablus, Jidda, Damascus, and the Lebanon.¹⁰⁴ While the communal equality of the 1856 edict expressed the ideal of an Ottoman religious mosaic, by using the language of *millet* – religious community – it formalized lines of religious difference and contributed to animosity against Ottoman Christians, who were seen as aligned with

foreigners,¹⁰⁵ against not just Islam. Missionary Protestantism supported from abroad compromised Ottoman Armenian and Orthodox congregations by its proselytizing, far more than Ottoman Muslim society.¹⁰⁶

Nothing raised emotions like conversion. To or from Islam, rare as it was at this point, it caused extremely hard feelings when it happened. One example is an international incident that erupted in Salonika in May 1876. A young Bulgarian woman arrived by train from Skopje and begged gendarmes in the station to take her to the authorities so she could convert to Islam. A Jewish printer who was an eyewitness reported that “They had barely walked a few steps when a bunch of Greek youths, who had been advised of her arrival, seized the young woman from their hands, publicly removed her veil and her Ottoman-style coat, and put her in a carriage.” People in nearby coffeehouses, all celebrating Hızır Ilyas Day, the mid-quarter “spring festival,” witnessed this, and next morning a crowd gathered in the Clock Tower Mosque demanding that the woman be allowed to do as she wished. The French and German consuls, who were in communication with the woman’s Greek captors, went to the mosque. Sensing extreme danger, the Ottoman governor pleaded with them to give him custody of the woman. When the consuls were unable to produce her from hiding, a riot ensued and both consuls were lynched.¹⁰⁷

Among Orthodox Slavs, Prince Michael Obrenović of Serbia orchestrated activities for Slavic unity, in parallel with other national consolidations of the 1860s.¹⁰⁸ Some Slavic priests and intellectuals, seeing themselves as living within a narrative plot of Romantic redemption, cast the era of Turkish rule as a Dark Age of subjugation and idealized Stefan Dushan and other historical figures of the pre-Ottoman past. In these times, the ancient Slavic kingdom was being awakened to its true character and would enjoy a beautiful revival in this new, modern age. Conversion to Islam was in this sense a betrayal. How then to explain the very real presence of Muslim Slavs?

In Bosnia, one popular view suggested that they were descendants of the medieval Bogomil heretics. Another view was that the medieval nobility had converted to retain their class privileges.¹⁰⁹ An especially dangerous view was that conversion must have been forced at the point of the sword – notorious proof for which was suddenly “discovered” on the last page of a 200-year-old Slavonic religious text found in Bulgaria in 1870. No one other than the publishers ever saw the supposed document, and considering the timing, in the middle of a battle over the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, not just this document but the whole issue of forced conversion was “most probably fabricated for the purpose of raising nationalist spirit.”¹¹⁰

Going back to the Greek revolt of the 1820s many Bulgarian Christians had expressed frustration with how their community’s interests were handled by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. The 1856 reform edict encouraged them to hope for a separate national Bulgarian Church. On Easter Sunday 1860 the Bulgarian community in Istanbul read prayers in the name of the Ottoman sultan rather than the Ecumenical Patriarch. The patriarchate’s efforts to reconcile over the next decade failed to satisfy the Bulgarians. In a decree in 1870 Sultan Abdülaziz granted the Bulgarian Orthodox an independent Church with seventeen regional dioceses and room for future expansion.¹¹¹ This generated intense antagonism, and not only between Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox Christians.

Race and Slavery

At the same time there are complex accounts of Ottoman pluralism after the Crimean War. One is a memoir written by a woman named Leyla Hanımefendi (Lady Leyla), who grew up in the palace of Sultan Abdülmecid. In 1925 when her memoir was first published, serialized in an Istanbul newspaper, Ottoman reminders of the Ottoman ethnic mosaic carried radically different ideological resonances. Her reminiscences were tinged with grief for a culture burnt away by the violence of the empire's end. Lady Leyla wrote fondly of an Ottoman society that delighted in "caricatures of all the races of the empire, each with his accent and peculiar traits, characteristics, and customs." There were the naïve but goodhearted Turk and the Rumelian Turk, "Proud and upright," the "terrible Albanian [who] would talk of nothing but slaughtering the whole world if he didn't get satisfaction," the unreasonable Kurd who could yet be persuaded with kindness, "the proud and avaricious Arab, the crafty and cowardly Jew," the "insinuating Armenian, the Greek involved in every conceivable trade," the Bulgarian shepherd, and the happy-go-lucky European swinging his walking stick. In popular dramas often all the characters were played by a single actor, who quickly changed his costume between scenes. Describing Ottoman social prejudices against Africans, she protested that it was "very unjust to lightly judge other human beings who are only different from us by the color of their skins."¹¹²

After the accession of Abdülaziz, Leyla married an Ottoman official and accompanied him to several provincial posts. When her husband was appointed governor of Baghdad, they separated, and Lady Leyla stayed to enjoy Istanbul high society. She wrote with deep sympathy for the plight of refugees, slaves, and others less fortunate than herself, based on the experience of her own parents. Leyla's father Ismail Pasha was a Greek born on one of the Aegean islands. He was sold into slavery in the Izmir market to a Jewish surgeon and

received a medical education in Istanbul and Paris. He became royal surgeon and performed Prince Abdülmecid's circumcision. Later, as minister of commerce, he supervised the Ottoman pavilion at the Great Exhibition of 1851.¹¹³ Leyla's mother Nefise was a Crimean Tatar who came to the Ottoman Empire with the war, like thousands of other Muslim Tatar refugees.

In the ten years following the war, Russia conquered the Caucasus and forcibly evicted the native Muslim populations, either relocating them elsewhere in the Russian Empire or, if they refused this, deporting them and giving their lands to Cossacks or Russians.¹¹⁴ First the Khanate of Daghestan and Chechnya fell, and then Abkhazia. Refugees were transported by ship to Ottoman Costanza, Varna, Samsun, Trabzon, and elsewhere, for resettlement in Rumeli and Anatolia.¹¹⁵ Disease, especially smallpox and typhus, spread from the ships to the port cities. To handle this human flood, somewhere between half a million and a million people, in 1860 the Ottoman government devised a quintessentially Tanzimat solution, a new Department of Tribes and Refugees.¹¹⁶

The refugee crisis accentuated the contradictions of Ottoman slavery. Many aristocratic Muslim landowners from the Caucasus brought their slaves with them.¹¹⁷ These were poor, agrarian Muslim slaves, different than the thousands of household slaves from the Caucasus already fully integrated into Ottoman elite society. A program of manumission was improvised with compensation for owners in the form of land grants, but it took many years to resolve the issues. The idea of abolition had come up before, in talks with Britain right after the Rose Garden edict. In 1847 Abdülmecid had closed the big Istanbul slave market, adjacent to the Nur-ı Osmaniye mosque entrance to the Covered Bazaar, and banned slave imports through the Persian Gulf. Private sales of slaves continued, however, as did the trade through other ports of entry.¹¹⁸ The fiasco in the Caucasus during the war led the Ottoman government to forbid the trade in Georgian slaves, and the African slave trade was prohibited

right after the war.¹¹⁹

Actual eradication was a different matter in both cases. The Egyptian cotton boom of the 1860s continued to feed the African slave trade,¹²⁰ and Circassian female slaves were still highly prized by elite households for their beauty – the biggest single buyer was in fact the Ottoman palace.¹²¹ Because of the illegality, secrecy surrounded each stage of the trade. African slaves, wrote Leyla, “Were captured in the depths of Africa by men without heart or pity.” Girls were destined to be household domestics. Castrated boys were valued as eunuchs in elite households all over the Ottoman world. They were “led to the coast by paths that were seldom used,” sold to Arab slave traders, resold for a profit, and transported for sale into upper-class households. Circassian slaves “were also to be pitied,” but in Leyla’s experience Circassians had worldly knowledge, compared to the Africans coming from more remote societies. Once purchased, African girls served seven years, Circassians nine, at which point they could decide to remain or be legally freed. She remembered that “In the 1860s at the time of the great immigration of the Circassians,” many destitute families, unable to feed their children, “sold them at ridiculously low prices.”¹²² Pretty girls especially were purchased, raised in an Ottoman upper-class lifestyle, and resold to the Ottoman palace or other very elite Ottoman noble families.

Music and Literature

Yet in many respects Lady Leyla's anecdotes point, like other evidence, to a heartening cultural recovery after the long period of conflict in the first half of the century. The existence of new, autonomous Greek and Slavic kingdoms notwithstanding, a sizable group of Ottoman Christians preferred Ottoman cosmopolitanism to the plebeian, provincial quality of culture in independent Greece. They continued to believe that an empire of many cultures and languages would better insure the future for the diverse peoples of the Ottoman mosaic. So it was that the century of greatest Muslim-Christian discord also produced the greatest Muslim-Christian concord, as a generation of artists, writers, publishers, scientists, educators, and others consciously redefined "Ottoman" to mean the citizens of the empire, in pluralist terms. Initially tentative cross-communal cultural contacts gained in confidence through translations and shared experiences.

Take music and reading. What became known as Ottoman classical music was the shared creation of Ottoman Christian, Jewish, and Muslim (especially Mevlevi) musicians, over several generations.¹²³ The court continued to lead. Lady Leyla's memoir described a vibrant musical life at the Çırağan Palace on the Bosphorus where she spent her youth, after the Crimean War. There were concerts or ballets a couple of nights each week. Not that the musical scene was confined to the palace. The harem orchestra of eighty women performed at Bayram and other public festivals. (They were just as good, she said, as the male palace orchestra.) They played both an Ottoman and a European repertoire. Leyla was an accomplished pianist. She also described dance groups of young boys, and Armenian and Jewish girls, entertaining crowds in the city.¹²⁴

The emerging musical culture in Istanbul, played out in non-liturgical spaces, enhanced secularizing trends within the religious communities and expressed the values of the second-generation

Tanzimat. Its most telling cultural victim, in terms of emotional power and redirected creative energies, was probably lyric poetry. But not right away: Leyla's father still made her memorize classic Ottoman poets.

The patterns were just as strong in literature. Ottoman Turkish, all seemed to agree, should be a common language. Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, French, English, Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) works all found their way into Turkish. There were so many accomplished translators and translations as to constitute a movement in Ottoman literature. Yet at the same time, something of a Greek renaissance took root within Ottoman society right alongside cultural cross-fertilization. With the Phanariot political lock broken in Istanbul, the door opened to a different generation of Ottoman Greeks. Ottoman civil officials needed training in European languages, French above all; urban Greek and Armenian Christians, who typically knew European languages, often did not know Ottoman Turkish. A large number of essential language tools, dictionaries, grammars, and primers, were produced. Re-Hellenization took root outside the major cities, too, in many small towns where the native language of Christians was Turkish – *Karamanlı*, Turkish written with Greek letters, and Armeno-Turkish, written with the Armenian script.

It took some time, after Turkish and Arabic printing presses appeared in Mahmud's Istanbul and Mehmed Ali's Cairo in the 1830s, but by the 1850s the reading public largely made the switch to books.¹²⁵ Inventories of booksellers indicate a publishing boom in the port cities, Istanbul, Cairo, Beirut, Izmir, and Salonika, in several languages, namely Ottoman Turkish, Greek, Armenian, and, in Cairo and Beirut, Arabic; Salonika was the center of Judeo-Spanish publishing. Newspapers appeared in all these languages. New literary genres enjoyed popularity, including novels and plays, but also classic devotional literature, heroic epics, and histories. Even the old advice for kings genre made an appearance in print – their defense of kanun suggested analogies to a secular basis of law in the context of debates

Box 6.4: Teodor Kasap

A leading figure in Ottoman literature was Theodor Kasap (Theodor Kasappis). A Karamanlı Greek from Kayseri, Kasap was a translator, publisher, and outspoken champion of an inclusive, cosmopolitan Ottoman culture. He spent some years in France in the close company of Alexandre Dumas. When he returned to the Ottoman lands with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war (1870), he published a Turkish translation of Dumas's *Comte de Monte Cristo* in 1870.^a The novel's modern tale of loss and longing caught the imagination of the Ottoman public. A later writer remembered that it “absorb[ed] our bespectacled grandparents’ attention for weeks and months during the winter nights.”^b The novel appeared in installments in Kasap’s paper, *Diyojen* (Diogenes).



Figure 6.6: *Diyojen*. This masthead of *Diyojen* was used for the first eleven months of publication. Diogenes of Sinop speaks from his famous tub, “Don’t trouble me, that’s all I ask.”

Diyojen, devoted to satire on current political and social issues, started out as a weekly in French, then in Greek, and eventually in Ottoman Turkish. It thrived in the post-Crimean War climate of competitive critique in Istanbul and other urban centers. By the time it was shut down by government order in 1873, it was publishing three times weekly. Kasap carried on in other publishing projects. Even during the devastating war years of 1875–78 Kasap’s paper *İstikbal* bravely proclaimed, “The Sons of the Fatherland are one body which does not admit partition by political means.”

^a Johann Strauss, “Notes on the First Satirical Journals in the Ottoman Empire,” in Pistor-Hatam, ed., *Amtsblatt*, 121–38.

^b Ismail Habib, quoted in Strauss, “The *Millets* and the Ottoman Language,” 239.

Christians and Muslims mingled in learned societies such as the official Society of Knowledge (1851–62), a self-consciously secular creation whose mission was to select, translate, and publish teaching materials in literature and the sciences.¹²⁷ Its mixed membership, Muslim, Armenian, and Greek, reads like a who’s who of Ottoman officialdom. Another, the Ottoman Scientific Society, published the first scholarly journal in Ottoman Turkish. A more successful and longer-lived Greek-language counterpart was the *Sylogos*, founded within a few months in Istanbul.¹²⁸ Even the official government gazette was published in both Turkish and Greek. One final exemplary case: an Ottoman Greek Christian, Constantine Photiadis, educated in a Muslim medrese, became director of Galatasaray Lycée, an elite government academy (founded 1867), and collaborated on an Ottoman Turkish–Greek dictionary with an Albanian from Janina.

The Past before Us

Perhaps the gist of the reorientation evident in the Tanzimat's second generation was a revised attitude towards time.¹²⁹ The calendar itself was reformed, or more correctly the fiscal calendar in use since the reform of the 1670s was adopted as the official calendar for all state business. This meant that the empire essentially used the Julian solar calendar, except that years were counted from the hegira of the Prophet Muhammad.¹³⁰ But it was more than a matter of mathematics. As the cultural prestige of lyric poetry waned and the scales slowly tipped towards music and other forms, narratives filled the emotional void.

Compared with narrative, poetry was the literary outlet of mystical experience. Its power was its capacity to express the inner world of loss, longing, and pain. Leyla Hanımefendi's anecdotal memoir also captures this loss but identifies it differently – it is a nostalgia for irretrievable experiences, for times past, for youth, for the youth of one's own children when grown. Narratives, however, both fictional and historical, sequenced time and propelled readers towards the future, where the plot would be resolved. The popularity of novels such as *Count of Monte Cristo* strongly suggests that Ottoman readers shared the modern hunger for such resolution.

In this fight over the experience of time, history emerged as the integrative discipline and, in the doing, paralleled the state's prerogative in organizing society. The court historian Şanizade was a cosmopolitan intellectual. A Bektashi and mentor of a salon that met in an estate along the Bosphorus shore, he was conversant with scholarly developments in many languages, not only Turkish, Arabic and Persian, but Latin, Greek, Italian and French.¹³¹ His successors, Ahmed Cevdet and Lütfi, included official documents in their multi-volume histories,¹³² as if narrating the contents of the state archives were history itself – the old term *devlet* meant *state* now, rather than charismatic personal authority.¹³³ Alongside these works a new kind

of world history also appeared. Some were translations of English or French books, but with state encouragement several Ottoman authors wrote original contributions.¹³⁴ As in the British and French versions, the main character of these narratives was *Civilization*. Born in antiquity, it matured to a classical glory before being plunged into a medieval era of religion and barbarism from which it was redeemed by modernity. The plot worked to rationalize secularism and modern European imperial projects. For some Ottoman writers civilization meant Islam, and thus history was divided into only two eras, before and after the hegira of Muhammad. Others accepted the three part ancient-medieval-modern scheme, and engaged the debate about when the Dark Ages ended and Modern Times begin.¹³⁵ In one fairly standard Ottoman adaptation, antiquity came to a close with the rise of Islam; the Middle Ages ended and modernity began with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.¹³⁶ Serving courses in history in the new state schools, these books made the subtle case that the Ottoman Empire embodied Civilization.

The material remains of this cultural accumulation, so coveted by its European neighbors, lay in visible ruins in its provinces, under increasingly close imperial control. Not long after the Rose Garden edict, as soon as Mustafa Reşid took office in his first term as grand vezir, an imperial magazine of artefacts was established within the palace grounds. Where Ottoman people had always lived amid the ruins, the Ottoman government now asked provincial officials to catalogue the antiquities within their domains and report them to Istanbul. Like the new Treasury of Documents, the magazine became the security chest for provincial treasures, and a statement of the empire's control over them. After Sultan Abdülaziz's European tour the magazine of antiquities became a museum, not open to the public but to the royal family, state servants, and select visitors. The Ottoman museum did not house the world, like European museums, or express the human spirit, or define the fine arts, but gathered, guarded, and cherished a new imperial identity.¹³⁷

Although decrees had long forbidden the export of manuscripts, a new antiquities law (1870) covered artefacts and archaeology as well.¹³⁸ In several instances Ottoman officials permitted French and British persons to export artefacts by informal local agreement, but two factors convinced the central government to intervene. One was the staggering volume of the materials now being sent out of the Ottoman lands; the other was the brazenness of treasure-seeking archaeologists, even decades after the removal of the Parthenon marbles by Lord Elgin.¹³⁹ The only requirement for excavation was permission, yet still some declined to ask for it. The rather generous terms of the first antiquities law allowed excavation teams to keep half of what they uncovered, yet Heinrich Schliemann secretly spirited across the border everything he excavated at Troy – he paid monetary compensation, only when confronted. Carl Humann plundered Pergamum, shipping the Altar of Zeus to Berlin.¹⁴⁰ More lay behind the obsession with antiquities than innocent intellectual curiosity, obviously.¹⁴¹ The contest to carry away the past was a species of imperialist rivalry. Allegations that the Ottomans failed to protect their artefacts were analogous to self-serving European assertions of Ottoman “misrule.” Possession of the past entitled claims to being its rightful heirs.¹⁴²

In the same year that the magazine of antiquities was created, Mustafa Reşid Pasha created a central Ottoman archives, a “Treasury (*Hazine*) of Documents.” By 1850 the archive was up and running as a repository for records of the grand vezirate and its chancery, with a director and a staff. Collections of old papers preserved in various locations and depots in the city were transferred there.¹⁴³ It served as a model for archives in other government offices and, eventually, in provincial centers.¹⁴⁴

Box 6.5: Historical Linguistics

Tremendous modern interest surrounded the supposed

relations of Turks, Hungarians, and Finns, and their possible descent from the Huns and Mongols. Philip Johan von Strahlenberg, a Swedish officer captured by the Russians at the Battle of Poltava (1709), noticed similarities between Turkic and Mongol dialects during his many years of captivity in central Eurasia. Matthias Alexander Castrén, a Finn who did fieldwork in Siberia in the 1840s, hypothesized a genetic relationship between them. Rediscoveries of old classics brought new understanding. *Shejere-i Terakime (Family Tree of the Turkmens)* by Abu'l-Ghazi Bahadur, the Khan of Khiva (1643–63), was translated into Ottoman Turkish by Ahmed Vefik, later minister of education, and printed in Istanbul in 1864. A Polish refugee of 1849, Mustafa Celaledin, who fled to Istanbul and converted to Islam, used *Family Tree* in his study *Les Turcs anciens et modernes* (published in Paris in 1870) to argue that Turkish and Latin were related – just the sort of fanciful connection that might impress readers in northwestern Europe. Mahmud Kashgari's *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects* (see [Box 1.3](#)) was found and published later, during the First World War.

The Crash of the 1290s

The reorientation of Ottoman society on this cosmopolitan compass was inseparable from the empire's financial indebtedness to European creditors. The empire was living if not on borrowed time then certainly on borrowed funds. It all came crashing down in the 1290s (that is, the years 1873–82), the final decade of the thirteenth Islamic century.

Ottoman Debt

Although Sultan Abdülmecid had backed out of the French loan of 1852, with the onset of the Crimean War the Ottoman state ran out of options. The costs of the conflict forced the sultan to overcome fears of the loss of sovereignty implied in pledging Ottoman collateral and taking on foreign debt for the first time. The first loans came secured with the annual tribute from Egypt. The state could pay off its domestic debt with funds borrowed at lower interest, and attract additional credit. Meanwhile the government of Egypt itself borrowed on the European market. In the following years the Ottoman state borrowed again, using specific, highly liquid revenues as collateral: the customs revenues of Istanbul and Izmir.¹⁴⁵

Over time these valuable assets were used up, and further foreign credit had to be tied to general revenues. Availability, therefore, depended on convincing creditors that Ottoman government accounting was reliable, which in turn meant drawing up a state budget recognizable to European banking institutions – a highly problematic task.¹⁴⁶ Ottoman budgets were built from the raw material of provincial financial reports, but in these reports the provinces had plenty of reason to overstate expenses and understate revenues. Government cash shortfalls were covered with written orders called *havale*, which amounted to forced loans from below, since their actual value often turned out to be subject to negotiation. Another problem was the porous barriers between the state budget and the palace budget, and the lack of effective restraints on the sultans' spending. Both Abdülmecid (1839–61) and Abdülaziz (1861–76) acquired reputations as big spenders. Abdülaziz, for example, wowed audiences on a lavish, first-ever trip to Western Europe by an Ottoman sultan. He even traveled to Egypt. Dolmabahçe Palace, built along the Bosphorus as a needed replacement to the aging Topkapı, was a shining venue to host the return visits of foreign monarchs and dignitaries, but it too was expensive. The sultan lived at another new

palace, Çırağan, further yet up the Bosphorus in the village of Beşiktaş. Skeptics described Ottoman budgets as approximations at best.

Ottomans were not only borrowers but also major trading partners in the emerging Atlantic world economy. Ottoman trade with Western Europe rose dramatically with the free trade agreements after 1830, above 5 percent annually until 1873. Coastal Syria, western Anatolia, and northern Greece led the expansion. More than 70 percent of Ottoman trade was with Central and Western Europe now, Great Britain surpassing France as the largest single Ottoman trading partner in both exports and imports. The volume was large enough that fluctuations in foreign trade strongly affected Ottoman society as a whole. When American transatlantic wheat exports flooded the market after the American Civil War, for example, world prices were depressed and Ottoman wheat exports fell significantly. The free trade treaties banned protectionist tariffs.¹⁴⁷

In 1863 an Ottoman central bank was founded, called the Imperial Ottoman Bank, to reassure potential creditors. Despite its name the bank was not an Ottoman venture but an Anglo-French consortium. It ran Ottoman treasury accounts, collected designated revenues, and had a monopoly on issuing paper notes against currency reserves. Ottoman borrowing rose steeply after 1865. Ottoman state spending sought funding, and at the same time foreign capital was in hot pursuit of investment opportunities, part of the speculative fervor sweeping Europe.¹⁴⁸ The wave of national unifications generated a financial bubble in urban construction and railroads in Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, and even post-Civil War America. European capital raced to assess the credit risk of the Ottoman Empire. The war between France and Germany in 1870–71 both made France abruptly withdraw from world markets and poured flammable financial fuel on the building boom in Germany and Austria. Overconfident investors lent far in excess of borrowers' realistic means to repay.

Then the Vienna stock market crashed in May 1873, and panic struck.¹⁴⁹ London and New York sidestepped the initial blowback, but overexposed British banks put the brakes on foreign securities at just the time when, with France disabled, funds were in greatest demand. Financial markets collapsed all across the continent. Credit dried up overnight.

The impact was nowhere more damning than in the Ottoman Empire. In the fall of 1873, following a lengthy drought, the wheat harvest failed on the plateau of Rum and in Bosnia. More than a hundred thousand people perished that winter, and 40 percent of the livestock on the plateau.¹⁵⁰ Ottoman revenue contractors throughout the region defaulted on their obligations to the state.¹⁵¹ Acutely in need of continued funding, the Ottoman government bowed to requests and appointed a budget commission under the control of the Ottoman Imperial Bank. This bought some time and new loans. Much of the spending went into military expenditures. Some gains appeared, but they were uneven and tended to be most evident in targeted provinces under gifted administrators. For example, Midhat Pasha piloted the provincial reform law (1864) in a totally revamped Danube Province, now encompassing Rusçuk, Vidin, Sofia, Tarnovo, Varna, Tulça in the Dobrudja, and Nish. This was a region where the Crimean War settlement had wrought profound changes.¹⁵² In Cilicia, somewhat chaotic since the withdrawal of Ibrahim's Egyptian administration in 1841, a "Reform Division" imposed order with a civil governor and troops commanded by Derviş Pasha.¹⁵³

Box 6.6: Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Anatolia Province




Figure 6.7: A large community of Orthodox Christians spoke Turkish as a native language, but wrote it using the Greek alphabet. This figure depicts a fragmentary inscription written in this Karamanlı dialect, found in Alaşehir, Turkey, the gravestone of a man named Master Vasiloglu Dimit, dated 26 July 1890.^a

Photo courtesy of Ümit Yoldaş and Orhan Sezener.



Figure 6.8: An inscription in Ottoman Turkish and Hebrew, found in Bergama, Turkey. It is a dedication marker for building renovations funded by a respected merchant, Andan Morino, dated 1295 [AD 1878]. The Hebrew quotes the Proverbs 5: 16–18, *May your springs spring out rivulets of water*

in the square; Your fountain shall be blessed, you shall be blessed with the wife of your youth. It concludes, to the Lord [Senior] Chaim Moshe our Teacher Kurkidi, may God strengthen and keep him. And I blessed him 363 [AD 1868].^b

^a Thanks to Evangelia Balta and Orhan Sezener for help understanding the text.

^b I owe a debt of gratitude to Katja Vehlow and Frans van Liere for reading the Hebrew.

The Bosnian Revolt

In Bosnia, public order broke down after the wheat failure. Because of their location and their mixed religious makeup, the provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina were at the center of explosive rivalries. According to Ottoman figures from the provincial yearbook of 1870–71, the population of Bosnia was roughly 50 percent Muslim, 36 percent Orthodox, and 13 percent Roman Catholic, with about 1 percent non-Muslim Gypsies and a small number of Jews.¹⁵⁴ The respected Ottoman governor who had implemented the provincial reform law died in 1869; Prince Michael Obrenović of Serbia, a tireless advocate of Slavic unification, died just the previous year. Without their courage and political will social relations deteriorated badly. Orthodox monks preached a narrow Slavic Christian chauvinism from seminaries at Mostar and Banja Luka, while a garish new Orthodox cathedral went up in the middle of Sarajevo. Its bells threatened to drown the voices of the muezzins, and insecure imams grew incensed that the bell tower might be bigger than the tallest minarets in town. Local demagoguery was matched by careless outside meddling. While Russian donors poured money into the cathedral, Austrian nuns built a convent and American missionaries built a school.¹⁵⁵ Encouraged by Croatian supporters and Bosnian Catholic refugees in Vienna, in the spring of 1875 Emperor Franz Josef paid an official visit to Bosnia-Hercegovina, an overt demonstration of Austrian interest.¹⁵⁶

Violence of villagers against landlords erupted in the summer of 1875. When the wheat crop failed, hungry and destitute people fled to the mountains to get out of paying taxes, and three hard-pressed landlords – two Muslim, one Christian – tried to force the issue. But this dire human problem occurred in a tense political context, and as the insurrection persisted, the ethnic and religious dimensions of the conflict became significant, and neither foreign intervention nor Ottoman concessions could settle it.

Bankruptcy

In October 1875 the grand vezir announced that the Ottoman state would only make half the interest payments on its debt. Although twice in the past (in 1866 and in 1871) payments had been delayed,¹⁵⁷ in this case the bad timing and the manner of announcing the default – a government statement in the Istanbul newspapers, without any effort to open negotiations for restructuring the debt – outraged both the Ottoman public and European creditors, who sensed Russian designs.¹⁵⁸ Efforts stepped up to mediate the Bosnian conflict, headed by Count Gyula Andr ssy, the Hungarian foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy. These failed, despite Istanbul’s acceptance of plans for financial reform and land redistribution in the province. Ottoman weakness under the circumstances seems to have steeled the resolve of Slavic Orthodox Christians, who were obsessed with Habsburg Catholic interference. And in the midst of violence, fearful Christian villagers became susceptible to propaganda. Attacks on Muslim villages coincided with the foreign intervention that was supposed to calm everything down. The partial Ottoman default in October 1875 was followed by total default in April 1876. At the very same time, partial default in Egypt brought a European financial consortium to oversee the Egyptian public debt. A similar arrangement already existed in Tunis.¹⁵⁹

At revolutionary demonstrations in three towns in central Bulgaria in May 1876 mobs attacked Turks, killing a thousand people. Ottoman troops and irregulars recruited from Muslim villages responded viciously. According to Ottoman figures three thousand one hundred Christians and four hundred Muslims died; the British consul put the death toll at twelve thousand; American sources made it fifteen thousand. In Istanbul at the end of May, Sultan Abd l ziz was deposed in a coup. Less than a week later he took his own life. Unhinged by this suicide, his successor Murad V, on whom liberal Ottoman constitutionalists had pinned their hopes, was unable to

function. The Istanbul government was paralyzed until the last day of August, when Murad was replaced on the throne by his brother Abdülhamid II. In the intervening weeks Serbia and Montenegro both declared war.

The Russo-Ottoman War

News of a rather quick victory of Ottoman armies, and of a constitution forthcoming in Istanbul, was received differently in France and Britain than in Russia. In Britain, evangelical Christians raised a stink over violence against Bulgarian Christians. Gladstone fulminated against Disraeli's Turkish alliance in a pamphlet called *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, published in September 1876.¹⁶⁰ Unlike the "mild Mohametans of India," Gladstone wrote, or the "chivalrous Saladins of Syria," or the "cultured Moors of Spain," the Turks were, "From the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-Human specimen of humanity." Men of more temperate mind in Paris and London saw no practical alternative to the Ottoman Empire, without which Russia would certainly overrun the Balkans and bondholders of the Ottoman debt would lose everything. Indeed, Russia threatened military intervention. An international conference held in Constantinople failed to avert war, as the Ottoman government led by Grand Vezir Midhat Pasha, author of the constitution that went into effect on the day the meeting opened, refused to make concessions.¹⁶¹

The war lasted only seven months and ended in Russian victory, but the human toll matched the Crimean War. Russia invaded in June 1877 on both sides of the Black Sea, at the Danube and in the Caucasus. In the Caucasus, a Russian offensive took Kars in November and surrounded Erzurum. In the Danubian plain the Ottoman fortress of Plevna held out for five months before capitulating in December. When Edirne fell in January 1878 the Ottomans agreed to an armistice. More than half the Muslim population of Bulgaria was gone by war's end – a quarter of a million died, and more than half a million were expelled to other Ottoman lands, driven out by the Russian army. The Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina too dropped by more than 30 percent, and the Serbian Orthodox population of the province by 7 percent.¹⁶²

In the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia imposed a massive war indemnity and made Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomous. Serbia and Montenegro became independent with added territory despite their having lost the war. Romania (as the unified Danubian Principalities became known), having permitted Russian troops to march through it, got the Dobruja in return for southern Bessarabia. Russia kept Batumi on the eastern Black Sea, as well as Kars. Most alarming, an enormous, autonomous Bulgaria suddenly sprawled across the map from Albania to the Black Sea, with an outlet on the Aegean Sea.

Seeing such egregious terms, especially Great Bulgaria – a facile tool of Russian domination – and San Stefano's total silence on the Ottoman debt,¹⁶³ the other European powers intervened, ordering immediate revision under threat of force. At the Congress of Berlin in June 1878 a new treaty was written. Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire attended. Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro sent observers. In the Berlin agreement, Great Bulgaria was broken up and greatly reduced in size. It was to have a prince approved by the Ottomans and would pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire; it was to be autonomous and self-governing, yet occupied by Russian troops. Macedonia was given back to the Ottoman Empire, and Eastern Rumelia was made an autonomous Ottoman province. Russia kept Kars and Batumi and southern Bessarabia. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were recognized as fully independent, but Serbia's and Montenegro's territorial gains were reduced. At Berlin, payment of the Ottoman debt was prioritized over the Ottoman war indemnity to Russia, and the newly independent states were assigned a proportional share of the debt. Finally, Austria-Hungary occupied and administered Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a separate Cyprus Convention, Britain acquired the right to occupy and govern the island of Cyprus on behalf of the sultan, in return for promises of aid against Russian attack and payment of a tribute.

There remained to deal with the Ottoman default. The combined

principal totaled over £250 million, more than ten times the annual Ottoman treasury revenues at the time of the 1873 stock market crash. Because the pieces of the debt involved very different conditions, coordination of debt service was complicated. Part was secured by the Egyptian tribute, deposited directly in the Bank of England, while part was secured on general treasury revenues and owed to several creditors. This lack of coordination among the bondholders, coupled with the renewed involvement of the Galata Bankers, was what made it possible for the Ottoman government to continue to have access to credit during and after the war.¹⁶⁴

Agreement was announced in the Decree of Muharrem, in the first month of the last year of the thirteenth Islamic century (December 1881). The agreement reduced the principal to under £100 million and the interest arrears to 10 percent of that total. Certain Ottoman revenues were earmarked for this debt until it should be retired. These included the government tobacco monopoly, the salt monopoly, the tax on alcohol, the stamp tax now that the empire was developing its own independent postal service,¹⁶⁵ the fish tax, the silk tax of specific provinces, the Bulgarian tribute payment, the revenues of the new province of Eastern Rumelia, and the surplus revenues of Cyprus.¹⁶⁶ A new institution, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, was created to manage these.

Notes

- 1 Galip, *Beauty and Love*.
- 2 Victoria Holbrook's phrase; Galip, *Beauty and Love*, ix.
- 3 Galip, *Beauty and Love*, xiv.
- 4 Galip, *Beauty and Love*, xviii–xx.
- 5 Galip, *Beauty and Love*, couplet 780, p. 77.
- 6 Stavrianos, *Balkans since 1453*, 192–94.
- 7 Stoianovich, "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," 283–91.
- 8 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 160–67.
- 9 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 181–84.
- 10 Quoted in Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 184.
- 11 Ágoston, "Military Transformation."
- 12 Note the remarks of Tilly, "War Making and State Making."
- 13 *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Esham" (Mehmet Genç).
- 14 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*.
- 15 A theme stressed by Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*.
- 16 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 192–95.
- 17 Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, 1–12.
- 18 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 180–213.
- 19 Gran, *Islamic Roots*, 6–11.

- 20 Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 155–63.
- 21 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 257–58.
- 22 Atkin, *Russia and Iran*, 46–65.
- 23 Atkin, *Russia and Iran*, 66–90.
- 24 Vassiliev, *History of Saudi Arabia*, 96–98.
- 25 Vassiliev, *History of Saudi Arabia*, 98–105.
- 26 Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 84; Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 271–282.
- 27 Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*.
- 28 Fleming, *Muslim Bonaparte*, 63–69.
- 29 Fleming, *Muslim Bonaparte*, 36–44.
- 30 Skiotis, “From Bandit to Pasha.”
- 31 Zens, “Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa.”
- 32 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 219–24.
- 33 Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 35.
- 34 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 261–65, quote at 262.
- 35 Vassiliev, *History of Saudi Arabia*, 140–47.
- 36 Vassiliev, *History of Saudi Arabia*, 155.
- 37 Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 76–111.
- 38 Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 1, 204–14.
- 39 Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity*, 398–400.
- 40 Brewer, *Greek War of Independence*, 103–6.
- 41 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 356–61.

- 42 Quoted in Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 343.
- 43 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 288–305, is an excellent summary.
- 44 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 297.
- 45 Arnakis, ed., *Americans in the Greek Revolution*, 192–93.
- 46 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 298–99.
- 47 The approach is informed by Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff.”
- 48 Reed, “Destruction of the Janissaries,” 40–61, 332–33.
- 49 Reed, “Destruction of the Janissaries,” 39–49.
- 50 Strauss, “Millets and the Ottoman Language,” 200–203.
- 51 Aksan’s translation, *Ottoman Wars*, 341, n. 39.
- 52 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 324.
- 53 Reed, “Destruction of the Janissaries,” 245.
- 54 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 274–76.
- 55 Küçük, *Role of the Bektāshīs*, 40–44.
- 56 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 276–79.
- 57 Gölpınaralı lists ninety, two-thirds in Anatolia.
- 58 Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 67–69.
- 59 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 38–55.
- 60 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 55–60.
- 61 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 363–74.
- 62 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 38–75.

- 63 Krämer, *History of Palestine*, 63–70.
- 64 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, 55–171.
- 65 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*.
- 66 I was helped by an unpublished paper of Virginia H. Aksan, “Hüsrev Pasha: The Man Behind Mahmud II’s Reforms,” given at a symposium at New York University, 2 March 2009.
- 67 Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, 53–55, 71.
- 68 Karpas, *Ottoman Population*, 18–24.
- 69 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 370.
- 70 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 112–277.
- 71 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 380–83.
- 72 Clay, *Gold for the Sultan*, 16–17.
- 73 Blumi, “Thwarting the Ottoman Empire,” 273.
- 74 Clay, *Gold for the Sultan*, 17.
- 75 Clay, *Gold for the Sultan*, 18–20.
- 76 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 200–204.
- 77 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 189, citing Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1986).
- 78 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 210–213.
- 79 Barbir, “One Mark of Ottomanism.”
- 80 Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 193–200.
- 81 Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*.
- 82 Baykal, “Makamat-ı Mübareke Meselesi.”
- 83 Temperley, *England and the Near East*, 281–86.

- 84 Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, 25–27.
- 85 Rich, *Why the Crimean War?* 18–22.
- 86 Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, 30–31.
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- 101 Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 1–24.
- 102 Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 160–172.
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- 110** Quoting Minkov, *Conversion to Islam*, 77, 80. See also Hupchick, *Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 63–65.
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- 121** Toledano, *Ottoman Slave Trade*, 115–23, 184–86.

- 122** Saz, *Imperial Harem*, 59.
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- 125** Strauss, “Who Read What?” 40–41.
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- 134** I have benefited from Nakıp, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Geç Dönem Tarih-i Umûmîler,” 19–44.
- 135** Johan Strauss, “Kurûn-ı vustâ: la découverte du “moyen âge” par les ottomans,” in Georgeon and Hitzel, eds., *Les Ottomans et le temps*, 205–40.
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- 137** Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*.

- 138 Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 83–107.
- 139 Ousterhout, “‘Bestride the Very Peak of Heaven’,” 320–24.
- 140 Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 74–75, 108–9.
- 141 Eldem, “From Blissful Indifference,” in Bahrani, Çelik, and Eldem, eds., *Scramble for the Past*, 281–329.
- 142 Jockey, “Venus de Milo,” in Bahrani, Çelik, and Eldem, eds., *Scramble for the Past*, 237–55.
- 143 Elker, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa,” 182–89.
- 144 Çetin, “Osmanlı Arşivlerinin Tarihçesi,” 63–71.
- 145 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 25–28.
- 146 Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 27–31.
- 147 Pamuk, “Ottoman Empire in the ‘Great Depression’.”
- 148 Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 31–46; Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 32–35.
- 149 McCartney, “Crisis of 1873,” 85–86, 94–97.
- 150 Kuniholm, “Archaeological Evidence.”
- 151 Ianeva, “Financing the State?” 222–23.
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- 153 Çomu, *Exchange of Populations and Adana 1830–1927*, 26–29.
- 154 McCarthy, “Ottoman Bosnia,” in Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 58–60.
- 155 Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 129–31.
- 156 Stavrianos, *Balkans since 1453*, 399.
- 157 Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 77.

- 158** Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 78–80.
- 159** Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 268–75.
- 160** Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 184.
- 161** Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, 172–82.
- 162** McCarthy, *Ottoman Peoples*, 47–8.
- 163** Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 83–84.
- 164** Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 41–54.
- 165** Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, 228–29.
- 166** Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 90–107.

Dissolution, 1882–1924

The Ottoman Empire that the generation of the Islamic decade of the 1290s (1873–82) took charge of when it reached maturity was an empire startlingly different than that even of its own grandparents. The mass immigration of Muslims, fleeing the wars and territorial losses in the Balkans and the Caucasus, brought a seismic shift in the empire's demographic balance. Debt, like defeat, reshaped the empire. The turn of the fourteenth Islamic century – the last, partial, century, as it turned out, of the empire's existence – brought apprehension and mixed expectations.

Box 7.1: Ottoman Sultans of the Fourteenth Islamic Century

Abdülhamid II 1876–1909

Mehmed V, Reşad 1909–18

Mehmed VI, Vahideddin 1918–22

In time the Ottoman constitution, though suspended by Sultan Abdülhamid II in ironic fulfillment of its own provisions, by its very existence created expectations of a more open political culture even if the sultan had no evident intention of fulfilling them. Abdülhamid was in many ways a forward-thinking monarch, and one who by his public piety might calm old Sunni nervousness about novelty. Yet old suspicions of fun still survived, in secular dress. Hence the regime's eager integration into the international order of unfettered colonial capitalism coexisted with its tedious Islamic apologetics, paranoid information management, and obsessive recriminations. Ottoman Muslims felt harassed by their intrusive government, while Ottoman non-Muslims felt both this and the regime's mean-spirited religious

chauvinism. No one was really satisfied except perhaps the administrators of the Public Debt Administration. The forecast for investment appeared promising.

The Ottoman generation of the Islamic decade of the 1290s, however, finally refused to accede to a subordinate role in an international order that both defined its empire as backward and used that definition to justify depriving it of sovereignty. The assassin's bullets that killed the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, setting off a chain of events that took most of Europe to war by the end of that summer, were not just the first shots of what came to be known as the Great War. They were retaliatory shots in a larger conflict, already underway, a conflict that might better be called the War of Ottoman Dissolution. It began not in the summer of 1914 but six years earlier, in the summer of 1908, and its first shots were fired not by foreigners but by Ottoman junior officers who took matters into their own hands. The War of Ottoman Dissolution lasted well beyond the armistice that ended the Great War, until the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in August 1923. Radicalized by their circumstances, patriotic Young Turks of this last Ottoman generation overthrew their own government, seized control of the empire, and steered it to its final ruin. The victory of "nationalist" forces – the remnants of the Ottoman army, led by Ottoman generals – forced the Entente powers to the negotiation table as the Ottoman sultan fled his empire. The last vestige of Ottoman sovereignty ended in March 1924 when parliament deposed Abdülmecid II, no longer even the sultan but just the caliph, and he drove across the border into exile.

The Hamidian Era

The background of those epic events lay in the preceding decades. Sultan Abdülhamid II was one of those Ottoman sultans whose name speaks of an entire era. Only three past sultans – Orhan (1327–61), Süleyman (1520–66), and Mehmed IV (1648–87) – exceeded Abdülhamid's thirty-three years on the throne. Thanks to modern bureaucratic and communications technology, especially the telegraph and railroads, Abdülhamid became an autocrat such as none of his ancestors ever were.

Abdülhamid closed the debate over Tanzimat aims decisively, in favor of the centrally directed development of Ottoman Islamic society. He took Mahmud II as his model, declaring, "I now understand that it is not possible to move the peoples whom God has placed under my protection by any means other than force."¹ He used the constitution to banish its author only four months after it went into effect, and he used constitutional measures to suspend the constitution. Parliament was sent home after two sessions, in February 1877. Abdülhamid liked to be in control, and his personal obsessiveness was complemented by an insatiable demand for loyalty. The gendarmerie was organized as an internal security force, under not military administration but the Ministry of the Interior. A network of spies, both paid and voluntary, submitted obsequious reports on all kinds of mundane activities. More than twenty thousand of these were discovered later in the palace, kept for the sultan's personal reading pleasure. But Abdülhamid's pathologies did not by themselves dictate the shape of Ottoman policy and governmental action. Rather, policy was written and enacted by paternalistic civil servants, mostly native Turkish Muslims from Rumeli and Anatolia,² who eagerly enforced regulations amid this pervasive culture of suspicion.

Though the assassination of Russian Tsar Alexander II by Russian anarchists in March 1881 cannot have escaped his notice,

Abdülhamid's paranoia seems to have needed no such exterior stimulation. Two perspectives on the sultan's personality appear in memoirs by women of the palace, published decades later in Istanbul newspapers of the 1940s–50s. To his daughter Ayşe, Sultan Abdülhamid was serious and hardworking, devoted and devout, an introverted ascetic. Seeing her smiling at him through the carriage door on the way to the weekly public prayers, the sultan overruled her mother's protests that she was too young and had her put on the veil. The family wore one cologne because her father wore it. When he went to bed at night the whole palace fell silent so as not to disturb him.³ Another image emerges in the memoir of Filizten, a low-ranking lady in the court of Sultan Murad V, who spent just three months on the throne in 1876, the second ruler in that “year of three sultans.” Murad seemed to have been mentally undone by the suicide of Abdülaziz, his predecessor. By the time Murad recovered, he had been deposed and the throne belonged to Abdülhamid, his brother. Murad spent the next twenty-eight years confined to Çırağan Palace, until his death in 1904. Virtually no word of him got through the guards into public knowledge. Abdülhamid never visited.⁴

The Ottoman Census

Seeking accurate data, Abdülhamid's government carried out a complete census in the first decade of the new Islamic century.⁵ Prior to the territorial losses of the Russo-Turkish war (1877–78), estimates based on the provincial yearbooks put the Ottoman population at about twenty-nine million, evenly divided between what was being called, for convenience, even by Ottoman administrators, “Europe” (50.8 percent) and “Asia” (49.2 percent), and excluding Africa.⁶ At San Stefano and Berlin, Russian officials making their case for a Great Bulgaria, and the Greek and Armenian patriarchates, all supported territorial claims with fabricated population figures.⁷ Frustrated Ottoman officials decided that a census, a full count of Ottoman citizens on a kaza-by-kaza basis, would serve state aims, both as a defense against additional diplomatic aggression and to facilitate taxation and conscription. The records listed the number of persons in each household, the name, birthdate, and physical description of household heads and details of their eligibility for military service. (The reform edict of 1856 had mandated equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, and therefore equal liability for military service, but in practice non-Muslims continued to pay for an exemption.⁸) Women were counted for the first time. Identity documents were issued.

The total count, which took years to complete, came to about 17.4 million people, of whom about three-quarters were Muslims. Adjusting for undercounts – nomadic tribes hid their full numbers; very few women were found in Ipek and Prizren sancaks, in Kosovo; the census was never finished in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul – yields an estimated total population of about 20.4 million people for the whole empire.⁹ Aggregate numbers, however, show only part of the story. The census did not separate people linguistically, whether Turkish-speaking, Kurdish, Arabic, Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, or any other language. And while the records did distinguish Greek, Armenian, and Catholic Christians, they did not differentiate among


Muslim groups. Both Ottoman Europe and Ottoman Asia were quite mixed. Europe, though a much smaller part of the empire now, had large groups of Muslims among the majority Greek and Slavic Christians; likewise in Ottoman Asia, large groups of Christians lived among Ottoman Muslims, with wide regional variations.

Box 7.2: The Ottoman Census

In both Europe and Asia, Ottoman confessional groups were intermixed in widely variant regional patterns.^a

To give some examples: In Europe, Yanya (Janina) was more than 75 percent Greek and just over 20 percent Muslim. Kosovo was 56.8 percent Muslim, 38.1 percent Bulgarian. Edirne province had a Muslim majority of 52 percent, but was also around 30 percent Greek and 12 percent Bulgarian. Even in the Aegean Islands the Muslim minority was 10.4 percent of the population.

In Asia, Bursa province was 84 percent Muslim, almost 10 percent Armenian, and most of the rest Greek. Aydın province, including İzmir, was about 80 percent Muslim and 14 percent Greek. Samsun was nearly evenly split between Muslims (49.4 percent) and Greeks (48.7 percent). Van was the only province with an Armenian majority (52 percent), and the city of Van itself was nearly 65 percent Armenian; yet many other cities had strong Armenian minorities: Bitlis over 40 percent, Elazığ 27 percent, Erzurum 25 percent, Sivas 23 percent, Kayseri 19 percent, Erzincan 18 percent, Diyarbakir 17 percent. Adana, the main city of Cilicia, was 13.6 percent Armenian. The Sancak of Jerusalem, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and surrounding regions, was 85 percent Muslim, 7 percent Greek, and only 3.5 percent Jewish.



Map 7.1: The census in Ottoman cities.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda.

^a Figures in Karpatis, *Ottoman Population*, 122–51.

The Ottoman population was Muslim now in increasing measure, due mainly to migration from the Russian lands and the independent Balkan countries. The second Ottoman census, carried out in 1905–6, documented this trend. Like the first, this census too was at least partly motivated by political concerns, namely the international controversy surrounding Macedonia.¹⁰ Most of the migrants settled in Anatolia. Swollen Muslim populations in Salonika and Izmir suggest employment in manufacturing as well.

Ottoman Development

Overall Hamidian-era development was shaped both positively and negatively by two interrelated factors, the Public Debt Administration (PDA) and the capitulations. The PDA, an international financial consortium, controlled a significant portion of the Ottoman economy, and its political and military backers enjoyed legal advantages in decision-making that had clear implications for Ottoman sovereignty. This does not mean that the sultan and his government were either impotent or incompetent, just that their actions, as well as opposition to them, always had an international fiscal and political context. The Ottoman government of Abdülhamid II never found adequate terms to contest global colonialism within its own realms because, like the Tanzimat statesmen, it accepted the fundamental premise that global progress towards modernity was both inevitable and necessary. Far from opposing the international fiscal regime, the Ottoman government participated in it, benefited from it, and tried to use it to advance its own vision of Ottoman development. Despite projecting an Ottoman identity in sometimes stridently Islamic terms,¹¹ there was little real resistance to colonialism in the Ottoman government, merely quibbles about means and pace and who would lead it. The resumé of many a Hamidian civil servant included a stint in the employ of the PDA.

The capitulations exempted foreign companies and their Ottoman clients from Ottoman taxation, allowing escape from fiscal sovereignty for a very large portion of the Ottoman non-Muslim population, since that was who foreign companies preferred to work with. By administering certain Ottoman revenues on behalf of a consortium of lenders at the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the PDA paid down the original Ottoman debt over time and facilitated foreign credit at much improved terms.¹² With a staff larger than that of the Ottoman finance ministry, the PDA took gross receipts of 13 percent of total treasury revenues in 1903–4; by 1911 the figure was 17 percent.¹³ Despite the

loss of Ottoman sovereignty indicated in these sobering numbers, it could have been worse – in Egypt, European creditors simply seized their assets. A similar outcome came to French-occupied Algiers and Tunis. British troops used the pretext of unrest after an army revolt to land troops in 1882, take over the Suez Canal, and occupy the country. Istanbul, for all its woes, did not yet have a high commissioner appointed in London or Paris.

A substantial portion of foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire went into port facilities and railroad building.¹⁴ By the end of Abdülhamid's reign several rail lines operated. Sirkeci station, opened on the Bosphorus waterfront next to the outer walls of Topkapı Palace in 1890, connected Istanbul with Salonika and Manastır and, by the Orient Express route, to the Austro-Hungarian capitals of Budapest and Vienna and ultimately to Paris. Another line ran from an enlarged Haydar Pasha station, opposite Sirkeci on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, to Ankara. By 1909 separate lines connected İzmir and Kasaba, with extensions up the river valleys to the interior, and Damascus and Hama, with extensions to the Mediterranean at Beirut.¹⁵

Shared interests between railroad construction companies and the PDA compromised independent Ottoman decision-making.¹⁶ There was growth. PDA control of the salt monopoly brought development in related industries like olives and fishing; it administered the fish markets of Istanbul and its surrounding villages; its control of silk revenues in several provinces enabled officials to rid the industry of silk worm disease.¹⁷ But there were also costs. Because they brought Ottoman agricultural produce and raw materials to market, railroads worked to commercialize Ottoman agriculture, but without necessarily adding manufacturing capacity. More grain was exported, but there was little increase in actual grain production. Istanbul still imported flour, for example.¹⁸ And unlike other major European powers, the Ottoman rail system was built not with its military needs in mind; rather, commercial profits came first. In the event of a mobilization,

for example, the lines, which were not close to the empire's frontiers, would ill serve the likely needs for troop movement.¹⁹ Ambitious plans for a line to Baghdad saw the first Ottoman rail line not connected directly to the coast – a section between Eskişehir and Konya.

Tobacco and cotton also illustrate the mixed results. In its tobacco monopoly the PDA had a source of potentially spectacular profits – tobacco accounted for a whopping 35 percent of all PDA revenues.²⁰

The PDA contracted the tobacco monopoly to a multinational corporation, called, for short, the Régie Company, which shared profits with the PDA and the Ottoman government. The Régie Company controlled all aspects of production, from planting to sale, within the empire. Growing tobacco for personal use or for sale to neighbors was forbidden. Local Ottoman tobacco companies either went out of business or moved to the Nile Delta. It was possible for licensed independent Ottoman merchants to sell for export abroad, though not to British-occupied Egypt. Predictably, tobacco prices rose, and smuggling thrived.²¹ While it destroyed thousands of jobs, the Régie Company also employed thousands of Ottoman laborers, in a workforce that was over 90 percent local, but management was mostly European.²² Many of those jobs were in its security apparatus. Régie Company relations with the Ottoman government were stormy, since the government looked out for its own while the company blamed it for low profits and complained about lax control of smuggling.²³ Public protests and demonstrations crossed religious and communal lines and frequently turned violent, as did encounters between smugglers and company security. In the three decades it did business, the Régie Company's private militia killed more than twenty thousand people.²⁴

Box 7.3: Cigarettes

Tobacco was three centuries old in the Ottoman lands, though

not indigenous. Cigarettes, however, if not an Ottoman invention – the evidence is not quite definitive – were certainly made popular by Ottoman soldiers, who shared them with the allies on Crimean battlefields. Cigarettes then sailed the Atlantic to armies of the north and south during the American Civil War. In the Ottoman lands seemingly everyone smoked, men, women, and children. Ottomans even broke the Ramadan fast by lighting up in the evening.^a



Figure 7.1: Eunuch with a cigarette. A eunuch, Nadir Aga,^b takes a smoke break in Dolmabahçe Ottoman palace, about 1912.

From a period postcard published by Neue
Photographische Gesellschaft, Berlin.

^a Quataert, *Social Disintegration*, 15.

^b Thanks to Jane Hathaway for the identification.



Figure 7.2: Cotton bales at the Kasr al-Nil market, Cairo, sometime after 1860.

LC-DIG-PPMSCA-03920.

Cotton was a different case. The American Civil War had European textile firms scrambling for alternative sources of raw cotton. It stimulated a Mediterranean cotton boom, not just in Egypt but also in Aydın province and in Cilicia, where it was transformative. The boom played out on a stage set by the Tanzimat Land Law of 1858, two aspects of which were relevant to cotton. By insisting on registration of the title to the land itself, and awarding title to cultivators alone rather than tax collectors, tribal chiefs, and absentee landlords, the land law finally laid revenue contracting to rest.²⁵ And the state sold title to land that had been previously unproductive and uncultivated. Such land, especially in the lower Cilician plain, played a big role in the expanded cotton production for international markets.²⁶

Separated from Aleppo and made a new province in 1869, Cilicia (Adana province) became a model of civil and military administration.

Armenian entrepreneurs bought and drained the uncultivated malarial wetlands of lower Cilicia and hired sharecroppers and laborers to plant cotton. Swamp drainage went hand-in-hand with a settlement program for the area's pastoral nomads, as the land law foresaw.²⁷ By 1878, over 60 percent of the raw cotton exported from the Ottoman Empire came from Adana.²⁸ In May 1884 a rail line between Adana and the port of Mersin was inaugurated with a band, ceremonial prayers in Turkish and "the language of the other nationalities present," and a speech by the governor in praise of modern progress.²⁹ Waves of Muslim migrants changed the demographic makeup of Adana – Nogay Turks after the Crimean War, Abkhazians and Circassians, and Slavs from the central Balkans after 1875.³⁰ Some Armenian merchants and landowners became quite wealthy, while the boom made a much more modest impression on the Turkish working class, and contributed to tensions between landowners and nomad populations.

The Modern Caliphate

While the Hamidian regime participated willy-nilly in the European colonial order, it staked out a sphere for itself. The Ottoman sultan was one of the few independent Muslim sovereigns in all of Afro-Eurasia. Abdülhamid, a master of pomp and ceremony, made Friday prayers (the *selamlık*) a weekly procession and crafted such celebrations as a twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign and a six-hundredth anniversary of the dynasty. He made the caliphate into a source of pride and an important emblem of Muslim political aspirations. In these ways the Ottoman imperial project challenged European colonialism with a version of Ottoman Muslim solidarity, while at the same time adopting the full range of its modernizing assumptions.³¹ Abdülhamid's cultural policies countered the heavy colonial imprint and channeled the anxiety and resentment created by the massive influx of Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Abdülhamid's prayerful secularism faced a test in education. The crisis of the Islamic decade of the 1290s (1873–82) had dulled the Education Act of 1869. Cases like Damascus stood out. Under the ambitious Governor Midhat Pasha, education societies with local leadership sprang up in several Syrian cities.³² But for the most part educational reform took place in the hard realities of the new century. Abdülhamid's forceful program targeted universal primary education, not just military and medical academies as before. It faced difficulties of financing, of great distances between Istanbul and the provinces, and lack of enthusiasm for its secularism, both among Muslim and non-Muslim families. And while local input was not unwelcome, an imperial imprint was felt, in the common curriculum, the daily schedule, and the uniforms worn by students. The architecture made Tanzimat modernist statements in Ottoman towns, from utilitarian to a kind of Ottoman historicism.³³ Attempts to introduce reforms in the outdated medrese system failed, however. Given the great political

risk of challenging the jealously guarded military service exemptions of medrese students and professors, medreses remained largely outside reforms of curriculum and vision.³⁴



Figure 7.3: Solitary man praying in Haghia Sophia. Court photographers helped shape the empire's public image. The first in this role were three Armenian brothers known as Abdullah Frères, who operated a studio in Istanbul for decades, and branches in Alexandria and Cairo. In 1900 the firm was sold to Sébah & Joaillier. Their photographs rebutted exotic European images of the empire with the everyday buildings and common people.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-03672.

Among non-Muslims, schooling typically happened within confessional communities. Some more secular-minded families used the public schools, but like Muslim families, those with the means often sent their children abroad for education. Foreign missionary schools offered another option, used by some Christian families.³⁵ The pedagogical model of American Protestant schools interested the

Ottoman government as early as the 1830s.³⁶ After the Crimean War large numbers of Americans settled in Anatolia, the central plateau, greater Syria and the Caucasus, establishing schools, hospitals, and a printing press, first in Malta, then in Istanbul, and another in Beirut. Tanzimat authorities valued them as a counterbalance to Russian influence among Ottoman Greeks and Armenians. Cyrus Hamlin, founder of an American seminary and college in the Greek village of Bebek on the Bosphorus, was personally welcomed by Sultan Abdülaziz.³⁷ The sheer number of American schools, however, aroused concern about their intentions, and attempts were made to license them and inspect their curricula.³⁸ A 1910 missionary survey documented ninety-two main mission stations and five hundred substations, with over six hundred foreign staff. More than forty thousand students, mostly Armenian and Greek Christians, were enrolled in 549 primary schools. Eleven colleges enrolled another one thousand seven hundred students.³⁹ The missionaries tended to exaggerate Ottoman illiteracy for their own reasons, and were concerned about the issue of apostasy,⁴⁰ but missionary attitudes covered the range from deep understanding of Ottoman Muslim society on the one hand to profound ignorance and bigotry on the other. Ottoman Christians shared government concern for supervision of these schools.⁴¹ A comparable movement among Ottoman Jews was financed by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, a French organization founded in 1860. Like the American schools among Armenians and Greeks, Alliance schools envisioned a modernized Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire, modeled on its own.⁴²

Modern Times

The Ottoman modernist contradictions were embodied in the multi-talented Osman Hamdi, archaeologist, painter, and civil servant.⁴³ Osman Hamdi loved Paris where, sent by his family for his education, he imbibed empire as a civilizing mission. Son of a grand vezir, he had the good fortune to begin his administrative career under the gifted Midhat Pasha, in Baghdad. After several additional posts, he received the twin appointments that became his vocation, as Director of the Imperial Museum of Antiquities and of the School of Fine Arts. In hiring him Ottoman officials demonstrated that they clearly understood the relationship between culture and imperialism. Osman Hamdi was the longest-tenured Ottoman representative on the board of the PDA, serving from 1888 until his death in 1910. He used this position to implement protective legal policies for Ottoman archaeological assets, in terms that European governments and scholars would understand, culminating in the Antiquities Law of 1884.⁴⁴ Greedy archaeologists might still go over his head, appealing to the sultan or using their home consular offices in places like Salonika and Aleppo. Ottoman officials too might be coopted, and Osman Hamdi himself was not above flattery.⁴⁵ But there were no repeats of Lord Elgin, who had shipped the Parthenon frieze sculptures to Britain in 1800, or Heinrich Schliemann, who carried away “Priam’s Treasure” from Troy in 1874.



Figure 7.4: Two Musician Girls, by Osman Hamdi. Like Abdullah Frères, Osman Hamdi's art subtly protested against Orientalist clichés.⁴⁶

This painting, now in the Pera Museum collection, recalls Gérôme and makes many orientalist references, such as carpets and an arabesque balustrade. Yet its setting is identifiable (the Green Mosque in Bursa), and the unveiled female musicians are

confident artists, fully clothed. Used by permission of Art Resource, New York.




Figure 7.5: The Alexander Sarcophagus.

From a contemporary photograph. Used by permission of Art Resource, New York.

Osman Hamdi's networking and diplomacy, and his strong interpersonal skills, won over colleagues and rivals, and gradually both the process and the product of archaeological research were redirected towards the Ottoman capital. He became a catalyst for increased public awareness of antiquities, of historical preservation, and the value of the Ottoman and Islamic past.⁴⁷ This work continued in the Ottoman Historical Society, founded in 1909. Perhaps Osman Hamdi's greatest coup was the "Alexander Sarcophagus," excavated at Sidon in 1887. A remarkably well-preserved white marble sarcophagus, with stunning high-relief scenes of Alexander the Great battling the Persians and hunting lions, it was at first identified as the

sarcophagus of Alexander himself. Once celebrated in epic verse, the Alexandrian heritage of the Ottoman sultans now became the most prized possession of the Museum of Antiquities. There it could compete with another tomb popularly believed to be Alexander's, plundered from Egypt and housed in the British Museum.

Opposition to Abdülhamid II

Abdülhamid's repressive security apparatus, censorship, and network of spies made it difficult to express dissatisfaction within the empire.⁴⁸ Liberal ideas circulated among students at the medical school, law school, military academy, and some high schools. They formed clandestine groups, got the attention of the police, and were called in for questioning. Opposition groups also formed among Christians. The Church leadership was suspected; in 1891 the Armenian patriarchal assembly was suppressed.⁴⁹ Outside the empire, opposition groups could meet, argue, and publish newspapers and tracts, in Paris, Geneva, British-occupied Cairo and Alexandria, and Beirut.⁵⁰ By the mid-1890s a loose organization eventually called the "Committee of Union and Progress" (CUP) was functioning, forming an umbrella under which the disparate elements of the Ottoman opposition, with their widely varying philosophical positions, could talk to each other about aims. The collective name "Young Turks," also applied to the movement in European circles, was misleading.⁵¹ The various groups had little in common except wanting to overthrow Abdülhamid.

The opposition got formally organized during an intense period of anti-Armenian violence in the empire. The violence broke out in Sason, near Lake Van, in August 1894, originally over a mundane tax dispute. The Ottoman governor was set upon by members of Hnchak, an Armenian dissident group. It turned into a massacre when Hamidiye regiments, a tribally organized adjunct of the gendarmerie, as well as regular troops, were called in. A year later Hnchak, trying to prod European intervention, staged a demonstration in Istanbul that became a riot in which hundreds of Armenians were killed. An anti-Armenian pogrom spread to Trabzon and other places, encouraged by some Ottoman officials. Ordinary Ottoman Muslims took part too, lured by plunder. A German missionary, Johannes Lepsius, estimated that eighty-eight thousand Armenians died. He thought that the persecutions were not religious but political.⁵² The new patriarch,

elected in 1896, was viewed as a lackey of the sultan.⁵³ Later that year members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutun) seized the headquarters of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in Istanbul with 150 hostages, and threatened to blow it up. The French intervened and the criminals got off. Still, some six thousand Armenians were killed in renewed violence.⁵⁴ Abdülhamid resisted suggestions for Armenian autonomy, citing the cases of Eastern Rumelia, which after the Congress of Berlin united with Bulgaria,⁵⁵ and Crete, where after a representative assembly and Christian governor were granted, union with Greece was declared and backed by Greek troops. The Ottoman army won a short war, but Crete was given autonomy anyway, under a European-appointed high commissioner who turned out to be Prince George of Greece.⁵⁶


At a general congress of the Ottoman opposition in Paris in February 1902, the various factions split – constitutionalists, materialists, anarchists, and others. The most divisive issue was feelings for or against foreign intervention in Ottoman affairs, which correlated generally with attitudes towards Armenian autonomy.⁵⁷ The CUP lay dormant during the next couple of years, but there is no overstating the impact on Ottoman dissidents of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war and the Russian revolution of 1905.⁵⁸ Ottoman observers were not alone. Inspired revolutionaries overthrew the Qajar dynasty and gave Iran its first constitution. With wild rumors circulating that the Japanese emperor had become a Muslim, Abdullah Cevdet, in British Cairo, wanted to make him caliph – until wiser heads reminded him that, naturally, the caliph should be a Turk!⁵⁹

Abdülhamid's government was not unaware of the mushrooming secret societies and revolutionary groups. Ahmed Bedevî Kuran, a participant who published his memoirs fifty years later, remembered more than one failed plot against the sultan's life in 1905.⁶⁰ Bahaeddin Şakir, the private physician of Prince Yusuf Izzeddin (second in line to the throne), was discovered to be a secret CUP

member and fled to Paris. He arrived in September 1905, just as the Russo-Japanese war was ending and Count Witte was announcing the Russian constitution. Dr. Şakir reconnected the Ottoman oppositional groups into a network of cells inside and outside the empire, and made a crucial tactical alliance with Armenian revolutionaries. He helped organize a second congress of the Ottoman opposition in December 1907.

The Young Turk Revolution

The Ottoman revolution burst open in Macedonia. “Macedonia” meant three Ottoman provinces, i.e., Manastir, Kosovo, and Salonika. When combined, the three provinces had more Christians than Muslims – but Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian Orthodox Christians were sharply divided along confessional and linguistic lines. A plurality (over 45 percent in the 1906 census) were Muslims, but neither were these a single community.⁶¹ These demographic facts meant that after the Congress of Berlin (1878) Macedonia became the target of Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek ambitions, Ottoman jealousies, and Great Power rivalries. Within Macedonia itself, religious differences were secondary, compared to labor and land. Militant labor movements took root as the Régie Company drove local tobacco concerns out of business and workers had to choose between the Régie or leaving altogether.⁶² A rail line connecting Salonika with Manastir opened in 1894, and in 1903 improvements on the port facilities at Salonika were finished. A wave of land expropriations drove mass emigration. Macedonians entering the United States alone numbered fifteen thousand just in the first half of 1906, according to consular records.⁶³



Map 7.2: Ottoman Macedonia.

Drawn by Jason Van Horn and Caitlin Strikwerda. From a contemporary map.

There was no shortage of international proposals to solve the problems, and the sultan handled the situation ineffectually. The provinces were home to some of the most radical Ottoman revolutionary groups. A movement for Macedonian independence took shape, while at the same time revolutionary organizations funded by the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian governments aimed at annexing Macedonia. The British had mooted a plan for Macedonian autonomy under a Christian governor as far back as the Berlin Congress, with the evacuation of Ottoman troops and new provincial boundaries. Austria and Russia proposed modest reforms, with international supervision of finances and a joint European and Ottoman peacekeeping force. Abdülhamid assented, but implementation talks made little headway. A series of egregiously violent attacks took place after 1903. There was the high-profile kidnapping and ransom of an American missionary, a wave of bombings, and the assassination of the Serbian king, Alexander Obrenović. In the spring of 1908 the CUP staged

several assassinations in Macedonia. English consular sources estimated at one point that political assassinations claimed about one hundred lives each month.⁶⁴

Against a background of drought across the empire in 1907, bread riots in Sivas, Kayseri, and Erzurum,⁶⁵ and earnest prayers for rain in processions from mosques and churches, King Edward of Britain met Tsar Nicholas II at Reval in June 1908. Rumors flew that they were going to force the Ottomans to give up Macedonia. Ottoman army officers took action. Ahmed Niyazi, Ismail Enver, and others went with their troops into the mountains and began gathering volunteer forces. Someone tried to kill the Salonika garrison commander, a known spy for the sultan. Şemsi Pasha, sent by the palace to take charge of the situation, was shot to death by a CUP revolutionary in broad daylight in front of the post office as he stepped into a carriage.⁶⁶ The mutiny spread, there were more killings, and within two weeks the rebels had control of the province. They rebuffed offers of negotiation and announced they would march on Istanbul. The sultan was forced to concede. The Ottoman constitution was restored on 24 July 1908.⁶⁷ If indeed there was a first shot fired in the War of Ottoman Dissolution, the assassination of Şemsi Pasha in Manastır on 7 July 1908 was that shot.⁶⁸ A 600-year-old empire was coming apart, and the empire's diverse peoples, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, South Slavs and others, whose desires the revolution channeled, now fought intensely for control of its heritage.

The international reaction was immediate. Bulgaria declared independence. Greece annexed Crete. There was little choice in Istanbul but to accept these faits accomplis. Bosnia and Hercegovina, however, were a bit different. They were legally still Ottoman territory, so a new Ottoman parliament might nullify the thirty-year Austrian occupation.⁶⁹ Preempting this, Vienna announced annexation. That very night, the Serbian foreign minister and other angry officials met in Belgrade to lay plans for funding propaganda,

cultural events, and less innocent activities aimed to destabilize the provinces. Gavrilo Princip, Franz Ferdinand's assassin, testified that he and his co-conspirators, South Slav idealists, received training and money.⁷⁰

In Istanbul the rebel officers who wanted to save the empire had few concrete plans for running it. The Committee of Union and Progress was not an organized political party. They had not so much an ideology as the shared outlook of a generation of dissident cadets and patriotic civil servants. As a group they were anti-clerical, materialist, secularizers. They did want to run things, but they relied on intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and others to harmonize their ideas and articulate a coherent vision. Yet urgent problems demanded their attention. Labor unrest accompanied the revolution and expressed the underlying social resentments that had made it succeed. The very troops the palace ordered to Salonika to quell the revolt in July 1908 had refused to move from Izmir because they were owed back wages.⁷¹ A wave of strikes swept the empire that summer and fall. Workers of the Golden Horn–Princes' Islands ferry route struck for back wages only eight days after the constitution was restored. Strikes shut down practically the entire rail system of the empire in September. The strikes were grievance based, not nationalist, not ethnic, not political. Workers wanted better wages and working conditions – shorter hours, safer work spaces – and had little class consciousness or organization. They could not last long without labor rules or strike funds to protect them. Companies used force to get them back to work, or fired them and replaced them with others. Their hopes of CUP support were disappointed. The empire was too thickly connected into international capitalist structures for the CUP to find leverage to mount a challenge.⁷²

Counterrevolution

Bickering among the Ottoman revolutionaries spilled into the streets of Istanbul in April 1909. In the first few months of the Ottoman parliament, ceremonially opened by Abdülhamid in the Çırağan Palace in December 1908, the CUP formally organized as a political party. Opposition to the “Unionists” grew more vocal over national economic policy and the role of religion in public life, and a liberated press found ample material for satire.⁷³ Many in the CUP were known secularists; some were atheists, some were Bektashis, some Masons.⁷⁴ A public demonstration in the hippodrome in Istanbul, timed to coincide with the Nativity of the Prophet in April 1909 (31 March old style), turned violent. One group, the Muhammadan Union, raised the cry for “sharia.” With democracy under threat, troops moved into position outside the capital to defend the revolution. Mahmud Şevket Pasha, commander of the army in Macedonia and a CUP ally, declared martial law. Parliament deposed Abdülhamid, though he had no clear connection to the violence, and elevated Sultan Mehmed V, a.k.a. Reşad, with whom the Unionists had a secret understanding.⁷⁵ The constitution was revised to make the sultan a parliamentary monarch, to put restrictions on freedom of assembly and the right to strike, and to end non-Muslim exemptions from military service.

Violence was not confined to the capital. In Adana, where anti-Armenian bigotry was present and anti-Unionist politics popular, the first confused reports of the 31 March incident made it seem that the CUP had been overthrown. Nefarious rumors spread of a planned Armenian uprising.⁷⁶ An Armenian carpenter, attacked by Turkish hoodlums, killed his assailants in self-defense, and the funeral of the muggers turned into a riot. An American eyewitness, Herbert Adams Gibbons (who would later write an influential history of the early Ottoman Empire), watched Armenian merchants closing up shop and hurrying home.⁷⁷ The underlying social and religious tensions in Adana exploded into horrific violence. Gibbons and a fellow

missionary saw a mob kill two Armenians in front of their eyes. For two days fighting raged, with “continuous and unceasing shooting and killing in every part of the town.” Muslims from nearby villages poured into the city and joined the battle, egged on by murderous Muslim ulema. Hate-filled Muslims across Cilicia turned on their Armenian neighbors. Gibbons reported that 250 Turkish irregulars commandeered the train to Tarsus and helped destroy the Armenian quarter there. Troops sent to end the killing joined it instead.⁷⁸ An estimated twenty-five thousand Armenians and 1,850 Turks died.⁷⁹



Figure 7.6: A street in Adana’s Christian quarter, June 1909.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LOC-DIG-
ggbain-50065.

The bigoted preachers, seminarians, and Sufis of the counterrevolution shocked parliament. The killings muted the voices of Ottoman liberals and their non-Muslim allies, put them on the defensive, and shifted the CUP balance in favor of the radical secularists on its central committee. A semi-official Board of Sheikhs was created, with the Şeyhülislam as honorary chair. It published a

history and began compiling a general library of Sufism, hoping by quiet scholarship to call everyone back to sanity.⁸⁰ But some in parliament called for simply shuttering the lodges. Jihad should be called against dervishes and seminarians, said one MP, so far had they departed from Islam and the Qur'an. In his *History of the Ottoman Decline* Celal Nuri wrote scathingly that "the Mejnun and madman of Turkish literature was Fuzuli, of Arabic literature Ibn Arabi, and of Persian literature Hafız." Sufi books were "like vampires, circling the medrese, sinking their teeth into our minds."⁸¹

Unity of the Elements

Sultan Mehmed Reşad made a high-profile goodwill trip to Macedonia and Albania in June 1911, championing Ottoman social diversity.⁸² All along the route parades greeted him, sheep were sacrificed and prayers said. Public events stressed ethnic and religious concord, giving royal endorsement to the “Unity of the Elements,” a Unionist slogan for talking about common purposes across the diverse Ottoman communities.

In the hands of CUP radicals after the counterrevolution, Unity of the Elements could look like social engineering. The Central Committee was led by men born in the crisis decade 1873–82, the Islamic decade of the 1290s, young men and confident in youth and its mission to make big changes. Key figures were Ismail Enver (b. 1881) and interior minister Mehmed Talat (b. 1874), sociologist Ziya Gökalp (b. 1876), the Tatar immigrant historian Yusuf Akçura (b. 1876 in Ulyanovsk), Celal Nuri (b. 1881); Ahmet Ağaoğlu (a.k.a. Ağayev), slightly older, was born in Azerbaijan in 1869. Some were themselves victims of ethnic cleansing.⁸³ They could be both contemptuous of Muslim piety and insensitive to non-Muslims. They doubted the capacity of either Islamic or non-sectarian Ottomanist ideals to build social cohesion in a modern state.⁸⁴ Their standardized educational goals included use of the Turkish language and Ottoman script. Blunt criticism of the capitulations, while shared across the Ottoman political spectrum, could come across in party circles as advocating statist national economic policies, anathema to liberals. Non-Turkish and non-Muslim members, who – even after the Cilicia violence – clung to hopes of cooperation, were alienated at CUP party congresses by talk of a homogeneous “national” society.

But on the sultan’s tour, the emphasis was on images and symbols of harmony. In Salonika the sultan attended a Mevlevi sema, and Ahmed Niyazi, one of the heroes of the revolution and an Albanian, was honored and his historic entry into the city was re-enacted.

Albanian rebels received pardon after public vows of loyalty. At Kosovo a direct descendant of the Serbian royal family paid his respects. The choir of the Serbian Orthodox seminary performed in Prishtina. At the train station in Velez a Muslim girl who recited a poem was honored and a Bulgarian Christian girl who spoke was promised an education at full royal expense.

Joining the sultan's entourage was a charismatic young preacher from near Bitlis, Said Nursi.⁸⁵ He had been jailed as a member of the Muhammadan Union after the 31 March incident, but a court martial acquitted him. In fact Nursi's modernist cultural attitudes were sympathetic to much of what the CUP was trying to achieve. His concept of a university of the east as a focal point for the economic and social development of his native Kurdistan resonated with Albanian Muslims, and his colorful Kurdish dress fit the multi-cultural theme of the imperial tour.⁸⁶ The invitation to accompany the sultan on the tour came after a moving sermon he gave in the ancient Umayyad Mosque in Damascus earlier that spring. Titled "Six Words," the sermon used the Qur'anic text *Do not despair of God's mercy* (39:53) to talk about sacred hope. Nursi urged his Arabic-speaking audience to stand with the Turks as "sentries of the sacred citadel of Islamic nationhood." In a concluding modernist simile he likened Islamic society to a factory with many machines, all coordinated to manufacture a product.⁸⁷ Proud and ambitious, Nursi thrived on debate and basked in his proximity to power. He believed in his own ability to diagnose the problems of Ottoman Islamic society. But he was wary of politics. In the conclusion to the Damascus sermon he noted, "No politics can make Islam a tool for itself."⁸⁸ After the royal tour he did not stay in the capital but returned to Van with funding to begin developing his dream of the university in an old medrese building.

“The Complete Extermination of an Alien Population”

Three months after the royal visit to the Balkans, in late September 1911, Italy landed troops at Tripoli. From this time until the evacuation of Greek troops from Izmir eleven years later, the Ottoman Empire was almost continuously at war. While fighting in Libya, Italy also bombarded two Ottoman forts guarding the Straits and occupied the Dodecanese Islands. A revolt against CUP rule broke out in Yemen,⁸⁹ and a revolution erupted in Albania. An earthquake struck the Gallipoli peninsula and the northern Marmara shore on 9 August 1912. The Ottoman press reported over one thousand one hundred deaths, and a government report estimated that about twenty-nine thousand people were left homeless and sixty percent of the houses and other buildings in over a hundred villages were destroyed or damaged.⁹⁰ That fall, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire at the head of a coalition that included Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece; and Ottoman society, too, fractured along well-known fault lines.

Under the circumstances civilian democratic rule functioned poorly when it functioned at all. A group of self-styled “Savior Officers” overthrew the CUP cabinet and dissolved parliament, which did not meet for two years. The Savior Officers scrambled to make peace with Italy while repositioning forces from the North African desert to Macedonia and Thrace. Ottoman armies gave way in a rapid series of defeats. In late October they lost at the hands of the Serbians near Skopje, and the Bulgarians at Kırk Kilise and Lüleburgaz, east of Edirne.⁹¹ With the horrors of 1875–78 still in living memory, the Muslim population “stampeded” towards Salonika,⁹² but Salonika too surrendered to Greece in November. Ottoman defenses held at Çatalca, 35 miles from Istanbul, as cholera and dysentery decimated the ranks. The citizens of the city could hear the guns.⁹³

When an armistice was signed in December little remained of Ottoman Europe other than the cities of Edirne, Janina, and Shkodër, and all three were under siege. Incredulous that the “Savior Officers” offered to partition Edirne, Ismail Enver and several others burst into a cabinet meeting, shot the grand vezir to death, and installed Mahmud Şevket Pasha in his place. Resuming the war, they promptly lost Janina and Shkodër; Edirne fell to the Bulgarians at the end of March, and Mahmud Şevket Pasha himself was assassinated in a failed counter coup. In a short but savage Second Balkan War in July 1913 the erstwhile allies turned upon one another, the Ottomans joining the others in ganging up on Bulgaria. Edirne was liberated. The sort of celebrity only such conditions can create, Enver stood in the spotlight, the “conqueror” of Edirne.

The Carnegie Report

After Edirne returned to Ottoman control *Le Jeune-Turc* published accounts of atrocities during the Bulgarian occupation. The Carnegie Endowment for Peace, an early leader in the nascent movement for international peace and disarmament, appointed a delegation to investigate. The commissioners arrived in late summer just after the Second Balkan War ended. They spent about a month studying the conflict.

The Carnegie Report, published in early 1914, was an unflinching exposé of extreme brutality, mistreatment of war prisoners, and atrocities perpetrated against civilian populations.⁹⁴ It verified Ottoman reports of Bulgarian atrocities at Edirne and elsewhere in Thrace.⁹⁵ When it entered Edirne after its successful siege, the Bulgarian army found the population emaciated and starving. Prisoners trapped on an island in the Tunca were eating grass from the ground and bark stripped from trees. Many Greek, Armenian, and Jewish residents joined the Bulgarian soldiers plundering the city while the Turkish population, in “calm dignity” and in fear of reprisals, “let them carry off everything without saying a word.” There were heroic exceptions. Bulgarian Major Mitov halted the pillage where he could.⁹⁶ A courageous Jewish man tried to prevent a Bulgarian soldier from killing a defenseless Turkish captive. After four months the Bulgarians hastily fled by rail as the Ottoman army approached. When the Ottoman troops did not at first appear, the Bulgarian troops came back, went door to door rounding up selected inhabitants, bound them together in fours, and drowned them in the Maritsa River.

The commissioners noted that these were “not isolated or fortuitous events. They represent national tactics.”⁹⁷ This war, their report stated, was not one of armies alone but of nations, waged by the people of these nations. “The object of these armed conflicts,” they wrote, “overt or covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but always

and everywhere the same, was the complete extermination of an alien population.”⁹⁸ No side refrained, no side was spared. Most of the population in the path of destruction, knowing what was coming, fled *en masse*, “a real exodus ... The Turks fleeing before the Christians, the Bulgarians before the Greeks and the Turks, the Greeks and the Turks before the Bulgarians, the Albanians before the Ser[b]ians ...”⁹⁹ Whoever remained faced forced conversion and “assimilation through terror.”¹⁰⁰ The London *Times* printed eyewitness testimony of forced baptism of Muslims.¹⁰¹

In Macedonia during the second war, Greek authorities killed the Bulgarian residents of Serres with the besieging Bulgarian army outside. When they captured the city the Bulgarians massacred the Greeks and burned it down. In revenge, the King of Greece personally ordered the total devastation of Bulgarian villages.¹⁰² Greek forces systematically burnt over 160 villages in Strumnica district. In the town of Kilkis, 4,725 buildings were destroyed including 1,846 houses, over six hundred shops and five mills. From there to the Bulgarian border, a distance of about 100 miles, the Greeks burned every village, more than eighty. Greek war posters, published in the Carnegie report, showed soldiers gleefully gouging out eyes and performing other cruelties. A trove of twenty-five letters from Greek soldiers bragged of being more brutal than the Bulgarians. “I can’t find paper to write to you,” stated one, “for all the villages here are burnt and all the inhabitants have run away. We burn all their villages, and now we don’t meet a living soul.” Another wrote, “The things that happen are such that have never occurred since the days of Jesus Christ ... God knows what will become of it.”¹⁰³

The Serbs and Turks “were no exception to the general rule.” Accounts published in the contemporary Socialist press were verified by the commission. The brutality was face-to-face, with pistol whips, bayonets, and rifle butts the favored weapons. Corpses were found with skin torn off or eyes gouged out or ears and noses cut off, some with their mutilated parts stuck in their mouths, some skewered on

spits and roasted.¹⁰⁴ Officers encouraged their men. An Arab Christian in Ottoman service told a friend, “[T]he *express orders* of their captains were first to burn and ravage, then to kill all the males, next the women ... and that he had personally carried out the orders given him.” He did as others had done.¹⁰⁵ The commission concluded with “absolute certainty” that the purpose was the complete extermination of the population by the military authorities, “in execution of a systematic plan.”¹⁰⁶ When the Turks retook Rodosto (Tekirdağ) in July 1913 their irregulars and the returning Turkish population murdered the Bulgarian representative who handed the town back to them, pillaged the place, killed about three hundred people, and extorted payment from survivors. In nearby Malgara, returning Turkish forces killed dozens of Armenians, sacked their homes, and set the town on fire. The fire spread when ordnance hidden in Armenian shops exploded. The next day “the bodies of people killed in the market place were deposited in the church yard.”¹⁰⁷

The experience of the Balkan Wars gave the advantage to extremist voices within the CUP leadership.¹⁰⁸ “Turkey in Europe” was reduced to eastern Thrace, its borders at the Maritsa and Tunca, in Edirne. Not only was Macedonia lost, even Albania seceded. Ottoman resettlement processes were swamped by more than half a million Muslim refugees from Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. As negotiations began with the Balkan neighbors towards an exchange of populations, the Russian Embassy in Istanbul brought British, French, German, and Austrian representatives a proposal for Ottoman reforms in the east. The Ottoman government was excluded from these discussions, but made counterproposals. In the final agreement, which it signed in February 1914 without any intention of carrying it out, the six eastern Ottoman vilayets in which Armenians formed a significant population were to be reorganized into two new provinces, each under a European inspector who would oversee changes. The Ottoman government saw the agreement as simply an invitation for Russia to dismember what little was left of the

empire.¹⁰⁹ Led by interior minister Talat Pasha, in the first half of 1914 the CUP central committee fought back with plans for a national Ottoman Muslim economy. A campaign of intimidation and a boycott of Greek and Armenian merchants drove more than one hundred and sixty thousand Christians of the Marmara region to leave the empire. While troublesome Albanian immigrants were marked for relocation in the east,¹¹⁰ talk began among CUP leaders of homogenizing, “cleansing,” Anatolia of its Christian Greeks and Armenians.¹¹¹

The Great War

Gutted by the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman army was in no condition to fight another major war in 1914. An intensive overhaul, begun after the Second Balkan War with close involvement of a German military mission, was not complete.¹¹² Enver's bellicosity after Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 was opposed by other CUP leaders including Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha, who had modest war aims and hoped to avoid foreign intervention.¹¹³ Aggressive manipulation of the German alliance, by Enver particularly, brought the Ottoman Empire into the war in November 1914. The Ottoman government repudiated the Armenian reform agreement, abrogated the capitulations agreements with the European powers, and suspended debt payments. It also formally declared a "jihad."

About eight hundred thousand Ottoman men served in the armed forces in the Great War of 1914–18, conscripts from the Turkish villagers of Anatolia being the best fighting troops. Arabs were worthy but less reliable; Christian Greeks and Armenians, conscripted like the Muslims since 1909, served mostly in support roles, in transport and labor units.¹¹⁴ The CUP military brass made poor decisions, however. Too light defense of Mesopotamia allowed British forces to seize Basra within days of the declaration of war. Despite exhaustion and insufficient numbers, the army opened simultaneous fronts in the Caucasus and at the Suez Canal. Both failed dismally. Cemal Pasha and his army spent the war in an uneasy occupation of Syria and Palestine. Arab irregulars mutinied in the Hejaz and joined forces with the British. Promises of an Arab kingdom after the war were dashed by British duplicity after General Allenby's advance drove Ottoman armies from Syria in the fall of 1917. At the Straits, on the other hand, in the spring of 1915 Ottoman armies repelled a massive British invasion that aimed to take Istanbul and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. Fighting at the Straits led the CUP leadership to deport thousands of Greeks, Armenians, and Albanians from the region to the

Anatolian interior.¹¹⁵ When their attack stalled against the staunch Ottoman defenses on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the British reopened the Iraq front, advancing towards Baghdad. The Ottoman defenses held once again, defeating the British army at the Battle of Kut in late 1915.

The Armenian Genocide

Nothing, however, compared to what happened in eastern Anatolia and the southern Caucasus, where the template of mass exterminations and physical destruction of the two Balkan Wars was enacted in a human cataclysm of unprecedented scale.¹¹⁶ Already in August 1914, with the outbreak of hostilities on the Western Front, Ottoman and Russian propaganda was active among Armenians and Muslim people in the Caucasus. Militia organizations prepared for war even though there was little enthusiasm among the general populace.¹¹⁷ While property seizures and deportations of Ottoman Greeks from northwestern Anatolia were going on, shadowy and loosely organized CUP paramilitary groups, now formally constituted as the “Special Organization” (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*), also started evicting and killing Armenians in eastern Anatolia and confiscating their property. Initial Armenian gains were reversed with a massive campaign in December led by Enver. Unable to coordinate the attack due to logistical weakness, winter weather, poor communications, and the delaying maneuvers of Armenian irregulars, the Ottoman offensive stalled at Sarıkamış.¹¹⁸ Disaster befell the Ottoman army. Various casualty reports gave some fifty thousand killed or wounded in the fighting, about seven thousand captive to the Russians and marched off to camps in Siberia, and several thousand more dead of typhus or exposure.¹¹⁹

The Ottoman defeat galvanized the Armenian resistance. A Russian counteroffensive began with “mutual indiscriminate massacring of Muslims by the joint Russo-Armenian forces and of Christians by Ottoman forces.”¹²⁰ In Istanbul Talat ordered all regional security personnel and government officials who were Armenian dismissed.¹²¹ Ottoman troops carried out massacres of Armenians as reprisals for desertions and for helping the Russians. Cevdet, the Ottoman governor of Van province, punished “any sign of trouble with extreme, indiscriminate, vengeful violence.”¹²² He had

grown up in Van as the son of a former governor and was Enver's brother-in-law.¹²³ Russian troops advanced in eastern Van province as, simultaneously, 1,000 miles to the west, British forces attacked the Dardanelles. Defeated by Russian forces, Cevdet attacked Armenian villages in the area, convinced they were colluding with the Russians. The Armenian quarter of Van, since autumn the center of Armenian paramilitary preparations, built defensive bulwarks against Cevdet's anticipated attack. Cevdet laid siege on 20 April.¹²⁴ The Allied landing at Gallipoli came five days later.

On 24 April 1915 orders went out from Istanbul for the closure of Armenian committees and the arrest of their leaders,¹²⁵ confiscation of their records, and "gathering the Armenians whose existence in their present places is regarded as dangerous in secure places in provinces and sub-provinces without leaving any room for them to escape."¹²⁶ In fact deportations had already commenced from Cilicia in early April, in the face of an anticipated British synchronized landing with Greek forces at İskenderun.¹²⁷ Mass deportations were carried out all over the upper Tigris–Euphrates, without regard for actual involvement in revolutionary activity or combat against the Ottoman army. Armenian men, women, and children were rounded up and marched in columns from their towns and villages, sent into exile without provisions for survival. Huge camps formed at Aleppo, the center of the process, at other Syrian cities, and at Deyr al-Zor and several other locations along the Euphrates in the Syrian desert. In these camps there were mass murders, expropriations and pillaging, and forced conversions.¹²⁸

Thousands of the deported victims, moreover, never reached the camps. Many died of hunger, thirst, and exhaustion. Frequently the columns were set upon and plundered by bands of Turks and Kurds, with mass killings. The deportation from Erzurum became an "orgy of murder, rape, mutilation, kidnap, and theft."¹²⁹ At the Kemakh gorge, the gendarmes withdrew to the heights and opened fire on the defenseless people, slaughtering thousands upon thousands. An

eyewitness reported:

A few days later there was a mopping-up operation: since many children were still alive and wandering about beside their dead parents, the chetes were sent to round them up and kill them. They collected thousands of children and brought them to the banks of the Euphrates where, seizing them by the feet, they dashed their heads against the rocks. And while a child was still in its death throes, they would throw it into the river.¹³⁰

In Diyarbekir a new Ottoman governor arrived, Mehmed Reşid, a Circassian whose family had fled the Russian conquest of the Caucasus a year after his birth. He brought a reign of terror that surpassed anything in the whole period. Obsessed with “treason,” he fired all the local security officials, organized a committee of radicals, and began hunting for hidden arms and seditious books. Going after “deserters,” within a couple of weeks he put hundreds of the Christian notables and artisans of Diyarbekir in prison, where he had them tortured and killed. He carried out the 24 April orders from Istanbul with gusto, supervising the mass deportations of the Christian population of the province. Convoys were driven down the Tigris on rafts, on the pretext that they were being taken to Mosul. Made to write letters home to their families at a resting point, they were then slaughtered by Kurdish militiamen and dumped in the river.¹³¹ Thousands more were marched off to work in the Ergani mines, then hurled off the cliffs into the Maden gorge instead.¹³² In September Reşid telegraphed Talat that he had succeeded in deporting one hundred and twenty thousand people from his province.¹³³ Many of the killings were done by Kurdish paramilitary forces, but many also were done by ordinary Ottoman Muslims lured by the possibility of plunder. Incredibly, Reşid came in for criticism because he had not just killed Armenians, he had killed Süryani Christians too, which were not his orders. Inquiries were also made about the sudden disappearance of Hüseyin Nesimi, the mayor of Lice. Nesimi had refused to harm

Armenians, and Reşid had him killed as he had murdered other recalcitrant officials.¹³⁴

In Trabzon tensions, already high with the debate over reforms, turned to recriminations when the Russian navy bombed the city in November 1914. An Armenian notable was accused of signaling the Russian ships. The local gendarmerie searched for Russian spies, as well as arms and possible Armenian deserters, under orders from Governor Cemal Azmi. Deportations of leading Armenians accelerated into a general expulsion and despoliation after a visit to Trabzon by Bahaeddin Şakir. Efforts to improvise an orphanage for Armenian children turned into a dispersal of the children to Turkish families. Many aged and infirm, admitted to a Red Crescent hospital, were poisoned. Bahaeddin Şakir himself controlled the Trabzon detachment of the Special Organization, which took barges of people and drowned them in the Black Sea.¹³⁵

Retreat and Armistice

After the revolutions of 1917 the Russian soldiers in the Caucasus left and started walking home. The Ottomans were able to recover all the territories lost earlier in the war and, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Bolsheviks (March 1918), regained Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. German military leadership strongly urged that the Ottomans reinforce the Bulgarian front in Macedonia and replenish dangerously undermanned forces in Iraq and Palestine. But instead, during the summer of 1918 Enver transferred thousands of Ottoman troops, released from the Balkan front, to the east. The Ottomans briefly captured Baku with its oil in September, but there was little realistic hope of holding this prize and the investment it took left other priorities fatally neglected. The fronts in Palestine and in Macedonia collapsed within days of one another in mid-September. In Palestine, Allenby smashed Ottoman defenses with overwhelmingly superior numbers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's meager Ottoman force retreated hastily to Aleppo.¹³⁶ In Thrace, troops commanded by French General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey broke the Bulgarian defenses, abruptly dismissing Bulgaria from the war and posing a dire threat to Istanbul.

The Young Turk cabinet approached the United States through Spanish channels to ask for peace, then resigned when it received no response. A new cabinet tried again, this time using General Charles Townshend, in custody on the Princes' Islands since his capture at Kut, to convey the request. Negotiations produced the Armistice of Mudros, signed on 30 October 1918. The Entente powers dictated the demobilization and disarmament of the Ottoman armies and demanded control of ports and railways. They claimed liberal rights to intervene in what the document referred to, by standard European convention, as the "Six Armenian Provinces," as well as anywhere else in the empire where they deemed their security threatened.

Although the Ottoman leadership was apprehensive about several of the armistice provisions, their worries at first seemed insignificant

compared to the relief that the war was over. The Ottoman dynasty had survived and the sultan and caliph kept his throne.¹³⁷ But what the Ottoman armies had successfully defended at the cost of thousands of young men's lives, the armistice gave away in a signature. The Ottoman delegation believed it had received assurances that, although the forts of the Straits would be occupied, only British and French troops would participate, and Istanbul itself would not be occupied. Two weeks after the signing of the armistice, however, more than fifty Allied ships entered the Straits, occupied the Dardanelles forts, and anchored in the harbor of Istanbul. Among them were four Greek warships. Ottoman protests availed nothing; on 8 December Istanbul was put under foreign military rule. The intentions of the Entente seemed clear enough merely by their representatives' use of the title "High Commissioner," given to the British governors of Egypt since 1882. In February, General d'Espèrey processed through the gates of Constantinople on a white horse, greeted by a delirious crowd of Ottoman Christians and Jews.¹³⁸ There was rapturous talk of Haghia Sophia becoming a church again.¹³⁹

Partition of the Empire

News of the likely distribution of Ottoman territory amongst the European colonial empires began to leak from the Paris peace conference during the early spring of 1919. Their lengthy deliberations were formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres (signed in August 1920). The terms were shocking. The Ottoman army was to be limited to fifty thousand men, mostly gendarmes, and effectively supervised by Entente commanders. The Ottoman navy was strictly regulated. The capitulations were reimposed, with an Allied commission taking control of collection of the Ottoman debt and significant aspects of the Ottoman economy and finance. The Anatolian Railway, the Baghdad Railway, and the railway in Cilicia that linked Mersin, Tarsus, and Adana, were to be run by a consortium of European investors.

Although the Ottoman cabinet had promised to support the national will of the Arab people as the basis for a post-war political settlement, it was impossible to maintain meaningful links between the sultan and the Arabs under the circumstances. Palestine, Syria, and Iraq were under occupation and at the mercy of the Entente, whose mutually contradictory wartime agreements all had one thing in common, European colonial control from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. In northern Mesopotamia British troops violated the armistice before the ink was dry, driving north to seize Mosul from the outnumbered Ottoman troops in the first few days of November 1918 – a post-facto addendum to the armistice submitted on 15 November obliged the Ottoman army to evacuate Mosul and turn over its artillery. Thus was Mosul, too, severed from Ottoman control. American President Woodrow Wilson's project, for an inter-Allied commission to survey the populations of the region regarding the kind of government they desired, received little enthusiasm. American commissioners were appointed, led by Henry Churchill King (President of Oberlin College) and industrialist Charles R. Crane, with

a staff that included Robert College Professor Alfred Howe Lybyer. The British selected commissioners and a secretary – Arnold J. Toynbee, who had been a delegate at the peace conference – but did not send them out. The French did nothing. Undaunted, King and Crane did their fieldwork in the summer of 1919, returning with the entirely unsurprising result that the Arab population wanted independence. If forced to live under a foreign mandate, they wanted America to have the mandatory authority. King and Crane advocated creation of an American mandate over Armenia, but they did not actually survey popular opinion in the Caucasus. The entire report was suppressed.¹⁴⁰

In the spring of 1920 an Entente treaty signed at San Remo divided the Arab lands into colonial “mandates” under British and French rule, to the frustration of Arab leaders who had joined the British war effort under promises of independence, and who had met in Damascus to form native governments. British troops in Syria withdrew in favor of the French, and the western Syrian cities, with some of the Jezira plain of the upper Euphrates, became the French Mandate of Syria. A small territory on either side of Mount Lebanon was separated out to become the French Mandate of Lebanon, consisting of the coastal plain, the mountain, and the Beka’a Valley and the Anti-Lebanon Range. British troops remained in Palestine, which was divided at the Jordan River and made into two British Mandates. West of the Jordan Britain made good its promise to create a national home for the Jewish people, contained in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. The territory on the East Bank, called “Transjordan,” was exempted from the stipulations of the Balfour Declaration. Finally, Mosul was appended to Baghdad and Basra, together to make the British Mandate of Iraq. Local resistance to all these colonial arrangements, immediate and violent, was for the most part contained and suppressed. Native Arab leaders tried to ally with leaders of the Ottoman resistance that was forming in the inner Anatolian plateau and the Caucasus.¹⁴¹

The Treaty of Sèvres dictated the partition of the remaining Ottoman territory. Eastern Thrace, Izmir, and the Aegean coast were put under a Greek administration. In five years, a plebiscite would decide whether Izmir and the surrounding region would be permanently annexed to the Kingdom of Greece. An independent Armenia was created with an outlet on the Black Sea under an anticipated American Mandate, with precise boundaries to be determined by President Woodrow Wilson. Italy was given the Dodecanese Islands, the Zonguldak coal fields of northwestern Anatolia province, and a “special interest” in the Mediterranean coast around Antalya and the inner plateau, including Konya. France received a similar “special interest” in Cilicia as far as Urfa and Mardin. The only territory left to the rule of the Ottoman sultan was the city of Constantinople and small adjacent lands along the Marmara.

The National Resistance of Ottoman Muslims

Although the treaty still awaited formal signature, in May 1919 Greece, Italy, and France moved to enforce their claims. Italian troops occupied Antalya and Bodrum. The French occupied Adana and the rest of Cilicia, territories contiguous with their Syrian holdings, and began arming Armenians as a kind of local militia. Greek troops landed at Izmir and began a full-scale invasion. The experience of the Arab provinces proved to the Ottoman people that mere public outrage was not enough. The one place where sufficient armed strength remained to resist colonial rule was in the Caucasus and interior Anatolian plateau, east of Ankara. Irregular militia bands formed immediately, and the remnants of the Ottoman army rallied to defend the empire.

The Chaos of the Capital

Superficially, affairs went on as before in the Ottoman capital city, yet nothing was really the same at all. An emotional rift of sorts began to separate the sultan's supine government and its Ottoman Muslim subjects. Enveloped in melancholia, the dynasty believed that survival was best assured by compliance with Entente demands, even as the Entente powers willfully disregarded terms of the just-signed armistice. But living amid the ruins of the world the war had destroyed, the citizenry gradually and in varying measures saw visions of a different kind of outcome.

Admiral Mark Bristol, the fiercely anti-colonial American high commissioner, questioned the effectiveness of the Entente blockade, which punished the city's poor while doing little to disturb the powerful.¹⁴² Bristol's own men were paid in gold, British or Turkish, but there was no silver or copper change in circulation, only small dirty paper bills.¹⁴³ The trams had been out of service since November. There was food in the markets, fresh meat and fish and fruit and vegetables, but it was expensive. Avoiding Ottoman taxes, oil floated ominously offshore,¹⁴⁴ on the occupying powers' storage barges in the Bosphorus, shipped from Romanian Constanza or British-controlled Baku, despite a massive explosion at Haydar Pasha station a year earlier, and despite a ruling of the Entente powers' own judiciary committee against it.¹⁴⁵

Box 7.4: Admiral Mark L. Bristol

The American high commissioner arrived in February 1919, setting up headquarters on the USS *Scorpion*. The ship had lain at anchor in Istanbul with a skeleton staff throughout the war because (if the story later told by the Bridge editor of the *New York Times* can be believed) Lieutenant Commander Herbert Babbitt had beat Talat Pasha at cards.^a Pictured with Bristol is

American travel writer Frank G. Carpenter, who visited in August 1923 with his private secretary, Ambrose Kelly, and sought Bristol's help in getting an audience with Caliph Abdülmecid.



Figure 7.7: Admiral Mark Bristol (left).

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-131129.

^a Truscott and Truscott, *Bridge Book*, 14–17. I owe the reference to an unpublished undergraduate thesis by Spencer Cone.

In Istanbul the once great gathered to commiserate on their losses. There was the ex-Khedive of Egypt Abbas Hilmi, forced off the

throne at the beginning of the war, whose mother had a home on the Bosphorus in Bebek. There was Princess Shevekiar, the first wife of the current Khedive Fuad. The former Shah of Iran was also living in Bebek. He was joined by one of his sons, who fled Iran by way of India and Egypt when Reza Khan forced the Qajar dynasty from the throne.¹⁴⁶ There were two sons of the ex-Emir of Mecca, whose position had been usurped by Sherif Hussein. The defeated Russian anti-Bolshevik generals, first Denikin and then Wrangel, found refuge in Istanbul in 1920, a host of destitute and pathetic Russian nobility in their wake.

But the greater misery was suffered by the common people, who emerged from the rubble of war to make their way to the old capital from all over Western Eurasia. The city was a transit point for refugees from both the Russian civil war and the war between the Bolsheviks and armies of the fledgling South Caucasian Republic, in winter-spring 1918–19. Ottoman troops, still in the field months after the armistice, retreated before the combined Russian and Armenian forces, carrying away livestock, food stores, and agricultural implements with them and leaving thousands of Armenian refugees destitute and starving.¹⁴⁷ Widespread famine occurred throughout the eastern Black Sea region the following summer, as far east as Lake Van. Refugees who had access to sea transit arrived in Istanbul from Costanza, from Trabzon, Samsun, and Batum, and from Odessa and southern Ukraine. Allied relief work concentrated on shipments of flour and foodstuffs to these ports, and in some cases supplies reached towns in the interior by way of British-controlled routes in northern Syria and the upper Euphrates. By early summer Britain controlled Baku with its oil wealth, as well as Tiflis and Batum and the railway connecting them. Admiral Bristol took advantage of the moment to visit the region where now three new Transcaucasian Republics – Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia – had appeared, in his words as “brilliant examples of political anarchy.”¹⁴⁸

As refugees poured into Istanbul disease was everywhere,

especially influenza, smallpox, and typhus, and also venereal diseases, among the Allied soldiers anyway.¹⁴⁹ Anticipating the requirements of the peace conference, the sultan's government ordered a halt to Greek and Armenian deportations from Anatolia and began to collect data on these populations.¹⁵⁰ Besides the Christians, there were more than a million Muslim refugees and displaced persons, expelled from the Balkans and arriving by ship from Costanza, or escaping the Russian civil war by way of the Crimean ports, or fleeing the war in the Caucasus. The Ottoman Department of Tribes and Refugees was given care of the refugees, but the sultan was no longer sole master of his own house. Under the circumstances their orders, whether altruistic or self-interested, were impossible to carry out. There was no money. The Istanbul government had lost access to its revenue sources and struggled to pay its own civil servants.¹⁵¹ Tenuous communication lines between the capital and Anatolia were totally cut by the British reoccupation of March 1920, making it impossible to come by even basic information about conditions behind the Greek and British military lines. In the limited districts of the immediate Marmara region in which the Istanbul government had any say at all, attempts to resettle returning Greek and Armenian refugees met vigorous and sometimes violent resistance. The homes the refugees had left behind were in many cases now occupied by Turkish people, refugees themselves, forced from Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, unwilling to vacate their new homes unless they were given back their old. Some of the returning Christian refugees were provided with arms by their priests, under Allied supervision. Deadly confrontations occurred.¹⁵² Everyone of course knew that dignitaries at the peace conference were considering creating Christian states in the region, and a sweeping propaganda machine prepared the rhetorical ground for these new nations in the foreign press and in local Greek and Armenian publications.

Extraordinarily complex situations blurred all boundaries of personal identity and faith. The war had created thousands of widows

and tens of thousands of orphans. Tensions arose between missionary and relief organizations on the one hand and the Istanbul government, the Entente governments, and the affected populations on the other. Christian women and children were in Muslim institutions and homes; Christian women had married Muslim men; Muslim women and children wound up in Christian institutions and homes. Some wished to remain as they were and some did not. Muslim people resented Christian relief organizations for the favoritism they showed Christian refugees, and perceived close affinities between Christian relief work and the occupying foreign armies.¹⁵³ Admiral Bristol, who spent considerable time trying to persuade American missionaries and relief workers to help needy Muslims as well as needy Christians, estimated that Americans invested about \$70 million in relief in the region in the four years after the armistice.¹⁵⁴

Throughout early 1919 preparation for war crimes trials of Unionists had been going on. The three CUP leaders most often implicated in the Armenian genocide, Talat, Enver, and Cemal, escaped on a German submarine and made their way to the Crimea as soon as the armistice was declared. All three died violent deaths within the next few years. The trials began in April 1919. By late May when sixty-seven prisoners were deported to Malta few noticed because, just days before, news of the Greek occupation of Izmir hit the streets of the capital. Public demonstrations went on for weeks. Parliament opened with great solemnity in January 1920, the sultan's speech promising further reforms. MPs, the majority of whom had strong sentiments for the resistance movement then organizing, did not sit for long. British troops reoccupied the city and dismissed them in March 1920. Many deputies evaded arrest and fled the city to join the resistance which, everyone understood, would decide the fate of the country. Newspapermen like L. E. Brown of the *Chicago Daily News* found activity in the capital largely irrelevant. They tried to get security passes to go to Anatolia.¹⁵⁵

The War of Resistance

Greek troops occupied Izmir on 15 May 1919, receiving the public blessing of the Greek Metropolitan and the support of the victorious Entente powers. The French, Italians, and British returned to business as usual with Greek rule, imposing the capitulations over the protests of the Greek high commissioner, who could now see how ruinous they were for the local economy.¹⁵⁶ Within days, the Greek troops began to advance into western Anatolia. As they did so, Turkish notables fled, Turkish regular troops and gendarmes deserted, and the Greek population pillaged Turkish homes.¹⁵⁷ Some Greeks and Armenians, deported three years earlier, had returned since the autumn armistice, endeavoring to take up their former homes and resume their former lives.¹⁵⁸ The occupation of Izmir and the determined Greek military advance inland brought excitement to Greek communities. Admiral Bristol, in the eastern and southern Black Sea coast a month later, reported that the sight of a Greek torpedo boat cruising offshore was received in Trabzon “with ostentatious rejoicing and entertainments by the Greek populace and especially the Greek Bishops.” Greek refugees were returning from Russia to Trabzon and Samsun. Thousands more at Novorissisk awaited British permission to return.

Not that the palace was completely lacking forces of loyalist support,¹⁵⁹ but the Greek actions evoked a deep revulsion among the Ottoman Muslim population. Thousands joined daily demonstrations in the streets. At one gathering in the Istanbul hippodrome the famed novelist Halide Edib, the first Turkish graduate of the American College for Girls at Üsküdar, addressed the crowd from Sultan Ahmed mosque.¹⁶⁰ Protesters praised President Wilson’s Fourteen Points both for its ideals of self-determination and for the specific phrasing of “secure sovereignty” for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire, Wilson’s twelfth point. Rumors flew of a Greek demonstration to be held at the Bayram after Ramadan, in late June. Greek troops had occupied rail lines in Thrace before withdrawing again to Çatalca, and

there was fear that Istanbul itself might be attacked.

Local “societies for the defense of national rights” sprang up all over, more than two dozen of them. “National” now meant Ottoman Muslims, including both Turks and Kurds, resisting plans to hand over territory behind the armistice lines to Armenians and Greeks.¹⁶¹ The first such organization had formed in Kars right after the armistice. Under Russian rule since 1877, the town had been reconquered by Ottoman armies in 1918 and now was slated to become part of Armenia. Muslims living along the Aegean and Black Sea coasts, where they constituted 80 percent of the population, saw that they were to be handed over to a Greater Greece. Trabzon’s suffering was typical – occupied by the Russians, then captured by the Bolsheviks, and finally reoccupied by the Turks. With relief agency supplies running short, there would be “a great deal more suffering before the new crops are harvested, that is; for the next two months.”¹⁶²

An inter-Allied commission of inquiry visited the Izmir region three months after the Greek invasion, in September 1919, holding morning conferences at 9:30 in a Turkish school. One day the commissioners drove south by automobile up the Meander valley. “The houses north of the Meander bridge were destroyed or burned and there was no signs of life or livestock. As soon as the bridge was crossed, settlements of Turkish refugees living under improvised tents were encountered with large herds of goats, sheep and cattle.” Viewing Aydın from a bluff, they could see that three-fourths of the town was destroyed by fire. “Practically all houses that had not been burned had been pillaged,” whether they were Greek or Turkish. They found three hundred Greek refugees from Aydın being fed by Turks at Nazli, and also interviewed a Turkish refugee, one of thousands whose villages had been burned by Greek troops only two days before.¹⁶³

Several Ottoman generals who had remained in the field after the armistice refused to demobilize or disarm. They had perhaps not disagreed with the dire assessment of the empire’s military position in October 1918 but were incensed at the government’s acceptance of

the armistice terms. Mustafa Kemal, another young brigadier known for his performance in the Gallipoli campaign and his management of the Syrian retreat, was called to the palace and appointed to go to the interior to oversee demobilization and disarmament of the Ottoman army in accordance with the treaty terms. Landing in Samsun on 19 May, he instead contacted the Ottoman commanders and together they shaped the remnants of the Ottoman forces into a unified army of resistance. They collaborated to organize three meetings of leading citizens, at Amasya in June, at Erzurum in July, and at Sivas in September.

These Ottoman armies, quickly known as the “nationalists,” fought back against the Russians and their Armenian proxies, and cut a deal with the Bolsheviks that allowed the Red Army to concentrate on Denikin’s forces in southern Ukraine. The Armenian forces left Anatolia with the retreating Russian army, abandoning their crops in the field. Fullerton Waldo of the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* saw a refugee camp near Batum with about eight thousand Greeks, “living practically in the open and dying of all kinds of diseases and starvation.” At the Georgian border, officials refused passage to ten thousand Armenians until the refugees at Batum were moved, and Waldo estimated that another eight thousand refugees in Armenia awaited transit to Macedonia.¹⁶⁴ In April 1920 Denikin’s forces were defeated and twenty thousand refugees with Denikin himself crossed the Black Sea to land in Istanbul. Six months later, Wrangel’s campaign against the Bolsheviks ended in the Crimea and two hundred thousand Russian refugees on ships lay anchored in Istanbul harbor. Relief agencies from all the Allied countries went into crisis mode, working to shelter and feed the refugees. A kitchen at Sirkeci station run by Helen Moore Bristol, the admiral’s wife, was serving tea, hot cocoa, and bread to four thousand Russian refugees a day in November.¹⁶⁵ Since nothing had been planted in southern Ukraine and the southern Volga region the previous year there was no harvest in 1921. Thousands of people starved to death.

After the nationalists' victory in the east, the French and Italians came to terms and withdrew their troops in the summer of 1920, including between five and six thousand Armenians under French arms.¹⁶⁶ The nationalists now faced a renewed Greek advance. They lost Eskişehir in April 1921 and fell back upon their headquarters at Ankara, but rallied to win in a three-week long battle on the Sakarya River in August 1921, the decisive engagement of the war.

The Return of Said Nursi

Said Nursi, the charismatic preacher from Bitlis, returned to Istanbul among the other lost souls. After the sultan's Balkan tour of 1911 Nursi had gone back to Van with imperial seed money to start work on the eastern university, his pet project. When the Russians invaded in 1915 he enlisted as an Ottoman volunteer. Captured in 1916, he spent the duration of the war as a prisoner. There in the loneliness of a prison camp on the upper Volga a deep inner transformation began. He spent many long nights in a small, borrowed mosque on the banks of the river, where he despaired of life and homeland, listening to "the sad plashing of the Volga and the mirthless patter of the rain and the melancholy sighing of the wind."¹⁶⁷ Istanbul newspapers noticed Nursi's return in June 1918 but he found his public persona unbearable. Like Leyla he had fallen from the caravan, but no one realized it.¹⁶⁸ He remembered Niyazi-i Mısri's words:

Each day a stone from the building of my life falls to the
ground;

Heedless one! You slumber, unaware that the building is in
ruins!¹⁶⁹

Betrayed by a close friend, he felt overwhelming loss and helplessness. He felt his age. Of all his accomplishments none mattered, all seemed unstable and transient.¹⁷⁰ He took a house in Çamlıca, overlooking the Bosphorus on the Asian side, with his nephew as his companion and secretary. He could not stop writing in spite of himself, and even produced a powerful anti-British tract called *The Six Steps*. But he had reached the end of his emotional and spiritual strength. Istanbul was a graveyard city, and he was staring into the very face of death.¹⁷¹ The Şeyhülislam still wanted him to work on the university plan, but all Nursi's academic certainties of a few years before were gone, and he pleaded to be left alone.¹⁷²

He dreamed he was surrounded by a cloud of witnesses. The great figures of Islamic history asked for a report on current affairs.¹⁷³ They were comforting, but the route forward was long and painful. This was no overnight transformation, it needed time to work through the consciousness. In his anguish he saw that human suffering had no solution, least of all political; scholarship and activism too failed. He had spent the first half of his life reaching for truth through reason, but he now counted the whole search futile. Repeatedly he wrote that he “gave it up.”¹⁷⁴ He turned to the spiritual classics. A passage from Gilani mocked him, *You are in the House of Wisdom, so search for a doctor to cure your heart*. He was Said Nursi, he had diagnosed the spiritual sickness of Islam, what need had he of a doctor?¹⁷⁵ But he knew it was true, that of all people it was indeed he who needed the physician. He accepted Sirhindi’s charge as his own, *Unify your qibla* – heart and mind together, soul and intellect, in an integrated life of the spirit. It was a very catholic insight, individual but not only so, the vision simultaneously inward and outward to all humanity. He did not give up the mosque, nor was this traditional Sufism. Those paths offered rules and rituals; that was all well and good but they were designed to create identities and boundaries, things outside the self. They had no effect, gave him neither authentic encounter with the holy nor interior wholeness. He was slowly groping his way towards something else, the articulation of a modern condition in which the central human experience was estrangement,¹⁷⁶ and an individual contemplative practice guided by the simple light (*nur*) of the Qur’an.¹⁷⁷

Nursi’s crisis was personal not political, but he could not miss the strange parallels between his inner death and redemption, and the final crisis of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁸ The popularity of his little tract *Six Steps* aroused the interest of the rival nationalist government and earned him an invitation to Ankara in the fall of 1922. He went, though it brought no enlightenment, only “four or five layers of the darknesses of old age one within the other.” He climbed the ancient

city's citadel. "It seemed," he wrote, "to be formed of petrified historical events." He knew that the changes he had witnessed were permanent:

The old age of the season of the year together with my old age,
the citadel's old age, mankind's old age, the old age of the
glorious Ottoman Empire, and the death of the Caliphate's rule,
and the world's old age all caused me to look in the most grieved,
piteous and melancholy state in that lofty citadel at the valleys of
the past and the mountains of the future.¹⁷⁹

Partings

At the beginning of September 1922 a final nationalist offensive cracked the Greek lines, the suddenness of whose collapse surprised even the Greeks. Retreating towards Izmir and the coast, Greek forces burnt and destroyed everything in their path, driving refugees ahead of them. A. J. Toynbee, who accompanied the Greek forces as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, witnessed the Greek army's "war of extermination."¹⁸⁰ Edith Parsons, Head of the American Girls' School in Bursa, reported that the "Retreating Greek army burned eighty percent of the smaller villages[,] nearly every [farm,] and partially burned almost all larger ones." About thirty thousand Turkish refugees from the area were entirely destitute. In the approaching winter, shelter would not be a problem, Parsons wrote, because of the evacuation of the Christian population, which had been transferred out. With crops and granaries totally destroyed, however, clothing and food were urgently needed.¹⁸¹ George Horton, the American consul in Izmir, warned Istanbul that the military situation was extremely grave and that threats to burn Izmir were "freely heard." Uşak and Kutay Ayntab had already been evacuated and burnt, and Eskişehir was expected to suffer the same fate.¹⁸² H. C. Jaquith, head of the American Near East Relief, wired chaotically from Izmir:

exhausted refugees majority whom women children blocking all roads leading Smyrna stop city terribly crowded refugees who exposed famine lack shelter causing intense suffering misery many deaths attributable starvation typhus outbroken and local hospitals overflowing appalling need doctors nurses medicines foodstuffs stop deplorable conditions worsened by wailing pleading women babies be safeguarded.¹⁸³

Disaster followed. Whether accidental or deliberately set – both

versions have supporters – now started the most terrible and destructive fire the empire had ever experienced. Everyone agreed that it began in the Armenian quarter. Fanned by a southeasterly breeze, the conflagration grew and the ancient city gave itself to the flames. American naval officers said that they felt the heat on shipboard in the bay. Hundreds of thousands of people crowded the quay between the raging fire and the sea, sheltering themselves from the fierce heat and flying sparks under water-soaked carpets and blankets. A few jumped into the water and swam for the ships in the harbor. Some drowned trying to crowd into small boats along the shore.¹⁸⁴ Even after intensive investigations no cause of the fire could ever be identified. Imputations of blame on all sides spread as a kind of surrogate of sadness.

In October an armistice was signed at Mudanya, ending the war. The American consulate reported to Washington in November that 262,587 refugees had left Izmir for the Greek islands and mainland since the fire, besides the twenty thousand or so who had already left before the Turks arrived. Another seventy thousand left Bursa. Pacts of mutual protection between Muslim and Christian neighbors availed little as the Greek residents of coastal towns were driven out by the Turkish army. In addition, “the entire non-Muslim population of Eastern Thrace” was evacuated to western Thrace and Bulgaria, approximately two hundred and eighty thousand people, and the “departure from Constantinople of Greeks and Armenians who [could] pay passage [was] constant,” amounting to another sixty thousand people. Thousands more awaited transport from Trabzon, Samsun, Mersin, and Aleppo. An estimated seventy-five thousand destitute Greek prisoners of war were still in Anatolia.¹⁸⁵ The pain of the forced parting of the Ottoman peoples reached its full modern measure in the Exchange of Populations, agreed to between Greece and Turkey in January 1923 and ratified in the Lausanne treaty that replaced Sèvres later that year. Even the Karamanlis were expelled – though Turks, speaking Turkish, they were Orthodox Christians.

Two weeks after the armistice the nationalist assembly meeting in Ankara abolished the Ottoman sultanate, a decision no less breathtaking for having been entirely predictable since the sultan's government signed the Sèvres treaty two years earlier. The assembly stopped short of abolishing the caliphate, allowing the Ottoman ruler to remain in this office. Mehmed VI Vahideddin, however, left Istanbul on 17 November 1922 unannounced. Admiral Bristol, the American high commissioner, heard the news from his chauffeur, who had heard from the British high commissioner's chauffeur, who that very morning had driven General Harington with the sultan from Dolmabahçe down to the dock. The sultan boarded the British destroyer *Malaya*, which got underway around nine o'clock. His luggage followed in a Ford ambulance.¹⁸⁶

The assembly conferred the caliphate on Abdülmecid II, the senior male member of the Ottoman dynasty, who was installed with great pomp on 24 November. The Ottoman caliph was a potent symbol of home rule, for example to the Palestinian-Syrian delegation at Lausanne, and to Indian Muslims living under British colonialism. Yet the ambiguities of the office were obvious, its purely religious role an anomaly. Abdülmecid lived in Dolmabahçe Palace. Every Friday he processed out to worship at a different mosque in the city, these public selamlıks a weekly reminder of the dynasty's dignity. He wanted to be the sultan, and people still acted as if he were so. Admiral Bristol noticed the extreme deference with which Abdülmecid was treated by Abdülhak Adnan, when he introduced the admiral at an audience.¹⁸⁷ Mustafa Kemal's determination to do away with the caliphate altogether sparked a rancorous debate that divided the national assembly and the nation.

The capital seemed unable to escape the grip of grief and loss. On the morning of 4 March 1924 assembly deputy Hüseyin Rauf visited Admiral Bristol and his wife in the American hospital, where Bristol had been admitted with a carbuncle on his neck. To Helen Bristol, Rauf joked without mirth that Mustafa Kemal was "busy clearing all

the antiquities out of Turkey.” Soon there would be no more. The assembly had voted to abolish the caliphate. Given twenty-four hours to leave the country, early that morning Abdülmecid and his family had bid their farewells.

Forty years later, Abdülmecid’s private secretary told the story of that last day of the Ottoman dynasty.¹⁸⁸ Leaving the palace, the caliph embraced his staff, lifted his hands to pray one last time for his country and its people, and stepped into an automobile. With Abdülmecid were his wives; his only son, Prince Ömer Faruk, with his wife and their two small children; and Abdülmecid’s amazingly named daughter Dürrüşehvar, *Royal Pearl*, 10 years old. As they reached the city walls a gray dawn spread across the sky. Outside the city the car drove with great difficulty over the poor roads, gendarmes setting stones under the tires to prevent being bogged down in the mud. At length they reached Çatalca railway station in the early afternoon. The station official there happened to be Jewish. He leapt to action, exclaiming tearfully, “When our ancestors were expelled from Spain and sought a country in which to settle, the Ottoman family saved us from extermination. Under the shade of its sovereignty our lives, honor, and property were preserved and we enjoyed freedom of religion and language. To serve them insofar as we are able in this dark day is to repay a debt of conscience.”¹⁹⁰



Figure 7.8: From sovereignty to celebrity: Princess Dürrüşehvar, by Sébah and Joaillier. Like many members of her extended family, Abdülmecid's daughter Dürrüşehvar married into an Indian princely dynasty (in 1931) and became a sensation. She died in London in 2006, aged over ninety, the last of the children of a ruling Ottoman dynast.¹⁸⁹

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-04929.

The next day's papers were filled with the story and with the

arrangements for the departure of the entire Ottoman family. Admiral Bristol sent his aide, Lieutenant Wheeler, to Sirkeci station to say goodbye to Prince Vasıb, a personal friend. At the station Wheeler found “a most pitiful sight ... all the Princes and Princesses leaving on the train,” and their people gathered for the parting. The station, Wheeler said, “was packed with people but there was not a sound amongst them.”¹⁹¹

Yet there was indeed a sweetness that lingered on the palate of regret and longing.¹⁹² A thousand miles to the east a contemplative Said Nursi climbed the fortress of Van alone and looked down from the summit. He gazed at the burnt-out town below, at the medrese where he had taught, now razed to the ground, and at the homes of Christian friends he had known, all gone. Most had died during the migrations, or entered “a wretched exile.” All the Muslim houses of Van had been leveled too. His Islamic university was closed by act of the assembly. Had he a thousand eyes, he wrote, “They would have all wept together.” The Ottoman Empire was dead, the Van citadel a gravestone over its entombed remains. The world was collapsing upon him. In his grief the words of the Qur’an came to mind, *It is He Who gives life and death; and He has power over all things*. Opening his eyes, it was as if the tops of the fruit trees were smiling at him. “Note us as well,” they were saying, “Do not only look at the ruins.”¹⁹³

Notes

- 1 Quoted in Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 22.
- 2 Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery,’” 337–38 and passim.
- 3 Brookes, trans., *The Concubine, the Princess, and the Teacher*, 136–40, 154–55.
- 4 Brookes, trans., *The Concubine, the Princess, and the Teacher*, 57–90.
- 5 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, 30–33.
- 6 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, 117, table I.6.
- 7 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, 26–30.
- 8 Zürcher, “Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice,” in Zürcher, ed., *Arming the State*, 79–94.
- 9 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, 34, 151.
- 10 Karpát, *Ottoman Population*, 162–69.
- 11 Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*.
- 12 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 86, figure 3.5.
- 13 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 104.
- 14 Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*.
- 15 Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 128.
- 16 Blaisdell, *European Financial Control*, 124–53.
- 17 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 103–26.

- 18 Quataert, "Commercialization of Agriculture in Ottoman Turkey," 40–41.
- 19 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 17–19.
- 20 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 130–33.
- 21 Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, 18–25.
- 22 Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, 16–17.
- 23 Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, 25–40.
- 24 Birdal, *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*, 136–65.
- 25 Quataert, in Faroqhi et al., eds., *Economic and Social History*, vol. 2, 856–61.
- 26 Gerber, *Social Origins*, 84–95.
- 27 Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants, and Cotton*, 65–73.
- 28 Çomu, *Exchange of Populations and Adana 1830–1927*, 40, Table II.
- 29 *The Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway* (Bristol Pamphlets, 1884), 3.
- 30 Çomu, *Exchange of Populations and Adana 1830–1927*, 36–69.
- 31 Deringil, "‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’."
- 32 Cioeta, "Islamic Benevolent Societies."
- 33 Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 139–45.
- 34 Bein, "Politics, Military Conscription."
- 35 Evered, *Empire and Education*, 2.
- 36 Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 99–120.
- 37 Akgün, "Turkish Image."

- 38 Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 104–7, 125–32.
- 39 Richter, *History of Protestant Missions*, 420–21.
- 40 Karpas, “Reinterpreting Ottoman History”; Strauss, “Who Read What?” 52–53.
- 41 Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 104–7.
- 42 Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews*.
- 43 Eldem, “An Ottoman Archaeologist Caught between Two Worlds: Osman Hamdi Bey (1842–1910),” in Shankland, ed., *Archaeology, Anthropology, and Heritage*, vol. 1, 121–49.
- 44 Eldem, “An Ottoman Archaeologist.”
- 45 Eldem, “An Ottoman Archaeologist,” 135–37.
- 46 Woodward, “Between Orientalist Clichés,” 164–65.
- 47 Çelik, “Defining Empire’s Patrimony,” in Bahrani, Çelik, and Eldem, eds., *Scramble for the Past*, 466–69.
- 48 Yosmaoğlu, “Chasing the Printed Word,” 20–27.
- 49 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 64.
- 50 Khuri-Makdisi, *Eastern Mediterranean*.
- 51 Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition*.
- 52 Melson, *Revolution and Genocide*, 46–49, 52.
- 53 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 65.
- 54 Bloxham, *Great Game*, 51–57.
- 55 Melson, *Revolution and Genocide*, 59–64.
- 56 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, 206–7.
- 57 Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 180–99.

- 58 Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, 474.
- 59 Hanioğlu, *Preparations for a Revolution*, 71.
- 60 Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, 398–99.
- 61 Karpas, *Ottoman Population*, 166.
- 62 Khuri-Makdisi, *Eastern Mediterranean*, 154–56.
- 63 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “İttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin Oluşumunda Selânik’in Toplumsal Yapısının Belirleyiciliği,” in Okyar and İnalçık, eds., *Türkiye’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi*, 351–382, 361–62.
- 64 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 32.
- 65 Quataert, “Economic Climate of the Young Turk Revolution.”
- 66 Hanioğlu, *Preparations for a Revolution*, 268.
- 67 Hanioğlu, *Preparations for a Revolution*, 261–71.
- 68 Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, 464.
- 69 Fay, *Origins*, vol. 1, 373–74.
- 70 Fay, *Origins*, vol. 2, 80–84.
- 71 Hanioğlu, *Preparations for a Revolution*, 269.
- 72 Details from Karakışla, “1908 Strike Wave.”
- 73 Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 15, 132–47.
- 74 Küçük, *Role of the Bektashis*.
- 75 Hanioğlu, *Preparations for a Revolution*, 261.
- 76 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 74–81.
- 77 *New York Times*, 28 April 1909.
- 78 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 83–93.

79 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 93–94.

80 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 314–25.

81 Kara, *Metinlerle*, 315–16.

82 Details are from Zürcher, “Kosovo Revisited.”

83 Zürcher, “The Young Turks.”

84 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, 301–4.

85 Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*.

86 Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 101–4.

87 Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 94–99.

88 Quoted in Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 99.

89 Blumi, “Thwarting the Ottoman Empire,” 267–73.

90 American consular reports to Washington transcribed official reports released in the Ottoman press. Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910–1929, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC, DS 867.48/0–150. My thanks to Josh Speyers for this research in his unpublished undergraduate thesis.

91 Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*.

92 Pallis, “Racial Migrations,” 317.

93 Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 35–36.

94 *The Other Balkan Wars*.

95 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 109–35.

96 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 111–15.

97 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 126.

- 98 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 148.
- 99 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 149, 154–55.
- 100 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 165.
- 101 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 155.
- 102 *The Other Balkan Wars*, Appendix C, 310–11.
- 103 *The Other Balkan Wars*, Appendix C, 307–14.
- 104 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 137–47.
- 105 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 127, 134; emphasis in original.
- 106 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 130.
- 107 *The Other Balkan Wars*, 128–30 and appendix C, 348–49.
- 108 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 141–52.
- 109 Lewy, *Armenian Massacres*, 37–39.
- 110 Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*, 38–41.
- 111 Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime*.
- 112 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 9–12.
- 113 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 25–37.
- 114 Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*, 167–87.
- 115 Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*, 43–46.
- 116 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 103.
- 117 Bloxham, *Great Game*, 72–75.
- 118 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 52–62.
- 119 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 60–61.

- 120 Quoting Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 66.
- 121 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 59 n. 30.
- 122 Quoting Bloxham, *Great Game*, 78.
- 123 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 228.
- 124 Bloxham, *Great Game*, 76–78.
- 125 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 251–59.
- 126 Published by Sarinay, “What Happened on April 24, 1915?”
- 127 Bloxham, *Great Game*, 80–83.
- 128 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 625–79.
- 129 Quoting Bloxham, *Great Game*, 86.
- 130 Quoted in Bloxham, *Great Game*, 87.
- 131 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 72–73.
- 132 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 78.
- 133 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 85.
- 134 Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 79–80.
- 135 Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 467–93.
- 136 Based on Dyer, “Turkish Armistice of 1918,” and Shuttleworth, “Turkey, from the Armistice to Peace.”
- 137 Zürcher, “Ottoman Empire and the Armistice of Moudros,” 266–75.
- 138 İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, vol. 4, 1717–18.
- 139 Goldstein, “Holy Wisdom.”
- 140 Howard, “An American Experiment in Peace-Making.”

- 141** Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, note 193.
- 142** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” Con. 325–19, Bristol to Department of State, 12 February 1919.
- 143** LOC, Mark Bristol Papers, “War Diaries,” Box 1, “Weekly Report,” 2 February 1919, p. 3.
- 144** LOC, Mark Bristol Papers, Container 3, “War Diaries,” 21 February 1922, pp. 1–5.
- 145** Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*, 183.
- 146** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 3, “War Diaries,” 25 August 1921, pp. 4–5.
- 147** “Outline of Items of Interest Bearing Upon Local Conditions” (Con. 2392–19), LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” Report of 13 April 1919.
- 148** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” Con. 4052–19, parts III–IV, p. 1.
- 149** See the report of the medical officer, LOC Bristol Papers, “War Diaries,” Box 1, 11 February 1919.
- 150** Shaw, “Resettlement of Refugees.”
- 151** Shaw, “Resettlement of Refugees,” 63, note 25. See also LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 2, 14 January 1921, part three, p. 3.
- 152** Shaw, “Resettlement of Refugees,” 74–75.
- 153** Shaw, “Resettlement of Refugees,” 65–74.
- 154** See, for example, Bristol’s notes of a meeting at Robert College during his first week in Istanbul, LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” 7 February 1919. For the figure \$70 million, see LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 4, “War Diaries,” 12 September 1922.
- 155** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” 9 April 1920.

156 Horton to Stanav, Received Dispatch, MISC 1699, 31 May 1920. LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 72, folder “Ottoman Empire, Commercial, January–December 1920.”

157 See the report of the “Interallied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and District,” 14 pp., LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 77, subject file “Smyrna Inquiry 1919.” This is a typescript English translation of *Rapport de la Commission Interalliée d’enquête sur l’occupation Grecque de Smyrne et des territoires adjacents*, n.d., also included in the file.

158 Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*, 52–54.

159 Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*, 81–135.

160 Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, 20–26.

161 Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*, 213–35.

162 LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” Con. 4052–19, parts III–IV, p. 2.

163 LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 1, “War Diaries,” 7–12 September 1919.

164 LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 2, “War Diaries,” 4 October 1920, pp. 1–2.

165 “Draft of Sketch of Mrs. Bristol’s Relief Work in Constantinople (November 1920–August 1923),” LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 74, folder “Helen Bristol Russian Refugees.” I owe the reference to the unpublished undergraduate senior thesis of Melanie Janssens.

166 LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 2, “War Diaries,” 13 June 1920.

167 Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 286–337.

168 Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 289.

169 Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 288.

170 Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 294, 305, 310.

- 171** Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 298, 302.
- 172** Vahide published the letters, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 136–41.
- 173** Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 157.
- 174** Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, pp. 164, 167.
- 175** Quoted in Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 165.
- 176** Haddad, “Ghurbah as Paradigm,” in Abu-Rabi‘, ed., *Islam at the Crossroads*, 237–53.
- 177** Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 157–67.
- 178** Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 108.
- 179** Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 293.
- 180** Toynbee, *Western Question*.
- 181** Bristol to Secretary of State, 28 September 1922, SECSTATE 223, LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 74, folder “Smyrna, High Commission, Messages Sent, 1922.”
- 182** Horton to Stanav, Constantinople, 2 Sept 1922, MISC 5475, LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 74, folder “Smyrna, General Situation, 1919, 1922.”
- 183** SD 12 September 1922, MISC 5446, Stanav to Near East New York.
- 184** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 4, “War Diaries,” 17 September 1922, part three; see also Bristol to Secretary of State, 22 September 1922, SECSTATE 207, LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 74, file “Smyrna, General Situation, 1919, 1922.”
- 185** Dolbeare to Secretary of State, 29 November 1922, SECSTATE 361, LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 74, file “Smyrna, General Situation, 1919, 1922.”
- 186** LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 4, “War Diaries,” 17 November

1922, p. 1.

187 LOC Mark Bristol Papers, Box 4, “War Diaries,” 3 January 1923.

188 Bardakçı, *Son Osmanlılar*, 11–17, from the 1964 book by Salih Keramet Nigâr (see n. 1, p. 14).

189 Bardakçı, *Son Osmanlılar*, 111–13.

190 Bardakçı, *Son Osmanlılar*, 14, quoting Nigâr.

191 LOC, Mark Bristol Papers, Container 6, “War Diaries,” 4–6 March 1924.

192 Davenport, “Symbol of the Archaic,” 20.

193 Vahide, trans., *Flashes Collection*, 314–17.

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